G L O B A L G O V E R N A N C E L A B

Care for Assets, Resources, and Obligations (CARO)

PlayerOne

A Governance Simulation Platform for Structural Fairness Research and Civic Leadership Training

Production Bible · Volume I: Foundation, Fairness Index & Platform Architecture

Global Governance Lab · CARO · 2026

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A B S T R A C T

Governance systems — the institutional architectures through which societies allocate authority, resolve disputes, and make binding collective decisions — are among the most consequential engineered structures in human civilization. Yet they are routinely deployed at full scale without the systematic testing infrastructure that every other high-stakes engineering domain treats as non-negotiable. Bridges are load-tested before they carry traffic. Aircraft are simulated before they carry passengers. Pharmaceuticals undergo staged clinical trials before they reach populations. Governance constitutions are debated, drafted, and enacted — but not tested. The structural failure modes of governance design are discovered not in controlled research environments but through the catastrophic experiences of governed populations: elections captured by incumbents, legislatures subordinated to party machines, courts stripped of independence, and accountability mechanisms neutralized by the very actors they were designed to constrain.

PlayerOne is CARO's methodological response to this gap. Developed by the Global Governance Lab under the theoretical framework of Equitism — the political philosophy holding that people have a right not merely to vote but to governance systems architecturally designed to preserve equal justificatory standing — PlayerOne is a governance simulation platform designed to serve two distinct but architecturally integrated functions. At its first level, PlayerOne is a civic leadership training environment: a structured simulation in which participants take on governance roles, navigate scenarios modeled on real political crises across Bangladesh and the global democratic landscape, make decisions under structural constraint, and develop the governance reasoning capacity that civic leadership demands. At its second level, PlayerOne is a governance research engine: a behavioral data platform through which the structural fairness properties of governance architectures can be tested under realistic decision-making conditions, and through which the empirical behavioral baseline required for agent-based governance modeling can be systematically constructed.

This Production Bible constitutes the complete institutional specification of the PlayerOne platform. It documents the platform's theoretical foundations, its 100-role architecture spanning Bangladesh and global governance contexts, its integrated Fairness Index measurement system, the full script library of 50 governance simulation scenarios drawn from documented political crises across the 2015 to 2026 period, the fairness analysis and reflection architecture that converts each simulation

session into a research data point, and the technical platform specifications governing registration, authentication, scenario delivery, data collection, and research export. It is designed to serve simultaneously as a scholarly publication of the Global Governance Lab, as a development specification for platform engineers, and as a content production manual for scenario authors.

The platform's central innovation is its integration of the CARO Fairness Index — the world's first empirical measurement system for structural governance fairness — directly into the simulation experience. Every participant completes the Fairness Index baseline survey as a mandatory first step, establishing their pre-simulation governance fairness perception profile. Every simulation session generates Fairness Alignment Scores mapped to the Index's domain structure. Every reflection module collects post-decision responses to domain-matched Fairness Index questions. The result is a research architecture in which the simulation platform and the measurement system are not parallel instruments but a single integrated behavioral research environment — one in which the causal relationship between governance experience and fairness perception can be studied empirically for the first time.

The 50 scenarios documented in this volume are grounded in real political history. They draw on documented governance failures and structural design problems from Bangladesh's electoral and constitutional record — the 2014 uncontested elections, the Article 70 party discipline mechanism, the 2018 electoral commission controversies, the 2024 student uprising and quota protest crackdown, the post-Hasina transitional governance crisis — as well as from the broader global landscape of democratic erosion: judicial capture, press suppression, resource allocation corruption, minority rights violations, international institutional paralysis, and crisis governance failures. Every scenario is designed not to entertain but to make structural unfairness felt as a lived governance experience — because the pedagogical foundation of PlayerOne is the insight that governance capability is developed through practice under realistic constraint, not through passive exposure to constitutional theory.

PlayerOne is named for the recognition that governance is not a spectator activity. Every person is a player in the governance systems that shape their life. The question is whether they play with the structural fairness instincts, the governance reasoning capacity, and the accountability orientation that structurally fair governance requires — or whether they govern by the unreflective reproduction of the structural failure modes they have inherited. PlayerOne exists to change that ratio. This document is the specification of how.

Keywords: *governance simulation, structural fairness, Equitism, Fairness Index, civic leadership training, behavioral governance research, PlayerOne, CARO, Global Governance Lab, Bangladesh governance, democratic erosion, agent-based modeling, governance design testing*

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Introduction: The Governance Testing Gap

> *Every major infrastructure system is tested before it is deployed at scale. Governance systems are not. PlayerOne is the beginning of a discipline that corrects this.*

I. The Problem

There is a discipline of structural engineering. There is a discipline of aeronautical engineering. There is a discipline of pharmaceutical development. Each of these disciplines has, at its core, a commitment to systematic testing infrastructure: the recognition that complex systems designed to serve human populations must be rigorously evaluated for failure modes before those failure modes are discovered by the populations who depend on them.

There is no equivalent discipline of governance engineering. Constitutions are drafted by committees. Electoral systems are designed through political negotiation. Parliamentary procedures are inherited from historical precedent. Judicial independence mechanisms are borrowed from neighboring jurisdictions. Anti-corruption architectures are assembled from international best practice recommendations. These governance structures are then implemented at national scale — without load testing, without failure mode analysis, without controlled behavioral trials, and without any systematic method for identifying the conditions under which their structural fairness properties break down.

The consequences are measured in generations. A constitutional design that subordinates legislators to party discipline — such as Bangladesh's Article 70, which strips an MP of their seat if they vote against their party — produces justificatory subordination across an entire legislature. The MPs are not individually corrupt. The design is structurally defective. But the design was never tested. The failure mode was not identified in simulation. It was discovered through three decades of governance experience in which Bangladesh's parliament functioned not as a deliberative body but as a ratification machine for party leadership decisions. The cost of that untested design has been borne not by constitutional scholars but by 170 million people.

This is the governance testing gap that PlayerOne exists to address. It is not a gap born of negligence. Governance systems have not been tested for the same reason that governance

design has not been treated as an engineering discipline: until recently, the methodological tools required for governance simulation did not exist at sufficient sophistication, and the theoretical frameworks required to specify what structural fairness means in measurable terms had not been developed. Both of those conditions have now changed. The CARO Fairness Index provides the measurement vocabulary. PlayerOne provides the testing environment. The Global Governance Lab provides the research infrastructure. The synthesis of these three elements is what makes systematic governance design testing — for the first time — possible.

II. The Theoretical Foundation: Equitism

PlayerOne is not a neutral simulation tool. It is grounded in a specific theoretical framework — Equitism — and its scenario architecture, fairness analysis methodology, and research design are all structured around that framework's core claims. Understanding the platform requires understanding the theory.

Equitism holds that democratic legitimacy requires more than electoral procedure. The conventional understanding of democratic rights — that citizens have a right to vote, to free expression, to assembly, and to equal protection under law — is necessary but insufficient. These procedural rights can be formally satisfied while governance systems are structurally designed to produce outcomes that systematically advantage particular actors, exclude particular communities from effective political standing, or concentrate accountability-free authority in ways that no formal right can constrain. A system in which votes are cast freely but electoral commissions are structurally captured by incumbents satisfies the formal right to vote while violating the substantive right to governance that actually responds to voter preferences.

Equitism's foundational claim is that citizens have a Meta-Right to Structural Fairness: the right to governance systems architecturally designed to preserve equal justificatory standing across political cycles, regardless of which actors hold power at any given moment. This Meta-Right is not a right to particular outcomes — it does not guarantee that any citizen's preferred policy will be enacted. It is a right to a governance architecture in which the structural conditions for fair political competition, accountable exercise of authority, and equal standing before institutional processes are maintained by design rather than dependent on the goodwill of current power-holders.

The Unified Fair Democratic System (UFDS) is Equitism's constitutional blueprint — a seven-component governance architecture designed to address the documented structural failure modes of democratic systems simultaneously. FairVote is the decision mechanism through which authority

is weighted by accountability relationship to the decision domain. Fairocracy is the institutional model in which democracy operates with structural fairness built into its operating mechanisms. The Universal Governance Framework extends these principles to international institutions.

PlayerOne's simulation scenarios are structured around these frameworks. Every scenario is designed around one or more of Equitism's identified structural failure modes: justificatory subordination (when decision-makers are structurally prevented from acting on their accountability relationships), authority-accountability misalignment (when those who hold power are not accountable to those who bear its consequences), structural capture (when accountability mechanisms are controlled by the actors they are designed to constrain), epistemic dependence (when decision-makers are structurally prevented from accessing the information their role requires), and structural exclusion (when communities affected by governance decisions are systematically prevented from participating in making them). Participants in PlayerOne scenarios do not observe these failure modes from outside. They inhabit them. They make decisions within them. And through that inhabitation, they develop the visceral understanding of structural unfairness that no amount of theoretical reading can replicate.

III. The Fairness Index Integration

The CARO Fairness Index is the world's first empirical measurement system for structural governance fairness. It consists of 25 questions across five governance domains — Governance and Leadership, Justice and Rule of Law, Economy and Resources, Public Services and Welfare, and Accountability and Institutions — each answered on a five-point scale from Completely Unfair to Completely Fair. The responses generate Question Fairness Scores, Domain Fairness Scores, an Overall Fairness Index, and — when mapped to specific governance decisions — Policy Alignment Scores and Actor Fairness Scores.

Within PlayerOne, the Fairness Index is not an external measurement tool applied to the platform. It is structurally integrated into the participant experience at three points. First, every participant completes the full 25-question Fairness Index survey as a mandatory step before accessing any simulation scenario. This baseline establishes each participant's pre-simulation governance fairness perception profile — the starting point against which post-simulation measurement will be compared. Second, every simulation session generates a Fairness Alignment Score for each participant, mapping their in-scenario decisions to the Fairness Index's domain structure and calculating the degree to which their governance choices aligned with or diverged from the structural fairness standards the Index captures. Third, every scenario concludes with a reflection

module that includes three to five domain-matched Fairness Index questions — questions from the same governance domain as the scenario just played — adding real-time data points to each participant's evolving fairness perception profile.

The research value of this integration is significant. The central question that PlayerOne's behavioral data can begin to answer is: does experiential encounter with structural governance failure modes — through simulation — change how participants perceive governance fairness? Does playing the Article 70 scenario as a parliamentarian who must choose between constituency accountability and party survival shift a participant's response to Fairness Index Question 1 — 'Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election?' — in measurable ways? The pre-simulation baseline and the post-scenario reflection data provide the before-and-after measurement required to begin answering that question empirically. The answer, over thousands of participants and hundreds of scenario-sessions, will constitute the first systematic evidence base on the causal relationship between governance experience and governance fairness perception.

IV. The Platform Architecture: An Overview

PlayerOne operates through three integrated environments. The participant-facing simulation environment — accessible at playerone.caronnonprofit.org — is where civic leaders, students, governance practitioners, and researchers engage with the platform's scenario library, build their governance profiles, accumulate Fairness Alignment Scores across roles and domains, and contribute to the research data pipeline. The administrative backend — accessible to CARO staff — provides session management, participant roster oversight, scenario configuration, and real-time monitoring of platform engagement. The research data environment — accessible to the Global Governance Lab — provides clean, anonymized, structured data exports for academic analysis, Fairness Index calibration, and Level Two agent-based modeling preparation.

The platform's 100-role architecture spans two tracks. The Bangladesh Track comprises 60 roles drawn from Bangladesh's national government, electoral and constitutional institutions, judiciary, local government, civil society and media, and security and administrative apparatus. The Global Track comprises 40 roles drawn from international institutions, major power governments, regional organizations, and global civil society. Every role is fully specified — with a role briefing that describes the holder's authority, constraints, accountability relationships, and structural position — and is mapped to the scenarios for which that role is active.

Authentication is built on verified identity: Google Sign-In provides the primary account layer, with mobile number OTP verification adding a second verification step. Every participant account is unique, verified, and persistent. The Fairness Index baseline is completed once and may be updated voluntarily. Simulation session data is accumulated across the participant's engagement history, building a longitudinal governance profile that tracks how their decision patterns and fairness perceptions evolve across multiple scenarios and roles.

V. The Scenario Library: Grounding in Political History

The 50 scenarios in the PlayerOne library are not invented exercises. They are structured simulations grounded in documented political events, institutional failures, and governance crises drawn from Bangladesh's political record across 2015 to 2026 and from the broader global landscape of democratic erosion and governance failure across the same period.

From Bangladesh, the scenario library draws on: the 2014 parliamentary elections in which 153 seats went uncontested, the Article 70 constitutional mechanism that has subordinated Bangladesh's legislature to party discipline since 1972, the 2018 election controversies including pre-filled ballot allegations, the Digital Security Act's systematic use to suppress press freedom and political dissent, the Rohingya refugee crisis and Bangladesh's structural position in an international protection system it did not design, the 2024 student quota protest movement and the security response that ultimately produced the fall of the Hasina government, the subsequent transitional governance crisis under the Yunus interim administration, and the constitutional reform debates of 2025 and 2026.

From the global landscape, the scenario library draws on: UN Security Council veto paralysis in the face of documented atrocities, IMF conditionality conflicts with democratic governance, international election observation dilemmas between reporting accuracy and access preservation, judicial independence crises across multiple jurisdictions, climate displacement governance failures, and the structural tensions between national sovereignty and international institutional accountability that define the contemporary global governance crisis.

Each scenario is built around a specific structural failure mode drawn from the Equitism framework. Each presents participants with decision points that make the structural constraint felt rather than merely described. Each generates a consequence reveal that connects the participant's choices to historically grounded or logically derived outcomes. Each concludes with a fairness analysis that names the structural failure mode, maps it to the Equitism framework, and calculates the

participant's Fairness Alignment Score for that session. And each includes a reflection module that converts the experiential learning into systematic data.

VI. Structure of This Document

This Production Bible is organized in six parts across eighteen chapters. Part I — Foundation — comprises the present introduction and two additional chapters covering the platform's research design and its data architecture. Part II — Fairness Index — is a single chapter providing the complete specification of all 25 Fairness Index questions, their domain mapping, scoring methodology, and integration into the PlayerOne participant experience. Part III — Role Library — comprises two chapters, one for the Bangladesh Track's 60 roles and one for the Global Track's 40 roles, each providing full role briefings, authority specifications, constraint descriptions, and scenario eligibility maps. Part IV — Scenario Scripts — comprises nine chapters organized by governance domain, each containing the fully scripted scenario content for the scenarios in that domain: context narrative, pressure signals, decision points with full option texts, consequence reveals, fairness analysis, and reflection modules. Part V — Fairness Engine — comprises two chapters specifying the mathematical and interpretive architecture through which simulation decisions are converted into Fairness Alignment Scores. Part VI — Platform Specifications — is a single chapter providing the technical architecture of the platform: database schema, authentication flow, user experience design, administrative backend, research data export protocols, and backup systems.

This document is designed to be read sequentially for institutional understanding and referenced non-sequentially for production purposes. Scenario authors working on Part IV will need frequent reference to Part II (Fairness Index domain specifications) and Part III (role briefings). Platform engineers working on Part VI will need reference to Part II (scoring formulas) and the data collection requirements specified throughout Parts III and IV. Researchers using the platform's output will find the theoretical grounding in Part I and the analytical architecture in Part V most relevant.

> *Governance is the infrastructure of everything else. It determines who gets water, who gets justice, who gets heard, and who gets ignored. PlayerOne exists because infrastructure this consequential deserves the same testing rigor we apply to every other system on which lives depend.*

VII. A Note on Historical Grounding and Institutional Positioning

The scenarios in this platform draw on real political events. They name real constitutional mechanisms — Bangladesh's Article 70, the Digital Security Act, the caretaker government system. They reference real institutional crises — the 2014 and 2018 elections, the 2024 student uprising, the UN Security Council's veto paralysis on documented atrocities. This historical grounding is deliberate and methodologically essential. The pedagogical power of governance simulation depends on participants encountering governance failure modes that feel real — because they are real, because they have happened, because the structural conditions that produced them persist.

The scenarios do not, however, adjudicate blame. They do not assign moral culpability to named individuals. They do not take political positions on contested historical interpretations. They present structural situations — the institutional architecture, the competing pressures, the decision constraints — and they ask participants to make decisions within those structures. The fairness analysis that follows each scenario names the structural failure mode and maps it to the Equitism framework. It does not tell participants that any particular historical actor made the wrong choice. It asks participants to experience what it feels like to be inside a governance structure that makes certain choices structurally difficult and others structurally easy — and to reflect on what that structural architecture reveals about governance design.

PlayerOne is a publication of the Global Governance Lab, the research division of CARO. It is grounded in the theoretical framework developed in Fairness as Foundation (2026) and in the empirical measurement architecture of the CARO Fairness Index Version One (2026). It engages the intellectual traditions of agent-based modeling in social science, experimental political science, and governance simulation methodology. It is offered not as the final word on governance testing methodology but as the beginning of a discipline — the first systematic attempt to build the testing infrastructure that governance design has always required and never had.

The 300 civic leaders trained in Dhaka and Chattogram in the first PlayerOne pilot demonstrated that governance simulation works: that participants develop governance reasoning capacity through experiential encounter with structural failure modes in ways that passive education cannot replicate. This Production Bible is the specification for scaling that demonstration — from 300 participants to thirty thousand, and eventually to a generation of governance leaders who understand structural fairness not as a constitutional abstraction but as a lived governance reality.

— End of Abstract and Introduction —

Next: Chapter 2 — Research Design and Data Architecture

CHAPTER 2

Research Design and Data Architecture

PlayerOne is simultaneously a civic education platform and a behavioral research instrument. These two functions are not in tension — they are architecturally integrated. Every participant who engages with the platform as a learner simultaneously contributes to the platform's research mission as a data source. Every simulation session that develops governance reasoning capacity in a civic leader also generates a structured behavioral data point for the Global Governance Lab's research pipeline. The design challenge of this chapter is to specify, precisely, how these two functions coexist within a single data architecture — what data is collected, how it is structured, what research questions it is designed to answer, and how it feeds the longer-term development of PlayerOne Level Two and the CARO Fairness Index.

> *PlayerOne does not study governance from the outside. It creates a controlled environment in which governance decisions are made, recorded, analyzed, and reflected upon — generating empirical evidence that normative theory alone cannot produce.*

I. The Research Mission

The Global Governance Lab's research mission within PlayerOne is organized around four primary research questions, each operating at a different level of analytical ambition and each generating a different category of data output.

The first research question is foundational and addresses the platform's training function: Does experiential encounter with structural governance failure modes — through simulation — measurably change participants' governance fairness perceptions? This question is answered through the comparison of pre-simulation Fairness Index baseline scores with post-scenario reflection responses and, where participants engage with multiple scenarios over time, through the longitudinal tracking of their Fairness Alignment Scores across their platform history. The hypothesis, derived from the pedagogical theory underlying PlayerOne Level One, is that participants who inhabit structural failure modes in simulation — who experience from the inside what justificatory subordination, authority-accountability misalignment, and structural capture feel

like as decision constraints — will demonstrate measurable shifts in their governance fairness perceptions relative to their pre-simulation baselines.

The second research question addresses the relationship between governance role and fairness perception: Does the governance role a participant plays in a simulation scenario predict the pattern of their decision-making and the direction of their fairness perception shifts? This question is answered through cross-role comparison of decision patterns and Fairness Alignment Scores within the same scenario — comparing, for instance, how participants playing the role of a ruling party MP respond to the Article 70 scenario relative to participants playing the role of an opposition MP or an independent observer. The hypothesis is that role-specific structural constraints produce systematic decision patterns that vary predictably by role — and that these patterns reveal how governance architecture shapes decision-making beyond individual preference or values.

The third research question addresses demographic and background variation: Do governance fairness perceptions vary systematically by age, gender, geographic division, educational background, civic engagement history, and CARO program participation? This question is answered through subgroup analysis of Fairness Index scores and Fairness Alignment Scores across the demographic categories collected at registration. The hypothesis is that significant subgroup variation will be found — and that this variation will map onto the structural conditions of participants' governance environments in ways that validate the Equitism theory's claim that structural unfairness is experienced unequally across social position.

The fourth research question is the most ambitious and addresses the platform's Level Two research function: What behavioral assumptions about governance decision-making under structural constraint are most empirically grounded, and how do these assumptions affect the structural fairness outcomes produced by different governance architectures in agent-based simulation? This question cannot be fully answered by Level One data alone — it requires the agent-based modeling environment that Level Two will provide. But Level One data provides the behavioral baselines that Level Two models require: the empirical distribution of decision choices under specific structural conditions, the time-pressure response patterns, and the role-specific reasoning patterns that replace the theoretical assumptions that agent-based models must otherwise make without empirical grounding.

II. The Data Architecture: Five Layers

PlayerOne's data architecture is organized in five layers, each collecting a distinct category of information and serving a distinct analytical function. The layers are cumulative: each participant's complete data profile includes data from all five layers, and the research value of the platform increases as the layers are analyzed in combination.

Layer One: Identity and Demographic Profile

Layer One data is collected at registration and constitutes the participant's permanent profile. It includes verified identity data (Google account linked to a unique participant ID, mobile number linked to a verified OTP confirmation), demographic data (age group, gender, division of residence, occupation category, education level), civic engagement baseline (MP awareness, government contact history, system trust score), and CARO program history (which CARO programs the participant has previously completed, if any). Layer One data does not change after registration unless the participant voluntarily updates their profile.

The research function of Layer One data is to enable the subgroup analysis that constitutes the most powerful publication output of the Fairness Index: the identification of systematic variation in governance fairness perceptions across demographic and civic engagement categories. Every subsequent data layer is linked to Layer One through the participant's unique ID, making subgroup analysis possible for all research questions the platform addresses.

Layer Two: Fairness Index Baseline

Layer Two data is collected immediately after registration, before the participant accesses any simulation scenario. It consists of the participant's responses to all 25 Fairness Index questions, answered on the standard five-point scale, along with the three civic engagement supplementary questions. Layer Two data is collected once as a mandatory baseline and may be updated voluntarily by the participant at any point in their platform history — with each update timestamped to create a longitudinal record of how the participant's fairness perceptions evolve over time.

The research function of Layer Two data is dual. First, it serves as the pre-simulation baseline against which post-scenario fairness perception data is compared — enabling the measurement of simulation's causal effect on fairness perception. Second, it constitutes a direct contribution to the CARO Fairness Index dataset: every PlayerOne participant's Layer Two responses are verified, demographically tagged data points that expand the Fairness Index sample. Because PlayerOne participants are verified through Google Sign-In and mobile OTP — a higher verification standard

than the Google Forms deployment of the Fairness Index Version One — their responses carry greater methodological weight in the Index's confidence scoring.

Layer Three: Scenario Decision Data

Layer Three data is generated during each simulation session and constitutes the core behavioral dataset of the platform. For each decision point within each scenario, Layer Three records the participant's role in the session, the scenario identifier, the decision point identifier, the option chosen from the available options, the time elapsed between decision point presentation and option selection, the pressure signal that was most recently active when the decision was made (party directive, public pressure, institutional constraint, or external signal), and a session timestamp.

Layer Three data is the primary input for Fairness Alignment Score calculation. The scoring engine maps each decision choice to the Fairness Index domain most relevant to that decision point, calculates the alignment between the participant's choice and the structural fairness standard for that domain, and produces a Fairness Alignment Score for each decision point, each scenario, and each participant's cumulative platform history. The research function of Layer Three data is to provide the behavioral evidence base for all four research questions the platform addresses, and to generate the empirical decision distribution data that Level Two agent-based models require for behavioral assumption calibration.

Layer Four: Consequence and Reflection Data

Layer Four data is collected in the post-scenario reflection module. It includes the participant's response to the structured reflection question ('What constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario?' — answered through a structured set of options mapped to Equitism's structural failure mode taxonomy), the participant's response to the visibility question ('Was the structural unfairness you experienced visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences?' — answered on a five-point awareness scale), the participant's open-text response to the structural design question ('What governance design change would have made fair decision-making structurally easier in this scenario?'), and the participant's responses to the three to five domain-matched Fairness Index questions presented at the end of each scenario.

The research function of Layer Four data is to capture the reflective dimension of the simulation experience — the degree to which participants are able to identify structural failure modes, articulate structural design alternatives, and update their fairness perceptions in response to their simulation experience. The domain-matched Fairness Index questions in Layer Four provide the

post-scenario fairness perception data that is compared to the Layer Two baseline to measure simulation's effect on fairness perception. The open-text responses to the structural design question constitute a qualitative dataset that will, over thousands of participants, generate a corpus of citizen-generated governance design proposals — a resource with significant research and publication value.

Layer Five: Longitudinal Platform History

Layer Five data is not collected at any single point but emerges from the accumulation of Layers Two through Four across a participant's complete platform engagement history. It consists of the longitudinal record of each participant's Fairness Alignment Scores across all scenarios played, all roles inhabited, and all domains engaged — together with the timestamped updates to their Fairness Index responses and the evolution of their reflection responses over time. Layer Five data enables the longitudinal research questions that no single session can address: how do governance fairness perceptions evolve with repeated simulation experience? Do participants who inhabit multiple roles within the same scenario domain show different perception trajectories than participants who remain within a single role? Does CARO program history predict the direction or magnitude of perception shifts?

Layer Five analysis is the most methodologically ambitious component of the research design and will become analytically powerful only after the platform has accumulated sufficient longitudinal data — a threshold that requires significant participant numbers and multi-session engagement patterns. Its architecture is specified now so that the data collection infrastructure supports it from the beginning, even though its analytical outputs will not be available in the platform's early phases.

III. The Research Data Pipeline

The research data pipeline describes the path from raw participant interaction data to structured, anonymized, analytically ready research outputs accessible to the Global Governance Lab. The pipeline operates in four stages.

Stage One: Real-Time Data Capture

Every participant interaction with the platform generates a structured data record at the moment of interaction. Registration data, Fairness Index responses, scenario decision events, reflection responses, and profile updates are all captured in real time and written to the platform's primary database. The database schema is designed for research utility from the outset: every record includes a participant ID (anonymized from personally identifying information for research access),

a timestamp, a record type identifier, and the record-specific data fields appropriate to that interaction type. No personally identifying information — name, email address, phone number, Google account identifier — is stored in the research-accessible data environment. The linkage between participant identity (held in the secure authentication layer) and participant research data (held in the anonymized research layer) is maintained through the participant ID, which allows longitudinal tracking without exposing personal identity.

Stage Two: Automated Daily Processing

Every twenty-four hours, an automated processing routine runs on the previous day's interaction data. The routine performs four functions. First, it calculates Fairness Alignment Scores for all scenario sessions completed in the preceding twenty-four hours and writes these scores to each participant's platform profile and to the research data store. Second, it updates each participant's cumulative Fairness Alignment Score across all domains based on their complete session history. Third, it flags any data anomalies — unusually rapid decision times that may indicate non-engaged participation, duplicate session patterns that may indicate testing activity, or response patterns that may indicate systematic random selection rather than genuine engagement — for human review before inclusion in research analysis. Fourth, it updates the aggregate research dataset that the GGL accesses for analysis, adding the previous day's clean, processed data to the cumulative research store.

Stage Three: GGL Research Access

The Global Governance Lab accesses research data through a dedicated data environment that provides anonymized, structured, export-ready datasets. The GGL data environment provides four categories of access. The aggregate Fairness Index dataset provides all participants' Layer Two baseline responses and Layer Four reflection responses, anonymized and demographically tagged, in a format directly compatible with the Fairness Index scoring formulas. The behavioral decision dataset provides all Layer Three scenario decision records, anonymized and role-tagged, in a format designed for the decision distribution analysis that Level Two calibration requires. The longitudinal profile dataset provides Layer Five data for participants who have completed multiple sessions, enabling the longitudinal research questions the platform is designed to answer. The qualitative corpus provides the open-text responses from Layer Four's structural design question, cleaned and organized by scenario domain, for qualitative analysis.

Stage Four: Automated Backup

The complete research data store — all five layers, for all participants, across all time — is backed up automatically every twenty-four hours to a secure cloud storage environment with version control. Weekly backups are retained for ninety days. Monthly backups are retained indefinitely. The backup system ensures that no research data is lost through platform failure, and that the historical record of the platform's data is preserved for longitudinal research that may be conducted years after the initial data was collected. Backup integrity is verified automatically with each backup cycle, and backup failure triggers an immediate alert to the platform administrator.

IV. The Consent Architecture

The research function of PlayerOne requires explicit, informed consent from every participant. The consent architecture is designed to be thorough, comprehensible, and genuinely voluntary — not a legal formality buried in terms of service, but a meaningful communication of what data is collected, how it is used, who can access it, and what rights the participant retains.

Consent is presented at two points in the registration flow. The first presentation, at the beginning of registration, describes the platform's dual function — civic education and behavioral research — and explains that participation in the platform involves both. It specifies the five categories of data collected, describes the research purposes for which each category is used, identifies the Global Governance Lab as the research institution with access to anonymized data, and confirms that personally identifying information is never shared with any third party and is accessible only to CARO administrative staff for platform management purposes.

The second presentation, immediately before the Fairness Index baseline survey, provides specific consent for research use of Fairness Index responses. It explains that responses will be combined with other participants' responses to calculate aggregate fairness scores that will be published by the Global Governance Lab, confirms that individual responses are never published or shared in identified form, and explains that the participant's responses contribute to a research dataset that may be used in academic publications and shared with research partner institutions in anonymized form.

Participants must actively confirm consent at both presentation points — not through a pre-checked box, but through an explicit affirmative action. Participants who decline consent at either point may not proceed to the simulation platform: the research function is integral to the platform, and participation without data contribution would undermine the research design. However, participants are informed at both consent points that they may withdraw their consent at any time by contacting

CARO, and that upon withdrawal their data will be removed from the research dataset, though historical aggregated scores calculated before withdrawal cannot be retrospectively revised.

Future platform development includes the option to license anonymized, aggregated behavioral data to research institutions, technology companies, and governance organizations for purposes consistent with the platform's research mission. Any such licensing arrangement will be disclosed to participants at registration and will be subject to the same anonymization standards that govern GGL research access. No personally identifying information will ever be included in any commercial data arrangement. This option — noted in the platform specifications and the consent architecture — represents a future revenue pathway that becomes meaningful only at significant platform scale.

V. The Fairness Alignment Scoring Engine

The Fairness Alignment Scoring engine is the analytical mechanism that converts raw scenario decision data into research-meaningful fairness measurements. It operates in three stages for each scenario session.

Stage One: Decision-to-Domain Mapping

Every decision point in every scenario is pre-mapped to one or more Fairness Index domains by the scenario design team. This mapping is specified in the scenario script and stored in the platform database. A decision point in the Article 70 scenario that asks the MP to choose between constituency accountability and party loyalty is mapped to Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership — and specifically to Question 1 (party switching after election) and Question 2 (major decisions without public consultation). A decision point in the Resource Allocation scenario that asks the Mayor to allocate health funding is mapped to Domain 3 — Economy and Resources — and Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare. The mapping is not exclusive: decision points that involve multiple fairness dimensions are mapped to multiple domains, with each domain assignment carrying a specified weight that reflects the relative relevance of that domain to the decision.

Stage Two: Alignment Calculation

For each decision point, the scoring engine compares the participant's chosen option against the structural fairness standard for the mapped domain. The structural fairness standard is not a single correct answer — it is a specification of which options preserve structural fairness principles (equal justificatory standing, accountability alignment, structural inclusion) and which options reinforce structural failure modes (justificatory subordination, authority-accountability misalignment, structural

capture). Options are coded on a four-point alignment scale: fully aligned with structural fairness (1.0), partially aligned (0.5), structurally neutral (0.0), and directly reinforcing a structural failure mode (-1.0). The alignment score for each decision point is the product of the option's alignment code and the domain weight for that decision point.

Stage Three: Score Aggregation

Decision-point alignment scores are aggregated to produce a Fairness Alignment Score for the complete scenario session. This session score is then added to the participant's cumulative Fairness Alignment Score history, organized by domain — producing a domain-specific alignment profile that shows, across all scenarios the participant has played, their pattern of governance decision-making relative to structural fairness standards in each of the five Fairness Index domains. This profile is displayed to the participant in their platform dashboard as their governance profile — a representation of their decision patterns that is designed to be informative and developmental rather than judgmental.

VI. Relationship to the Fairness Index Version One

The PlayerOne platform's data architecture is designed to complement and strengthen the Fairness Index Version One publication scheduled for June 2026. The relationship operates in two directions.

PlayerOne contributes to the Fairness Index dataset by generating verified, OTP-confirmed Fairness Index responses from participants whose governance engagement is documented through their CARO program history. These responses carry higher verification confidence than responses collected through open Google Forms deployment, and their demographic profiles are more completely documented. The PlayerOne Fairness Index contribution will be reported in the Version One publication as a distinct participant cohort — 'verified civic leader participants' — with its own subgroup analysis, providing the first comparison of governance fairness perceptions between platform-verified civic leaders and general survey respondents.

The Fairness Index contributes to PlayerOne's analytical architecture by providing the measurement vocabulary and scoring formulas through which simulation decisions are evaluated and Fairness Alignment Scores are calculated. The Index's five domains organize the scenario design, the decision-point mapping, and the reflection module structure. The Index's scoring interpretation guide provides the language through which the fairness analysis presented to participants after each scenario translates their decision patterns into meaningful governance feedback. Without the Fairness Index, PlayerOne would be a simulation platform without a

measurement standard. Without PlayerOne, the Fairness Index would be a measurement system without a behavioral testing environment. Together, they constitute the integrated research infrastructure that neither could achieve alone.

VII. The Level Two Development Pathway

PlayerOne Level Two — the agent-based governance modeling environment through which the structural fairness claims of the UFDS and Fairocracy will be tested under computational simulation conditions — is a multi-year research investment that depends on the behavioral baseline data that Level One generates. This section specifies the four-stage development pathway from the current Level One operational status to the Level Two research engine.

Stage One: Fairness Index Measurement Vocabulary (Current)

The first stage of the Level Two development pathway is the completion and publication of the Fairness Index Version One. This stage is currently underway, with the Version One pilot data collection completed and the publication target set for June 2026. The Fairness Index provides the measurement vocabulary — the Question Fairness Scores, Domain Fairness Scores, Overall Fairness Index, and Policy Alignment Score formulas — that Level Two requires to express simulation outcomes in terms that are directly comparable to empirical fairness measurements. Without this measurement vocabulary, Level Two simulation results cannot be connected to the real-world governance fairness standards the platform is designed to test.

Stage Two: Basic Agent-Based Model (Year One to Two)

The second stage is the development of a basic agent-based governance model that implements simplified versions of the UFDS institutional rules and tests their structural fairness properties under stylized behavioral assumptions. This model will be developed by the Global Governance Lab's Simulation and Behavioral Research pillar, either through internal computational social science capacity or through academic research partnerships. The basic model will implement a simplified version of a national legislature — with agents representing MPs, party leadership, constituents, and executive actors — and will test how different rules governing party discipline, floor voting, and constituency accountability affect the structural fairness outcomes produced by the legislative process. The behavioral assumptions in Stage Two will draw on the existing academic literature on legislative behavior and on the Level One data already accumulated by the time Stage Two begins.

Stage Three: Behavioral Calibration Using Level One Data (Year Two to Three)

The third stage is the calibration of the basic agent-based model's behavioral assumptions using the empirical decision distribution data generated by Level One. This stage replaces the theoretically assumed behavioral parameters in the Stage Two model with empirically grounded parameters drawn from the pattern of real decisions made by PlayerOne Level One participants under specified structural conditions. The calibration process is iterative: initial Level One data informs an initial calibration, the calibrated model produces new simulation outputs, the outputs are compared to Level One behavioral patterns, and the discrepancies inform further calibration cycles. The goal is a model whose behavioral assumptions reflect how real governance decision-makers actually behave under structural constraint — not how they are theoretically assumed to behave.

Stage Four: Full Research Engine (Year Three and Beyond)

The fourth stage is the full Level Two research engine: a parameterized simulation environment in which different governance rule configurations can be specified, simulated over extended time periods, and compared on their structural fairness outcomes as measured by the Fairness Index formula set. In this environment, a researcher can specify a constitutional architecture — with defined rules for party discipline, electoral commission independence, judicial appointment, and accountability mechanism design — run thousands of simulation cycles under that architecture with agents whose behavioral parameters are calibrated from Level One data, calculate the trajectory of Fairness Index scores produced across the simulation runs, and compare the results to simulations run under alternative constitutional architectures. The comparison constitutes empirical evidence — not proof, but testable evidence — about which governance design features produce more durable structural fairness outcomes under realistic behavioral conditions.

The table below summarizes the four research questions, the data layers that address them, and the analytical outputs they produce.

Research Question	Primary Data Layer	Analytical Method	Output
Does simulation change fairness perceptions?	Layer 2 (baseline) + Layer 4 (reflection)	Pre/post comparison; longitudinal tracking	Causal evidence on simulation's pedagogical effect
Does role predict decision patterns?	Layer 3 (decision data)	Cross-role decision distribution comparison within scenario	Role-specific structural constraint profiles
Do perceptions vary	Layer 1 (profile) +	Subgroup analysis	Demographic fairness

Research Question	Primary Data Layer	Analytical Method	Output
by demographic?	Layer 2 (FI baseline)	across all demographic categories	perception variation map
What behavioral assumptions ground Level Two?	Layer 3 + Layer 5 (longitudinal)	Decision distribution extraction; calibration modeling	Empirically grounded ABM behavioral parameters

VIII. Ethical Research Standards

PlayerOne's research design is governed by ethical standards appropriate to a behavioral research platform that collects data from participants across diverse demographic and political contexts. Five principles organize the platform's ethical commitments.

1. **Informed consent is genuine, not formal.** Consent presentations are written in accessible language, presented before any data collection begins, and structured to ensure participants understand what they are agreeing to before they agree to it. No data collection precedes explicit consent confirmation.
2. **Anonymization is structural, not procedural.** The separation between personally identifying information and research data is enforced at the database architecture level — not merely through policy commitments. Research data cannot be re-identified through the research access environment because the linkage between identity and research record is maintained only in the secure authentication layer, inaccessible to research users.
3. **Participation is voluntary at every stage.** While consent to research participation is required for platform access — because the research function is integral to the platform design — participants retain the right to withdraw at any point, and withdrawal requests are honored without penalty or delay.
4. **Data is used only for stated purposes.** Research data is used for the four research questions specified in this chapter, for Fairness Index calculation and publication, and — in anonymized aggregate form — for potential future research partnerships. It is not used for commercial profiling, political targeting, or any purpose inconsistent with the platform's stated mission.
5. **Findings are reported with methodological honesty.** All publications based on PlayerOne data will specify the platform's participant verification methodology, the limitations of simulation-derived behavioral data relative to real-world governance behavior, and the appropriate scope of inference from the findings. PlayerOne data generates hypotheses and

provides evidence — it does not constitute proof of governance design claims that can only be validated through real-world constitutional implementation.

— End of Chapter 2 —

Next: Chapter 3 — Platform Experience Design and User Flow

CHAPTER 3

Platform Experience Design and User Flow

Platform design is not decoration. In a governance simulation platform whose research value depends on participant engagement quality, the design of the user experience determines whether participants arrive at the scenario decision points with sufficient context and orientation to make meaningful decisions — or whether they click through screens without the cognitive engagement the research requires. This chapter specifies the complete user flow of the PlayerOne platform: every screen, every interaction, every transition, every piece of copy, and every design decision that shapes the participant's journey from first registration through scenario completion and into their ongoing platform engagement. It is written to serve both as a development specification for platform engineers and as a design rationale document for institutional and research audiences.

> *The platform must feel like entering a governance institution — not signing up for an app. Every design decision communicates what kind of experience this is and what it demands of the person who enters it.*

I. Design Philosophy

PlayerOne's design philosophy is governed by four principles that sit above every specific design decision.

Principle One: Institutional Weight

The platform must communicate, from the first screen a participant encounters, that they are entering a serious institutional environment. PlayerOne is not a quiz, a game, or a social platform. It is a governance simulation with research consequences. The visual language — typography, color, spatial organization, interaction patterns — must carry the weight of that institutional seriousness. This means no gamification aesthetics: no points badges on landing screens, no progress bars styled as arcade games, no confetti animations on completion. The design draws from CARO's established visual system: Playfair Display for headings, Inter for body text, the primary green palette for institutional elements, deep ink for text, generous whitespace, and the kind of typographic hierarchy that signals scholarly and governmental contexts.

Principle Two: Clarity Before Immersion

Before a participant can be genuinely immersed in a scenario, they must clearly understand what kind of experience they are entering, what their role is, what the governance situation is, and what is being asked of them. Confusion at the scenario entry point produces disengaged decision-making, which produces low-quality research data. The design prioritizes clarity at every transition: clear role briefings before scenario entry, clear scenario context before decision points, clear consequence reveals before fairness analysis, and clear reflection prompts before data capture. Immersion is the product of clarity — participants become genuinely engaged with governance scenarios when they understand what they are doing and why.

Principle Three: Research Transparency

The platform never obscures its research function. Participants are told clearly, repeatedly, and in accessible language that their decisions are being recorded for research purposes, that their Fairness Index responses contribute to a published dataset, and that their engagement with the platform generates evidence about governance decision-making. This transparency is not only ethically required — it is strategically important. Participants who understand that their decisions matter to a real research program engage more seriously with the scenarios than participants who believe they are playing a game with no consequences. The research transparency principle means that the platform's institutional purpose is visible in its design: the GGL branding, the Fairness Index integration, the research framing of every scenario, and the data contribution acknowledgments throughout the experience are all design features, not afterthoughts.

Principle Four: Mobile-First, Accessibility-Always

The primary user population is young civic leaders in Bangladesh, the majority of whom access digital platforms through mobile devices. The platform is designed mobile-first: every screen, every interaction element, every text length, and every navigation pattern is designed for a smartphone screen before being adapted for desktop. Text sizes are legible without zoom. Touch targets are large enough for reliable mobile interaction. Scenario content is broken into screen-sized segments rather than requiring long scrolling. Language is available in both English and Bangla throughout, with Bangla as the default for participants who register with a Bangladesh mobile number. Accessibility standards — sufficient color contrast, screen-reader compatibility for key navigation elements, clear focus indicators — are implemented from the outset rather than retrofitted.

II. The Complete User Flow

The PlayerOne user flow consists of seven stages, each with defined entry conditions, screen sequences, data capture points, and exit conditions. The stages are sequential for first-time participants and partially non-sequential for returning participants who have completed onboarding.

Stage One: Landing and Authentication

[SCREEN: Landing Screen]

The landing screen is the participant's first encounter with the platform. It is designed to communicate institutional purpose in the first three seconds and to convert institutional understanding into registration action.

The screen displays the PlayerOne name in Playfair Display at full viewport prominence, accompanied by the GGL and CARO logos. Beneath the name, a single line of body text states the platform's purpose without abstraction: 'A governance simulation platform for civic leaders. Make decisions. Understand systems. Build governance reasoning.' Below this, two action buttons: 'Begin — Sign in with Google' (primary, green) and 'Learn More' (secondary, outline). A third line in smaller text reads: 'A research platform of the Global Governance Lab, CARO — caronnonprofit.org.'

The 'Learn More' path opens a single overlay screen that explains what PlayerOne is in four short paragraphs — platform purpose, simulation method, research function, and Fairness Index integration — with a 'Begin' button at the bottom. This overlay serves participants who need more context before committing to registration and reduces the drop-off rate among participants who arrive without prior knowledge of CARO.

[SCREEN: Google Sign-In]

Clicking 'Begin' initiates the Google Sign-In OAuth flow. The participant authenticates through their Google account. Upon successful authentication, the platform receives a verified Google account identifier, the account's display name, and the account's email address. These are stored in the secure authentication layer. The participant is then directed to the mobile verification screen.

[SCREEN: Mobile OTP Verification]

The mobile verification screen requests the participant's mobile number. A six-digit OTP is sent via SMS to the number provided. The participant enters the OTP to confirm. Upon confirmation, the mobile number is linked to the participant's account in the secure authentication layer. The combination of Google account verification and mobile OTP confirmation constitutes the platform's two-factor identity verification — ensuring that each account corresponds to a unique verified individual.

Participants who cannot complete mobile verification — for instance, because they do not have a Bangladesh or international mobile number accessible — are presented with an alternative email OTP path. A six-digit code is sent to the Google-verified email address. This alternative path provides a verification fallback while maintaining the unique-participant requirement.

Upon successful verification, the participant is directed to Stage Two: Registration and Consent.

Stage Two: Registration and Consent

[SCREEN: Consent Screen One — Platform Research Consent]

The first consent screen is presented before any personal data is collected. It is written in plain language and structured in three sections. The first section explains what PlayerOne is: a civic leadership training platform and behavioral research instrument operated by the Global Governance Lab at CARO. The second section explains what data is collected: profile information, Fairness Index responses, scenario decision records, and reflection responses — and specifies that each category serves both the participant's training experience and the platform's research mission. The third section explains participant rights: the right to withdraw at any time, the right to request data deletion, and the assurance that no personally identifying information is shared with any third party.

A single checkbox at the bottom of the screen reads: 'I understand that my participation involves both civic leadership training and behavioral research, and I consent to participate on this basis.' The checkbox must be actively checked by the participant — it is not pre-checked. A 'Continue' button is activated only after the checkbox is checked. A 'Decline' option is available, which returns the participant to the landing screen with an explanation that platform access requires research consent.

[SCREEN: Profile Registration]

The profile registration screen collects the participant's demographic and civic engagement information. The screen is divided into two sections. The first section — 'Your Profile' — collects age group (six options from Under 18 to 60+), gender (four options including Prefer not to say), division of residence (nine options covering all eight Bangladesh divisions plus Outside Bangladesh), occupation category (seven options: Student, Professional, Business, Government Employee, NGO/Civil Society, Unemployed, Other), and education level (four options from up to SSC to Master's or above). All fields display 'Optional' labels except Division, which is marked 'Required for research subgroup analysis.'

The second section — 'Your Civic Background' — collects the three civic engagement questions: MP awareness (Do you know the name of your local Member of Parliament? Yes / No / Not sure), government contact history (Have you ever tried to contact or engage with any government official about a problem? Yes / No), and system trust score (How much do you trust your country's governance system overall? — presented as a five-point labeled scale from No Trust to Complete Trust). A brief explanatory note beneath this section reads: 'These questions help us understand how civic engagement relates to governance fairness perceptions. Your responses are anonymous in all research publications.'

CARO program history is collected through a multi-select field: 'Have you previously participated in any CARO programs? Select all that apply.' Options include VEP, CMEP, MEP, Campus Ambassadors, BIP, Equitism Leaders Program, Bangladesh Nexus, and None / First time engaging with CARO. This field allows the platform to track how CARO's program pipeline feeds PlayerOne participation and to analyze whether program history predicts decision patterns or fairness perception shifts.

[SCREEN: Consent Screen Two — Fairness Index Research Consent]

Before proceeding to the Fairness Index survey, a second consent screen provides specific consent for research use of Fairness Index responses. This screen explains in three short paragraphs: what the Fairness Index is (the world's first empirical measurement of structural governance fairness, developed by CARO's Global Governance Lab), how the participant's responses will be used (combined with other participants' responses to calculate aggregate fairness scores published by GGL in June 2026 and subsequently), and what individual responses will not be used for (they will never be published or shared in identified form, and individual response records are accessible only to GGL researchers in anonymized form). A second active-consent checkbox confirms the participant's agreement. Upon confirmation, the participant proceeds to Stage Three.

Stage Three: Fairness Index Baseline

[SCREEN: Fairness Index Introduction]

The Fairness Index introduction screen presents the survey context and instructions. The header reads: 'The CARO Fairness Index — Your Governance Baseline.' Below this, three short paragraphs explain: what the Fairness Index measures (collective governance fairness perceptions across five domains), how the participant's responses will be used (to establish their personal governance fairness baseline, to contribute to the GGL's published dataset, and to enable pre/post comparison after simulation scenarios), and how to respond (there are no right or wrong answers —

the participant's honest judgment is the research contribution). The response scale is presented visually: five labeled points from 1 — Completely Unfair to 5 — Completely Fair, with brief descriptions of each scale point.

A progress indicator at the top of the screen shows the participant's position in the onboarding flow: Step 1 of 2 in the pre-simulation setup. The screen includes a time estimate: 'This survey takes approximately 8 to 12 minutes. You will complete it once and may update your responses at any time.'

[SCREEN: Domain Introduction Cards]

Before the questions in each domain begin, a domain introduction card is displayed. The card names the domain, describes in two sentences what it measures, and lists the five questions the participant is about to answer. This card serves two purposes: it orients the participant to the governance area they are about to evaluate, and it reduces survey fatigue by creating a sense of structured progression through clearly defined sections rather than an undifferentiated sequence of 25 questions.

The five domain introduction cards are: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership ('This domain measures your fairness perceptions about political accountability, party discipline, government decision-making, and the use of public authority. You will be asked about five specific governance practices.'), Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law ('This domain measures your fairness perceptions about legal equality, court access, law enforcement, and the relationship between wealth and justice.'), Domain 3 — Economy and Resources ('This domain measures your fairness perceptions about wealth distribution, wages, economic concentration, and procurement.'), Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare ('This domain measures your fairness perceptions about service delivery equity, healthcare, education, and access to government support.'), and Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions ('This domain measures your fairness perceptions about information access, media independence, emergency powers, lobbying, and international influence on national decisions.').

[SCREEN: Question Screens (25 total)]

Each question is presented on its own screen, one at a time. The screen layout is consistent across all 25 questions: the domain name and question number appear at the top in small label text (e.g., 'Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership · Question 3 of 5'). The question text appears in large, clearly readable body text in both English and Bangla, stacked vertically with English first. Below the question, the five-point response scale is displayed as five large touch-friendly buttons, each labeled with both the numerical score and its text description (1 — Completely Unfair, 2 — Mostly

Unfair, 3 — Uncertain / Mixed, 4 — Mostly Fair, 5 — Completely Fair). A progress bar at the bottom of the screen shows completion across all 25 questions.

There is no back button within the question sequence — participants move forward only. This is a deliberate design choice that reflects the research requirement for first-response data: the most research-valuable response is the participant's initial judgment, before they have had the opportunity to reconsider based on subsequent questions. Participants who wish to change a response are informed at the domain introduction card that responses can be updated from their profile dashboard at any time after completing the baseline.

After the final question in each domain, a brief transition screen displays the domain score the participant has just generated — not as a judgment but as information: 'Your Domain 1 Governance and Leadership score: 2.3 — Your responses suggest you perceive significant unfairness in the governance practices covered by this domain. Continuing to Domain 2.' This real-time feedback serves engagement and retention while simultaneously communicating the research value of the participant's responses.

[SCREEN: Fairness Index Completion]

After completing all 25 questions, the participant sees a completion screen displaying their full Fairness Index profile: their score for each of the five domains (as labeled bars on a visual scale from 1 to 5), their Overall Fairness Index score, and a brief interpretive note for each domain based on their score range. The completion screen also displays the aggregate average scores from all participants who have completed the baseline to date — giving the participant a sense of how their perceptions compare to the collective. A note clarifies that these aggregate scores are preliminary and that the formal published findings will appear in the GGL's June 2026 report.

A 'Continue to PlayerOne' button directs the participant to Stage Four: Scenario Selection.

Stage Four: Scenario Selection and Role Briefing

[SCREEN: Scenario Library]

The scenario library is the participant's primary navigation environment within the platform. It displays all 50 scenarios organized by domain, with each scenario represented by a card showing the scenario title, the governance domain it belongs to, the number of active roles available in this scenario, a difficulty indicator (reflecting the structural complexity of the decision points), and a completion indicator showing whether the participant has previously played this scenario and in which roles.

Scenarios are initially displayed in domain order — Electoral Integrity first, followed by Party Discipline, Judicial Independence, Resource and Corruption, Civil Liberties and Press, Minority Rights, Constitutional Reform, Crisis Governance, and Global Governance. Participants can filter by domain using a tab navigation at the top of the library screen. A second filter allows participants to show only scenarios in which they have not yet played their selected role — enabling systematic role coverage across the library.

New participants see a 'Recommended Starting Scenario' prompt that directs them to Scenario 9 — the Article 70 scenario — as the entry point most tightly connected to the Equitism framework and most likely to produce a powerful first simulation experience. This recommendation is not mandatory: participants may enter any scenario they choose. But the recommendation serves the pedagogical purpose of ensuring that the platform's first experience communicates the core structural fairness concept — justificatory subordination — that underlies the entire framework.

[SCREEN: Role Selection]

Upon selecting a scenario, the participant is presented with the role selection screen. This screen lists all active roles for the selected scenario, each represented by a card showing the role title, a two-sentence description of the role's institutional position, the governance track (Bangladesh or Global), and an indicator showing whether the participant has previously played this role in this scenario. Roles the participant has not yet played are highlighted; roles previously played are displayed in a secondary visual style.

The participant selects one role. A confirmation dialog summarizes the selected role and the scenario, and asks the participant to confirm their selection before proceeding to the role briefing. This confirmation step prevents accidental role selections that would generate low-quality decision data.

[SCREEN: Role Briefing]

The role briefing is one of the most important screens in the platform experience. It is the participant's orientation to the governance position they will inhabit for the duration of the scenario. A poorly understood role produces decisions that reflect confusion rather than genuine governance reasoning — which is both pedagogically unhelpful and research-unusable.

The role briefing screen is structured in five sections. The first section — Authority — describes what formal power the role holds: what decisions the role can make, what institutional resources it controls, and what governance processes it can initiate or block. The second section — Constraints — describes the structural limitations on the role's authority: the rules, norms, institutional

pressures, and accountability relationships that limit what the role-holder can do, even when they have formal authority to act. The third section — Accountability Relationships — identifies who the role-holder is accountable to, in what ways, and through what mechanisms — making explicit the authority-accountability alignment or misalignment that characterizes the role's structural position. The fourth section — Competing Pressures — previews the kinds of pressure the participant should expect to encounter during the scenario: party directive, public opinion, institutional procedure, external influence, resource constraint, or some combination of these. The fifth section — Your Objective — states clearly what the role-holder is trying to achieve, and notes that 'achieving your objective' and 'making structurally fair decisions' may not always be the same thing.

The role briefing concludes with a confirmation button: 'I understand my role — enter the scenario.' Participants who wish to select a different role can use a 'Choose a Different Role' link that returns them to the role selection screen without penalty.

Stage Five: Scenario Play

[SCREEN: Scenario Context]

The scenario context screen presents the governance situation the participant is entering. It is structured in three sections. The first section — 'The Situation' — provides the historical and political context for the scenario in approximately 250 to 300 words in the participant's selected language (English or Bangla). For Bangladesh scenarios, this context names the specific constitutional mechanism, policy issue, or political event the scenario is drawn from, and places it in the documented political history of Bangladesh between 2015 and 2026. For global scenarios, it describes the institutional setting and the specific governance challenge the role-holder faces. The context is factual and describes the structural situation without assigning blame to named individuals.

The second section — 'The Pressures on You' — lists three to four competing signals that the role-holder is receiving from different actors or institutions. These pressures are presented as direct communications: a message from party leadership, a constituency petition, an institutional protocol requirement, a media report, a communication from an international actor, or a resource constraint notification. These pressure signals make the structural constraints on the role tangible — they are not abstract descriptions of competing interests but concrete communications that the participant must weigh in making their decisions.

The third section — 'What You Must Decide' — previews the decision structure without revealing the options. It states how many decision points the scenario contains (typically three to five) and

describes in general terms what kinds of decisions the participant will face. A 'Begin' button advances the participant to the first decision point.

[SCREEN: Decision Point Screens]

Each decision point is presented on a dedicated screen. The screen layout is consistent across all scenarios and all decision points. At the top, a small context reminder displays the participant's role, the scenario name, and the decision point number (e.g., 'Decision 2 of 4'). Beneath this, a timer displays the time remaining for this decision — set to 90 seconds for standard decisions and 45 seconds for crisis scenario decisions that are designed to simulate time pressure. The timer is visible but not prominently featured: it creates awareness of time constraint without dominating the participant's cognitive attention.

The decision prompt — the specific situation the participant must respond to — is presented in a clearly delineated box in the center of the screen. It is written in second person, addressed directly to the role-holder: 'Your party whip has just delivered a direct instruction to vote in favor of the constitutional amendment. Your constituency committee has sent an urgent message urging you to vote against. The vote is in 90 minutes. What do you do?'

Below the prompt, three to four response options are presented as large, clearly labeled buttons. Each option is a one to two sentence description of a governance action — not an abstract choice label like 'A' or 'B,' but a specific governance decision: 'Vote with the party as instructed and issue a public statement explaining that party unity is essential for stable governance.' Each option is written to be genuinely plausible — there is no obviously correct choice and no obviously absurd option. Every option represents a decision that a real governance actor might make under the structural conditions described.

When the participant selects an option, the selection is recorded immediately with its timestamp. The screen transitions to a brief consequence preview — two to three sentences describing the immediate consequence of the participant's decision — before advancing to the next decision point. For the final decision point in a scenario, the consequence preview is followed by the transition to Stage Six: Consequence Reveal and Fairness Analysis.

If the timer reaches zero without a selection, the platform records a 'time-elapsed' decision event — capturing the fact that no decision was made within the time window — and displays a brief notification: 'Time elapsed. In a real governance situation, inaction is itself a decision. Here is what happened as a result.' The narrative consequence of inaction is then displayed, and the participant

proceeds to the next decision point. Time-elapsed events are recorded in the Layer Three dataset as a distinct decision type, providing research data on the conditions under which governance actors default to inaction under structural constraint.

Stage Six: Consequence Reveal and Fairness Analysis

[SCREEN: Full Consequence Reveal]

After the final decision point, the participant sees the full consequence reveal screen. This screen describes, in 200 to 300 words, the downstream consequences of the participant's sequence of decisions — what happened to the governance situation as a result of the choices made. The consequence narrative is branched: the platform selects from a set of pre-written consequence narratives based on the pattern of the participant's decisions. Decisions that consistently reinforce structural failure modes produce one consequence trajectory; decisions that resist structural constraint in favor of accountability relationships produce another; mixed decision patterns produce intermediate narratives.

The consequence reveal is written to feel consequential — not as a judgment of the participant, but as an honest account of what governance decisions of this kind produce in practice. For scenarios drawn from documented historical events, the consequence reveal includes a note on what actually happened: 'In the 2014 Bangladesh elections, 153 seats went uncontested after opposition parties made the decision you faced. Here is what followed.' This historical grounding converts the simulation from a hypothetical exercise into a documented governance case study.

[SCREEN: Fairness Analysis]

The fairness analysis screen is the pedagogical core of the PlayerOne experience. It is the point at which the simulation becomes explicitly connected to the CARO frameworks, and at which the participant's decisions are analyzed against structural fairness standards.

The screen is structured in four sections. The first section — 'The Structural Failure Mode' — names and defines the structural failure mode that was present in the scenario, drawing directly from the Equitism framework taxonomy: justificatory subordination, authority-accountability misalignment, structural capture, epistemic dependence, or structural exclusion. It explains in accessible language what this failure mode is, why it constitutes a structural fairness problem rather than an individual misconduct problem, and how it manifested in the specific scenario just played.

The second section — 'Your Decisions and Structural Fairness' — presents the participant's decision pattern across all decision points and maps each decision to the structural fairness

alignment scale. This is not presented as a score to maximize but as a pattern to understand: 'In Decision Point 1, you chose to vote with the party. This reinforced the justificatory subordination built into Article 70's design — your constituency's accountability relationship to you was overridden by the party's structural power. In Decision Point 3, you chose to issue a public statement of dissent while voting with the party. This partially preserved your accountability relationship to your constituency while remaining within the structural constraint.' The analysis is descriptive and explanatory, not prescriptive.

The third section — 'Your Fairness Alignment Score for This Session' — displays the participant's Fairness Alignment Score for the completed scenario, broken down by the Fairness Index domains relevant to this scenario. The score is contextualized: 'Your score in Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership for this session: 0.3 out of 1.0. This reflects a pattern of decisions that predominantly reinforced the structural failure mode present in this scenario. This is not a measure of your values — it is a measure of how the structural design of the governance situation shaped your decisions.'

The fourth section — 'What a Structurally Fair Design Would Have Changed' — describes specifically what governance design features — drawn from the UFDS, Fairocracy, and FairVote frameworks — would have altered the structural conditions of the scenario in ways that would have made fair decision-making possible without the structural cost the participant experienced. For the Article 70 scenario: 'The UFDS's legislative independence provision eliminates the structural mechanism that Article 70 creates — the threat of seat loss for independent voting. Under a Fairocracy design, an MP's constituency accountability relationship is constitutionally protected from party override. The decision you faced in this scenario would not exist under a structurally fair governance design.'

Stage Seven: Reflection Module and Return

[SCREEN: Reflection Questions]

The reflection module is the final stage of each scenario session and the point at which the participant's experiential learning is converted into structured research data. It consists of four interaction elements.

The first element — Constraint Identification — presents the participant with a structured question: 'What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario?' with five options mapped to the Equitism structural failure mode taxonomy: Party or institutional pressure that prevented me from acting on my accountability relationship, Lack of information that made fair decision-making impossible, Time pressure that forced decisions before adequate deliberation, Competing interests

with no structural mechanism for fair resolution, and Fear of personal consequences for choosing the structurally fair option. The participant selects one option. This response is recorded as a Layer Four data point and contributes to the research dataset on which structural failure modes are most viscerally experienced by participants in different role and scenario combinations.

The second element — Visibility Assessment — presents a five-point scale question: 'Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences?' The five scale points range from 'Completely visible from the start — I could see exactly how the structural design was shaping my options' to 'Not visible at all — I only understood the structural problem after seeing the consequence reveal.' This response measures the degree to which structural failure modes are transparent to decision-makers who inhabit them — a key research question about the relationship between structural literacy and governance decision quality.

The third element — Design Proposal — presents an open-text field with the prompt: 'In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced.' The open-text field accepts responses in English or Bangla. This response is recorded as a Layer Four qualitative data point and added to the GGL's corpus of citizen-generated governance design proposals — a resource that will, over thousands of responses, constitute the most extensive bottom-up governance design dataset ever collected.

The fourth element — Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions — presents three to five questions from the Fairness Index domain most relevant to the scenario just played. These questions are drawn directly from the 25-question Fairness Index and are answered on the same five-point scale used in the baseline survey. The participant is told: 'After what you just experienced in this scenario, answer these questions about governance fairness.' The responses are recorded as Layer Four data and compared to the participant's Layer Two baseline responses to the same questions — providing the pre/post measurement that captures simulation's effect on fairness perception.

[SCREEN: Session Summary and Navigation]

After completing the reflection module, the participant sees a session summary screen. The screen displays: the scenario completed, the role played, the Fairness Alignment Score for the session, the cumulative Fairness Alignment Score profile across all sessions to date (broken down by domain),

and the number of scenarios remaining in the library that the participant has not yet played in any role.

Three navigation options are presented: 'Play Another Scenario' (returns to the scenario library), 'Play This Scenario as a Different Role' (returns directly to the role selection screen for the same scenario), and 'Go to My Dashboard' (directs the participant to their full platform profile and engagement history). A fourth option — 'Share My Fairness Profile' — generates a shareable summary card displaying the participant's Fairness Alignment Score profile and their Overall Fairness Index baseline score, formatted for social media sharing. The share card includes the CARO and GGL logos and a link to the PlayerOne platform — serving as an organic distribution mechanism for platform awareness.

III. The Participant Dashboard

The participant dashboard is the participant's persistent platform home — the screen they return to between scenarios and the record of their complete engagement history. It is designed to be informative and developmental: showing the participant what they have done, what their decision patterns reveal about their governance reasoning, and what remains available for them to explore.

The dashboard is organized in five panels. The Governance Profile panel displays the participant's Fairness Alignment Score profile across all five Fairness Index domains, accumulated across all scenarios played to date. Scores are displayed as a visual profile — a pentagon chart showing the participant's alignment pattern across the five domains — with a brief interpretive note for each domain. The Fairness Index Baseline panel displays the participant's Layer Two baseline scores, with a 'Update My Responses' button that allows voluntary updates and a display of how the participant's baseline compares to the current aggregate across all participants. The Scenario History panel lists all scenarios the participant has played, the roles they played in each, and the Fairness Alignment Score for each session. The Role Coverage panel shows which of the 100 roles the participant has inhabited, organized by governance track (Bangladesh and Global), with a visual map of which roles remain unexplored. The Achievements panel — designed with institutional rather than gamification aesthetics — shows meaningful engagement milestones: 'Scenarios Completed,' 'Governance Domains Explored,' 'Roles Inhabited,' 'Fairness Index Updated,' and 'Design Proposals Submitted,' each displayed as a simple count alongside the date of first achievement.

IV. The Complete Screen Inventory

The table below lists every distinct screen in the PlayerOne platform, organized by flow stage, with the primary data capture event associated with each screen.

#	Screen Name	Stage	Primary Data Capture
1	Landing	Authentication	None
2	Learn More Overlay	Authentication	None
3	Google Sign-In	Authentication	Google account ID, display name, email
4	Mobile OTP Entry	Authentication	Mobile number, OTP confirmation
5	Consent Screen One	Registration	Platform research consent (Layer 1)
6	Profile Registration	Registration	Demographics, civic engagement, program history (Layer 1)
7	Consent Screen Two	Registration	Fairness Index research consent (Layer 1)
8	Fairness Index Introduction	FI Baseline	None
9–13	Domain Introduction Cards (5)	FI Baseline	None
14–38	Question Screens Q1–Q25 (25)	FI Baseline	25 FI responses with timestamps (Layer 2)
39–43	Domain Score Transitions (5)	FI Baseline	None — display only
44	FI Completion Screen	FI Baseline	None — display only
45	Scenario Library	Scenario Selection	Scenario selection event
46	Role Selection	Scenario Selection	Role selection event
47	Role Briefing	Scenario Selection	Role confirmation event
48	Scenario Context	Scenario Play	Session start timestamp

49–53	Decision Point Screens (3–5 per scenario)	Scenario Play	Decision choice, time taken, active pressure signal (Layer 3)
54	Full Consequence Reveal	Analysis	None — display only
55	Fairness Analysis	Analysis	Fairness Alignment Score written to profile
56	Constraint Identification	Reflection	Structural constraint selection (Layer 4)
57	Visibility Assessment	Reflection	Structural visibility scale response (Layer 4)
58	Design Proposal	Reflection	Open-text design proposal (Layer 4)
59–63	Domain-Matched FI Questions (3–5)	Reflection	Post-scenario FI responses (Layer 4)
64	Session Summary	Return	None — display only
65	Participant Dashboard	Ongoing	Profile update events

V. Copy Standards

Every piece of text in the platform — from screen headers to button labels to error messages — is governed by a consistent set of copy standards that maintain the platform's institutional voice throughout the participant experience.

6. **Address the participant directly.** All copy is written in second person: 'You are the MP. Your party whip has issued a directive.' Not 'The MP receives a directive from the party whip.' The direct address creates role immersion and clarifies the participant's agency within the scenario.

7. **Name structural problems specifically.** Fairness analysis copy never uses vague language like 'this was complicated' or 'there were competing interests.' It names the structural failure mode, explains what it is, and connects it to the specific decision the participant faced: 'This is justificatory subordination — the structural condition in which a decision-maker is prevented by institutional design from acting on their accountability relationship.'

8. **Separate description from judgment.** The platform describes decision patterns and their structural consequences without judging the participant's values or character. 'Your decisions in this scenario predominantly reinforced the structural failure mode' is descriptive. 'You made the wrong choices' is judgmental and will not appear in any platform copy.

9. **Use institutional language, not startup language.** No exclamation points in informational copy. No 'Amazing!' or 'Great job!' after completing the Fairness Index. Completion screens use language like: 'Your Fairness Index baseline is complete. Your responses have been recorded and will contribute to the GGL's published dataset.' The platform is a research institution, not an app store product.

10. **Bilingual parity, not translation subordination.** Bangla text is not a translation of English text that happens to appear beneath it. Both language versions are primary. The Bangla text is reviewed by native speakers with governance literacy, not generated through automated translation. Where a governance term does not have a natural Bangla equivalent, the English term is used in parentheses after the Bangla closest approximation.

— End of Chapter 3 —

Next: Chapter 4 — The CARO Fairness Index: All 25 Questions, Domain Architecture, and Scoring System

CHAPTER 4

The CARO Fairness Index: All 25 Questions, Domain Architecture, and Scoring System

The CARO Fairness Index is the measurement infrastructure that connects PlayerOne's simulation experience to empirical governance research. It is the world's first systematic attempt to measure structural governance fairness as a collective perception — not as an expert assessment, not as a legal compliance checklist, and not as a single-dimension democracy index, but as the aggregated judgment of real participants about whether the governance practices that affect their lives are structurally fair. This chapter provides the complete specification of the Fairness Index as it operates within the PlayerOne platform: the theoretical basis for each of the five domains, the full text of all 25 questions in both English and Bangla, the structural failure mode each question addresses, the PlayerOne scenarios in which each question is most directly relevant, and the complete scoring methodology through which individual responses are converted into the published governance measurement outputs of the Global Governance Lab.

Fairness cannot be measured from outside. It must be measured as the collective judgment of those who live under the governance systems being evaluated. The Fairness Index is that measurement — the first of its kind, and the foundation of everything PlayerOne builds.

I. Theoretical Basis of the Domain Architecture

The Fairness Index measures governance fairness across five domains. The selection of these five domains is not arbitrary — it derives from the Equitism framework's analysis of the governance dimensions along which structural fairness most commonly fails, and from the empirical observation that governance unfairness, wherever it occurs, tends to manifest in one or more of five structural areas: how political authority is exercised and held accountable (Governance and Leadership), how legal rules are applied and enforced (Justice and Rule of Law), how economic resources are distributed and protected (Economy and Resources), how public services and social protections are delivered (Public Services and Welfare), and how governance actors are held accountable and how information about their conduct is made available (Accountability and Institutions).

These five domains are designed to be comprehensive without being exhaustive — to cover the full range of governance fairness concerns without requiring participants to respond to an unwieldy number of questions. Five questions per domain, twenty-five questions in total, represents the minimum necessary for domain-level analysis while remaining manageable as a survey instrument for participants with varying levels of governance literacy and varying time availability for platform engagement.

The domains are also designed to be analytically independent — each captures a dimension of governance fairness that is not fully captured by any of the others. A governance system could score well on Domain 1 (elections are competitive and party switching is constrained) while scoring poorly on Domain 2 (courts are accessible to the wealthy but not to the poor). A system could score well on Domain 4 (public services are delivered equitably) while scoring poorly on Domain 5 (government spending is opaque and lobbying is unrestricted). The independence of the domains enables the kind of nuanced governance diagnosis that a single composite score cannot provide — identifying which specific dimensions of structural fairness are strongest and weakest in a given governance environment.

II. The Response Scale

All 25 questions use a standardized five-point scale. The scale is the same across every question, every domain, and every language version of the survey. Standardization is essential for aggregation: Domain Fairness Scores and the Overall Fairness Index are calculated as weighted averages of individual question responses, and this calculation is only meaningful if every question uses the same response scale.

Score	Label	Interpretation	Governance Implication
1	Completely Unfair	Strong rejection — considered deeply unjust	Systemic failure — urgent structural reform needed
2	Mostly Unfair	Majority considers this unfair with some uncertainty	Structural problem — policy intervention required
3	Uncertain / Mixed	Society is divided — no clear collective judgment	Contested issue — FairVote Protocol most relevant
4	Mostly Fair	Majority considers this acceptable with some	Broadly acceptable — monitor for change

		dissent	
5	Completely Fair	Strong consensus — considered just and appropriate	Governance norm — protect and maintain

III. Domain One — Governance and Leadership

Domain One measures participants' fairness perceptions about the practices through which political authority is exercised, political accountability is maintained, and political decisions are made. It covers the most fundamental structural features of democratic governance: the relationship between elected representatives and those who elect them, the transparency of government decision-making, the use of public office for private or partisan benefit, the constraints on political dissent, and the process by which those who hold public authority are selected. These five questions capture the dimension of structural fairness that Equitism's core principle of equal justificatory standing most directly addresses — the question of whether those who exercise authority are genuinely accountable to those over whom they exercise it.

Q1 Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate?

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Structural Failure Mode: Justificatory subordination — the mandate given by voters is abandoned when the representative changes party, breaking the accountability relationship that the election established.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S09 Article 70 (direct), S10 Defection Trap, S13 Omnibus Bill, S14 Coalition Collapse

Q2 Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning behind them?

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PlayerOne Scenarios: S02 Pre-Cast Ballots, S04 EC Under Pressure, S13 Omnibus Bill, S42 Flood Crisis

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Q3 Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

Is it fair for political leaders to appoint close family members or personal associates to government positions?

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Domain Two measures participants' fairness perceptions about how legal rules are made, applied, and enforced across different social positions. The structural fairness of a governance system depends critically on whether the rule of law applies equally regardless of wealth, power, or political connection — or whether legal equality is formal while practical access to justice is stratified by resources and relationships. Equitism's principle of equal justificatory standing before institutional processes is most directly tested in the justice domain: when courts are inaccessible to those without resources, when enforcement is selectively applied by political affiliation, or when judicial institutions are captured by the actors they are designed to constrain, the rule of law becomes a structural mechanism of unfairness rather than a protection against it.

Q6 Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

Is it fair that access to quality legal representation is significantly better for wealthy individuals than for those with fewer resources?

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Structural Failure Mode: Structural capture — judicial independence is the institutional mechanism that prevents the rule of law from being captured by executive power. When courts are politically influenced, the separation of powers that structural fairness requires collapses.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S15 Political Trial, S16 Judicial Appointment Capture, S17 Contempt Trap, S41 Term Limits Under Pressure

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Q9 Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

Is it fair for individuals to be detained without trial for extended periods when charged with political offences?

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Structural Failure Mode: Structural exclusion — pre-trial detention without timely judicial review removes the accused from the political arena while their case proceeds, effectively punishing political opposition through the process itself.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S18 Bail Denied, S20 Amnesty vs Accountability, S46 The Coup Decision

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Q10 Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

Is it fair for the same actions to result in very different legal consequences depending on the social status or connections of the person involved?

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Structural Failure Mode: Authority-accountability misalignment — when legal outcomes depend on social position rather than legal merit, the accountability relationship between governance actors and citizens breaks down across social strata.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S15 Political Trial, S22 Development Fund Diversion, S24 Infrastructure Contract, S43 Factory Collapse

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V. Domain Three — Economy and Resources

Domain Three measures participants' fairness perceptions about how economic resources — wealth, wages, public funds, and economic opportunity — are distributed, protected, and governed. The structural fairness of economic arrangements is a dimension of governance fairness because economic resource distribution is largely determined by governance decisions: tax policy, labour

regulation, procurement rules, anti-monopoly enforcement, and public investment allocation all reflect governance choices that either preserve or undermine equal standing in the economic domain. Equitism does not prescribe a particular economic system — it prescribes that whatever economic arrangements a governance system maintains should be structured to preserve equal justificatory standing across economic positions, not to systematically advantage particular economic actors through governance design.

Q11 Domain 3 — Economy and Resources

Is it fair for a small number of individuals or families to control a very large share of a country's total economic wealth?

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Structural Failure Mode: Authority-accountability misalignment — extreme wealth concentration translates into disproportionate political influence, creating an economic basis for structural capture of governance institutions by wealthy actors.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S21 Hospital Budget, S22 Development Fund Diversion, S24 Infrastructure Contract, S26 World Bank Loan

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Q12 Domain 3 — Economy and Resources

Is it fair for workers in the same industry to receive significantly different wages based on factors unrelated to their work performance or skill?

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Structural Failure Mode: Structural capture — politically connected procurement captures the public resource allocation mechanism, converting governance into a tool for rewarding political loyalty rather than serving public interests.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S22 Development Fund Diversion, S24 Infrastructure Contract, S43 Factory Collapse, S49 China Infrastructure Offer

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Q14 Domain 3 — Economy and Resources

Is it fair for companies to be able to avoid paying taxes through legal arrangements that are unavailable to ordinary citizens and small businesses?

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services are distributed on the basis of political loyalty, geographic concentration of institutional resources, or the capacity of communities to advocate effectively for their interests, the delivery system becomes a mechanism of structural exclusion rather than structural fairness.

Q16 Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

Is it fair for the quality of public healthcare to vary significantly based on whether a person lives in an urban or rural area?

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Structural Failure Mode: Structural exclusion — geographic service inequality structurally excludes rural populations from the equal standing in public service delivery that structural fairness requires.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S21 Hospital Budget, S22 Development Fund Diversion, S35 Indigenous Land Rights, S42 Flood Crisis

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Q17 Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

Is it fair for government support programs to be distributed based on political loyalty to the ruling party rather than on objective need?

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Structural Failure Mode: Structural capture — when welfare distribution is politicized, the social protection system is captured by the ruling party and converted from a universal governance obligation into a political reward mechanism.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S21 Hospital Budget, S22 Development Fund Diversion, S32 Hindu Temple Attacks, S42 Flood Crisis

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Q18 Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

Is it fair for the quality of education available to children to depend heavily on the wealth of their parents or the area they live in?

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Structural Failure Mode: Structural exclusion — education quality stratified by wealth perpetuates across generations the unequal starting positions that structural fairness requires governance to address.

PlayerOne Scenarios: S35 Indigenous Land Rights, S36 Stateless Population, S50 Climate Displacement

Q19 Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

Is it fair for people to receive better access to government services when they have personal connections to government officials?

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Q21 Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how public funds are spent and how governance decisions are made?

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Q24 Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

Is it fair for powerful corporations to be able to influence government policy decisions through financial lobbying and campaign contributions?

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The three civic engagement questions are: CE1 — 'Do you know the name of your local Member of Parliament?' (Yes / No / Not sure), which tests basic civic awareness as an indicator of engagement with formal governance structures. CE2 — 'Have you ever tried to contact or engage with any government official or institution about a problem or concern?' (Yes / No), which tests active civic participation — the willingness to exercise formal channels of governance engagement. CE3 — 'How much do you trust your country's overall governance system to act in the interests of ordinary people?' (five-point scale from No Trust at all to Complete Trust), which tests overall system trust as a baseline measure that the Fairness Index's domain scores should, according to Equitism theory, correlate with inversely: populations that perceive high governance unfairness should also show low system trust if the theory is correct.

These three supplementary questions are displayed after Question 25 and before the completion screen. They are labeled clearly as supplementary and are not included in the Fairness Index scoring calculations. They are stored as part of the participant's Layer Two data profile and are analyzed in GGL publications as a separate analytical dimension — the civic engagement profile — that is cross-tabulated with fairness perception scores to test Equitism's theoretical propositions about the relationship between structural fairness awareness and civic engagement behavior.

IX. The Scoring Methodology

The Fairness Index scoring methodology converts individual participant responses into the hierarchy of aggregate scores that constitute the published governance measurement outputs of the Global Governance Lab. The methodology is specified here in full — every formula, every weighting decision, and every interpretation standard — so that the scoring process is completely transparent and reproducible by any researcher with access to the raw data.

Question Fairness Score (QFS)

The Question Fairness Score is the foundational calculation — the average of all valid responses to a single question across all participants who have completed the baseline survey. It is calculated separately for each of the 25 questions.

QFS(q) = Σ(responses to question q) ÷ N(valid responses to question q)

$$QFS(q) = \Sigma r_i \,/\, N \qquad \text{where } r_i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$$

Range: 1.00 – 5.00. Interpretation: 1.0–1.8 = strong unfairness consensus; 1.81–2.60 = majority unfair; 2.61–3.40 = contested; 3.41–4.20 = majority fair; 4.21–5.00 = strong fairness consensus.

Question Confidence Score (QCS)

The Question Confidence Score measures the degree of consensus among participants on a given question. A QCS near 1.0 indicates that participants are in strong agreement — their responses cluster tightly around the mean. A QCS near 0.0 indicates maximum disagreement — responses are spread across all five scale points. The QCS is used to weight the QFS in the Adjusted Question Fairness Score calculation.

QCS(q) = 1 − (σ ÷ σ_max)

```
QCS(q) = 1 − (σq / 2.0)      where σ_max = 2.0 on a 1–5 scale
```

Range: 0.00 – 1.00. Values near 1.0 indicate strong consensus. Values near 0.0 indicate maximum disagreement. Questions scoring between 2.5 and 3.5 on QFS with a QCS below 0.4 are flagged as 'deeply contested' — the most important governance questions for Fairocracy design.

Question Participation Score (QPS)

The Question Participation Score measures whether a question has received sufficient responses for its score to be statistically reliable. It is capped at 1.0 regardless of how many responses exceed the target threshold — overparticipation does not increase the score.

QPS(q) = min(N_active ÷ N_target, 1.00)

```
QPS(q) = min(Nq / N_target, 1.0)      N_target = 150 for Version One
```

Range: 0.00 – 1.00. A score below 0.5 indicates insufficient participation for reliable score calculation. Questions with QPS below 0.5 are reported with a reliability caveat in GGL publications.

Adjusted Question Fairness Score (AQFS)

The Adjusted Question Fairness Score is the primary published score for each question. It weights the raw QFS by both the confidence level of the responses and the participation rate — rewarding questions where participants show strong consensus and broad participation, and discounting questions where responses are highly dispersed or where participation is low.

AQFS(q) = QFS(q) × [0.60 + 0.20 × QCS(q) + 0.20 × QPS(q)]

```
AQFS(q) = QFS(q) × [0.60 + 0.20·QCS(q) + 0.20·QPS(q)]
```

The weighting structure prioritizes the raw fairness judgment (60%) while rewarding consensus (20%) and broad participation (20%). Maximum AQFS = 5.0 when QFS = 5.0, QCS = 1.0, and QPS = 1.0. Minimum AQFS = 0.6 when QFS = 1.0, QCS = 0.0, and QPS = 0.0.

Domain Fairness Score (DFS)

The Domain Fairness Score aggregates the five Question Fairness Scores within each domain into a single domain-level score. In Version One, equal weights are applied to all questions within a

domain. Future versions may apply differential weights based on Methodology Board assessments of the relative centrality of different questions to structural fairness measurement in each domain.

DFS(d) = Σ[w(q) × QFS(q)] ÷ Σw(q) for all questions q in domain d

```
DFS(d) = (QFS_q1 + QFS_q2 + QFS_q3 + QFS_q4 + QFS_q5) / 5     [V1: equal weights]
```

Range: 1.00 – 5.00. Five domain scores are produced: DFS_1 (Governance), DFS_2 (Justice), DFS_3 (Economy), DFS_4 (Public Services), DFS_5 (Accountability). Domain score comparison is the most analytically powerful publication output — revealing which governance dimensions are perceived as most and least fair.

Overall Fairness Index (OFI)

The Overall Fairness Index is CARO's headline governance fairness measurement — the single number that summarizes collective fairness judgment across all five governance domains. In Version One, equal weights are applied across domains. Future versions may apply differential domain weights following Methodology Board review.

OFI = Σ[w(d) × DFS(d)] ÷ Σw(d) for all active domains d

```
OFI = (DFS_1 + DFS_2 + DFS_3 + DFS_4 + DFS_5) / 5     [V1: equal weights]
```

Range: 1.00 – 5.00. This is the number published in the Annual Global Fairness Report. An OFI below 2.0 indicates that the governed population perceives their governance system as predominantly unfair across all domains. An OFI above 4.0 indicates broad perceived fairness. The Version One Bangladesh pilot OFI provides the first empirical data point in what will become a longitudinal governance fairness tracking series.

Policy Alignment Score (PAS)

The Policy Alignment Score measures the degree to which a specific governance decision or policy aligns with the collective fairness judgment established by the Fairness Index. It is used in PlayerOne to calculate Fairness Alignment Scores for scenario decisions, and will be used in future GGL publications to evaluate real governance actors and institutions.

PAS(p) = Σ[AC(p,q) × QFS(q) × w(q)] ÷ Σ[QFS(q) × w(q)]

```
PAS(p) = Σ [AC(p,q) · QFS(q)] / Σ QFS(q) AC codes: 1.0 = fully aligned, 0.5 = partially aligned, 0.0 = neutral, −1.0 = directly opposed
```

Range: −1.0 to 1.0. A PAS of 1.0 indicates a policy fully aligned with the collective fairness judgment on all relevant questions. A PAS of −1.0 indicates a policy directly opposed to the collective fairness judgment. PAS is the mechanism through which PlayerOne's scenario decision data is converted into Fairness Alignment Scores.

Actor Fairness Score (AFS)

The Actor Fairness Score aggregates Policy Alignment Scores across all governance decisions associated with a specific actor — an MP, minister, institution, or party — into a single actor-level fairness score. In PlayerOne, the AFS provides each participant's cumulative governance profile score, accumulated across all scenarios played. In future GGL publications, AFS methodology will be applied to real governance actors based on documented policy decisions.

AFS(a) = Σ[w(p) × PAS(p)] ÷ Σw(p) for all policies p associated with actor a

```
AFS(a) = Σ [w(p) · PAS(p)] / Σ w(p)  w(p) = policy importance weight by scope and domain centrality
```

Range: −1.0 to 1.0. Updated continuously as new decisions are assessed. In PlayerOne, the AFS is displayed in the participant dashboard as their governance profile score — the accumulated record of their decision alignment with structural fairness standards across all roles and scenarios.

X. Score Interpretation Guide

The table below provides the complete interpretation guide for all score types. This guide is used in GGL publications to translate numerical scores into governance-meaningful language, and in PlayerOne's fairness analysis screens to communicate score meaning to participants.

Score Range	Label	Governance Interpretation	Action Implication
1.00 – 1.50	Strong unfairness consensus	Overwhelming agreement this is structurally unjust	Urgent structural reform — Fairocracy intervention needed
1.51 – 2.00	Clear majority unfair	Majority perception of structural unfairness	Structural problem — policy intervention required
2.01 – 2.50	Majority unfair with dissent	More perceive unfairness than fairness but not overwhelming	GGL analysis recommended — identify specific structural drivers
2.51 – 3.50	Contested	Society is genuinely divided — no collective consensus	FairVote Protocol most relevant — needs deliberative resolution
3.51 – 4.00	Majority fair with dissent	More perceive fairness than unfairness	Broadly acceptable — monitor for change over time

4.01 – 4.50	Clear majority fair	Strong majority perception of structural fairness	Strong social contract on this issue — preserve
4.51 – 5.00	Strong fairness consensus	Near-unanimous perception of structural fairness	Governance norm — constitutionalize as structural floor

XI. Subgroup Analysis Standards

The most analytically powerful outputs of the Fairness Index are not the aggregate scores but the subgroup comparisons — the differences in fairness perception between demographic categories. Subgroup analysis is the primary mechanism through which the Fairness Index tests Equitism's theoretical claim that structural unfairness is experienced unequally across social position: that rural women, young people, minority communities, and economically marginalized groups will perceive governance unfairness more acutely than urban men, older participants, majority communities, and economically privileged groups.

Subgroup analysis is conducted for every demographic variable collected in the participant profile: age group, gender, division of residence, occupation category, education level, MP awareness, government contact history, and system trust score. For each variable, the complete set of QFS, DFS, and OFI scores is recalculated separately for each subgroup and compared to the aggregate scores and to the scores of other subgroups. Statistically significant differences — assessed using standard significance testing appropriate to the sample size — are reported in GGL publications with their magnitude, direction, and governance interpretation.

In PlayerOne, subgroup analysis data is not displayed to individual participants — individual participants see their own scores, not comparative demographic data. Subgroup findings are reported in aggregate in GGL publications and in the Annual Global Fairness Report, where they constitute the most compelling evidence base for the structural fairness claims of the Equitism framework.

XII. The Fairness Index in PlayerOne: Integration Points Summary

The table below summarizes all points at which the Fairness Index integrates into the PlayerOne participant experience, the data generated at each integration point, and the research function served.

Integration Point	What Happens	Data Generated	Research Function
Registration — Consent Screen 2	FI research consent captured	Consent record with timestamp	Ethical compliance
Onboarding — FI Baseline	All 25 questions answered once before any scenario	25 responses, 3 CE questions, domain scores, OFI (Layer 2)	Pre-simulation baseline; FI dataset contribution
Fairness Analysis Screen	Participant decisions mapped to FI domains; FAS calculated	Fairness Alignment Score by domain (Layer 3 processed)	Behavioral decision data; FI calibration
Reflection Module	3–5 domain-matched FI questions answered post-scenario	Post-scenario FI responses (Layer 4)	Pre/post perception comparison; simulation effect measurement
Dashboard — FI Panel	Participant views current FI scores; may update voluntarily	Updated FI responses with timestamp (Layer 2 update)	Longitudinal FI tracking; perception evolution measurement

— End of Chapter 4 —

Next: Chapter 5 — The Bangladesh Role Library: All 60 Roles Fully Specified

CHAPTER 5

The Bangladesh Role Library: All 60 Roles Fully Specified

The Bangladesh Track of the PlayerOne role library comprises 60 governance roles drawn from Bangladesh's national, electoral, judicial, local, civil society, and security institutional landscape. Each role is fully specified across six dimensions: the formal authority the role-holder possesses, the structural constraints that limit the exercise of that authority, the accountability relationships that define the role's institutional position, the competing pressures the participant should expect to encounter during scenarios, the role-holder's objective within the governance system, and the PlayerOne scenarios in which this role is active. Together, these 60 roles constitute a comprehensive map of Bangladesh's governance architecture — covering the full range of institutional positions from which governance decisions are made, resisted, facilitated, and obstructed.

The role specifications in this chapter are written to serve two purposes simultaneously. For participants entering a PlayerOne scenario, the role briefing establishes who they are, what they can do, what constrains them, and who they answer to — providing the contextual foundation without which simulation decisions cannot be genuinely informed. For researchers analyzing the platform's behavioral data, the role specifications define the structural parameters within which each participant's decisions were made — enabling the cross-role comparisons and structural constraint analyses that constitute the platform's primary research contribution.

Every role in this library is a position within a real institutional architecture. The constraints are real. The pressures are real. The accountability relationships are real. What the simulation provides is the opportunity to inhabit these positions without the permanent consequences of real governance failure.

The Bangladesh Track is organized into six institutional groupings: National Government (Roles 1–15), Electoral and Constitutional (Roles 16–25), Judiciary (Roles 26–33), Local Government (Roles 34–43), Civil Society and Media (Roles 44–53), and Security and Administration (Roles 54–60). Within each grouping, roles are ordered from highest formal authority to most constrained

institutional position, reflecting the hierarchy of accountability relationships that structure Bangladesh's governance architecture.

SECTION A — NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Roles 1 through 15 · The legislative, executive, and ministerial layer

Role 1 Prime Minister [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive authority over the Bangladesh government. Commands the cabinet, sets legislative agenda, controls state resources and appointments, leads foreign policy, and holds de facto authority over the ruling party's parliamentary decisions.

CONSTRAINTS Constitutionally accountable to parliament but Article 70 effectively insulates the PM from floor rebellion. Must maintain coalition unity, military confidence, and international donor relationships simultaneously. Public legitimacy is always fragile in a system with contested electoral foundations.

ACCOUNTABILITY Formally to parliament and the President. Practically to the ruling party's central committee, the military establishment, and major international partners including India, China, the US, and the IMF.

PRESSURES Party factions demanding patronage, opposition street pressure, military signaling on governance boundaries, international conditionality from donors and geopolitical partners, media narratives, and the permanent threat of losing parliamentary majority.

OBJECTIVE Maintain power while advancing the party's governance agenda. Manage the tension between institutional legitimacy and political survival — in Bangladesh's governance environment, these frequently conflict.

ACTIVE IN S02, S03, S04, S05, S13, S14, S23, S25, S28, S34, S42, S43, S44, S46, S47, S48, S49, S50

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of state apparatus by party), justificatory subordination (of parliament to executive), authority-accountability misalignment (power without proportionate accountability)

Role 2 Opposition Leader (Parliament) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the parliamentary opposition. Has formal speaking rights, can table motions and call for debates, leads opposition in question time, and nominates shadow ministerial positions. Commands the largest non-ruling party bloc in parliament.

CONSTRAINTS Article 70 constrains opposition MPs from defecting to support government legislation — but also from breaking opposition party discipline. Limited institutional resources compared to government. Faces harassment, legal cases, and restricted public assembly rights in Bangladesh's constrained political environment.

ACCOUNTABILITY To opposition party members, to the opposition voter base, and nominally to parliament as an institution. In practice, to the party leadership committee that selects and can remove the parliamentary leader.

PRESSURES Party hardliners demanding maximum confrontation, pragmatists urging selective cooperation, street movement leaders expecting parliamentary validation of protest demands, international democracy monitors expecting credible opposition conduct.

OBJECTIVE Provide credible institutional opposition while keeping the party viable for the next election. Navigate between full boycott (which hands government unchecked power) and selective engagement (which risks appearing to legitimize a system the opposition contests).

ACTIVE IN S03, S09, S10, S11, S13, S14, S37, S38, S41, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (from effective governance participation), epistemic dependence (limited access to government information), justificatory subordination (party discipline constrains floor votes)

Role 3 Member of Parliament — Ruling Party (Majority Seat) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Votes on all legislation, participates in parliamentary debate, sits on committee assignments determined by party leadership, can raise constituency issues in parliament, and nominally holds the government to account through question time.

CONSTRAINTS Article 70 removes the seat of any MP who votes against their party on a confidence vote or money bill. In practice, party whipping extends to virtually all significant votes. Constituency service work depends on access to government resources controlled by the party.

ACCOUNTABILITY Formally to constituents who elected them. Structurally to the party leadership that controls their renomination, their committee assignments, and their access to the development funds that enable constituency service.

PRESSURES Party whip directives conflicting with constituency interests, constituent petitions on local issues requiring government responsiveness, personal policy convictions versus party line, pressure from local party leaders who control ground-level organizational support.

OBJECTIVE Maintain the party's parliamentary majority while managing constituency accountability obligations that the party's governance decisions frequently make difficult to fulfill.

ACTIVE IN S09, S10, S11, S12, S13, S37, S38

FAILURE MODES Justificatory subordination (Article 70 structural mechanism), authority-accountability misalignment (accountability to party over constituency)

Role 4 Member of Parliament — Opposition Party [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Same formal powers as ruling party MP but without access to government resources. Can participate in debate, raise questions, sit on committees, and vote — but votes rarely affect outcomes given ruling party majority.

CONSTRAINTS Article 70 equally constrains opposition MPs. Faces potential harassment, legal cases under broad security legislation, and restricted access to government information and development resources. Opposition MPs in Bangladesh's post-2014 environment have operated under significant physical and legal pressure.

ACCOUNTABILITY To opposition constituents, to opposition party leadership, and to the principle of parliamentary accountability. The accountability chain is more coherent for opposition MPs than ruling party MPs — party discipline and constituency interest more frequently align in opposition.

PRESSURES Party leadership demanding full confrontation, constituents needing local services that require government cooperation, personal safety considerations given political risk environment, media attention on opposition conduct.

OBJECTIVE Provide visible accountability pressure on the government while protecting parliamentary institution and personal safety. Use limited institutional tools — debate, questions, committee work — to maximum effect.

ACTIVE IN S03, S09, S10, S11, S12, S13, S14, S38

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (from effective governance participation), epistemic dependence (blocked from government information)

Role 5 Member of Parliament — Independent [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Same formal parliamentary powers as party MPs. Not bound by Article 70 in the same way — an independent MP who votes against no party faces no automatic disqualification. Potentially the most structurally free parliamentary actor.

CONSTRAINTS No party machine for constituency mobilization, no access to party development funds, no whipping network for local organizing. In Bangladesh's party-dominant political culture, independents struggle to win reelection without eventual party affiliation. Freedom from Article 70 is structurally valuable but practically isolated.

ACCOUNTABILITY Directly to constituents — the purest form of constituency accountability available in Bangladesh's parliamentary system. No intermediary party accountability layer.

PRESSURES Constituent demands, personal policy convictions, pressure from both ruling party and opposition to align with their bloc, potential offers of government resources in exchange for voting support.

OBJECTIVE Exercise genuine constituency accountability — the structural freedom that party MPs lack — while maintaining enough political viability to remain an effective parliamentary actor. This role demonstrates what governance looks like when justificatory subordination is removed by design.

ACTIVE IN S03, S09, S11, S13, S38

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (structural freedom creates vulnerability to isolation), structural exclusion (from party resource networks)

Role 6 Minister of Home Affairs [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Commands the Bangladesh Police, oversees the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), controls internal security policy, has authority over public assembly permissions, and administers the Digital Security Act enforcement. One of the most powerful ministerial positions in Bangladesh's governance structure.

CONSTRAINTS Accountable to the PM and cabinet. Subject to international human rights scrutiny on RAB conduct and DSA use. Constrained by public order obligations — must maintain enough security legitimacy to prevent the security narrative from becoming a liability.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Prime Minister, to the cabinet, and nominally to parliament through question time. In Bangladesh's governance environment, the Home Minister is primarily accountable to the PM's political requirements rather than to any independent oversight mechanism.

PRESSURES PM directives on managing protest and opposition, police leadership requesting operational guidance, international partners expressing concern about security sector conduct, media covering security incidents, and the permanent tension between stability maintenance and democratic norms.

OBJECTIVE Maintain public order and political stability using the security apparatus while managing the reputational and diplomatic costs of security sector conduct. Navigate the tension between the PM's political requirements and the rule of law obligations the role formally carries.

ACTIVE IN S05, S07, S15, S18, S28, S29, S32, S42, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of security apparatus by ruling party), authority-accountability misalignment (security power without independent oversight)

Role 7 Minister of Finance [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Controls the national budget, sets fiscal policy, leads IMF and World Bank negotiations, manages Bangladesh Bank oversight, sets garment sector wage policy parameters, and controls public investment allocation across ministries.

CONSTRAINTS Subject to IMF conditionality requirements that constrain fiscal choices. Cabinet collective responsibility means individual fiscal positions require PM approval. Faces permanent tension between fiscal discipline requirements and political demands for development spending.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the PM and cabinet, to parliament through budget presentation, and effectively to international financial institutions whose conditionality frameworks constrain policy choices. Bangladesh's debt structure makes IMF and World Bank accountability practically significant.

PRESSURES IMF demanding fiscal consolidation, PM demanding development spending for electoral reasons, business community lobbying for tax concessions, labor movement demanding wage floors, energy sector requiring subsidy decisions, and international development partners with competing conditions.

OBJECTIVE Manage Bangladesh's fiscal position while satisfying political demands that frequently conflict with fiscal discipline. Navigate IMF conditionality without triggering either economic instability or political backlash from austerity measures.

ACTIVE IN S23, S24, S25, S26, S43, S44, S49, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (fiscal authority constrained by external conditionality without domestic democratic authorization), epistemic dependence (IMF information asymmetry)

Role 8 Minister of Education [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Oversees curriculum design, university governance, madrassa regulation, national exam systems, and education budget allocation. Controls appointment of university vice chancellors — a significant source of political patronage in Bangladesh.

CONSTRAINTS University autonomy provisions limit direct ministerial control over academic affairs but are routinely circumvented through VC appointment power. Education budget is constrained by overall fiscal envelope. Opposition from religious education sector on secular curriculum changes.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the PM, to cabinet, and nominally to a parliamentary education committee. In practice, primary accountability is to the party's education policy network and to the religious and secular institutional interests that constitute major political constituencies.

PRESSURES Student political organizations (Chhatra League) demanding favorable treatment, religious education sector lobbying on curriculum, university faculty on academic appointments, business sector on skills training alignment, and international development partners on education quality metrics.

OBJECTIVE Modernize Bangladesh's education system while managing the political coalitions that the education sector mobilizes. Balance secular curriculum advancement against religious education sector resistance. Use VC appointment power to maintain party organizational presence in universities.

ACTIVE IN S05, S35

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of university governance by party through VC appointments), epistemic dependence (curriculum decisions made without adequate research infrastructure)

Role 9 Attorney General [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the state's legal representation in all courts, advises the government on constitutional matters, appears before the Supreme Court in government cases, and provides legal opinions on proposed legislation.

CONSTRAINTS The Attorney General is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the President on advice of the PM. Independence from the executive is structurally limited — the role is formally the government's chief lawyer, not an independent constitutional officer. The tension between legal officer obligations and political loyalty is the defining structural challenge of the role.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the President (formally), to the PM and cabinet (practically), and to the legal and constitutional obligations of the office. Bangladesh's Attorney Generals have historically been politically aligned with the ruling party.

PRESSURES Government direction on litigation strategy that may conflict with legal ethics, Supreme Court expectations of professional conduct, constitutional principle on which the government's instructions may sit uneasily, and public scrutiny on high-profile government cases.

OBJECTIVE Represent the government's legal interests effectively while maintaining enough professional credibility to function as a legitimate constitutional officer. Navigate the structural tension between the role's political appointment basis and its professional legal obligations.

ACTIVE IN S15, S16, S17, S37, S38, S41, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of legal advisory function by executive), justificatory subordination (professional legal judgment subordinated to political instruction)

Role 10 Speaker of Parliament [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Presides over parliamentary sessions, rules on points of order and procedure, controls the parliamentary agenda in coordination with the government, certifies money bills, and has authority to suspend MPs for conduct violations.

CONSTRAINTS Formally required to be impartial. In Bangladesh's political environment, the Speaker is elected by the ruling party majority and in practice serves government interests in parliamentary management. The gap between formal impartiality requirement and structural political accountability to the ruling party is the defining tension of the role.

ACCOUNTABILITY Formally to the full parliament as an institution. Structurally to the ruling party that elected the Speaker to the chair. This accountability mismatch is one of the clearest examples of authority-accountability misalignment in Bangladesh's parliamentary design.

PRESSURES Government requests to manage debate and limit opposition speaking time, opposition demands for procedural fairness, constitutional obligations of impartial presiding, international parliamentary standards that the Speaker is expected to demonstrate.

OBJECTIVE Manage parliamentary sessions in ways that serve the government's legislative requirements while maintaining enough procedural credibility to prevent the opposition from successfully mounting a procedural legitimacy challenge.

ACTIVE IN S09, S11, S12, S13, S38

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (presides over full parliament but accountable to ruling party), structural capture (parliamentary procedure captured by executive majority)

Role 11 Deputy Speaker [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Presides in the Speaker's absence, assists in parliamentary administration, and chairs certain committee proceedings. Has less authority than the Speaker but faces the same structural tensions between formal impartiality and party accountability.

CONSTRAINTS Same Article 70 constraint as other ruling party MPs. Formal obligation of parliamentary impartiality when presiding, but structural accountability to the party that nominated the position.

ACCOUNTABILITY To parliament as institution when presiding, to party when voting, to the Speaker in administrative matters.

PRESSURES Similar to Speaker but with less direct exposure. Party management of time allocation when presiding, opposition demands for fair procedure, committee management expectations.

OBJECTIVE Support effective parliamentary function while maintaining party loyalty. This role is active primarily in scenarios where parliamentary procedure is contested.

ACTIVE IN S09, S11, S12, S13

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, justificatory subordination

Role 12 Parliamentary Whip — Ruling Party [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Enforces party discipline on legislative votes. Communicates the party line to MPs before votes. Manages attendance for quorum. Identifies potential defectors and applies pressure to maintain voting unity. Article 70 is the Whip's primary enforcement tool.

CONSTRAINTS Cannot override MPs' formal voting rights but can threaten party consequences including renomination denial and development fund access restriction. The Whip's authority is relational and coercive rather than formal and institutional.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the party leadership and PM who set the legislative agenda the Whip enforces. Zero accountability to the MPs the Whip manages — the relationship is downward pressure, not upward accountability.

PRESSURES MPs with genuine constituency reasons to deviate from party line, PM's office demanding 100% compliance, opposition attempting to peel off wavering government MPs, and the permanent management challenge of maintaining a coalition across diverse constituency interests.

OBJECTIVE Deliver the votes the party needs on every significant parliamentary decision. This role most directly operationalizes the justificatory subordination mechanism — the Whip's job is to ensure MPs prioritize party accountability over constituency accountability.

ACTIVE IN S09, S10, S11, S13

FAILURE MODES Justificatory subordination (the Whip's primary function is to enforce it), structural capture (of legislative votes by party leadership)

Role 13 Parliamentary Committee Chair [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a standing committee that provides oversight of a specific ministry or policy area. Can call ministers to testify, request documents, commission inquiries, and publish committee reports.

CONSTRAINTS Committee composition reflects parliamentary majority — ruling party controls most committee chairs and has majority membership. Government ministries can delay and limit document production. Committee reports require majority approval before publication. In Bangladesh's parliament, committee oversight has historically been limited in practice.

ACCOUNTABILITY To committee members collectively, to parliament as institution, and to the public interest in oversight. In practice, to the party that controls committee composition.

PRESSURES PM's office managing which issues receive committee attention, opposition committee members demanding genuine oversight, ministries resisting scrutiny, media attention on politically sensitive committee inquiries.

OBJECTIVE Provide meaningful oversight of government conduct within the political constraints of committee composition. This role demonstrates how parliamentary accountability mechanisms can be structurally captured without being formally eliminated.

ACTIVE IN S12, S15, S24, S37, S38

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of oversight mechanism by ruling majority), epistemic dependence (limited access to government documents)

Role 14 Member of Parliament — Swing Constituency (Pressure from Both Parties) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Holds a constituency where electoral margins are narrow and both parties have significant voter bases. Same formal powers as other MPs. Faces the most acute constituency accountability pressure of any parliamentary role — cannot afford to alienate either party's voter bloc entirely.

CONSTRAINTS Article 70 constrains party-line deviation. Constituency accountability is more acute than safe-seat MPs. The swing constituency nature means both voter loyalty and party loyalty are simultaneously under pressure — a structurally impossible position when party and constituency interests diverge.

ACCOUNTABILITY To a genuinely divided constituency, to the party that provided the nomination and organizational support, and to personal political survival.

PRESSURES Ruling party whip directives that alienate opposition-leaning constituents, constituency needs that require government cooperation the opposition discourages, opposition supporters expecting visible independence, party loyalists expecting full compliance.

OBJECTIVE Navigate the impossible geometry of the swing constituency MP — where full party compliance loses opposition voters and full independence loses party support. This role most vividly illustrates the structural cost of Article 70 to genuine constituency representation.

ACTIVE IN S09, S10, S13, S14, S38

FAILURE MODES Justificatory subordination (most acute form — both constituency and party accountability are structurally in conflict), authority-accountability misalignment

Role 15 Member of Parliament — Minority Community Representative [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Represents a constituency with significant Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, or indigenous minority population. Faces the specific structural challenge of advocating for minority community interests within a political system where minority rights are politically sensitive and minority community security depends on government goodwill.

CONSTRAINTS Article 70 constraint applies. Political calculation of minority advocacy — too visible an advocacy risks provoking majority backlash; insufficient advocacy fails the constituency. The minority community's physical security is partly dependent on the government's willingness to deploy protection — a structural dependency that limits the MP's independence.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the minority community that elected them, to the party that provided the nomination, and to the minority community's safety interests which may require government cooperation even when constituency interests conflict with party policy.

PRESSURES Minority community demands for visible advocacy, party requirements for discipline, security concerns that make confrontation risky, media attention on minority rights issues, and the awareness that minority community safety depends partly on government responsiveness.

OBJECTIVE Represent minority community interests within the structural constraints that make full advocacy risky and incomplete advocacy insufficient. Navigate the dependency trap in which the minority community's security needs compromise the representative's independence.

ACTIVE IN S05, S09, S32, S35

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (minority communities from effective political representation), justificatory subordination, authority-accountability misalignment

SECTION B — ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

Roles 16 through 25 · The integrity and constitutional architecture layer

Role 16 Chief Election Commissioner [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the Bangladesh Election Commission. Has constitutional authority over all aspects of national and local elections: voter registration, candidate vetting, polling station management, result certification, and electoral dispute adjudication.

CONSTRAINTS Appointed by the President on PM's recommendation — structural dependence on executive that formally independent constitutional mandate is designed to overcome but cannot fully eliminate. Operates under the Digital Security Act's broad provisions. International election observation creates external accountability but no enforcement mechanism.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the constitution, to the electorate, and formally to an independent commission structure. Practically to the executive that appointed the role and controls the security environment in which elections are administered.

PRESSURES PM's office signaling expectations on result management, opposition parties demanding fair process, international observers requiring transparency, field officials reporting operational problems, security forces whose deployment the Commission does not fully control.

OBJECTIVE Administer elections that are credibly free and fair enough to sustain Bangladesh's democratic legitimacy internationally while navigating executive pressure that has historically produced contested electoral outcomes. This is the role most directly implicated in Bangladesh's documented electoral integrity failures.

ACTIVE IN S01, S02, S03, S04, S06, S07, S08

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of electoral administration by ruling party), authority-accountability misalignment (independence claim without independent appointment or enforcement mechanism)

Role 17 Election Commissioner (Member) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Member of the Bangladesh Election Commission. Has voting rights within the Commission on major decisions. Can dissent from Commission majority decisions and, in principle, make dissent public.

CONSTRAINTS Same structural constraints as the Chief EC but with less formal authority. The ability to dissent publicly is a structural freedom that is rarely exercised in Bangladesh's political environment — dissent within a commission that the government effectively controls carries significant career risk.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the constitution and the electorate in principle. To the Commission majority that collectively certifies results. The Commissioner who dissents from a controversial certification faces personal exposure without institutional protection.

PRESSURES Commission majority dynamics, executive signaling, personal career considerations, professional integrity obligations, and the awareness that public dissent may be the only accountability mechanism available when Commission processes are captured.

OBJECTIVE Contribute to election administration with integrity within the Commission structure. This role specifically tests whether the structural freedom to dissent within an institution is exercised when dissent carries personal cost.

ACTIVE IN S01, S02, S04, S07, S08

FAILURE MODES Structural capture, epistemic dependence (limited independent information), justificatory subordination (institutional majority overrides individual judgment)

Role 18 Returning Officer (District Level) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Manages all electoral processes in an assigned district during an election period: candidate nomination receipt and vetting, polling station establishment, presiding officer deployment, result collection and transmission, and district-level result declaration.

CONSTRAINTS A civil servant appointed to the role — career entirely within the government bureaucracy. Has no institutional independence from the civil service hierarchy that is itself subject to political direction. Faces the most direct operational pressure of any electoral role during active elections.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Election Commission above and to the civil service hierarchy that controls career outcomes. The dual accountability creates the structural trap that produces electoral administration failures: Commission directives conflict with civil service political direction.

PRESSURES Election Commission directives, ruling party local leaders demanding favorable administration, opposition scrutiny agents watching for irregularities, Home Ministry security deployment decisions that affect polling access, and personal career consequences for decisions that displease either the Commission or the political hierarchy.

OBJECTIVE Administer the election accurately and legally in the district while managing the political pressure that Bangladesh's civil service-based electoral administration structure makes unavoidable. The district-level failures that produce nationally contested results originate in this role.

ACTIVE IN S01, S02, S06, S07

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (accountable to both Commission and civil service with conflicting requirements), structural capture (civil service hierarchy captured by ruling party)

Role 19 Presiding Officer (Polling Station) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Manages a single polling station during election day. Controls access to the station, oversees the ballot process, manages the ballot box from opening to sealing, certifies the station-level result, and signs result sheets.

CONSTRAINTS The lowest-ranking formal electoral official. Has essentially no institutional protection from local political pressure. Career entirely within the government structure. Physical safety in contested constituencies is a genuine concern. The pre-filled ballot allegation in the 2018 Bangladesh election — if accurate — would have been operationalized at this level.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Returning Officer and to the Election Commission through the chain above. In practice, to the local political environment that controls physical access to the polling station and whose agents are present throughout election day.

PRESSURES Local ruling party activists expecting favorable administration, opposition agents demanding procedure compliance, fear of physical consequences in contested constituencies, bureaucratic instruction from the chain above, and personal integrity.

OBJECTIVE Administer the polling station with procedural accuracy under conditions of direct local political pressure. This role demonstrates the gap between electoral law and electoral practice at the point of implementation — where democratic outcomes are most directly determined.

ACTIVE IN S01, S02

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (at the lowest institutional level, with no protection), authority-accountability misalignment (formal accountability to Commission, practical accountability to local political power)

Role 20 Constitutional Reform Council Member [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Member of the body established by Bangladesh's interim government in 2025 to advance the July Charter constitutional reforms. Has deliberative authority over constitutional design proposals. Can propose, support, oppose, and vote on reform measures.

CONSTRAINTS The Council's constitutional basis is itself contested — BNP lawmakers refused to take oaths citing lack of constitutional basis. The Council operates in a transitional political environment where reform legitimacy is disputed and political parties have competing interests in the reform agenda.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the constitutional reform mandate of the interim government, to the political parties whose cooperation is required for reform implementation, and to the people of Bangladesh whose governance system the reforms will determine.

PRESSURES Interim government direction on reform priorities, BNP pressure for early elections rather than extended reform, NCP student movement pushing for July Charter implementation, Jamaat-e-Islami on religious provisions, and international observers monitoring the reform process.

OBJECTIVE Advance constitutional reforms that improve structural fairness while building sufficient political legitimacy for those reforms to survive the next elected government. This role operates at the most fundamental level of governance design — changing the rules that determine how all other governance happens.

ACTIVE IN S37, S38, S40, S41, S46

FAILURE MODES Epistemic dependence (insufficient empirical basis for constitutional design choices), structural capture (reform process captured by competing political interests)

Role 21 Caretaker Government Adviser [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Senior adviser in a neutral caretaker government overseeing an election transition. Has executive authority during the caretaker period over day-to-day government functions while the elected government has stepped down.

CONSTRAINTS Legitimacy depends entirely on perceived neutrality. Any action that appears to favor a particular political party destroys the caretaker's purpose. Formal authority is broad but political capital is extremely fragile. The 2006-2007 Bangladesh caretaker crisis illustrates how quickly caretaker legitimacy can collapse.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the constitution, to the election commission for electoral matters, and to the public whose confidence in electoral neutrality the caretaker period is designed to protect.

PRESSURES Both major parties pressuring for favorable caretaker decisions, the military whose support is essential for caretaker stability, international community monitoring the transition, civil society demanding neutrality, and the media scrutinizing every decision for partisan implications.

OBJECTIVE Manage the government transition with sufficient neutrality that the election can proceed with credibility. This role is active in historical scenarios about the caretaker system's function and failure.

ACTIVE IN S03, S37, S46

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (broad executive authority with zero partisan legitimacy), structural capture (constant pressure from parties to capture the caretaker)

Role 22 Anti-Corruption Commission Chair [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission. Has statutory authority to investigate corruption allegations against any public official. Can recommend prosecution to the Attorney General.

CONSTRAINTS The ACC Chair is appointed by the government — the same government whose officials the Commission is designed to scrutinize. Prosecution requires Attorney General cooperation who is politically appointed. The Commission's independence is formally guaranteed but structurally undermined by the appointment and prosecution dependency chain.

ACCOUNTABILITY Formally to an independent commission mandate and to the rule of law. Practically to the government that appointed the Chair and can decline to prosecute the Commission's recommendations.

PRESSURES Politically sensitive corruption cases that implicate ruling party figures, government pressure to prioritize opposition-related cases, international anti-corruption standards, media on high-profile cases, and the structural trap in which genuine independence produces career consequences.

OBJECTIVE Demonstrate enough independence to maintain ACC credibility while operating within the structural constraints that prevent full independence. This role illustrates how anti-corruption institutions can be simultaneously formally independent and practically captured.

ACTIVE IN S22, S24, S43

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of accountability mechanism by the actors it is designed to scrutinize), authority-accountability misalignment

Role 23 Information Commissioner [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the Bangladesh Information Commission established under the 2009 Right to Information Act. Has authority to order disclosure of government information and to investigate RTI request denials.

CONSTRAINTS The Commission's enforcement mechanism is weak — it can order disclosure but compliance depends on government cooperation. The broader political environment in which state information access is treated as a security matter under the Digital Security Act limits the RTI regime's practical scope.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the right to information mandate of the RTI Act, to RTI applicants whose complaints the Commission adjudicates, and to the government that appointed the Commission and controls its budget.

PRESSURES Government ministries resisting disclosure, RTI applicants demanding enforcement of orders, digital security environment that frames information access as potential security risk, journalists whose investigative work depends on RTI access.

OBJECTIVE Enforce the right to information meaningfully within the structural constraints that limit enforcement. This role tests whether a weak accountability mechanism can function under political pressure — and what it produces when it cannot.

ACTIVE IN S27, S28

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of information access mechanism), epistemic dependence (information the Commission needs is controlled by the same actors whose disclosures it oversees)

Role 24 Human Rights Commission Chair [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the National Human Rights Commission. Has authority to investigate human rights complaints, publish findings, and recommend remedial action. Can conduct prison visits, receive complaints from victims, and publish annual reports.

CONSTRAINTS The Commission has no enforcement authority — all it can do is investigate and recommend. The government that appoints the Chair can ignore recommendations without consequence. In Bangladesh's political environment, the NHRC has operated with significant political constraint.

ACCOUNTABILITY To human rights norms and to the victims whose complaints the Commission receives. Formally to a mandate of independence. Practically to the government that appointed the Chair and controls whether recommendations are acted on.

PRESSURES Politically sensitive human rights cases involving security forces, government pressure to avoid findings that embarrass the administration, international human rights bodies monitoring Bangladesh's record, victims expecting effective advocacy, and the structural limitation that the Commission's only power is its credibility.

OBJECTIVE Use the Commission's credibility and public legitimacy to create accountability pressure on human rights violations even when formal enforcement mechanisms are unavailable. This role demonstrates accountability through naming and shaming rather than through institutional power.

ACTIVE IN S05, S29, S32, S35

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of accountability mechanism), authority-accountability misalignment (accountability mandate without enforcement authority)

Role 25 Delimitation Commission Chair [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the process of redrawing Bangladesh's 300 parliamentary constituency boundaries, which occurs every ten years. Has formal authority over boundary determination subject to established criteria of population equality and geographic integrity.

CONSTRAINTS Delimitation in Bangladesh, as in most parliamentary systems, creates opportunities for gerrymandering — drawing boundaries that favor the party in power. The Commission's formal independence is structurally undermined by the political salience of boundary decisions and the government's ability to influence criteria interpretation.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the constitutional principles of equal representation and to the electoral integrity of the delimitation process. Formally independent. Practically subject to the political context in which boundaries are drawn.

PRESSURES Ruling party pressure on boundary configuration that affects competitive seats, opposition scrutiny of every boundary decision, international electoral standards, geographic and demographic complexity of legitimate boundary drawing.

OBJECTIVE Draw boundaries that satisfy constitutional representation requirements while managing the political pressure that every boundary decision inevitably generates. This role illustrates how structurally fair institutional design can be undermined through technically legitimate process manipulation.

ACTIVE IN S06

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of boundary process by ruling party interest), epistemic dependence (technical criteria subject to politically convenient interpretation)

SECTION C — JUDICIARY

Roles 26 through 33 · The rule of law and constitutional review layer

Role 26 Chief Justice [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Heads Bangladesh's Supreme Court. Leads the Appellate Division. Has authority over Supreme Court case assignment, judicial administration, and — crucially — the constitutional review of legislation and executive action.

CONSTRAINTS Appointed by the President on PM's recommendation. The 16th Amendment controversy in Bangladesh (which attempted to give parliament the power to remove judges) illustrates the structural conflict between executive authority and judicial independence. The Chief Justice who ruled against the 16th Amendment faced severe consequences.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the constitution, to the rule of law, and to the judiciary as an institution. The accountability relationship that makes the role structurally significant: no democratic accountability (judges are not elected) but a constitutional accountability that should make the role immune from political direction — and in Bangladesh's case, frequently does not.

PRESSURES Executive pressure on constitutionally sensitive rulings, attorney general office on government litigation, media on high-profile cases, Bar associations, international legal standards, and the ever-present career calculus of judicial appointments in a politically controlled system.

OBJECTIVE Uphold constitutional integrity and judicial independence under structural conditions that make both difficult. This role most directly tests whether a formally independent institution can function independently when the actors who appointed it have strong preferences about its outputs.

ACTIVE IN S07, S15, S16, S17, S37, S38, S40, S41, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of judicial institution by executive appointment), authority-accountability misalignment (judicial authority without effective independence protection)

Role 27 High Court Judge [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Hears and decides cases in the High Court Division of Bangladesh's Supreme Court. Has jurisdiction over fundamental rights cases, writs against government action, and appellate review of lower court decisions.

CONSTRAINTS Appointed politically. Transfer and elevation within the judiciary are subject to government influence. The threat of transfer to less desirable postings has historically been used to manage judicial conduct in politically sensitive cases.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the constitution and the law, to litigants whose cases the judge decides, and to judicial independence principles. Structural accountability runs through the judicial hierarchy to the Supreme Court — but that hierarchy is itself politically influenced.

PRESSURES Government pressure on politically sensitive cases (particularly writs against government action), attorney general office on government cases, bar association on professional conduct, personal career considerations regarding transfer and elevation.

OBJECTIVE Decide cases according to law and conscience under conditions of political pressure that the structural design of the judicial appointment system makes difficult to fully resist. This role tests judicial independence at the individual level.

ACTIVE IN S15, S16, S17, S18, S41

FAILURE MODES Structural capture, justificatory subordination (professional judgment subordinated to career calculation)

Role 28 Magistrate (District Court) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Presides over a district-level court. Has jurisdiction over bail decisions, remand orders, initial criminal hearings, and summary trial matters. In the context of political cases, the magistrate's bail and remand decisions are the first institutional check on executive detention power.

CONSTRAINTS Career civil servant in the judicial administration. Subject to transfer and career pressure through the administrative hierarchy. The decision to deny bail in a political case — or to grant it against government preference — carries direct career consequences.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the law governing bail and remand, to accused persons whose liberty the magistrate's decisions determine, and through the judicial hierarchy to the High Court that reviews magistrate decisions on appeal.

PRESSURES Government prosecution requests for remand extension, defense counsel bail applications, public attention on politically prominent cases, personal career risk from decisions that either party finds unfavorable.

OBJECTIVE Apply the law on detention and bail with integrity under conditions of political pressure that the career structure of the magistracy makes difficult to ignore. The bail denied scenario is directly modeled on patterns documented in Bangladesh's recent political detention record.

ACTIVE IN S18, S29

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of bail decisions by political direction), justificatory subordination (legal judgment subordinated to career pressure)

Role 29 Public Prosecutor [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Represents the state in criminal proceedings. Decides which charges to bring, what evidence to present, and how vigorously to prosecute. In political cases, the decision to prosecute and the vigor of prosecution reflect government direction.

CONSTRAINTS Appointed by and serving government interests. Professional ethical obligations require independent assessment of the evidence — but the appointment structure and career consequences create structural incentives for politically directed prosecution decisions.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the law and to the evidential requirements of professional prosecution. To the government that appointed the role and whose political interests prosecution decisions frequently serve or undermine.

PRESSURES Government direction on politically sensitive prosecutions, professional ethics obligations on evidence standards, defense counsel challenges to prosecutorial conduct, media scrutiny of selective prosecution patterns.

OBJECTIVE Prosecute cases that meet legal evidentiary standards while navigating the political direction that Bangladesh's prosecution structure routinely produces. This role illustrates how criminal prosecution becomes an instrument of political control rather than law enforcement.

ACTIVE IN S15, S18, S29

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of prosecution function by executive), justificatory subordination (professional judgment subordinated to political direction)

Role 30 Defense Lawyer — Political Case [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Represents a defendant charged in a politically motivated or politically sensitive criminal case. Has professional obligations to mount the best possible defense while operating in a legal environment where defense of politically unpopular clients carries professional and sometimes physical risk.

CONSTRAINTS Operates in a legal environment where the government controls prosecution, judicial appointments, and — through the bar association's political composition — aspects of professional discipline. Defense of opposition politicians, journalists, or human rights activists has historically involved professional risk in Bangladesh.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the client whose defense is the lawyer's primary obligation, to professional ethical standards, and to the rule of law principle that every accused person is entitled to a defense. No institutional protection from government pressure.

PRESSURES Client's instructions and interests, ethical obligation of zealous defense, personal safety risk in high-profile political cases, bar association environment, government signaling about acceptable defense conduct.

OBJECTIVE Provide the most effective possible defense within a legal environment structurally skewed against it. This role illustrates the rule of law as experienced from the defense side — the structural conditions that determine whether the right to a defense means anything in practice.

ACTIVE IN S15, S18

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of effective defense from political cases), structural capture (of legal environment by executive)

Role 31 Supreme Court Registrar [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Manages Supreme Court administration: case filing, scheduling, documentation, and court operations. Has significant procedural power — the Registrar controls when cases are listed for hearing, which can determine whether urgent relief is available.

CONSTRAINTS Civil servant within the court administration. Subject to both judicial hierarchy pressure and civil service structural norms. The scheduling function creates opportunities for politically motivated delay without formal judicial direction.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Chief Justice and the court administration, to procedural rules that govern case management, and to litigants whose cases the Registrar's scheduling decisions affect.

PRESSURES Requests from both government and opposition counsel for favorable scheduling, judicial hierarchy direction on court management, litigant pressure on urgent cases, and the structural opportunity to manage politically sensitive cases through administrative decisions.

OBJECTIVE Manage court administration with procedural integrity under conditions where administrative decisions have political consequences. A secondary role active primarily in scenarios involving judicial access and delay.

ACTIVE IN S16, S17

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of procedural administration by political direction), epistemic dependence (limited information about judicial hierarchy preferences)

Role 32 Special Tribunal Judge [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Presides over a special tribunal established for a specific category of cases — war crimes, terrorism, or digital security offenses. Special tribunals in Bangladesh have been created with specific procedural rules that differ from ordinary criminal courts.

CONSTRAINTS Special tribunals are established by executive decision with procedural rules set by the government. The combination of special procedures, limited appeal rights, and political sensitivity of the cases makes structural capture more acute than in ordinary courts.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the special tribunal's mandate and to the procedural rules established for it. The accountability to ordinary judicial independence norms is structurally weaker in special tribunal contexts.

PRESSURES Government direction on case handling, media attention on high-profile trials, international scrutiny of special tribunal procedures, defense counsel challenges to procedural fairness, political salience of verdict outcomes.

OBJECTIVE Conduct proceedings with credibility in a tribunal structure that has reduced the normal institutional protections for judicial independence. This role illustrates the structural fairness implications of special judicial procedures.

ACTIVE IN S15, S20

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of tribunal structure by executive mandate), justificatory subordination

Role 33 Legal Aid Officer [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Provides free legal assistance to individuals who cannot afford representation. Operates within a government-funded legal aid scheme. Handles the most resource-constrained legal work in Bangladesh's justice system.

CONSTRAINTS Severely under-resourced. Case loads are impossibly large. The quality of legal aid representation structurally cannot match the representation available to wealthy defendants. This structural inequality is the primary fairness problem the role inhabits.

ACCOUNTABILITY To legal aid clients whose interests the officer represents, to the legal aid scheme administration, and to professional ethics. The accountability to clients is real but the structural capacity to serve those clients is structurally insufficient.

PRESSURES Impossible case loads, client vulnerability, resource constraints, the awareness that adequate representation is structurally unavailable given the resources provided, and professional ethical obligations to clients who are not receiving adequate service.

OBJECTIVE Provide the best possible legal representation within structurally inadequate resources. This role demonstrates the structural unfairness in justice access that Fairness Index Domain 2 measures — experienced from the inside of the system rather than as an observer.

ACTIVE IN S06, S10, S18

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (poor defendants from equal justice access), authority-accountability misalignment (professional obligation without adequate resources)

SECTION D — LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Roles 34 through 43 · The municipal and district governance layer

Role 34 City Mayor — Dhaka North or South [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Elected mayor of one of Dhaka's two city corporations. Controls city budget, infrastructure spending, service delivery (waste, roads, drainage), and city corporation appointments. One of Bangladesh's most visible local governance positions.

CONSTRAINTS Dependent on national government for significant portions of city funding. Political alignment with the ruling party determines access to central government development funds. Opposition mayors face severe resource deprivation. City corporations in Bangladesh operate in a dual accountability structure between elected mayor and centrally appointed officials.

ACCOUNTABILITY To Dhaka city residents who elected the mayor, to the city corporation council, and practically to the national ruling party whose resource allocations determine what the mayor can actually deliver.

PRESSURES National government development fund allocation decisions, city corporation council dynamics, opposition political mobilization against city governance, media on city service delivery failures, business community on commercial district development.

OBJECTIVE Deliver visible city service improvements while managing the resource dependency on the national government that structurally constrains what an opposition-aligned mayor can achieve. This role illustrates how local democracy is structurally subordinated to national political control through resource dependency.

ACTIVE IN S21, S22, S34, S42

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (elected accountability to residents, resource accountability to national party), structural capture (of local government by national political control)

Role 35 City Mayor — Chittagong [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Elected mayor of Bangladesh's second largest city. Controls port city infrastructure, commercial district governance, and city services. Chittagong's port significance makes the mayoral role particularly intersected with national economic interests.

CONSTRAINTS Same structural constraints as Dhaka mayoral roles plus the additional complexity of port authority intersections and the military's institutional presence in Chittagong.

ACCOUNTABILITY To Chittagong residents, to the city corporation, and to national political party alignment that determines resource access.

PRESSURES Port authority relationships, national government development funding, commercial district business interests, opposition mobilization, and the city's geographic significance for Bangladesh's export economy.

OBJECTIVE Govern Chittagong effectively within the national resource dependency constraints and the specific political pressures of a strategically significant port city.

ACTIVE IN S21, S22, S43

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, structural capture

Role 36 Upazila Chairman [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Elected head of an upazila (sub-district) administration. Oversees development spending at the upazila level, coordinates between union parishads and district administration, and manages local governance in Bangladesh's second-tier local government structure.

CONSTRAINTS Heavily dependent on the DC (District Commissioner) and on national government development allocation. The upazila chairman in Bangladesh operates in a governance structure where civil service officials (UNO) have significant authority that elected officials cannot override.

ACCOUNTABILITY To upazila residents, to the upazila council, and to national party structures that control development funding. The dual accountability between elected office and civil service authority is structurally acute at the upazila level.

PRESSURES DC and UNO authority over development implementation, national government fund allocation, union parishad chairmen demanding upazila resources, local party leaders, and constituency service expectations.

OBJECTIVE Deliver local development outcomes through a governance structure that distributes authority between elected officials and civil servants in ways that frequently produce accountability confusion.

ACTIVE IN S22, S35

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (elected authority without commensurate resource control), structural capture (local government by civil service hierarchy)

Role 37 Union Parishad Chairman [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Elected head of Bangladesh's most local governance tier — the union parishad, covering approximately 25,000-30,000 people. Has authority over local development spending, dispute resolution, birth and death registration, and basic local services.

CONSTRAINTS Severely resource-constrained. Dependent on upazila and national government for development funds. The most direct accountability relationship with citizens — a Union Parishad Chairman is accessible to constituents in ways that no national politician is. Also the most exposed to local patronage pressure.

ACCOUNTABILITY Directly to the 25,000-30,000 people in the union. The most genuine constituency accountability relationship in Bangladesh's governance structure — also the most resource-constrained.

PRESSURES Constituent demands for direct service delivery, local party leaders on development allocation decisions, upazila administration on fund release, disputes between community members requiring local adjudication.

OBJECTIVE Serve constituents with extremely limited resources while managing local party and community pressures. This role demonstrates governance at the most granular level — where structural fairness or unfairness is most directly felt by ordinary people.

ACTIVE IN S21, S22, S35

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (strongest constituency accountability with weakest resource authority), structural exclusion (poorest communities from effective local governance)

Role 38 Ward Councilor (City Corporation) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Elected representative for a ward within a city corporation. Closest elected position to urban residents. Handles local complaints, facilitates citizen access to city services, and has minor development budget authority.

CONSTRAINTS Minimal formal authority relative to constituency expectations. Dependent on mayor and city corporation administration for resources. The ward councilor's formal power is largely limited to facilitating access to other government actors — a structural position of intermediary rather than autonomous authority.

ACCOUNTABILITY To ward residents, to the city corporation, and to the political party that provided organizational support for election.

PRESSURES Constituent service demands that exceed the councilor's formal authority, party expectations on local political management, the mayor's development spending priorities that may not align with ward needs.

OBJECTIVE Navigate the gap between constituent service expectations and the formal authority and resources the role actually provides. This role illustrates how local representation can be structurally insufficient even when formally provided.

ACTIVE IN S21, S33

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (high constituency accountability with very limited authority)

Role 39 District Commissioner (DC) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Senior civil servant administering a district. Coordinates all government activities in the district, controls disaster relief fund distribution, manages law and order in coordination with police, and is the primary representative of the national government at the district level.

CONSTRAINTS Civil servant entirely within the government hierarchy. Career advancement depends on political acceptability. The DC's dual function — serving both the government as political actor and the population as administrative servant — creates a structural tension that Bangladesh's civil service culture resolves in favor of the political hierarchy.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Ministry of Public Administration, to the national government, and formally to the population of the district. In practice, to the political direction of the national ruling party that controls civil service transfers and promotions.

PRESSURES Ministry direction on district administration, ruling party local leaders expecting favorable resource allocation, district-level disasters and crises requiring emergency response, police coordination on law and order, opposition political actors whose requests receive structurally different treatment.

OBJECTIVE Administer the district effectively while managing the political direction that Bangladesh's civil service structure makes structurally unavoidable. The DC's resource allocation decisions in disaster contexts are among the most directly consequential local governance decisions — and the most politically influenced.

ACTIVE IN S22, S32, S35, S42

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of civil service by ruling party), authority-accountability misalignment (administrative accountability to population, career accountability to political hierarchy)

Role 40 Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Senior civil servant at the upazila level. Coordinates government activities at the upazila, manages development project implementation, and is the primary civil service counterpart to the elected Upazila Chairman.

CONSTRAINTS Civil servant in the government hierarchy with significant authority over development implementation that the elected chairman nominally controls. The UNO-Chairman relationship is structurally tense — the elected official has political authority, the civil servant has administrative control.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the DC above in the civil service chain, to the Ministry of Public Administration, and formally to the public interest of the upazila. The UNO is not accountable to the elected Chairman — creating a structural division between elected governance and civil service administration at the upazila level.

PRESSURES DC direction from above, elected chairman pressure from the political side, constituent demand for development project delivery, national government development program implementation requirements.

OBJECTIVE Implement national government development programs effectively while managing the structural tension with the elected chairman whose political authority the UNO's administrative authority frequently supersedes in practice.

ACTIVE IN S22, S35

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (civil service authority over elected official's nominal domain)

Role 41 Local Government Minister [BD Track]

AUTHORITY National cabinet minister with oversight of Bangladesh's local government structure. Sets policy on local government financing, supports or constrains local government autonomy, and manages the relationship between national and local governance tiers.

CONSTRAINTS Constrained by the ruling party's interest in maintaining central control over local resources — genuine local government autonomy threatens the patronage system that local resource control enables. The Minister who genuinely empowers local government weakens central party organizational control.

ACCOUNTABILITY To cabinet and the PM, to the parliament's local government committee, and formally to the principle of local government. In Bangladesh's governance environment, the Local Government Minister is primarily accountable to the national party's organizational interests.

PRESSURES Local government officials demanding greater autonomy and resources, national party leadership expecting maintenance of central control, international development partners supporting local government strengthening, and the structural tension between genuine decentralization and party organizational interests.

OBJECTIVE Develop local government policy that maintains sufficient central control for party organizational purposes while providing enough local autonomy to maintain the international and domestic legitimacy of Bangladesh's local governance system.

ACTIVE IN S34, S35, S37

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, structural capture (of local governance by national political control)

Role 42 Women's Reserved Seat Councilor [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Holds one of the seats reserved for women in city corporation or upazila councils — appointed by political parties based on their share of elected seats rather than directly elected. Has full formal voting rights in council.

CONSTRAINTS The reserved seat mechanism provides representation without constituency accountability — the councilor is accountable to the party that appointed the seat rather than to a specific electorate. This structural design creates representatives without the constituency accountability relationship that makes representation meaningful.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the party that appointed the position, to the women of the area the seat nominally represents, and to the council as an institution. The accountability to women's interests is structurally weaker than the accountability to party interests because the appointment rather than election mechanism removes constituency accountability.

PRESSURES Party direction on council voting, women's constituency expectations for visible advocacy, the structural tension between the reserved seat's symbolic representation function and its practical accountability deficit.

OBJECTIVE Represent women's interests meaningfully within a structural design that makes constituency accountability — the mechanism through which representatives are held accountable — unavailable. This role directly illustrates the Fairness Index Domain 1 Question 5 issue.

ACTIVE IN S33

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (representative without constituency accountability), structural exclusion (women from direct electoral representation)

Role 43 Municipal Commissioner [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Elected commissioner of a smaller municipality (pourashava). Governs basic municipal services in a smaller urban center — market management, local roads, drainage, and minor development spending.

CONSTRAINTS Severely resource-constrained. Municipal authorities in Bangladesh receive minimal central government transfers and have limited revenue-raising capacity. The gap between resident expectations and available resources is structurally large.

ACCOUNTABILITY To municipal residents, to the municipal authority, and to the national government for development fund access.

PRESSURES Constituent service demands, national government development fund access politics, local business interests, and the resource constraint that makes almost any service delivery commitment structurally difficult to fulfill.

OBJECTIVE Govern a municipality with structural resource constraints that make the gap between formal authority and practical capacity acute. A secondary role active in local governance and resource allocation scenarios.

ACTIVE IN S21, S22

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, structural exclusion (smaller municipalities from adequate resource allocation)

SECTION E — CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA

Roles 44 through 53 · The accountability, voice, and civic engagement layer

Role 44 Editor — National Daily Newspaper [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Controls editorial direction of a major Bangladeshi daily newspaper. Has authority over news selection, editorial position, investigative reporting decisions, and the publication of content that may displease either political party or powerful business interests.

CONSTRAINTS Operates under the Digital Security Act, which criminalizes broadly defined online content and has been used against journalists. Newspaper ownership in Bangladesh is frequently connected to business interests with political relationships. Advertising dependency creates commercial pressure on editorial independence.

ACCOUNTABILITY To readers, to professional journalism standards, and to the public interest in press freedom. Practically to newspaper ownership, to advertisers, and to the legal environment that the DSA creates.

PRESSURES DSA prosecution risk on sensitive stories, ownership direction on politically sensitive coverage, advertiser pressure on business-critical reporting, journalism ethics obligations, and the operational reality that staff journalists face personal risk from aggressive stories.

OBJECTIVE Maintain meaningful press freedom and investigative journalism within an environment where both the legal framework and ownership structure create structural constraints on editorial independence. This role illustrates why press freedom requires structural protection, not just personal courage.

ACTIVE IN S27, S28, S29, S30, S31

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of press by DSA legal threat and ownership interests), structural exclusion (of critical journalism from safe publication)

Role 45 Journalist — Investigative Reporter [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Conducts investigative journalism on governance, corruption, and political conduct. Has professional obligation to pursue and publish stories in the public interest regardless of their political sensitivity.

CONSTRAINTS Direct personal exposure to DSA prosecution, physical intimidation, and professional harassment. The investigative journalist in Bangladesh's current environment faces structural risks that are not managed through institutional protection because the institutions that should provide protection — courts, police, bar associations — are themselves subject to political direction.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the public whose right to information the journalist serves, to professional journalism ethics, and to the news organization that provides the institutional platform (however constrained).

PRESSURES Personal safety risk from politically connected story subjects, DSA prosecution threat, editorial decisions that balance story significance against staff safety, source protection obligations, and pressure from ownership or advertisers on sensitive stories.

OBJECTIVE Pursue and publish investigative journalism that serves the public interest while managing personal safety and legal risks that Bangladesh's governance environment makes acute. This role demonstrates press freedom as a personal rather than institutional condition — the structural failure of a system in which journalists bear individual risk for institutional accountability functions.

ACTIVE IN S27, S28, S29, S30

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of press freedom from institutional protection), structural capture (of information environment by DSA enforcement)

Role 46 NGO Director — Governance and Rights [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a civil society organization working on governance reform, human rights, or democratic accountability in Bangladesh. Has authority over organizational programming, public advocacy, and research publication.

CONSTRAINTS NGO registration and operation in Bangladesh requires government approval under the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act. The government's discretionary authority to revoke registration creates a structural constraint on NGO independence. Organizations whose work displeases the government face registration pressure.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the organization's mission, to the communities and causes it serves, to international donors whose funding it depends on, and to the government whose regulatory authority it operates under.

PRESSURES Government regulatory pressure on politically sensitive programming, international donor requirements that may not align with local political realities, community partners whose safety depends on NGO positioning, and professional obligations to the rights and governance work the organization exists to advance.

OBJECTIVE Advance governance and rights work within the structural constraints that Bangladesh's NGO regulatory environment creates. This role illustrates how civil society organizations operate under structural capture threat — the regulatory ability to close organizations that challenge power.

ACTIVE IN S05, S29, S32, S35

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of civil society by regulatory threat), structural exclusion (of critical civil society from political legitimacy)

Role 47 University Vice Chancellor [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a public university. Has formal academic authority over curriculum, faculty appointments, student affairs, and university administration. In Bangladesh, VC appointments are political — creating structural tensions between academic independence and political loyalty.

CONSTRAINTS Appointed by the government. Student politics in Bangladesh is dominated by the Chhatra League (ruling party student wing), which VCs cannot challenge without executive displeasure. Academic freedom obligations conflict with political appointment accountability.

ACCOUNTABILITY To academic freedom and the university community, to the government that appointed the position, and to the Ministry of Education that oversees university administration.

PRESSURES Chhatra League student wing pressure on campus governance, Ministry direction on politically sensitive academic matters, faculty academic freedom demands, and the appointment accountability that makes academic independence structurally costly.

OBJECTIVE Maintain university function and academic credibility while managing the political accountability that the appointment structure creates. This role illustrates how academic institutions can be structurally captured through appointment processes while formally remaining independent.

ACTIVE IN S05, S12

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of academic institution by political appointment), justificatory subordination (academic judgment subordinated to political accountability)

Role 48 Student Union President [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the student representative body at a university. In Bangladesh's political environment, student union leadership is typically affiliated with a major political party — the Chhatra League or Chhatra Dal. Has significant campus influence and is a key pipeline role for future political careers.

CONSTRAINTS Student union politics in Bangladesh is deeply integrated with national party politics. The independence of student union leadership from party direction is structurally limited. The student union president operates as a party political actor on campus rather than as an independent student representative.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the student body the union nominally represents and to the party whose organizational extension the union functions as in Bangladesh's political culture.

PRESSURES Party direction on campus political management, student constituent demands for academic and welfare representation, administration pressure on politically sensitive student activism, and the career path calculation that student union leadership in Bangladesh represents.

OBJECTIVE Manage campus politics while navigating the tension between genuine student representation and the party political function that Bangladesh's student union culture assigns. This role is particularly relevant in scenarios involving student protest and political mobilization.

ACTIVE IN S05

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of student representation by party politics), justificatory subordination (student interests subordinated to party direction)

Role 49 Trade Union Leader [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a trade union in Bangladesh's garment sector or other major industry. Has authority to represent workers in wage negotiations, organize industrial action, and advocate for worker safety and labor rights.

CONSTRAINTS Union registration requires government approval. Union organizers face employer harassment and dismissal. In the garment sector, which employs 4 million workers and generates 80% of Bangladesh's export revenue, labor organizing faces structural resistance from both employers and government whose export interests align with labor cost suppression.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the union membership whose wages and working conditions the leader negotiates, to labor law obligations, and to the political and economic environment that constrains what labor advocacy can achieve.

PRESSURES Employer threats of factory relocation for wage demands, government reluctance to enforce labor protections, international buyer requirements on worker welfare, union members' economic vulnerability to job loss through strikes, and the physical intimidation that Bangladesh's labor organizing history documents.

OBJECTIVE Advance worker interests in wages and conditions within a structural environment that systematically disadvantages labor relative to capital in Bangladesh's export economy. This role demonstrates the structural exclusion of worker interests from effective political standing.

ACTIVE IN S25, S43

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of worker interests from political standing), structural capture (of labor regulation by export economic interests)

Role 50 Religious Leader — Community Influence [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Holds significant religious authority within a Muslim-majority community in Bangladesh. Has influence over community opinion, can mobilize community members politically, and occupies a social position that both political parties court and attempt to manage.

CONSTRAINTS Religious authority in Bangladesh's political context creates both influence and structural exposure — religious leaders who challenge the government on political grounds face legal risk, while those who align too strongly with opposition religious politics face government pressure. The structural position is one of significant social capital with constrained political expression.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the religious community whose spiritual guidance and community leadership the role provides, and to the governance system within which the community lives.

PRESSURES Government pressure on political statements, opposition political parties seeking endorsement, community members expecting leadership on governance issues affecting the community, international religious freedom monitors.

OBJECTIVE Exercise religious leadership and community influence within Bangladesh's political environment. This role is relevant in scenarios involving communal tension, religious freedom, and the political mobilization of religious community sentiment.

ACTIVE IN S31, S32

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of religious community concerns from political process), structural capture (of religious authority by partisan political interests)

Role 51 Business Association Chair [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a major business association — the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) or equivalent. Represents business sector interests in government policy processes.

CONSTRAINTS Business associations in Bangladesh have significant political influence through campaign finance and economic leverage, but operate in a political environment where the ruling party's favors and the business community's interests are deeply intertwined. The association chair cannot challenge ruling party policy without risking member businesses' access to government contracts and approvals.

ACCOUNTABILITY To association members whose business interests the chair represents, and to the political environment that determines access to government resources and regulatory approvals that businesses require.

PRESSURES Government policy decisions affecting member businesses, member interests that may conflict with public welfare (wage suppression, safety standards), international buyer requirements on labor and environmental standards, media on business sector conduct.

OBJECTIVE Advance business sector interests within the political dependency structure that Bangladesh's mixed economy creates. This role illustrates how business interests and political interests become structurally intertwined in ways that undermine both market efficiency and democratic accountability.

ACTIVE IN S23, S24, S25, S43, S49

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of policy process by business interests), authority-accountability misalignment (business influence without democratic accountability)

Role 52 Social Media Influencer — Political [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Operates a significant social media presence focused on Bangladesh political commentary. Reaches hundreds of thousands of followers on Facebook, YouTube, or other platforms. Has significant public opinion influence without formal institutional position.

CONSTRAINTS Operates entirely within the DSA's legal risk environment. Political commentary on social media in Bangladesh has resulted in prosecution, arrest, and imprisonment under the DSA. The influencer's reach creates influence but also visibility that makes DSA prosecution risk acute.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the audience whose attention and trust the influencer has built, to professional content standards, and to personal safety in an environment where content can result in criminal prosecution.

PRESSURES DSA prosecution risk on political commentary, audience expectations for critical content, political party pressure (both to amplify party messages and to suppress opposition commentary), and the platform algorithms that reward engagement over accuracy.

OBJECTIVE Maintain political commentary reach and credibility within the DSA's broad and unpredictable prosecution risk. This role demonstrates how digital spaces that appear free can be structurally captured through broad legal provisions.

ACTIVE IN S27, S28, S31

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of digital political speech from safety), structural capture (of information environment by DSA)

Role 53 International Election Observer [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Leads or participates in an international election observation mission in Bangladesh. Has authority to observe polling, interview election officials and voters, review electoral documentation, and publish an observation report.

CONSTRAINTS Has no enforcement authority — the observation mission can document and report but cannot compel electoral authorities to change conduct. Access to polling stations is subject to host government cooperation. The observation mission's credibility depends on the accuracy of its reporting and on its willingness to make findings that may displease the host government.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the electoral integrity standards the observation mission is mandated to assess, to the international body that deployed the mission, and to the voters of Bangladesh whose democratic rights the mission exists to support.

PRESSURES Host government pressure on mission access and finding framing, pressure from both ruling party and opposition on findings, the tension between maintaining access (which requires some host government goodwill) and accurate reporting (which may cost that goodwill), and professional election observation standards.

OBJECTIVE Conduct an accurate and credible election observation that serves democratic accountability without sacrificing access that future missions require. This role illustrates the structural limitations of international election monitoring — significant legitimacy effect with zero enforcement power.

ACTIVE IN S01, S04, S07, S08

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (accountability mandate without enforcement authority), epistemic dependence (access dependent on host government cooperation)

SECTION F — SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION

Roles 54 through 60 · The enforcement and state apparatus layer

Role 54 Inspector General of Police [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Heads Bangladesh's national police force. Commands all police operations, sets policing priorities, manages senior appointments within the police hierarchy, and is the primary interface between the political executive and the security apparatus on law and order matters.

CONSTRAINTS Career civil servant who serves at the government's pleasure. In Bangladesh's political environment, the IGP is expected to align police operations with government political requirements. The formal obligation of impartial law enforcement and the structural accountability to the ruling government are in permanent tension.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the law, to parliament through the Home Ministry, and to the government that appointed the position. In practice, primarily to the Home Minister and through the Minister to the PM.

PRESSURES Home Ministry political direction, professional policing obligations, public order situations requiring rapid operational decisions, international human rights scrutiny of police conduct, and the career consequences of decisions that either enforce the law impartially (risking political displeasure) or enforce it selectively (risking credibility).

OBJECTIVE Maintain effective policing while navigating political direction that Bangladesh's police command structure routinely produces. The IGP who orders action against ruling party supporters

faces career consequences; the IGP who fails to protect minority communities faces human rights scrutiny. There is no structurally safe position.

ACTIVE IN S05, S07, S15, S29, S32, S42, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of policing by political direction), authority-accountability misalignment (law enforcement accountability to political rather than legal authority)

Role 55 District Superintendent of Police (SP) [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Commands police operations in an assigned district. Has direct operational authority over policing decisions in the district — deployment, investigation priorities, arrest decisions, and crowd management.

CONSTRAINTS Career officer accountable to the IGP and through the IGP to the political hierarchy. District-level policing decisions in Bangladesh are heavily influenced by local political dynamics — the SP who enforces the law against ruling party activists faces transfer; the SP who protects minority communities from attack faces political pressure.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the law and to the communities the SP is mandated to protect. Structurally to the police hierarchy that controls career outcomes and to the political environment of the district.

PRESSURES Political direction from the local MP and DC, professional policing obligations, personal safety in post-Hasina environment where police legitimacy has collapsed, community expectations for protection, and the career calculation of each operationally significant decision.

OBJECTIVE Police the district with integrity in an environment where structural constraints on policing independence make impartial enforcement personally costly. The SP role demonstrates policing's structural position between political direction and legal obligation.

ACTIVE IN S05, S29, S32, S42

FAILURE MODES Structural capture, authority-accountability misalignment

Role 56 Army Brigade Commander [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Commands a brigade-level military formation. Has authority over the military assets within the brigade's area of responsibility. In Bangladesh's political context, the military's relationship with civilian governance is a fundamental structural question — the Bangladesh Army has intervened in politics directly and maintains significant institutional autonomy.

CONSTRAINTS Operates within a military chain of command that is formally subject to civilian oversight but that has historically exercised independent political influence in Bangladesh. The brigade commander who receives ambiguous orders in a political crisis faces the most structurally significant decision in the role library.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the military chain of command, to constitutional civilian oversight, and to the Constitution of Bangladesh. The accountability structure becomes structurally acute when these loyalties conflict — as they have multiple times in Bangladesh's political history.

PRESSURES Chain of command ambiguity during political crises, constitutional civilian oversight obligations, awareness of the military's historical role in Bangladesh's politics, personal professional and ethical judgment about constitutional obligations.

OBJECTIVE Maintain military discipline and constitutional conduct during political crises that test the boundary between legitimate civilian direction and unconstitutional political intervention. This is the role most directly relevant to democratic transitions, coups, and the constitutional role of military power.

ACTIVE IN S42, S46

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (military power without democratic accountability), structural capture (potential of governance by military authority)

Role 57 RAB Commander [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Commands the Rapid Action Battalion — Bangladesh's elite paramilitary force with a documented history of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and the targeted elimination of criminal and political opponents. The US imposed sanctions on RAB leadership in 2021.

CONSTRAINTS Operates under direct government political direction with less judicial and institutional oversight than the regular police. The RAB's operational mandate gives commanders significant extrajudicial latitude — creating structural conditions for abuse that the historical record documents extensively.

ACCOUNTABILITY Formally to the chain of command and to the law. In practice, to political direction that RAB's mandate and operational culture has historically aligned with regardless of legal constraint.

PRESSURES Government direction on targets and operations, professional military standards that extrajudicial operations violate, international sanctions environment, personal legal exposure from internationally documented extrajudicial conduct, and the organizational culture that has normalized rights-violating operations.

OBJECTIVE Manage RAB operations within the structural conditions that have produced a documented human rights record. This role is the most ethically challenging in the library — it places the participant directly inside an institution whose structural design facilitates systematic rights violations.

ACTIVE IN S05, S29

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of extrajudicial force by executive political direction), authority-accountability misalignment (lethal operational authority without independent legal oversight)

Role 58 Secretary — Ministry of Home Affairs [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Senior civil servant leading the administrative machinery of the Home Ministry. Coordinates between political ministers and operational departments, manages ministry budget and administration, and is the civil service counterpart to the Home Minister's political direction.

CONSTRAINTS Civil servant in the government hierarchy. The Home Ministry Secretary who resists ministerially directed police politicization faces transfer; the Secretary who facilitates it faces professional ethics violations. The structural position is between professional civil service standards and political direction.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the civil service code, to the Home Minister above, and to the administrative function of the Home Ministry.

PRESSURES Ministerial political direction on security operations, civil service professional standards, operational departments seeking administrative support, and the career calculus of civil servants in politically sensitive positions.

OBJECTIVE Administer the Home Ministry with professional integrity while managing the political direction that Bangladesh's civil service culture makes structurally normal. A secondary role active in security and policing scenarios.

ACTIVE IN S05, S28, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural capture, justificatory subordination

Role 59 Chief Secretary — Cabinet Secretariat [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Most senior civil servant in Bangladesh. Coordinates cabinet operations, manages the flow of policy decisions between ministries and the PM's office, and is the apex of the civil service hierarchy. Has significant administrative authority and institutional knowledge.

CONSTRAINTS Serves at the pleasure of the PM. The Chief Secretary who maintains professional standards that conflict with political direction faces immediate replacement. The structural position is the apex of a civil service that is systematically subordinated to political direction in Bangladesh.

ACCOUNTABILITY Formally to the civil service code and to good governance principles. Practically to the PM and cabinet whose administrative machine the Chief Secretary manages.

PRESSURES PM direction on politically sensitive administrative matters, civil service professional standards, inter-ministry coordination challenges, and the institutional knowledge about governance that makes the Chief Secretary's position strategically important.

OBJECTIVE Administer the government machinery with integrity while operating at the intersection of civil service professionalism and political direction where that integrity is most structurally challenged.

ACTIVE IN S42, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of civil service apex by political direction), justificatory subordination

Role 60 Border Guard Bangladesh Commander [BD Track]

AUTHORITY Commands the border security force responsible for Bangladesh's frontiers — including the Bangladesh-Myanmar border relevant to Rohingya movement, the Bangladesh-India border relevant to trade and migration, and the coastal border relevant to maritime security.

CONSTRAINTS Operates at the intersection of border security, migration, international relations, and humanitarian law. The Rohingya situation places the BGB commander in a structural position where border security obligations, humanitarian law, and political direction from the government are in simultaneous tension.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the military chain of command, to border security law, to Bangladesh's international humanitarian obligations, and to the political direction of the government on migration and border policy.

PRESSURES Government direction on Rohingya border management, humanitarian law obligations on refugee protection, Myanmar military operations that drive refugee flows, India border management coordination, and the operational reality of a 4,156 km border with limited resources.

OBJECTIVE Manage Bangladesh's borders within the intersection of security, humanitarian, and political obligations that the Rohingya crisis and regional geopolitics create. This role is active primarily in scenarios involving Rohingya refoulement, regional security, and humanitarian border management.

ACTIVE IN S34, S36

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (security mandate conflicting with humanitarian obligation), epistemic dependence (incomplete information about cross-border conditions)

— End of Chapter 5 —

Next: Chapter 6 — The Global Role Library: All 40 Roles Fully Specified

CHAPTER 6

The Global Role Library: All 40 Roles Fully Specified

The Global Track of the PlayerOne role library comprises 40 governance roles drawn from international institutions, major power governments, regional organizations, and global civil society. These roles extend the platform's simulation scope beyond Bangladesh's national governance context to the international institutional architecture through which global governance operates — and through which global governance consistently fails to deliver structural fairness to the populations most affected by its decisions.

The inclusion of a Global Track in PlayerOne reflects the Universal Governance Framework dimension of the Equitism project. The structural failure modes that produce governance unfairness at the national level — authority-accountability misalignment, structural capture, epistemic dependence, structural exclusion — appear with equal clarity at the international institutional level. The UN Security Council's veto mechanism produces structural exclusion of all member states from decisions made by five permanent members. The IMF's conditionality architecture produces authority-accountability misalignment between the conditions set by international institutions and the populations who bear their consequences. The ICC's jurisdiction constraints produce structural capture of international criminal accountability by the geopolitical interests of powerful states. These are not peripheral features of global governance — they are its structural design, and they produce the same kind of governance unfairness that Equitism identifies at the national level.

The Global Track roles are organized into four groupings: International Institutions (Roles 61–72), National Leaders of Major Powers (Roles 73–82), Regional and Developing World Leaders (Roles 83–92), and Global Civil Society and Media (Roles 93–100). Each role is fully specified across the same six dimensions as the Bangladesh Track: authority, constraints, accountability, pressures, objective, active scenarios, and structural failure modes. Global Track roles are marked with navy accent coloring throughout the platform — visually distinguishing them from the Bangladesh Track's green palette.

The structural unfairness of global governance is not accidental. It is the product of an institutional architecture designed by the powerful, implemented by the

powerful, and interpreted by the powerful — in which the populations most affected by global governance decisions have the least formal standing to shape them.

SECTION A — INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Roles 61 through 72 · The multilateral governance layer

Role 61 United Nations Secretary-General [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief administrative officer of the United Nations. Has authority to convene Security Council emergency sessions, publish independent reports on international peace and security situations, deploy Good Offices missions, appoint Special Envoys, and represent the UN institutionally in international diplomatic contexts.

CONSTRAINTS The Secretary-General's authority is formally constrained by member state sovereignty and practically constrained by the P5 veto. Any initiative that threatens the interests of a permanent Security Council member can be vetoed, defunded, or politically isolated. The SG who acts too independently of major power preferences loses the political capital required for the role's effectiveness.

ACCOUNTABILITY To all 193 UN member states through the General Assembly, to the Security Council on peace and security matters, and to the UN Charter's principles. In practice, the SG's accountability is asymmetrically weighted toward the P5 states whose political support determines the role's effectiveness.

PRESSURES P5 divergence on critical security situations that makes Security Council action impossible, developing member states demanding stronger advocacy on their interests, humanitarian crises requiring faster action than political consensus permits, and the permanent tension between the SG's independent voice and the political dependency on member state support.

OBJECTIVE Advance UN institutional effectiveness and uphold Charter principles while managing the structural reality that the SG's authority depends entirely on member state cooperation that is never guaranteed and frequently withheld. Navigate the gap between the moral authority of the role and the structural power it lacks.

ACTIVE IN S36, S40, S45, S47, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (global mandate with no enforcement authority), structural exclusion (of most member states from Security Council decision-making), epistemic dependence (limited independent information from conflict zones)

Role 62 UN Security Council President (Rotating) [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Monthly rotating chair of the Security Council. Has procedural authority over Council meeting agendas, can convene emergency sessions, and sets the tone and pace of Council deliberations during the presidential month.

CONSTRAINTS The presidency rotates among all 15 Council members on a monthly basis. The rotating president has no veto authority and cannot override permanent member vetoes. The procedural authority of the presidency is significant in agenda-setting but cannot overcome the fundamental structural constraint of P5 unanimity requirements.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Security Council membership collectively and to the UN Charter. In practice, the presidency's accountability to the P5 states whose cooperation makes any Council action possible.

PRESSURES P5 members' bilateral pressure on agenda priorities, the rotating member states' interests in using the presidency to advance their own national priorities, humanitarian advocacy from the SG and member states for emergency action, and the media attention that the Security Council's deliberations attract.

OBJECTIVE Use the procedural authority of the presidency to advance the Council's effectiveness within the structural constraints that the veto system creates. This role most directly illustrates how formal authority (setting the agenda) and real power (determining outcomes) diverge in structurally captured institutions.

ACTIVE IN S36, S40, S45, S47, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (procedural authority without veto power), structural capture (of Council outcomes by P5 interests)

Role 63 UN Special Rapporteur — Human Rights [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Independent UN expert appointed to monitor and report on a specific human rights situation or thematic issue. Has authority to conduct country visits, receive individual complaints, publish findings and recommendations, and address communications to governments.

CONSTRAINTS Has no enforcement authority whatsoever. Country visits require host government consent. Reports can be ignored without consequence. Governments whose rights records are criticized can withdraw cooperation with the mandate. The Special Rapporteur's only power is the credibility of findings and the reputational pressure that credible findings can generate.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the UN Human Rights Council that established the mandate, to the people whose rights situations the Rapporteur monitors, and to the human rights norms the mandate is designed to protect.

PRESSURES Government pressure to soften findings or accept access conditions that limit investigation scope, the tension between maintaining country access (which requires some government goodwill) and publishing accurate findings (which may cost that goodwill), NGO partners providing information and expecting strong findings, and the media attention that credible reporting can generate.

OBJECTIVE Produce credible, accurate, independent human rights findings that generate accountability pressure on rights-violating governments through naming, shaming, and international diplomatic cost — the only mechanism available when enforcement authority is structurally absent.

ACTIVE IN S05, S30, S32, S34, S36

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (accountability mandate with zero enforcement power), structural exclusion (of accountability mechanism from effective action)

Role 64 World Bank President [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the World Bank Group. Controls the world's largest multilateral development lending institution — approximately $100 billion in annual commitments. Has authority over lending decisions, policy conditions, technical assistance programs, and the institutional policy frameworks that shape development economics globally.

CONSTRAINTS Formally appointed by the US (the Bank's largest shareholder), which has dominated Bank leadership selection. Operationally constrained by the Board of Executive Directors representing member states. Conditionality frameworks are determined by economic orthodoxy, shareholder interests, and donor government preferences — not by recipient country populations who bear conditionality consequences.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Board of Executive Directors (weighted by capital share — wealthy countries have disproportionate votes), to the Bank's mandate of poverty reduction, and to the professional

standards of development economics. In practice, the Bank President's primary accountability runs to the major shareholder governments whose political support determines institutional effectiveness.

PRESSURES Major shareholder government pressure on lending decisions with geopolitical dimensions, recipient government negotiations on conditionality terms, civil society criticism of conditionality effects on vulnerable populations, IMF coordination requirements, and the tension between the Bank's poverty mandate and its governance by wealthy country interests.

OBJECTIVE Direct World Bank resources toward genuine development impact while navigating the governance structure that gives wealthy countries disproportionate control over an institution whose decisions most affect poor countries. This role most directly illustrates global governance's authority-accountability misalignment — decisions made by those least affected by their consequences.

ACTIVE IN S23, S26, S36, S47, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (institutional decisions by wealthy shareholders affecting poor populations), structural exclusion (of recipient populations from decision-making)

Role 65 IMF Managing Director [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the International Monetary Fund. Controls access to IMF emergency financing — the lender of last resort for countries facing balance of payments crises. Has authority over conditionality requirements attached to IMF programs, surveillance of member country economies, and technical assistance deployment.

CONSTRAINTS Managing Director appointment is conventionally reserved for European nominees (as the World Bank presidency is for Americans) — a structural arrangement that concentrates leadership of the two most powerful international financial institutions in wealthy country nationals. Conditionality decisions must navigate Executive Board approval with weighted voting favoring major shareholders.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the IMF Board of Governors and Executive Directors (weighted by quota — GDP-linked voting shares that give wealthy countries disproportionate influence), to the IMF mandate of international monetary stability, and to the populations of countries receiving IMF programs whose living standards conditionality directly affects.

PRESSURES Borrowing country governments negotiating conditionality terms that affect millions of citizens, major shareholder governments with geopolitical interests in country-level IMF decisions, market pressure that limits the negotiating space for flexible conditionality, and civil society criticism of austerity conditionality effects on the poor.

OBJECTIVE Deliver IMF support for economic stability while managing the structural governance deficit of an institution whose most consequential decisions are made by wealthy countries for poor countries. The IMF conditionality scenario is the most direct illustration of this structural failure at the global level.

ACTIVE IN S23, S26, S44, S47, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (conditionality set by wealthy country shareholders affecting poor country populations), structural exclusion (of recipient populations from IMF governance)

Role 66 International Criminal Court Prosecutor [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Has authority to investigate situations involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, request arrest warrants from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, and conduct prosecutions of individuals referred to the Court.

CONSTRAINTS The ICC has jurisdiction only over states parties to the Rome Statute — the world's most powerful states (US, Russia, China) are not members. Security Council referral can extend jurisdiction but is blocked by P5 veto when major powers are implicated. Arrest warrant execution depends on state cooperation. Suspects from non-member states often cannot be apprehended. Selective prosecution creates credibility challenges when African cases dominate while Western power-enabled situations receive no investigation.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Rome Statute, to the ICC Assembly of States Parties, to victims seeking accountability for atrocity crimes, and to the principle of international criminal justice. The accountability gap: the Prosecutor has no accountability to the Security Council members whose political decisions determine which situations can be prosecuted.

PRESSURES Security Council political dynamics that determine whether referrals are possible, state cooperation requirements for evidence and arrest, selectivity criticism from states who perceive investigation bias, victim community expectations for accountability, and the tension between legal sufficiency and political feasibility of prosecution decisions.

OBJECTIVE Pursue international criminal accountability within the structural constraints that the ICC's jurisdiction architecture creates. This role most directly illustrates how international law can be structurally captured by geopolitical interests through selective jurisdiction design.

ACTIVE IN S19, S36, S40

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of major power actions from ICC jurisdiction), structural capture (of international criminal justice by P5 veto power)

Role 67 International Court of Justice Judge [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Member of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Has authority to adjudicate disputes between states that consent to ICJ jurisdiction and to issue advisory opinions on legal questions referred by UN organs.

CONSTRAINTS ICJ jurisdiction requires state consent — states cannot be brought before the Court without agreeing to its jurisdiction. Advisory opinions are not legally binding on states. Compliance with ICJ judgments depends on political will of the respondent state and Security Council enforcement, which is blocked by P5 veto when a permanent member is implicated.

ACCOUNTABILITY To international law, to the ICJ Statute, and to the states that have consented to the Court's jurisdiction. The ICJ Judge's accountability runs to legal principle and the judicial institution — not to any political authority, which is the design intention of judicial independence. In practice, judicial selections reflect geopolitical balancing in the General Assembly election of judges.

PRESSURES Complex legal arguments from state parties with significant geopolitical stakes in the outcome, the tension between legal principle and the political context in which international law operates, advisory opinion requests that carry significant geopolitical implications, and the knowledge that compliance with ICJ judgments depends on political factors the Court cannot control.

OBJECTIVE Apply international law with judicial integrity and independence in a context where the enforcement of judgments depends on political will that the Court cannot compel. This role demonstrates the rule of law at the international level — where legal authority exists without enforcement mechanism.

ACTIVE IN S19, S36, S40, S47

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (judicial authority without enforcement mechanism), structural exclusion (of non-consenting states from ICJ accountability)

Role 68 World Health Organization Director-General [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the primary international public health authority. Has authority to declare Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC), coordinate international outbreak response, set international health standards, and deploy WHO technical resources globally.

CONSTRAINTS PHEIC declaration triggers international response obligations but depends on member state cooperation for implementation. Major member states can withhold information (as China did in early COVID-19), challenge declarations, and defund the organization. The US withdrawal from WHO during COVID illustrates how member state defection can cripple the organization's response capacity.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the World Health Assembly (all member states), to the IHR framework, to global public health outcomes, and to the member states whose cooperation and funding make WHO function. The accountability to the populations affected by WHO's disease response is significant but structurally indirect.

PRESSURES Major member state pressure on outbreak declarations with economic consequences, information withholding by states whose outbreaks are politically sensitive, funding pressure from major donors, the tension between evidence-based public health decision-making and the political consequences of PHEIC declarations, and the media amplification of WHO's decisions and credibility.

OBJECTIVE Protect global public health through coordinated international response while managing the structural dependency on member state cooperation that the pandemic governance scenario most vividly illustrated. Navigate the tension between public health necessity and the political consequences that accurate, timely outbreak declarations carry.

ACTIVE IN S45

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (global public health mandate with no enforcement authority), epistemic dependence (relies on member states for disease surveillance information they may withhold)

Role 69 UNHCR High Commissioner [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees — the primary international institution responsible for refugee protection. Has authority to declare refugee emergencies, coordinate international protection responses, negotiate with host governments on refugee access and rights, and manage the world's largest humanitarian operation.

CONSTRAINTS Has no enforcement authority over state treatment of refugees. Host state cooperation is essential and cannot be compelled. Non-refoulement — the principle that refugees cannot be returned to persecution — is international law but has no enforcement mechanism beyond diplomatic pressure. UNHCR's operational capacity depends on donor state funding that can be conditioned or withdrawn.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, to refugee populations whose protection is the mandate, to host state governments whose cooperation is essential, and to donor states whose funding enables operations. The accountability to refugees themselves is moral and normative — UNHCR has no legal mechanism for refugee populations to hold it accountable.

PRESSURES Host state governments restricting refugee access or pushing refoulement, donor state pressure on operational priorities, refugee population needs that exceed available resources, the political sensitivity of refugee situations in host countries, and the tension between refugee protection principles and the political feasibility of enforcing them.

OBJECTIVE Protect refugees within the structural constraints that make refugee protection dependent entirely on state cooperation that cannot be compelled. The Rohingya scenario is the most direct illustration — UNHCR must negotiate protection with a host state (Bangladesh) that is under its own severe structural pressures.

ACTIVE IN S34, S36, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (protection mandate without enforcement power), structural exclusion (of refugee populations from their own protection governance)

Role 70 WTO Director-General [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the World Trade Organization. Has authority over the WTO's dispute settlement system, trade negotiations facilitation, and the Secretariat that supports multilateral trade governance. Chairs key WTO bodies and represents the organization externally.

CONSTRAINTS The WTO operates by consensus — any member can block decisions. The dispute settlement system has been paralyzed by US refusal to approve Appellate Body appointments, eliminating the binding appeal mechanism. Trade negotiations have been deadlocked since the Doha Round failure in 2008. The DG's formal authority operates within an institution whose primary mechanisms are structurally paralyzed.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the WTO membership collectively, to the multilateral trading system's principles, and to the developing countries whose trade interests the DG must balance against major power preferences. WTO governance is formally one-country-one-vote — but trade negotiating power is not.

PRESSURES Major power divergence on trade policy (US-China trade war dynamics, European regulatory standards conflicts), developing country demands for fairer agricultural trade, Appellate Body paralysis that undermines dispute settlement credibility, and the structural tension between free trade principles and the political economy of trade protection.

OBJECTIVE Maintain WTO relevance and advance multilateral trade governance in an environment where the organization's core mechanisms are paralyzed by major power politics. This role illustrates institutional capture at the global level — where the formal governance structure (consensus) has been weaponized to produce institutional paralysis.

ACTIVE IN S23, S47, S48, S49

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of multilateral trade governance by major power political conflicts), authority-accountability misalignment

Role 71 UNESCO Director-General [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Has authority over UNESCO's standard-setting activities in education, science, culture, and communication, World Heritage Site designation, and international cultural preservation programs.

CONSTRAINTS UNESCO is perpetually underfunded — the US withdrew twice and withheld contributions during those periods, significantly constraining the organization's capacity. World Heritage Site designations have become geopolitically contested. Press freedom advocacy operates in tension with member state sensitivities. The organization's relevance is in permanent question amid its funding constraints.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the UNESCO General Conference (all member states), to the education, science, culture, and communication mandates, and to the principle of cultural heritage preservation as a global public good.

PRESSURES Major donor state pressure on politically sensitive designations and positions, developing country demands for greater cultural sovereignty recognition, press freedom advocacy in tension with authoritarian member state sensitivities, and the perpetual resource constraint of an underfunded organization.

OBJECTIVE Advance UNESCO's cultural and educational mandate within severe resource constraints and geopolitical tensions. A secondary global role active in scenarios involving cultural rights, education access, and press freedom.

ACTIVE IN S30, S36

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, structural exclusion (of cultural heritage protection from adequate resourcing)

Role 72 UNDP Administrator [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the United Nations Development Programme — the UN's primary development agency. Has authority over UNDP's global development programming, technical assistance deployment, the Human Development Index publication, and coordination of UN development system activities in country.

CONSTRAINTS UNDP's programming effectiveness depends on host government partnership, donor state priorities, and the political context of development in countries where governance is contested. The UNDP Administrator must navigate relationships with both authoritarian governments (whose cooperation enables programming) and civil society (whose independence requires protection from those governments).

ACCOUNTABILITY To UNDP's Executive Board (balanced between developed and developing countries), to development mandate, and to the human development principle underlying UNDP's work. The accountability to the populations whose development UNDP serves is structurally indirect — mediated through government partnerships that may not represent those populations' interests.

PRESSURES Host government limitations on civil society engagement, donor state conditionality on programming priorities, the tension between development effectiveness (which requires government partnership) and democratic governance support (which may require challenging government conduct), and the coordination demands of the UN development system.

OBJECTIVE Advance human development through UNDP programming while managing the structural tensions between government partnership requirements and the populations those governments may not adequately represent. Active in scenarios involving development conditionality and governance-development linkages.

ACTIVE IN S26, S36, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, structural exclusion (of development populations from effective voice in UNDP programming)

SECTION B — NATIONAL LEADERS OF MAJOR POWERS

Roles 73 through 82 · The geopolitical power layer

Role 73 President of the United States [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the world's largest economy and most powerful military. Has authority over US foreign policy, trade policy, international agreement participation, military deployment, and the exercise of P5 Security Council veto power. Shapes global governance through both multilateral institutional engagement and unilateral action.

CONSTRAINTS Constrained by US Congress on treaty ratification, appropriations, and war powers. Domestic political pressures frequently override multilateral obligations — the US withdrawal from WHO, Paris Agreement, and TPP illustrate how domestic politics can structurally undermine international institutions. Electoral cycle creates a four-year horizon that competes with long-term international commitments.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the US electorate, to Congress, to the US Constitution, and — in principle — to international obligations the US has undertaken. In practice, the President's accountability to domestic political constituencies frequently overrides international commitments when the two conflict.

PRESSURES Congressional opposition to multilateral commitments, domestic political constituencies whose economic interests conflict with trade liberalization or climate action, allied governments expecting US leadership on global governance, adversarial powers (China, Russia) whose geopolitical competition shapes every significant international decision.

OBJECTIVE Advance US national interests while maintaining the international leadership role that US power has historically defined — navigating the structural tension between domestic political accountability and international institutional responsibility that makes the United States simultaneously indispensable and unreliable in global governance.

ACTIVE IN S40, S45, S47, S48, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (global power with domestic accountability only), structural exclusion (of global populations from US decision-making that affects them)

Role 74 US Secretary of State [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief US diplomat and foreign policy executor. Has authority over US diplomatic relationships, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, sanctions designations, and the coordination of US foreign policy across government agencies.

CONSTRAINTS Subject to presidential direction and constrained by Congressional oversight, confirmation processes for ambassadors, and the domestic political environment. US sanctions policy — a primary tool of Secretary-level foreign policy — has significant extraterritorial effects that create governance conflicts with allies.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the President, to Congress through confirmation and oversight, and to US foreign policy goals. No formal accountability to the governments or populations most affected by US foreign policy decisions.

PRESSURES Presidential direction that may conflict with diplomatic best practice, Congressional pressure on specific bilateral relationships, allied government expectations, adversarial government retaliation against US actions, and the media attention that high-profile diplomatic decisions attract.

OBJECTIVE Execute US foreign policy with effectiveness and diplomatic credibility while managing the domestic constraints and international consequences that US power creates. Active in scenarios involving bilateral pressure, sanctions, and international institutional decisions.

ACTIVE IN S08, S30, S40, S47, S48

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (significant global impact with domestic accountability only), structural exclusion

Role 75 President of the People's Republic of China [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of the PRC — combining party, military, and state leadership. Commands the world's second largest economy, largest military, and one of five P5 Security Council vetoes.

CONSTRAINTS Constrained by the internal dynamics of the CCP leadership structure, by the economic interests of state-owned enterprises and party-connected business, by the military's institutional interests, and by the political legitimacy requirements of delivering economic development and national security. External democratic accountability is absent by design.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the CCP leadership and internal party accountability mechanisms, to the Chinese population's expectations of economic development and national sovereignty, and to China's national interests as the party defines them. No external democratic accountability mechanism.

PRESSURES Internal party factions on policy direction, economic growth targets that shape foreign policy flexibility, Taiwan and South China Sea sovereignty positions that constrain international cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative partner governments, and the strategic competition with the United States.

OBJECTIVE Advance Chinese national interests and CCP legitimacy through economic development and international influence expansion while managing the structural tensions that China's

governance model creates with liberal democratic international norms. Active in scenarios involving China's international role, South Asia, and global governance reform.

ACTIVE IN S26, S40, S47, S48, S49, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (global power exercised without democratic accountability), structural exclusion (of Chinese population from meaningful governance participation)

Role 76 Chinese Foreign Minister [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief diplomat of the People's Republic of China. Executes Chinese foreign policy across bilateral relationships, multilateral institutions, and the Belt and Road Initiative's diplomatic dimensions.

CONSTRAINTS Serves at the pleasure of the President/General Secretary. Chinese foreign policy is determined at the top of the party hierarchy — the Foreign Minister is an executor rather than a policy-maker. Constrained by party political line on Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and South China Sea that admits no diplomatic flexibility.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the President and party leadership, to CCP foreign policy doctrine, and to China's stated national interests. No external accountability mechanism.

PRESSURES Party line requirements on sovereignty issues, bilateral relationship management with both partners and adversaries, multilateral institutional positioning that advances Chinese interests, and the coordination with economic and military ministries whose actions shape China's diplomatic environment.

OBJECTIVE Advance Chinese diplomatic interests and international positioning within the party political constraints that the role's executor function creates. Active in scenarios involving Chinese regional influence, South Asian dynamics, and global institutional reform.

ACTIVE IN S26, S40, S47, S48, S49

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, structural capture (of foreign policy by party political doctrine)

Role 77 Prime Minister of India [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Head of government of the world's most populous democracy and largest South Asian power. Has authority over Indian foreign policy, economic policy, and the exercise of regional power in South Asia — including the relationship with Bangladesh that is critical to multiple PlayerOne scenarios.

CONSTRAINTS Constrained by coalition politics, by the Indian Parliament, by the federal structure that gives states significant autonomy, and by the domestic political environment in which Hindu nationalist politics has reshaped India's international positioning. The India-Bangladesh relationship is constrained by domestic Indian politics on border management, river sharing, and minority treatment in Bangladesh.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Indian electorate, to Parliament, to the Constitution, and to India's democratic accountability mechanisms — the most robust in the Global Track's national leader roles. External accountability to neighboring populations affected by Indian power is structurally absent.

PRESSURES Coalition management domestically, Pakistan and China strategic competition, SAARC engagement where India's regional dominance creates structural tensions, Bangladesh relationship management on water sharing and trade, and the domestic Hindu nationalist political environment that shapes India's international positioning.

OBJECTIVE Advance Indian national interests and regional leadership while managing the structural tensions that India's democratic governance, regional dominance, and domestic political

dynamics create simultaneously. Active in scenarios involving South Asian regional relations, water rights, and Bangladesh's relationship with its largest neighbor.

ACTIVE IN S34, S47, S48, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (regional power with national accountability only), structural exclusion (of neighboring populations from decisions that significantly affect them)

Role 78 Indian Foreign Minister [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief diplomat of India. Manages bilateral relationships across a complex neighborhood, India's engagement with major powers, and India's positioning in multilateral institutions. The India-Bangladesh bilateral relationship involves the Teesta River, trade access, border management, and the treatment of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh.

CONSTRAINTS Constrained by domestic political sensitivities on Pakistan, China, Bangladesh minority issues, and the electoral politics that shape which bilateral accommodations are politically feasible. India's foreign policy has the additional constraint of managing strategic competition with China while maintaining economic relationships that both countries need.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the Prime Minister and cabinet, to parliamentary oversight, and to India's national interest as defined by the ruling coalition's political priorities.

PRESSURES Domestic political constraints on bilateral negotiations, Pakistan and China strategic pressures, US-India strategic partnership management, Bangladesh relationship complexity on water and minority issues, and the regional power dynamics that make Indian foreign policy simultaneously demanded and resented by neighbors.

OBJECTIVE Execute Indian foreign policy with strategic effectiveness while navigating the domestic political constraints that democratic accountability creates. Active in Bangladesh-India bilateral scenarios.

ACTIVE IN S34, S47, S48

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment, structural exclusion (of affected neighboring populations from bilateral decision-making)

Role 79 President of the European Commission [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the EU's primary executive body. Has authority over EU legislative proposals, budget management, trade negotiations on behalf of the EU, and the representation of EU interests in international forums.

CONSTRAINTS Constrained by the Council of the EU (member state governments) and the European Parliament — both of which must approve Commission initiatives. The Commission President navigates between 27 member states' divergent interests, which requires constant consensus-building that slows and constrains EU action.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the European Parliament that confirmed the appointment, to the member state Council, to EU treaties, and ultimately to EU citizens through the democratic chain. The EU's multilevel accountability structure is among the most complex in the Global Track.

PRESSURES Member state divergence on foreign policy (where unanimity is required), European Parliament pressure on democratic governance and rights issues, major power relationships (US, China, Russia), trade policy negotiations, and the tension between EU integration deepening and member state sovereignty concerns.

OBJECTIVE Advance EU institutional interests and values — democracy, rule of law, human rights, free trade — while managing the consensus requirements that make EU action simultaneously more

legitimate and slower than major power unilateral action. Active in scenarios involving international trade, democracy support, and global governance.

ACTIVE IN S26, S36, S47, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (multilevel governance with complex accountability chain), structural exclusion (of non-EU populations from EU decision-making that affects them)

Role 80 Prime Minister of the United Kingdom [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Head of government of a P5 permanent Security Council member and significant middle power. Has authority over UK foreign policy, defense, international development, and the exercise of UN Security Council veto power.

CONSTRAINTS Post-Brexit UK governance operates with reduced multilateral institutional embeddedness — outside the EU single market and customs union, UK foreign policy has more flexibility but less structural weight in European decision-making. Constrained by Parliament, by the electoral cycle, and by the economic consequences of post-Brexit trade repositioning.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the UK Parliament, to the electorate, and to UK constitutional convention. External accountability to populations affected by UK foreign policy and P5 veto decisions is structurally absent.

PRESSURES Parliamentary opposition on international commitments, post-Brexit economic adjustment pressures, US alliance management, European relationship reconstruction, and the UN Security Council dynamics that the UK's P5 seat creates.

OBJECTIVE Exercise UK global influence through diplomacy, Security Council engagement, and international development while managing the post-Brexit structural repositioning that reduced UK's multilateral institutional weight. Active in global governance and Security Council scenarios.

ACTIVE IN S36, S40, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (global veto power with national accountability only), structural exclusion

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Role 81 President of the Russian Federation [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Head of state of a P5 permanent Security Council member. Has authority over Russian foreign policy, military deployment, and the exercise of the Security Council veto that has blocked international action on Syria, Ukraine, and multiple other situations. Russia's security sector has been documented in multiple international criminal investigations.

CONSTRAINTS Formally constrained by the Russian constitution, which has been modified to extend presidential tenure. In practice, external accountability mechanisms are structurally absent — Russia's governance system concentrates authority at the presidential level with weak institutional counterweights. International accountability through ICC proceedings faces the same jurisdiction constraints as other non-member states.

ACCOUNTABILITY To Russian domestic political constituencies whose nationalism the presidency represents, to the security establishment, and to the constitutional framework that the presidency has progressively reshaped to consolidate authority.

PRESSURES Domestic political legitimacy requirements, military-security establishment interests, economic pressure from international sanctions, and the geopolitical competition with the United States and NATO that structures Russian foreign policy.

OBJECTIVE Advance Russian national interests and presidential legitimacy within an international environment shaped by the consequences of Russian military action. Active in Security Council and global governance scenarios where Russian veto power is determinative.

ACTIVE IN S36, S40

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of Security Council by P5 veto when Russia is implicated), authority-accountability misalignment (global veto power with no external accountability)

Role 82 G20 Chair (Rotating) [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chairs the Group of Twenty — the primary forum for international economic cooperation among the world's major economies. Sets the G20 agenda, convenes Summits, leads negotiations on communique language, and represents the G20 in international contexts during the chair year.

CONSTRAINTS The G20 Presidency rotates among member countries on an annual basis. The Chair can set agenda priorities but cannot override member state objections. G20 declarations require consensus — which means the lowest common denominator of agreement among states with significantly divergent economic interests and governance models.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the G20 membership collectively, to the international economic governance mission the G20 was created to serve, and to the domestic political constituencies of the chair country.

PRESSURES G20 member state divergence on trade, climate, debt, and digital governance, major power bilateral tensions that spill into G20 multilateral negotiations, global economic crises that require faster action than G20 consensus permits, and the domestic political context of the chair country that shapes its agenda priorities.

OBJECTIVE Use the G20 chair year to advance international economic governance on priority issues while managing the consensus requirements that produce lowest-common-denominator outcomes. Active in scenarios involving global economic governance and climate finance.

ACTIVE IN S23, S26, S44, S50

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of international economic governance by major power interests), structural exclusion (of non-G20 countries from decisions that affect global economy)

SECTION C — REGIONAL AND DEVELOPING WORLD

Roles 83 through 92 · The regional governance and transitional democracy layer

Role 83 SAARC Secretary General [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief administrative officer of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation — the primary regional organization connecting Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. Has authority over SAARC's Secretariat, the convening of SAARC summits, and regional cooperation programming.

CONSTRAINTS SAARC has been effectively paralyzed by India-Pakistan tensions since 2016. The organization cannot function without the participation of its two largest members. The SAARC Secretary General leads an organization whose institutional effectiveness is hostage to a bilateral conflict that neither party has resolved. All SAARC decisions require consensus among members with fundamentally divergent interests.

ACCOUNTABILITY To SAARC member states collectively and to the principle of South Asian regional cooperation. In practice, the SG's effectiveness depends entirely on India-Pakistan diplomatic temperature that the office cannot control.

PRESSURES India-Pakistan bilateral tensions that determine whether summits can be held, smaller member states' expectations for regional cooperation benefits, China's growing regional influence

through BRI that competes with SAARC's institutional mandate, and the structural paralysis that has made SAARC one of the world's least effective regional organizations.

OBJECTIVE Maintain SAARC's institutional existence and advance whatever limited regional cooperation is politically feasible while managing the structural constraint that India-Pakistan hostility has imposed on the organization. This role illustrates how bilateral conflict can produce institutional capture at the regional level.

ACTIVE IN S47, S48

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of regional institution by bilateral conflict), authority-accountability misalignment (regional mandate without regional political cooperation)

Role 84 OIC Secretary General [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief administrative officer of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation — the second largest intergovernmental organization after the UN, comprising 57 member states. Has authority over OIC programming, the convening of Islamic summits, and advocacy on issues affecting Muslim-majority countries globally.

CONSTRAINTS The OIC's 57 member states span enormous governance diversity — from democracies to absolute monarchies to military-governed states — making consensus on governance standards impossible. The OIC's Islamophobia Observatory mandate conflicts with its member states' own rights records. The organization's effectiveness on Palestine advocacy has not translated to Rohingya protection despite Bangladesh's membership.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the OIC member states and to the Islamic Cooperation mandate. The accountability gap: the OIC's primary accountability is to member state governments, not to Muslim populations globally whose rights the OIC claims to represent.

PRESSURES Member state divergence on Palestine, Rohingya, and other Muslim minority situations, the tension between sovereignty respect and rights advocacy for Muslim minorities in non-member states, Saudi Arabia-Iran sectarian dynamics that shape OIC coherence, and the resource dependency on wealthy Gulf state donors.

OBJECTIVE Advance OIC member state interests and Muslim minority advocacy within the structural constraints that the organization's governance diversity and consensus requirements create. Active in scenarios involving Rohingya protection and international Muslim community governance.

ACTIVE IN S34, S36

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of Muslim populations from effective OIC advocacy for their rights), structural capture (of OIC by member state sovereignty norms over human rights)

Role 85 African Union Commission Chair [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the African Union Commission — the secretariat of the 55-member African Union. Has authority over AU programming, peace and security operations, the African Continental Free Trade Area, and continental governance standard-setting.

CONSTRAINTS The AU's Constitutive Act includes provisions for intervention in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity — more progressive than the UN Charter. But implementation depends on member state political will and the financial contributions that AU member states frequently fail to deliver. The AU Commission Chair leads an institution with progressive norms but limited enforcement capacity.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the AU Assembly (all 55 member heads of state), to the AU Commission, and to the principle of African continental integration. The Chair's effectiveness depends on the diplomatic capital to build consensus among 55 diverse member states with competing interests.

PRESSURES Member state divergence on responses to coups and unconstitutional governance changes, resource mobilization from member states with chronic contribution arrears, major power competition (US, China, EU, Russia) for African institutional influence, and the tension between the AU's democratic governance norms and the governance reality of many member states.

OBJECTIVE Advance African continental integration and governance while managing the structural gap between the AU's progressive normative framework and the political will of member states to implement it. Active in scenarios involving transitional governance, coups, and African governance.

ACTIVE IN S20, S36, S46

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (continental mandate with no enforcement authority), structural exclusion (of African civil society from AU decision-making)

Role 86 ASEAN Chair (Rotating) [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chairs the Association of Southeast Asian Nations during the annual rotation. Sets the ASEAN agenda, convenes summits, and leads diplomatic communications on ASEAN's behalf during the chair year.

CONSTRAINTS ASEAN operates on the principle of non-interference in member states' internal affairs and consensus decision-making — which has made the organization unable to address Myanmar's military coup effectively since 2021. The ASEAN Chair cannot override member state vetoes or impose accountability standards on members whose governance violates ASEAN's stated democratic norms.

ACCOUNTABILITY To ASEAN member states collectively and to the ASEAN Charter. The non-interference principle structurally protects member states from accountability to ASEAN standards.

PRESSURES Member state divergence on Myanmar, South China Sea, and major power competition, the tension between the non-interference principle and the accountability expectations of ASEAN's democratic member states, China's pressure on ASEAN coherence, and the domestic political context of the chair country.

OBJECTIVE Advance ASEAN's agenda while managing the structural constraints that the consensus and non-interference principles impose on the organization's ability to address member state governance failures. Active in scenarios involving regional institutions and non-interference norms.

ACTIVE IN S36, S40

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of accountability mechanism by non-interference norm), structural exclusion (of civil society from ASEAN governance)

Role 87 President — Transitional Democracy (Generic) [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Head of state of a transitional democracy — a country that has recently moved from authoritarian governance toward democratic institutions but whose institutions remain fragile, contested, and subject to backsliding pressure. This generic role allows the scenario to be applied to multiple specific country contexts.

CONSTRAINTS Operates in a governance environment where formal democratic institutions exist but their independence, effectiveness, and public legitimacy are contested. Faces simultaneous pressure from democratic reform advocates, former authoritarian networks seeking restoration, international democracy promoters with their own agenda, and economic crisis that undermines reform credibility.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the transitional democratic mandate, to the population that supported the transition, and to international partners whose support and conditionality shape the transition's parameters. The accountability structure is fragile — the institutions that should provide accountability are themselves under construction.

PRESSURES Former authoritarian networks seeking to recapture governance through elections or institutional capture, reform advocates demanding faster implementation of democratic norms, international partners with conditionality requirements, economic crisis that erodes public support for the transition, and the security sector whose loyalty is uncertain.

OBJECTIVE Consolidate democratic transition while managing the structural pressures that make transitional democracies vulnerable to reversal. This generic role allows the most universal application of democratic transition scenarios across Bangladesh's own 2024-2026 transition context and global parallels.

ACTIVE IN S20, S37, S38, S41, S46

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (transitional authority without consolidated institutional legitimacy), structural capture (risk from former authoritarian networks)

Role 88 Prime Minister — Donor-Dependent State (Generic) [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Head of government of a country whose budget, development programming, and international positioning are significantly dependent on external donor support — bilateral aid, multilateral loans, and technical assistance. This generic role applies directly to Bangladesh's fiscal context.

CONSTRAINTS External conditionality from donors constrains domestic policy choices. Donor requirements for governance reform may conflict with political sustainability. Debt service obligations limit fiscal space. The structural dependency relationship between the donor-dependent state and its funders creates a governance accountability chain that runs through international institutions rather than through domestic democratic accountability.

ACCOUNTABILITY To domestic electorate and parliament formally, and to international donors practically — whose conditionality requirements shape policy choices that domestic democratic accountability would produce differently. This dual accountability is the defining structural tension of the donor-dependent state.

PRESSURES IMF and World Bank conditionality requirements, bilateral donor aid conditionality, domestic political constituencies whose interests the conditionality may override, debt service obligations that limit development spending, and the diplomatic management of the dependency relationship itself.

OBJECTIVE Govern the donor-dependent state with developmental effectiveness while managing the structural accountability conflict between international conditionality and domestic democratic accountability. This role connects directly to Bangladesh's own fiscal and governance context.

ACTIVE IN S23, S26, S44, S47, S48, S49, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (domestic democratic accountability constrained by external conditionality), structural exclusion (of domestic populations from decisions shaped by external actors)

Role 89 Opposition Leader — Authoritarian Context (Generic) [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Leads political opposition in a country with significant authoritarian governance characteristics — where formal opposition is permitted but faces systematic structural disadvantage through legal harassment, media access restrictions, resource constraints, and physical intimidation.

CONSTRAINTS Faces the full toolkit of authoritarian opposition management: legal cases on politically constructed charges, denial of media access, physical intimidation of supporters, electoral system manipulation, and the structural disadvantage of challenging incumbents who control state resources. The structural constraints on opposition in authoritarian contexts are the clearest illustration of justificatory subordination at the national level.

ACCOUNTABILITY To opposition constituencies who take political risk in supporting the opposition, to democratic norms that the opposition is fighting to establish or restore, and to international democratic solidarity networks whose support provides some protection.

PRESSURES Personal safety and legal jeopardy, supporter safety considerations that may require strategic caution, international partners with expectations about opposition conduct, the strategic calculation of when to participate in flawed elections versus boycott, and the media narrative battle in a captured information environment.

OBJECTIVE Build effective political opposition in a structurally disadvantaged position — without the institutional resources of incumbency, within a legal environment that criminalizes political challenge, and for constituencies who bear personal risk for supporting the opposition. This role is a direct parallel to Bangladesh's own opposition experience under the Hasina government.

ACTIVE IN S03, S20, S37, S41, S46

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of opposition from effective political participation), structural capture (of political system by incumbent), justificatory subordination

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Role 90 Refugee Camp Administrator [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Manages a large refugee camp — potentially the Cox's Bazar Rohingya camps in Bangladesh, the world's largest refugee settlement. Has operational authority over camp administration, service delivery coordination among UN agencies and NGOs, security management, and liaison with host government authorities.

CONSTRAINTS Operates at the intersection of host government policy (which constrains camp conditions and refugee movement), international humanitarian law (which establishes minimum standards the host government may not want to meet), and the physical and logistical reality of managing 600,000 to one million displaced persons. Has no authority over the geopolitical situation that created the refugee population or that determines when safe return becomes possible.

ACCOUNTABILITY To UNHCR, to the host government whose territory the camp occupies, to humanitarian law, and to the refugee population whose welfare the administrator is mandated to protect. The refugee population itself has no formal accountability mechanism over camp administration.

PRESSURES Host government restrictions on camp conditions and refugee rights, humanitarian agency coordination among dozens of organizations with different mandates and approaches, refugee community leadership whose representatives the administrator must engage, security incidents within the camp, and the perpetual resource gap between needs and available funding.

OBJECTIVE Administer the camp with humanitarian effectiveness and dignity for the refugee population within the structural constraints that host government policy, resource limitations, and geopolitical stalemate create. This is the most operationally demanding role in the library — managing a population the size of a major city with refugee camp resources.

ACTIVE IN S34, S36

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (humanitarian responsibility without authority over the conditions that create humanitarian need), structural exclusion (of refugee population from decisions governing their lives)

Role 91 Post-Conflict Transitional Government Head [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a government established after armed conflict to manage the transition to stable governance. Has executive authority during the transitional period with a mandate to establish the institutional foundations for post-conflict democratic governance.

CONSTRAINTS Transitional authority is inherently fragile — its legitimacy is provisional, its timeline is contested, and the armed actors who stopped fighting can resume if the transition fails to deliver. The transitional government head must simultaneously demobilize armed groups, build institutions, manage international donor expectations, and prevent spoiler violence.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the transitional mandate's terms (negotiated by parties to the conflict), to international guarantors, to the population that bore the cost of the conflict, and to the political actors whose cooperation is essential for transition success. Accountability is multilateral and fragile.

PRESSURES Former armed group spoilers who benefit from instability, political party competition for transitional-period advantage, international community conditionality, justice versus peace tensions between accountability for conflict crimes and the amnesties that ex-combatant cooperation may require, and economic reconstruction demands that exceed transitional government capacity.

OBJECTIVE Navigate the post-conflict transition to stable governance while managing the structural tensions between accountability, reconciliation, and stability that make transitional governance among the most complex in the role library. Active in scenarios involving constitutional design and governance transition.

ACTIVE IN S20, S37, S38, S46

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (transitional authority without consolidated legitimacy), structural capture (risk from spoiler armed groups)

Role 92 Small Island State Leader — Climate Vulnerability [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Head of government of a small island developing state facing existential threat from sea level rise and climate change. Has formal UN membership, UNGA voting rights, and full diplomatic standing — with essentially zero leverage over the emissions decisions of the large economies whose greenhouse gas output determines the island state's survival.

CONSTRAINTS Commands no military power, minimal economic leverage, and is dependent on international aid and technical assistance. The formal equality of UN membership — one vote regardless of population or economic size — produces a governance environment in which existential stakes are accompanied by structural powerlessness. The island state leader who speaks most forcefully for survival may be the least structurally positioned to achieve it.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the island state's population whose survival is the ultimate accountability test, to international climate governance forums, and to the alliance of vulnerable states through which small island nations amplify their advocacy.

PRESSURES Major power unwillingness to accept emissions reduction commitments that threaten economic growth, adaptation funding that falls far short of what climate vulnerability requires, the tension between forceful advocacy (which creates diplomatic cost) and diplomatic accommodation (which produces inadequate outcomes), and the moral urgency of representing an existential threat to a population.

OBJECTIVE Advance climate justice for the world's most vulnerable populations through international climate governance forums while managing the structural powerlessness that makes the small island state position the most dramatic illustration of authority-accountability misalignment in the global governance system — maximum stakes, minimum structural power.

ACTIVE IN S36, S40, S47, S50

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of most climate-vulnerable populations from climate governance decisions), authority-accountability misalignment (existential stakes without commensurate decision-making power)

SECTION D — GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA

Roles 93 through 100 · The accountability, voice, and knowledge layer

Role 93 Amnesty International Secretary General [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Chief executive of the world's largest human rights organization. Has authority over Amnesty's global research agenda, public advocacy campaigns, country reports, and the mobilization of Amnesty's millions of member activists for human rights pressure campaigns.

CONSTRAINTS Amnesty's effectiveness depends on the credibility of its research — any finding that is successfully challenged by a targeted government damages the organization's core asset. Funding from members and donors creates a soft accountability to donor preferences that may not always align with the most strategically important human rights advocacy. Amnesty has faced criticism for both selective focus and inconsistent application of human rights standards.

ACCOUNTABILITY To Amnesty's membership and donor base, to human rights principles and the research standards that give Amnesty its credibility, and to the populations whose rights situations Amnesty documents.

PRESSURES Governments whose rights records Amnesty documents and who respond with diplomatic, legal, and reputational pressure, donor preferences on focus areas, the tension between organizational resource constraints and the global scale of human rights violations, and credibility management when research findings are contested.

OBJECTIVE Advance human rights accountability through research credibility and global campaigning while managing the institutional pressures that a large, globally visible human rights organization faces. Active in scenarios involving international human rights pressure and press freedom.

ACTIVE IN S05, S30, S32, S36

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (global advocacy mandate with no enforcement authority), epistemic dependence (relies on access that rights-violating governments can restrict)

Role 94 Transparency International Chair [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Leads the global coalition of national chapters working to combat corruption worldwide. Has authority over TI's Corruption Perceptions Index publication, the global anti-corruption advocacy agenda, and the coalition's engagement with international institutions on anti-corruption governance standards.

CONSTRAINTS TI's Corruption Perceptions Index — the world's most widely cited corruption measurement — is based on expert and business surveys rather than direct measurement, creating methodological vulnerabilities that governments whose rankings displease them are quick to exploit. TI has no enforcement authority and depends on voluntary government cooperation for anti-corruption reform.

ACCOUNTABILITY To TI's international secretariat and national chapters, to anti-corruption principles, and to the CPI's methodological standards. No external political accountability — TI's accountability is to its mission and its stakeholders.

PRESSURES Governments who challenge CPI methodology when their rankings fall, the methodological integrity of the CPI's construction, donor government pressure on which corruption issues receive priority attention, and the tension between naming governments for corruption (which damages bilateral relationships) and maintaining the access that effective advocacy requires.

OBJECTIVE Maintain TI's role as the world's primary corruption accountability institution through methodological credibility and global advocacy while managing the political pressures that corruption measurement generates. Active in resource allocation and accountability scenarios.

ACTIVE IN S22, S24, S43

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (global accountability mandate with no enforcement), epistemic dependence (CPI methodology based on perception surveys)

Role 95 International Press Freedom Correspondent [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Journalist specializing in international press freedom reporting for a major international media organization. Covers journalist imprisonments, media suppression, DSA-equivalent laws globally, and the systematic patterns of press freedom erosion worldwide.

CONSTRAINTS Operates in countries where press freedom coverage creates personal legal and physical risk. Sources are journalists in danger whose protection requires confidentiality that legal pressure can threaten. The journalist's home country and employer's commercial interests may constrain coverage of certain governments.

ACCOUNTABILITY To professional journalism ethics, to press freedom principles, to sources who risk their safety providing information, and to the public whose right to information the journalist serves.

PRESSURES Personal safety in press-freedom-hostile jurisdictions, source protection obligations under legal pressure, employer commercial relationships that may constrain certain coverage, governmental retaliation against the journalist's home country for coverage critical of its government, and the global scale of press freedom violations relative to the resources available to cover them.

OBJECTIVE Cover international press freedom comprehensively and accurately while managing the personal, legal, and institutional constraints that press freedom journalism in a hostile environment creates. Active in scenarios involving media suppression and journalist protection.

ACTIVE IN S27, S30, S31

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of press freedom from institutional protection in authoritarian contexts), structural capture (of information environment by government legal pressure)

Role 96 Global Think Tank Director — Governance [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a major international think tank focused on governance, democracy, and political institutions. Has authority over the institution's research agenda, publication program, and policy engagement with governments and international organizations.

CONSTRAINTS Think tank credibility depends on perceived independence — funding from governments, foundations, or corporations with policy interests creates potential conflicts that challenge the independence claim. The think tank director who produces research inconvenient to major funders faces funding pressure; the one who avoids inconvenient findings loses credibility.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the think tank's research standards and independence norms, to the funders whose support enables operations, to the policymakers and institutions whose decisions the research is designed to influence, and to the quality of public policy debate.

PRESSURES Funder preference pressure on research agenda, the tension between policy relevance (which requires engagement with governments) and independence (which requires distance from government preferences), credibility management when research findings are politically contested, and the media attention economy that rewards provocative findings over careful analysis.

OBJECTIVE Produce governance research that genuinely advances understanding and influences policy while maintaining the institutional independence that makes the research credible. Active in scenarios involving governance reform, democratic theory, and institutional design.

ACTIVE IN S37, S38, S40, S41

FAILURE MODES Structural capture (of research agenda by funder interests), epistemic dependence (access to government data requires relationships that may compromise independence)

Role 97 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate — Advocacy Role [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY A recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize who uses the platform and credibility the Prize provides to advocate for specific governance reforms, human rights, or peace and reconciliation goals. The Prize confers extraordinary international visibility and credibility without conferring any formal institutional authority.

CONSTRAINTS The Nobel Prize provides credibility capital but no enforcement mechanism. The laureate who speaks too provocatively on political issues risks alienating the diplomatic relationships through which advocacy can be translated into outcomes. The laureate's moral authority is their primary asset — and moral authority is consumed by association with partisan or contested positions.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the cause for which advocacy is conducted, to the populations whose interests the advocacy serves, and to the integrity of the Nobel Prize's moral authority. No formal accountability to any institution.

PRESSURES Government resistance to the changes the laureate advocates, diplomatic considerations about which governments to pressure publicly versus privately, the tension between comprehensive advocacy (addressing all violations) and strategic focus (prioritizing the most achievable changes), and the management of the extraordinary media attention that Nobel status generates.

OBJECTIVE Use the credibility and visibility of the Nobel Prize to advance specific governance changes or human rights outcomes while managing the structural gap between moral authority and political power. Active in scenarios involving international advocacy and transitional justice.

ACTIVE IN S20, S36, S50

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (significant moral influence with zero institutional power), structural exclusion (of laureate's advocacy targets from any formal accountability to the laureate)

Role 98 Diaspora Community Leader [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Leads an organized diaspora community — specifically the Bangladeshi diaspora in the United States, United Kingdom, or Middle East — that maintains significant economic ties (remittances constitute over 5% of Bangladesh GDP) and political engagement with Bangladesh's governance.

CONSTRAINTS The diaspora leader's authority is informal and community-based — there is no formal institutional structure through which diaspora communities exercise governance authority. Diaspora political influence operates through remittances, advocacy with host country governments, international media, and direct political party financial support.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the diaspora community whose interests the leader represents, to the homeland governance whose direction the diaspora seeks to influence, and to host country political norms within which the diaspora community operates.

PRESSURES Diaspora community divergence on homeland political party alignment, host country political sensitivities about diaspora political activity, homeland government management of diaspora relationships through diplomatic and economic levers, and the tension between diaspora political activism and host country integration expectations.

OBJECTIVE Advance diaspora community interests and homeland governance influence through the informal channels available to diaspora political actors. Active in scenarios involving international pressure on Bangladesh governance and diaspora economic influence.

ACTIVE IN S03, S05, S48

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (economic influence without formal governance standing), structural exclusion (of diaspora from formal homeland governance participation)

Role 99 International Election Observer Chief [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY Leads a major international election observation mission — EU EOM, Carter Center, NDI/IRI, or Commonwealth Observer Group — covering a significant national election. Has authority over the mission's methodology, observer deployment, preliminary statement, and final report.

CONSTRAINTS Same structural constraints as the BD-track International Observer role (Role 53) but at the mission leadership level — with greater public visibility, greater diplomatic pressure from the

host government, and greater consequence for the preliminary statement's findings. The tension between access maintenance and accurate reporting is most acute at the mission leadership level.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the deploying organization's standards, to election observation methodology, to the voters of the country being observed whose democratic rights the mission exists to support, and to the international diplomatic context in which the mission's findings will be received.

PRESSURES Host government pressure on preliminary statement language, the diplomatic consequences of findings that displease the host government, the mission's professional obligation to accurate reporting, the political context in which the observation takes place, and the tension between the mission's credibility (requiring accuracy) and its future access (potentially depending on diplomatic accommodation).

OBJECTIVE Lead an election observation mission to a credible conclusion — accurate findings, diplomatically effective communication, and a final report that advances the cause of electoral integrity. Active in electoral integrity and democratic governance scenarios.

ACTIVE IN S01, S04, S07, S08

FAILURE MODES Authority-accountability misalignment (accountability mandate with no enforcement authority), epistemic dependence (access controlled by host government)

Role 100 Global Youth Governance Advocate [GLOBAL Track]

AUTHORITY A young governance reform advocate with international platform — through youth UN bodies, international civil society networks, or significant social media presence — who advocates for structural governance reforms including the kinds of changes that Equitism proposes. This role may be occupied by PlayerOne participants themselves — it represents the trajectory that the platform's training pipeline is designed to produce.

CONSTRAINTS Youth advocates have significant moral voice and social media amplification capacity but lack institutional standing in the formal governance structures they seek to reform. The youth advocate who enters formal institutional spaces (UN Youth Delegate, national youth parliaments) gains institutional standing at the cost of the independence that makes youth advocacy credible.

ACCOUNTABILITY To the youth communities whose governance interests the advocate represents, to the governance reform principles the advocacy advances, and — uniquely in this role — to the long-term future that governance decisions made today will determine.

PRESSURES Institutional gatekeepers who control access to the forums where governance decisions are made, the tension between radical reform advocacy (which is credible but excluded from formal processes) and institutional engagement (which gains access but requires compromise), social media dynamics that reward simplification over nuance, and the structural reality that the governance systems most in need of reform are controlled by those who benefit from them.

OBJECTIVE Advance structural governance reform through the combination of formal institutional engagement and informal advocacy that the structural position of youth activists makes available. This role is the aspirational endpoint of PlayerOne's training mission — the civic leader who has internalized structural fairness principles and is working to implement them in real governance contexts. It is also intentionally the role most accessible to PlayerOne participants themselves.

ACTIVE IN S37, S38, S40, S41, S50

FAILURE MODES Structural exclusion (of youth from formal governance participation), authority-accountability misalignment (long-term stakes without decision-making power), epistemic dependence (excluded from information that formal institutional actors access)

— End of Chapter 6 —

Next: Chapter 7 — Scenario Scripts: Domain One — Electoral Integrity (S01–S08)

CHAPTER 7

Scenario Scripts — Domain One: Electoral Integrity (S01–S08)

Domain One scenarios address the structural conditions under which elections are administered, results are determined, and democratic mandates are established or denied. Electoral integrity is the foundational layer of democratic governance — without credible elections, every other governance institution loses its democratic legitimacy. These eight scenarios draw directly from Bangladesh's documented electoral history and from comparable international electoral governance failures, making each scenario grounded in real political experience rather than invented abstraction.

The eight scenarios in this domain collectively cover the full spectrum of electoral failure modes: uncontested seats produced by opposition intimidation (S01), ballot box manipulation at the polling station level (S02), the strategic dilemma of opposition boycotts (S03), electoral commission capture by the incumbent (S04), security force deployment against legitimate protest (S05), gerrymandering through delimitation (S06), judicial review of disputed results (S07), and international observer dilemmas between accurate reporting and access maintenance (S08). Each scenario is designed to make the structural dimension of electoral failure visible — to demonstrate that these are not individual misconduct problems but institutional design failures that produce systemic outcomes regardless of individual actors' intentions.

An election that is formally conducted but structurally captured is not a democratic election. PlayerOne's electoral scenarios are designed to make participants experience from the inside what structural electoral capture looks, feels, and produces — so they can recognize it, name it, and resist it in real governance contexts.

S01 The Uncontested Seat

Domain: Electoral Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh 2014 General Election — 153 uncontested constituencies | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Returning Officer (R18), Chief Election Commissioner (R16), Election Commissioner (R17), MP-Opposition (R04), Opposition Leader (R02), International Observer (R53), International Observer Chief (R99)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

In the January 2014 Bangladesh general election, the ruling Awami League government held elections boycotted by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and most major opposition parties. Of Bangladesh's 300 parliamentary constituencies, 153 returned MPs without a single opposing candidate filing nomination papers. In many of these constituencies, opposition candidates who attempted to file were reported to have faced physical intimidation, harassment, and obstruction. The Election Commission certified the results. International observers noted the lack of competition without refusing certification. The Awami League formed a government with absolute parliamentary control despite the fact that more than half of parliament's seats were never contested.

This scenario is the direct product of that documented event. It is grounded not in hypothetical abstraction but in the most significant structural electoral failure in Bangladesh's recent democratic history — an election in which the formal mechanisms of democracy operated while the substantive conditions for competitive democracy were structurally absent.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)

You are in your role during a national election. Nomination filing for your assigned constituency closed three days ago. You have received the documentation: only one candidate — from the ruling party — has filed valid nomination papers. No opposition candidate is listed. Your field reports include three separate accounts from witnesses describing intimidation of potential opposition candidates in the days before filing closed: one candidate's family was reportedly visited by local ruling party activists, another had his car damaged, a third withdrew after receiving a phone call he described as threatening. None of these incidents were reported to police. None resulted in any formal complaint on record. The election law is clear: if only one candidate files, that candidate is declared elected without a vote being held. The deadline for your district result certification is in 48 hours.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Election Commission Headquarters] *Process all uncontested declarations by the statutory deadline. The national tally must be certified on schedule.*

[Local Ruling Party District Leader] *We expect the result to be certified without interference. This is a procedurally correct outcome.*

[Opposition Party District Representative] *Three of our candidates were prevented from filing. This is not a free nomination process. We are demanding an investigation before you certify anything.*

[International Observer Team Leader] *We have received reports of nomination period irregularities in your district. We are requesting your cooperation in our documentation process.*

Decision Point 1

The opposition party representative has submitted a written complaint to your office alleging candidate intimidation that prevented competitive filing. The complaint includes three witness statements. The election law gives you no authority to investigate — only to certify results. What do you do?

Option A: Certify the uncontested result per statutory procedure, noting in your certification report that a complaint was received and forwarded to the appropriate investigative authority.

Option B: Decline to certify pending investigation, citing the witness statements as evidence that the nomination process was not free, and refer the matter to the Chief Election Commissioner.

Option C: Certify the result without notation — the complaint has no legal standing in the certification procedure and noting it creates unnecessary complications.

Option D: Contact the Chief Election Commissioner for guidance before taking any action, suspending the certification deadline pending instruction.

Decision Point 2

The Chief Election Commissioner has called. The instruction is to certify all uncontested seats nationally by end of business tomorrow — no extensions, no exceptions. The national tally requires your district's certification to proceed. What do you do?

Option A: Comply with the Commission's instruction and certify by the deadline, including a factual note in your file about the complaint received.

Option B: Certify but formally register your procedural objection in writing to the Commission, noting that the complaint has not been investigated.

Option C: Request that the Commission provide its instruction in writing before you certify — creating a documented record of the directive you are following.

Option D: Refuse to certify until the intimidation complaint is formally investigated, accepting whatever professional consequences follow.

Decision Point 3

You are completing the certification paperwork. The international observer team leader has requested a brief meeting before you finalize. She tells you her team has documented intimidation incidents in three other districts and is preparing a report that will be made public. She asks whether you will cooperate with her documentation by sharing your records of the complaint filed in your district. Sharing is not prohibited by law but is not required. What do you do?

Option A: Share all documentation with the observer team — the complaint, the witness statements, and your correspondence with the Commission. The public record should be complete.

Option B: Share the complaint document only, without the witness statements, as a compromise between transparency and caution.

Option C: Decline to share anything — your obligation is to the Commission, not to international observers.

Option D: Tell the observer team leader informally what you know, without providing any written documentation that could be traced to you.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Options A or B across all three decision points (procedurally compliant with documentation): *The election proceeds. The 153 uncontested seats are certified. The government is formed. Your district's certification note about the complaint is filed and never followed up. The international observer report documents the nomination period irregularities and is published — it receives international media coverage for two days and is then absorbed into the archive of documented but unremedied electoral failures. Your district's uncontested seat becomes one of the statistics. Nothing changes structurally. The complaint you documented disappears into a process that has no mechanism for acting on it.*

If Option D in Decision Point 2 (refuses to certify): *You are the only Returning Officer in Bangladesh who refused to certify an uncontested seat. The Commission replaces you with a temporary officer who certifies the result within hours. Your career in government service effectively ends. The seat is certified regardless. You have demonstrated individual integrity at significant personal cost and zero institutional effect. The structural outcome — 153 uncontested seats — is identical.*

If Option A in Decision Point 3 (full documentation sharing): *The international observer report includes detailed documentation from your district — the most specific evidence in the report. The report generates significant international pressure on Bangladesh's election credibility. The government dismisses the report as politically motivated. Three months later, you receive a transfer notice to a significantly less favorable posting. Your cooperation with the observers is noted in your personnel file as 'unauthorized disclosure of official information.'*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: **Structural Capture of Electoral Administration**

The Returning Officer operates within an institutional design in which certification is mandatory, investigation authority is absent, Commission direction is binding, and career consequences flow from non-compliance. The structural design of Bangladesh's electoral administration makes individual integrity insufficient to produce institutional fairness. The Returning Officer who documents the complaint, follows Commission direction, and cooperates with international observers has demonstrated maximum individual accountability within the role's constraints — and produced zero structural effect. This is not a failure of individual conduct. It is a failure of institutional design.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's principle of structural fairness requires that governance institutions be architecturally designed to produce fair outcomes — not merely to rely on the personal integrity of individual officials within structurally captured institutions. The Returning Officer scenario demonstrates why the Meta-Right to Structural Fairness cannot be satisfied by individual virtue within structurally defective institutions. The UFDS's Electoral Commission Independence provision addresses this directly: it requires that returning officers operate within an institution that has genuine independence from executive direction, independent investigation authority, and career protections that enable authentic impartial administration.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS Electoral Commission Independence provision requires: (1) appointment of returning officers through a non-partisan selection process, (2) independent investigation authority for nomination period complaints, (3) statutory career protections preventing transfer or dismissal for decisions made in good faith within the officer's mandate, and (4) mandatory investigation and public reporting requirements when formal complaints are received during the nomination period. Under a UFDS-compliant design, the Returning Officer in this scenario would have both the authority and the career

protection to delay certification pending investigation — and the institutional support to make that decision without personal consequence.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions — including election certification decisions — without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning behind them? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for political parties to select candidates for election without open and transparent internal processes? (FI Q5)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S02 Pre-Cast Ballots

Domain: Electoral Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh 2018 General Election — allegations of pre-filled ballot boxes | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — crisis scenario

Active Roles: Presiding Officer (R19), Returning Officer (R18), Chief Election Commissioner (R16), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), International Observer Chief (R99), Journalist-Investigative (R45)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

The December 2018 Bangladesh general election — in which the Awami League won 288 of 300 seats — was followed by widespread allegations of electoral fraud, most prominently that ballot boxes had been pre-filled with ruling party ballots before polling stations opened. Multiple opposition party polling agents reported being denied access to polling stations. Independent journalists

reported ballot stuffing incidents. International election observation missions issued statements expressing concern. The Election Commission denied the allegations. No systematic investigation was conducted. The results stood.

This scenario places the participant inside the polling station at the moment the decision must be made — before documentation exists, before external validation is possible, and with the full weight of career and personal safety consequences pressing against the fair choice.

▸ **SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)**

You are the Presiding Officer at Polling Station 7, Mirpur Parliamentary Constituency, Dhaka. It is 7:45 AM. Voting opens at 8:00 AM. You have just completed the statutory pre-opening ballot box inspection with your polling team. You have found that Box 2 of 3 contains approximately 150 pre-marked ballots — all marked for the ruling party candidate. The ballot papers match the official security features. Someone with access to official ballot materials marked these ballots before they arrived at your station. You have 15 minutes before the station opens. Your polling agents from both parties are waiting outside. Your assistant is watching you. The local ruling party agent who helped with logistics this morning is standing near the door. You have no phone signal. The Returning Officer's office is 20 minutes away.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Assistant Presiding Officer (quietly)] *Sir/Madam — what do we do? If we delay opening, they will say we are causing problems. If we report this, I am afraid of what happens to us.*

[Local Ruling Party Logistics Agent] *Is there a problem? We are ready to open. The community is waiting. Let's proceed on time.*

[Opposition Polling Agent (outside, knocking)] *We have the right to witness the pre-opening inspection. Please allow us in.*

[Your own professional training] *The pre-opening inspection protocol requires you to document and report any irregularities found before polling begins.*

Decision Point 1

It is 7:50 AM. The pre-filled ballot box is in front of you. You have 10 minutes. What is your immediate action?

Option A: Remove the pre-filled ballots from Box 2, document what you found in your incident log, seal the ballots as evidence, and proceed with two ballot boxes while dispatching your assistant to reach the Returning Officer by any means available.

Option B: Seal all three boxes — including Box 2 with the pre-filled ballots — without removing anything, document the irregularity in your log, delay opening, and attempt to reach the Returning Officer.

Option C: Allow the opposition polling agent inside, show them what you found, and ask them to cosign a joint witness document before you decide how to proceed.

Option D: Proceed with opening. Destroying the pre-filled ballots without authorization is beyond your mandate. Note the irregularity privately and report after polling closes.

Decision Point 2

You have documented the pre-filled ballots. Your assistant has gone to find the Returning Officer. It is now 8:15 AM. The station has not opened. The ruling party agent has moved to the door and is on his phone. A crowd of voters has gathered outside. Your assistant returns: the Returning Officer cannot be reached. You have received a verbal message through a local official: 'Open the station immediately or you will be responsible for disrupting the election.' What do you do?

Option A: Open the station with the two clean ballot boxes only, maintain your incident documentation, and continue attempting to reach the Returning Officer and the Commission's complaint hotline.

Option B: Open the station with all three boxes — including Box 2 — proceeding with the election as instructed and relying on post-election review processes to address the irregularity.

Option C: Refuse to open and formally close the station, citing the documented irregularity — accepting that you cannot conduct a clean election with compromised materials.

Option D: Contact the international observer team whose vehicle you saw earlier and request their physical presence as witnesses before making any further decision.

Decision Point 3

Polling has been underway for three hours using the two clean ballot boxes. An investigative journalist has arrived at your polling station. She tells you she has received reports of pre-filled ballot incidents at multiple stations in the constituency and is documenting evidence. She asks whether you experienced any irregularities this morning and requests access to your incident log. You are not legally required to share your log with a journalist. What do you do?

Option A: Share the incident log fully. The public interest in electoral integrity outweighs your procedural caution, and your documentation may be the only public record of what occurred.

Option B: Tell the journalist verbally what you found, without providing the written documentation — protecting the record while acknowledging the incident.

Option C: Decline to comment or share anything — your documentation is an official record for official use, and speaking to journalists is outside your mandate.

Option D: Tell the journalist that she should file a formal request through the Election Commission — and that you will cooperate with any official investigation that follows.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Options A or B in Decision Point 1 (documentation and delay): *You have created the only physical documentation of pre-filled ballots at any station in the constituency. Your incident log becomes evidence.*

After the election, your report is filed with the Commission. An internal Commission review notes the incident and classifies it as an isolated anomaly. No investigation is opened. Your log is not made public. Five months later you receive a transfer to a remote district posting. Your documentation exists — in a file that no one with authority to act on it will open.

If Option C in Decision Point 2 (formal station closure): *You are the only Presiding Officer in Bangladesh who formally closed a polling station on election day citing pre-filled ballots. The closure becomes national news within hours. The Commission dispatches officials who arrive, review your documentation, and order the station reopened with a replacement officer. Votes are cast. Your career in government ends within three months. The incident generates international coverage. The Commission's investigation concludes the pre-filled ballots were a 'logistical error' with no political intent. The result stands.*

If Option A in Decision Point 3 (full journalist cooperation): *The journalist's report — with your documented evidence as its primary source — is published by a major outlet and picked up internationally. Your incident log is the most specific documented evidence of pre-election ballot manipulation in the national story. The government responds by filing a complaint against the journalist under the Digital Security Act. An official investigation into 'unauthorized disclosure of confidential election materials' is opened. You are summoned for inquiry. The story has international reach. The election result is not changed.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: **Structural Capture — Electoral Administration at the Implementation Level**

The Presiding Officer's scenario reveals how electoral fraud at the implementation level is designed to be irreversible by the time it is discovered. Pre-filled ballots introduced into ballot boxes before station opening cannot be effectively remedied by individual Presiding Officers acting within their mandate: they lack the authority to destroy government materials, lack reliable communication with the Commission, lack career protection against consequences for delay, and lack any mechanism to escalate in real time to an actor who could intervene effectively. The structural design places the fraud at the point in the process where the individual official with least institutional protection has maximum operational responsibility and minimum authority.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's principle of equal justificatory standing requires that elections produce results that reflect genuine voter preferences. Pre-cast ballot manipulation is the most direct violation of this principle — it substitutes the choices of an authorizing actor for the choices of voters at the most fundamental level of the electoral process. The UFDS's Electoral Commission Independence and Chain of Custody provisions address this by requiring: physically verifiable ballot security with multi-party inspection, real-time communication capacity for all polling station officers, mandatory multi-party witness protocols for all pre-opening inspections, and Presiding Officer career protections that enable incident reporting without personal consequence.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): Under a UFDS-compliant electoral design, the chain of custody for ballot materials would require multi-party physical inspection and co-signature at every transfer point from printing to polling station. Pre-filled ballots would be virtually impossible to introduce without co-conspirators at multiple inspection points. The Presiding Officer would have: direct Commission communication, opposition agent co-signature rights for all pre-opening documentation, and a statutory right to delay opening pending Commission confirmation — without career consequence for exercising it.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning behind them? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how public funds are spent and how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

FI-4: *Is it fair for media organizations to openly support specific political parties while presenting themselves as independent news sources? (FI Q22)*

S03 The Boycott Decision

Domain: Electoral Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh 2014 and 2024 General Elections — opposition boycott strategy | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Opposition Leader (R02), MP-Opposition (R04), Caretaker Government Adviser (R21), International Observer Chief (R99), Diaspora Community Leader (R98), Opposition Leader-Authoritarian Context (R89)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's opposition parties faced the boycott dilemma twice in the decade between 2014 and 2024. In 2014, the BNP-led opposition boycotted the election entirely — producing 153 uncontested seats and a government formed without any electoral mandate from half the country. In 2024, under different political circumstances, a different calculation was made. In both cases, the boycott dilemma is structurally genuine: participating in a compromised election confers legitimacy on a rigged process; boycotting hands the ruling party complete electoral control. Neither option produces a structurally fair outcome — because the structural unfairness is in the electoral system design, not in the opposition's strategic choice.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)

You are the Opposition Leader six weeks before a national election. Three intelligence assessments, two independent electoral monitoring reports, and your own party's field reporting all indicate the same conclusion: the electoral commission has been effectively captured by the ruling party; voter rolls contain significant irregularities; key opposition candidates have been denied nomination through legal challenges that your legal team considers politically motivated; and the security environment in rural constituencies makes free canvassing impossible for your party's workers. The election will proceed regardless of your decision. The ruling party will form a government. The question is whether your party participates in an election you cannot win fairly — or boycotts and concedes all seats by default.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Senior Party Leader (internal)] *If we boycott, we hand them everything. We need to contest — even winning 30 seats means we have a parliamentary voice. Silence is surrender.*

[Youth Wing Leader] *We cannot give this election any legitimacy by participating. Our supporters are being attacked. Our candidates are being blocked. To contest is to accept this as an election.*

[International Democracy Partner] *We strongly urge continued participation. An uncontested election damages Bangladesh's democratic standing internationally more than a contested but flawed one.*

[Party Constituency Workers (field report)] *Our workers in rural districts are afraid. Several have been physically threatened. We cannot run a real campaign in these conditions.*

Decision Point 1

Your party's National Executive Committee has asked you to state your strategic recommendation before the formal vote. What is your position?

Option A: Participate. A compromised election with opposition presence is better than an uncontested election. Winning any seats preserves a parliamentary accountability function that boycott eliminates entirely.

Option B: Boycott. Participating legitimizes a fundamentally compromised process. The structural unfairness of this election must be named and refused, not normalized by participation.

Option C: Conditional participation. Set minimum conditions — restored nomination rights for blocked candidates, Commission commitments on specific procedural reforms — and participate only if conditions are partially met.

Option D: Partial participation. Contest seats in urban areas where conditions are somewhat better, withdraw from rural constituencies where worker safety cannot be guaranteed.

Decision Point 2

The National Executive Committee has voted for participation. You are preparing your public announcement. Your communications team has drafted two versions: one that frames participation as a strategic decision to maintain parliamentary presence; one that

frames it as participation under protest with full documentation of the electoral conditions. Which framing do you choose?

Option A: Strategic participation framing — emphasize the parliamentary presence rationale and avoid language that could be used to delegitimize results in the constituencies where your candidates might win.

Option B: Participation under protest framing — document the structural unfairness explicitly and announce that your party will contest while formally objecting to the conditions. Accept that this framing may reduce your candidates' chances in some constituencies.

Option C: Issue a hybrid statement — announce participation without extensive commentary on electoral conditions, preserving flexibility to challenge specific results after the election based on documented irregularities.

Option D: Request a meeting with the Chief Election Commissioner before making any public announcement — using the meeting as an opportunity to either extract meaningful commitments or create a documented record of Commission non-response.

Decision Point 3

Your party contested and won 28 seats. The ruling party won 256. Your party's election monitors have documented 140 specific irregularity incidents across 67 constituencies — enough for a credible challenge in 12 seats where margins were narrow. The international observer report notes 'significant concerns' but stops short of recommending result annulment. What is your post-election strategy?

Option A: Take your 28 seats, enter parliament, and use the documentation of irregularities as the basis for ongoing advocacy for electoral reform within the parliamentary system.

Option B: Refuse to take your seats until the documented irregularities are independently investigated — using parliamentary seat refusal as leverage for an investigation.

Option C: Challenge the 12 closest results in court using your documented evidence, while taking the remaining 16 seats and working within parliament.

Option D: Take your seats and simultaneously submit the irregularity documentation to the international observation missions and the UN Human Rights Council, pursuing international pressure rather than domestic legal challenge.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option B in Decision Point 1 (boycott): *Your party boycotts. The ruling party wins 278 seats. 22 seats go to small allied parties. Your party has zero parliamentary representation for the full five-year term. Your party workers in rural constituencies who bore the safety risk of the campaign period have borne it for nothing. Internationally, the election is criticized but recognized. The new government is seated. For five years, every governance decision in Bangladesh proceeds without a single opposition MP to challenge it. When the next election cycle begins, your party must rebuild from zero organizational presence in parliament.*

If Option A in Decision Point 2 and Option A in Decision Point 3 (strategic participation, accept seats): *Your party participates, wins 28 seats, accepts them, and works within parliament. You are present for every significant legislative vote. You are able to table questions, participate in committees, and maintain a*

public opposition voice. Your documentation of electoral irregularities is filed, acknowledged, and not acted upon. The structural unfairness of the electoral system is unchanged. But your party is present. In five years, when the next election occurs, your organizational infrastructure and parliamentary platform are intact. Whether that matters depends entirely on whether the next election is structurally fairer — which is not within your power to determine.

If Option B in Decision Point 3 (seat refusal pending investigation): *Your party refuses to take its seats. The Commission announces it will conduct an internal review. The review takes four months and finds no evidence of systemic irregularities. By the time the review is complete, the parliamentary session is already underway. Three of your newly elected MPs have individually decided to take their seats regardless of the party position. Your party's leverage has evaporated. You enter parliament six months late with a fractured caucus. The structural conditions are the same. The political cost is significant.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — No Structurally Fair Option Available

The boycott dilemma is unique among PlayerOne scenarios because it presents a situation in which neither available choice produces a structurally fair outcome. Participation legitimizes a structurally compromised election. Boycott concedes all representational power to the structurally captured system. This is not a failure of opposition strategic judgment — it is the consequence of an electoral system that has been structurally designed to eliminate the conditions under which competitive elections can occur. The opposition leader who chooses perfectly — by whatever strategic standard — cannot produce a structurally fair electoral outcome from within an electorally unfair system.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's analysis of the boycott dilemma is direct: the problem is not in the opposition's choice but in the governance architecture that created the choice. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires electoral systems that are architecturally designed so that competitive participation is genuinely possible — meaning independent electoral commissions, candidate nomination freedom, secure campaign environments, and chain-of-custody electoral administration. When these conditions are absent, the opposition's 'choice' between participation and boycott is not a genuine choice — it is a selection between two forms of structural defeat within a captured system.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's comprehensive electoral reform provisions — Electoral Commission independence, multi-party nomination oversight, security-neutral campaign environment requirements, and independent electoral dispute resolution — are designed to ensure that the boycott dilemma never arises. Under a UFDS-compliant electoral design, the structural conditions that make competitive participation impossible would be addressed by institutional design rather than leaving opposition parties to choose between forms of structural defeat.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for political parties to select candidates for election without open and transparent internal processes? (FI Q5)*

S04 Election Commission Under Pressure

Domain: Electoral Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Election Commission dynamics 2014–2024 | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Chief Election Commissioner (R16), Election Commissioner (R17), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), Prime Minister (R01), International Observer Chief (R99), Opposition Leader (R02)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's Election Commission has operated throughout the 2014–2024 period under consistent structural pressure from the executive branch. Commission Chairs have been appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, creating a structural dependency at the moment of appointment. Commission decisions on candidate vetting, voter roll management, polling station security deployment (which is determined by the Home Ministry rather than the Commission), and result certification have all been contested by opposition parties as showing ruling party bias. This scenario draws on the structural position of the Commission rather than attributing conduct to any specific Commissioner.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)

You are the Chief Election Commissioner. It is election night. Ninety-two percent of results have been declared. The ruling party is on course for a landslide — the margin is consistent with the pattern your internal analysts predicted based on the structural advantages the ruling party has held throughout the campaign. But you have received three separate reports in the last two hours that are now sitting on your desk. First: your field officers in two closely contested constituencies have reported that vote counting was suspended after disputes broke out at counting centers — in both

cases, the disputes involved ruling party officials demanding access that the counting protocol does not permit. Second: the international observer mission chief has called requesting an urgent meeting before the remaining results are certified. Third: the Home Ministry has called to remind you that the security situation 'requires prompt result certification to prevent uncertainty.' You hold the certification pen.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Home Ministry] *Certification must proceed without delay. Public uncertainty about the result creates security risks. The remaining constituencies should be certified tonight.*

[International Observer Mission Chief] *We are requesting a meeting before certification is complete. We have documented concerns that require discussion before the official result is finalized.*

[Field Officer — Constituency 217] *Counting has been halted for 90 minutes. Ruling party officials entered the counting hall without authorization. Two opposition counting agents have left, saying they felt unsafe. I need guidance on whether to resume counting.*

[Commission Legal Adviser (internal)] *The counting disruption reports are procedurally significant. Certification of results from disrupted counts without investigation creates legal vulnerability for the Commission. I recommend documentation before certification.*

Decision Point 1

The field officer in Constituency 217 needs your direction now. Counting has been suspended for 90 minutes. What do you instruct?

Option A: Instruct the field officer to resume counting only when all authorized counting agents from all parties have returned and confirmed they are present — and to document the 90-minute suspension and its cause in the official counting record.

Option B: Instruct the field officer to resume counting immediately with whatever agents are present — the delay is creating public uncertainty and the result is likely clear regardless of the suspended constituency.

Option C: Suspend counting in both affected constituencies, formally document the disruptions, and announce publicly that these constituencies' results will be held pending investigation.

Option D: Instruct the field officer to contact the Home Ministry for security assistance to resume counting — giving the Ministry control of the situation.

Decision Point 2

You have agreed to meet the international observer mission chief. She presents documented evidence of counting disruptions in five constituencies — more than you received from your own field officers — and states that her mission cannot certify the election as credibly conducted if these disruptions are not addressed before final

certification. She is asking you, as Chief Commissioner, to delay certification by 48 hours to allow investigation. What is your response?

Option A: Agree to delay certification by 48 hours, announce the delay publicly with a brief explanation citing 'procedural documentation requirements,' and launch an internal Commission investigation into the disruption reports.

Option B: Acknowledge the observer's concerns formally, commit to a post-certification review of the disruption incidents, and proceed with certification on schedule — arguing that holding the entire result for five disrupted constituencies is disproportionate.

Option C: Ask the observer mission to submit their documentation formally so that it can be reviewed by the Commission's legal team — and certify the undisputed constituencies while holding the five contested ones.

Option D: Thank the observer for her documentation, indicate that the Commission takes these matters seriously, and proceed with full certification — noting that international observer concerns will be addressed through the Commission's standard post-election review process.

Decision Point 3

It is now 2:00 AM. The Home Ministry has called again — the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff this time. The message is direct: 'The Prime Minister expects full certification to be complete by 6:00 AM. The government needs to form. The security situation requires clarity.' You have the five contested constituencies unresolved. The international observer is waiting for your decision. The Commission legal adviser is recommending documentation before certification. What do you do?

Option A: Certify all results including the five contested constituencies by 6:00 AM as the executive expects — noting the disruptions in an internal Commission file and committing to post-certification review.

Option B: Certify the 287 uncontested constituencies by 6:00 AM, formally hold the five contested ones, and issue a public statement explaining the hold — directly refusing the executive's demand for complete certification.

Option C: Call the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff and explain that full certification requires 48 additional hours — and that the Commission's constitutional independence means the timeline is the Commission's decision, not the executive's.

Option D: Resign as Chief Commissioner, citing executive interference in the Commission's constitutional mandate — and making the resignation and its reasons public.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Options A and B across decision points (cooperative but documented): *You certify the election with documentation of the disruptions in the Commission's internal records. The observer mission publishes a report noting significant procedural concerns. The government is formed. Your five-year term as Chief Commissioner ends without renewal. The Commission's internal records of the disruptions are never published or acted upon. The structural conditions that produced the disruptions are unchanged. You*

administered an election with more integrity than your institutional position required — and produced no structural improvement in the electoral system.

If Option B in Decision Point 3 (public hold of five constituencies): *You certify 287 constituencies and publicly hold five. The ruling party forms a government with 287 seats — sufficient for a parliamentary majority. The five held constituencies generate three weeks of intense public and international attention. An investigation is conducted. Two of the five seats are eventually re-counted; results are unchanged. The investigation finds 'procedural irregularities' but no evidence of outcome-affecting fraud. You are not reappointed when your term ends. The Commission's credibility has been partially restored — and immediately subjected to the same structural pressures in the next election cycle.*

If Option D in Decision Point 3 (public resignation): *Your resignation is international headline news within hours. You are the first Chief Election Commissioner in Bangladesh's history to resign citing executive interference. The government issues a statement characterizing your resignation as politically motivated. A replacement is appointed within 72 hours. Full certification proceeds. The structural conditions of the Commission are unchanged. Your resignation has created a permanent historical record of executive interference in election certification — and no institutional mechanism to act on that record.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Electoral Commission Independence Undermined at Appointment

The Commission's structural vulnerability originates at the moment of appointment. A Chief Election Commissioner who is appointed on executive recommendation cannot be structurally independent from the executive whose elections the Commission administers. The Home Ministry's control of polling station security deployment — which determines which areas are accessible to opposition campaigning and opposition counting agents — is a second structural capture mechanism that the Commission cannot address within its existing mandate. The scenarios that produce certification pressure are downstream effects of upstream structural design failures.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that the institutions responsible for conducting elections be structurally independent from the actors whose elections they administer. Independence requires: appointment mechanisms that do not run through the executive, operational authority that does not depend on executive-controlled agencies (police, security forces), career protections that prevent Commission leadership from facing professional consequences for decisions that displease the ruling party, and enforcement authority that enables the Commission to compel compliance with its procedural requirements. The Chief Election Commissioner in this scenario has none of these structural protections.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Electoral Commission Independence provision specifies: appointment of Commissioners through a multi-party nomination process with legislative confirmation rather than executive recommendation; Commission control over its own security arrangements during elections rather than dependence on the Home Ministry; five-year fixed terms with removal only by supermajority parliamentary vote; and independent budget appropriation that does not pass through executive control. Under this design, the phone call from the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff demanding certification by 6:00 AM would have zero authority over the Commission's decision.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning behind them? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8) — consider this in relation to independent institutions generally*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S05 The Quota Protest Crackdown

Domain: Electoral Integrity / Civil Liberties | Historical Basis: Bangladesh July 2024 — student quota reform protests and security response | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — crisis scenario

Active Roles: Inspector General of Police (R54), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), Prime Minister (R01), Human Rights Commission Chair (R24), NGO Director (R46), Student Union President (R48), UN Special Rapporteur (R63)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In July 2024, Bangladeshi university students launched nationwide protests against a government job quota system that reserved positions for descendants of 1971 liberation war veterans. The protests rapidly expanded beyond the quota issue into broader demands for governance accountability. The government's security response — involving police, RAB, and ruling party student activists — resulted in documented deaths, injuries, and mass arrests. At least 266 people were killed in the crackdown according to documented counts. The crackdown became the immediate precipitant of the August 2024 uprising that ended Sheikh Hasina's government. The IGP who commanded the security response became one of the most prominent accountability targets in the post-Hasina period.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)

You are in your role as the protests enter their fifth day. Tens of thousands of students are in the streets in Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Sylhet. The protests have shifted from quota reform to broader governance demands. Three students have been killed in confrontations between protesters and ruling party activists — police have been present at all three sites. No arrests of ruling party activists have been made. The Home Minister has called: the Prime Minister's instruction is clear — restore order. The internet has been partially disrupted. An international human rights NGO has published a statement calling for restraint. Your riot control units are deployed. Your officers on the ground are reporting that the crowd size exceeds manageable containment. You must give the order that determines what happens in the next six hours.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Home Minister] *The Prime Minister has instructed you to restore order. All necessary force is authorized. The stability of the government depends on this being resolved today.*

[Senior Field Commander (Dhaka)] *Sir/Madam — the crowd in Dhaka has reached approximately 80,000 in Shahbagh alone. Containment without lethal force is not possible at this scale. I need clear guidance.*

[UN Special Rapporteur (formal communication)] *We are monitoring the situation in Bangladesh with grave concern. We urge the government to exercise maximum restraint and call for dialogue with protest leaders immediately.*

[Your own assessment] *Three students are already dead. The crowd is angry, not armed. Escalation will produce more deaths. But if the protests continue, the government's political pressure on you will intensify.*

Decision Point 1

Your field commander in Dhaka needs an order. What do you authorize?

Option A: Authorize non-lethal crowd management only — tear gas, water cannon, physical barriers — with explicit orders that live ammunition is not authorized under any circumstances in the current situation.

Option B: Authorize graduated force including the use of rubber bullets and bird shot for 'direct threat situations' while maintaining a prohibition on live ammunition for crowd dispersal.

Option C: Authorize full force available to restore order, deferring to field commanders' judgment on proportionality — the Home Minister's instruction is to restore order by whatever means necessary.

Option D: Order all police units to hold position without escalation and immediately request a meeting with protest leaders through university chancellors — buying time for dialogue.

Decision Point 2

Six hours into your non-escalation posture, the Home Minister has called three more times. The Prime Minister's Chief of Staff has delivered a direct message: 'Your career ends today if order is not restored.' Ruling party student activists have entered two

university campuses and attacked protesters — your officers present did not intervene. The media is covering both the attacks and the police non-intervention. What do you do?

Option A: Issue explicit orders to all field commanders that ruling party activists attacking protesters must be treated identically to any other assault — arrest the attackers regardless of party affiliation.

Option B: Contact the Home Minister directly and state that you cannot maintain police neutrality if party activists are given de facto permission to attack protesters — and that you need either clear authority to arrest all assailants or your resignation accepted.

Option C: Continue non-escalation posture with the crowd, while avoiding intervention in the ruling party activist attacks — maintaining the political relationship that allows you to keep non-lethal restrictions in place.

Option D: Authorize RAB deployment to the university campuses — giving the paramilitary force authority to handle the situation while you maintain personal distance from the use-of-force decisions.

Decision Point 3

Four days later. The protest has ended — the quota reform was rescinded after the deaths and mass arrests. 38 people are confirmed dead. Hundreds are in detention. You have been asked to provide a formal account to the parliamentary committee investigating the security response. A human rights organization has specifically named you in their report on the crackdown. What is your testimony?

Option A: Provide a full factual account of every order you gave, every instruction you received from the Home Ministry and PM's office, and every field report you received — including the communications that directed you to restore order 'by whatever means necessary.'

Option B: Provide a factual account of the orders you gave, without disclosing the communications you received from the executive — protecting the chain of command while being accurate about your own decisions.

Option C: Provide a minimal account confirming that police acted within their mandate and deferring substantive questions to the Home Minister — as the political officer responsible for security policy.

Option D: Request legal counsel before testifying and exercise your right to limit disclosure pending legal advice — standard practice for officials facing potential accountability proceedings.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option A in Decision Point 1 and Option A in Decision Point 2 (maximum restraint, impartial enforcement): *The non-lethal restriction holds for 72 hours. Four people are killed by rubber bullets — the coroners' reports list the injuries as not consistent with non-lethal ammunition, suggesting field level non-compliance with your orders. The protest continues longer than it would have under full force deployment. The government's political pressure on you intensifies daily. When the quota rescission ends the protest, you are removed from your position within 30 days for 'failure to maintain public order.' The accountability record — 4 deaths rather than 38 — is the structural difference your decision produced. It is not acknowledged in your removal notice.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1 (full force authorized): *Order is restored within 36 hours. 38 people are killed. Hundreds are injured and arrested. The government remains in power for four more weeks before the uprising that follows the crackdown ends it. In the post-Hasina accountability period, you are among the*

senior officials specifically named in human rights investigations. International arrest warrant proceedings are initiated. You spend the following years managing the legal and reputational consequences of the order you gave. The government you protected fell regardless.

If Option A in Decision Point 3 (full truthful testimony): *Your testimony directly implicates the Home Minister and the PM's Chief of Staff in directing the security response. The testimony is the most significant accountability evidence produced by the parliamentary investigation. The hearing is publicly broadcast. Three senior officials named in your testimony immediately deny your account. The investigation produces a report with divided findings. Your testimony is the historical record that the crackdown was directed from the executive level — evidence that subsequent accountability proceedings will rely on.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — Security Force Deployment Without Independent Oversight

The IGP's scenario reveals the structural position of Bangladesh's police commander: authorized to use lethal force, directed by political actors with no independent oversight between the executive's instruction and the implementation of potentially lethal orders. The structural absence of an independent body with authority to review and constrain use-of-force decisions in real time — before deaths occur rather than after — is the design failure that the quota protest crackdown illustrates. Individual IGP decisions matter at the margin. The structural absence of institutional constraint is what determines the order of magnitude.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's authority-accountability misalignment principle identifies the security sector as one of the most structurally dangerous domains in democratic governance: the actors with the most consequential coercive authority are the least subject to independent real-time accountability. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that the use of lethal force against citizens be subject to independent institutional oversight that operates before authorization, during deployment, and in accountability after the fact. None of these oversight mechanisms existed in Bangladesh's 2024 security sector.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Security Sector Accountability provision requires: an independent police oversight commission with authority to review and countermand use-of-force orders that violate established proportionality standards; mandatory independent review of all deaths in custody or during security operations before any official account is finalized; and criminal accountability for officials who authorize disproportionate force regardless of their position in the command chain. Under this design, the Home Minister's instruction to restore order 'by whatever means necessary' would trigger an automatic oversight review — not a compliance obligation.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to use emergency powers that temporarily suspend certain legal protections when facing national crises? (FI Q23)*

S06 Voter ID Suppression

Domain: Electoral Integrity | Historical Basis: Comparative — Bangladesh and international gerrymandering and voter suppression parallels | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Delimitation Commission Chair (R25), Chief Election Commissioner (R16), MP-Ruling Party (R03), Opposition Leader (R02), International Observer Chief (R99), Legal Aid Officer (R33)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Voter suppression through administrative and legal mechanisms — rather than direct physical intimidation — represents a more structurally sophisticated form of electoral manipulation. New voter registration requirements, ID documentation standards, and constituency boundary designs can systematically reduce turnout in opposition-leaning communities without any individual act of fraud. This scenario draws on patterns documented across multiple democratic and semi-democratic contexts, including Bangladesh's voter roll management controversies, to create a structurally grounded administrative suppression scenario.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)

You are the Delimitation Commission Chair. A new voter registration regulation has just been passed by parliament requiring that all voters update their National Identity Cards with current address information before the next election — or be removed from the voter roll. The regulation gives voters six months to complete the update. An independent analysis commissioned by your office shows that the administrative process for NID updates is significantly more difficult for rural voters, migrant workers, and urban slum residents — populations that independent electoral research shows are predominantly opposition-leaning. The analysis estimates that 2.3 million voters

may be disenfranchised under this regulation if no supplementary measures are taken. The ruling party's parliamentary majority passed this regulation with no opposition support.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Ministry of Home Affairs] *The regulation is legally enacted. The Commission's role is to implement the voter roll updates per the statutory timeline. No supplementary measures have been authorized.*

[Civil Society Electoral Monitoring Group] *This regulation will disenfranchise millions of legitimate voters. As Delimitation Commission Chair you have an independent mandate to protect electoral integrity. We are requesting emergency supplementary registration measures.*

[Commission Legal Adviser] *The Commission has independent constitutional authority over voter rolls. An argument exists that the Commission can implement supplementary measures to protect voter roll integrity without specific parliamentary authorization.*

[International Electoral Standards Body] *Voter roll accuracy requirements that produce systematic disenfranchisement of identified demographic groups are inconsistent with international electoral integrity standards. We are watching this situation closely.*

Decision Point 1

Your Commission's analysis confirms 2.3 million potential disenfranchisements. What action do you take?

Option A: Implement supplementary mobile registration units, extended deadlines for rural areas, and digital update options — citing the Commission's independent constitutional mandate over voter roll integrity without seeking government approval.

Option B: Request government authorization for supplementary measures before implementing anything — if authorization is denied, implement the regulation as passed.

Option C: Publish the Commission's analysis publicly, formally noting the disenfranchisement risk, and implement the regulation as passed while creating a public record of the Commission's concern.

Option D: Refer the question of supplementary measures to the Supreme Court for constitutional guidance on whether the Commission's independent mandate covers unilaterally modifying implementation of a parliamentary regulation.

Decision Point 2

The government has denied authorization for supplementary measures. The Commission's analysis is now public and has been covered extensively by media. The opposition has filed a Supreme Court petition. The ruling party has publicly accused the Commission of political bias for publishing the analysis. You have received three calls today from the Home Ministry expressing 'concern about the Commission's conduct.' In two weeks, the court will rule. What do you do in the interim?

Option A: Proceed with implementing supplementary measures under the Commission's independent mandate — demonstrating that the Commission's constitutional independence is real, not formal.

Option B: Pause all action and wait for the court ruling — implementing nothing additional until the constitutional question is resolved.

Option C: Implement limited supplementary measures — digital update options only — that are clearly within the Commission's administrative authority without clearly requiring government authorization.

Option D: Issue a formal public statement defending the Commission's analysis and its constitutional mandate while waiting for the court to rule.

Decision Point 3

The Supreme Court has ruled: the Commission has the authority to implement supplementary measures but is not required to do so. The decision is constitutionally significant — it confirms Commission independence — but leaves the political decision to the Commission. You have six weeks until voter roll finalization. What is your decision?

Option A: Implement the full supplementary measures program — mobile units, extended deadlines, digital options — accepting the political cost of the ruling party's opposition.

Option B: Implement limited supplementary measures sufficient to reduce but not eliminate the disenfranchisement risk — a compromise position that demonstrates independence while managing political exposure.

Option C: Implement no supplementary measures — the court did not require them, and implementing them would expose the Commission to accusations of political partisanship in the context of a disputed election.

Option D: Implement supplementary measures only in districts where both ruling and opposition parties have agreed they are needed — making the supplementary program conditional on bipartisan support.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option A across all decision points (maximum supplementary measures): *Approximately 1.8 million of the 2.3 million at-risk voters are successfully updated before the deadline. The ruling party files a formal complaint against the Commission. An internal government review of the Commission's conduct is initiated. The election proceeds with a more complete voter roll than the regulation would have produced. The ruling party wins — the 500,000 voters not reached were insufficient to change the outcome in a ruling-party-dominated environment. Your term as Commission Chair is not renewed. The court ruling confirming Commission independence is a significant legal precedent — one that the next Commission Chair will inherit.*

If Option C across all decision points (implement regulation as passed, no supplementary measures): *2.1 million voters are removed from the roll. The election proceeds. The ruling party wins more decisively than in the alternative scenario — the disenfranchised voters were predominantly opposition-leaning, as the Commission's analysis predicted. Post-election analysis by independent researchers confirms the disenfranchisement effect. The Commission's published analysis is the documented evidence of awareness — the Commission knew the outcome and implemented it anyway. This is the historical record.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: **Structural Exclusion — Administrative Disenfranchisement**

Voter suppression through administrative mechanism is structurally more effective than direct fraud because it produces discriminatory outcomes through processes that are formally legal and individually defensible. Each element of the NID update requirement is administratively reasonable in isolation; the cumulative effect of the requirement on specific demographic groups is systematically discriminatory. The Delimitation Commission Chair's scenario illustrates the governance dilemma of an independent institution that has identified a structural injustice it has the authority but not the political mandate to address.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural exclusion principle identifies administrative disenfranchisement as a form of structural unfairness that violates the Meta-Right to Structural Fairness even when no individual act of fraud occurs. The right to vote is formally preserved while the conditions for exercising it are systematically denied to identified demographic groups. This is the most sophisticated form of electoral structural capture — using the administrative machinery of voter roll management to shape the electorate rather than the vote count.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Franchise Protection provision requires that any voter registration requirement be subject to an independent impact assessment before implementation — specifically analyzing its differential effect on identified demographic groups. Requirements that produce systematic demographic disenfranchisement are unconstitutional under UFDS regardless of their administrative justification. The Commission has mandatory authority and obligation to implement mitigating measures when impact assessments reveal systematic disenfranchisement risk.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for political parties to select candidates for election without open and transparent internal processes? (FI Q5) — consider in relation to voter access*

FI-2: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S07 The Disputed Result

Domain: Electoral Integrity | Historical Basis: Kenya 2017 Supreme Court election annulment; Bangladesh result contestation patterns | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Chief Justice (R26), High Court Judge (R27), Opposition Leader (R02), Chief Election Commissioner (R16), International Observer Chief (R99), UN Special Rapporteur (R63)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In September 2017, Kenya's Supreme Court made history by annulling the presidential election result — the first time in African history a Supreme Court had annulled a presidential election. The court found that the election had not been conducted in accordance with the constitution and electoral law. The ruling was upheld despite enormous political pressure. A repeat election was held. This scenario draws on the Kenya precedent to create a judicial decision scenario about disputed election results in a context that parallels Bangladesh's own patterns of electoral contestation.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)

You are the Chief Justice. The opposition party has filed an election petition challenging the national election result in which the ruling party won 256 of 300 seats. The petition alleges systematic irregularities including ballot manipulation, counting interference, and voter roll manipulation. Your court has jurisdiction. The international observer report notes 'significant procedural concerns' in 67 constituencies. The ruling party's lawyers argue that procedural irregularities, even if proven, did not change the overall result. The petition has been before your court for 21 days. Tomorrow you must deliver your judgment. You have three clerks and one senior judge who has reviewed the evidence with you. The evidence is mixed — credible documentation of irregularities in 42 constituencies, inconclusive documentation in 25 more. Whether the irregularities changed the result in enough constituencies to affect the national outcome is uncertain.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Ruling Party Legal Team (in court arguments)] *Even accepting every irregularity the petitioner has documented, the margin of victory is too large to have been affected. The court should not annul an election based on procedural irregularities that did not affect the outcome.*

[Opposition Legal Team (in court arguments)] *The right to a free and fair election is not simply about whether the margin was large enough. Documented, systematic irregularities violate the constitutional right to a legitimate electoral process — regardless of margin.*

[Senior Judge (private consultation)] *The evidence in 42 constituencies is credible and serious. I believe the election law was violated. But I am uncertain whether we should annul the entire result or order targeted re-runs in the affected constituencies.*

[Your own judicial assessment] *The Kenya precedent is directly relevant. The legal principle is clear: systematic violation of electoral law renders the result constitutionally defective regardless of margin. But the political consequences of annulment in Bangladesh's current environment are significant.*

Decision Point 1

Your senior judge agrees that irregularities are documented but is uncertain about remedy. The options before you are legally sound but politically distinct. What ruling do you draft?

Option A: Full annulment of the national election result, citing the documented systematic irregularities in 42 constituencies as constituting a violation of the constitutional right to a free and fair election — ordering a repeat election within 60 days.

Option B: Partial annulment — order repeat elections in the 42 constituencies with documented irregularities while upholding the results in the remaining 258 constituencies.

Option C: Uphold the result — find that while irregularities occurred, the petitioner has not proven they changed the outcome in enough constituencies to affect the national result.

Option D: Order an independent recount in all 67 constituencies flagged in the international observer report before delivering a final ruling — extending proceedings by 30 days.

Decision Point 2

You have delivered your ruling: partial annulment, ordering repeat elections in 42 constituencies. The ruling party has immediately announced it will not participate in the repeat elections, declaring your ruling unconstitutional. The ruling party's lawyers have filed an emergency application before the full Supreme Court bench to suspend your ruling. Three of the seven Supreme Court justices are expected to vote to suspend. You must decide how to respond to the suspension application.

Option A: Maintain your ruling in full — a legally correct judgment does not become incorrect because it faces political opposition, and suspending an electoral ruling on political grounds would be more constitutionally damaging than its enforcement.

Option B: Convene a full seven-justice bench immediately and allow the suspension application to be heard — demonstrating that you respect the full bench process even if you are confident in your original ruling.

Option C: Offer a modified timeline — extend the repeat election deadline from 60 to 90 days to allow the ruling party time to reconsider its boycott position.

Option D: Issue a public statement defending your ruling's legal basis and the court's independence — using public legitimacy as a tool when institutional enforcement is uncertain.

Decision Point 3

The full bench has upheld your ruling 4-3. The repeat elections are ordered. The ruling party announces a boycott. The repeat elections are held with only the opposition and minor parties contesting. The opposition wins all 42 seats by default. The ruling party now controls 214 of 300 parliamentary seats — still a majority — and has announced it will not recognize the legitimacy of the 42 repeat-election MPs. The political crisis is acute. As Chief Justice, you are being asked by civic society groups to issue a statement about the constitutional status of the parliament. What is your response?

Option A: Issue a formal court statement confirming the constitutional legitimacy of the full parliament including the 42 repeat-election members — making the court's position unambiguous.

Option B: Decline to issue any political statement — the court's role was to rule on the election petition, not to manage the political consequences of its ruling.

Option C: Issue a statement calling on all parties to respect the constitutional order and warning that any action that denies the constitutional status of legitimately elected MPs will be treated as a constitutional violation subject to contempt proceedings.

Option D: Request a meeting with all party leaders to facilitate dialogue on constitutional compliance — positioning the court as a mediator rather than merely an adjudicator.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1 and Option A in Decision Point 2 (full annulment, maintain ruling): *The repeat elections are held. The political crisis is acute but the constitutional order holds. The ruling party's boycott means the opposition wins seats it would not have won in a competitive election. The parliament that results is constitutional but contested. Your ruling has established the most significant judicial precedent in Bangladesh's electoral history: courts can and will annul elections for systematic procedural violations regardless of margin. The long-term institutional value of that precedent is significant. The short-term political crisis is real. Your security detail is doubled for six months.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1 (uphold the result): *The election result stands. The opposition's appeal to the constitutional process has produced no remedy. The international observer community notes that the judicial review produced no accountability for documented irregularities. The structural message to future election administrators is clear: systematic irregularities will not be remedied through the judicial process regardless of documentation. The precedent has been set. Future elections will be administered in the knowledge that the judiciary has established it will not overturn results even with documented evidence of systematic violations.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Judicial Independence Under Political Pressure

The Chief Justice's scenario is unusual in the PlayerOne library: it is a scenario in which the structurally fair decision is available and the participant has the formal authority to make it. The structural failure mode is not in the Chief Justice's formal authority but in the political consequences that flow from exercising it. The Kenya precedent demonstrates that judicial independence, when genuinely exercised, can produce constitutionally correct outcomes under extreme political pressure. The Bangladesh parallel demonstrates the structural conditions that make such independence rare.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's principle of judicial independence requires that courts be structurally positioned to apply the law without career or personal safety consequences from decisions that displease the ruling party. The Chief Justice who annuls an election is exercising precisely the constitutional function that judicial independence is designed to enable. The structural question is whether the institutional design — appointment process, removal procedure, security provision, post-tenure protections — makes such exercise genuinely available without personal devastation.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Judicial Independence provision requires: appointment of Chief Justices through a multi-party legislative confirmation process; fixed terms with removal only by supermajority legislative vote for specified misconduct; adequate security provision for judges in high-profile constitutional cases; and post-tenure income protections that prevent judicial decisions from being effectively punished through economic vulnerability. Under this design, the Chief Justice who annuls an election faces no career or economic consequence for the decision — the structural protection enables the constitutional function.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the same actions to result in very different legal consequences depending on the social status or connections of the person involved? (FI Q10)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S08 The International Observer Dilemma

Domain: Electoral Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh election observation patterns; comparative international observation methodology | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: International Observer Chief (R99), International Observer (R53), Chief Election Commissioner (R16), US Secretary of State (R74), UN Special Rapporteur (R63), NGO Director (R46)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

International election observation occupies a structurally paradoxical position in democratic governance: its value depends entirely on the accuracy of its findings, but the access required to produce accurate findings depends on host government cooperation that accurate negative findings can cost. Observation missions that have produced critical reports have faced expulsion, access restrictions, and diplomatic consequences. Missions that soften findings to preserve access produce reports that lend legitimacy to elections that do not deserve it. Bangladesh's elections have been observed by multiple international missions across the 2014-2024 period, producing reports ranging from strong criticism to carefully modulated 'significant concerns.'

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT (Displayed to Participants)

You are the Chief Observer of a major international election observation mission deployed for Bangladesh's national election. Your mission has 180 observers across all eight divisions. Election day is complete. Your preliminary statement — which you will read at a press conference in 18 hours — will be the most widely covered document in the world's reporting on this election. Your observers have submitted their field reports. The picture is consistent: serious procedural violations in rural constituencies including polling agent exclusions, observed ballot stuffing in three stations, security force intimidation of voters in six constituencies, and pre-opening inspection irregularities in multiple stations. In urban constituencies the picture is mixed — better in Dhaka and Chittagong, significantly worse in rural areas. Your mission's methodology calls for an overall assessment. The government has already called your lead diplomat twice today. The government spokesperson has stated publicly that any 'politically motivated' finding will result in a review of your organization's access for future missions.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Bangladesh Government (through lead diplomat)] *We expect the observation mission to present a balanced assessment that acknowledges the administration of the election across all constituencies, not just isolated incidents.*

[Your Lead Methodologist] *The field data is clear. In rural constituencies we have documented systematic violations at a level that, by our methodology, constitutes a failed election in those areas. Our preliminary statement must reflect what we observed.*

[Your Organization's Leadership (headquarters)] *Be accurate but calibrated. We need continued access to Bangladesh for future missions. A 'failed election' finding may be accurate but it will close Bangladesh*

to us for years. Consider whether the preliminary statement can be accurate and constructive simultaneously.

[Domestic NGO Partner] *Our monitors are being pressured tonight not to share their documentation with your mission. People are afraid. Your preliminary statement is the only external accountability document that will matter. Please be honest about what happened.*

Decision Point 1

You are drafting your preliminary statement's overall assessment. Your methodology allows three possible overall characterizations: 'credible,' 'credible with significant concerns,' or 'fell short of international standards.' Based on the field data, which characterization do you use?

Option A: 'Fell short of international standards' — the field data in rural constituencies documents systematic violations that meet the methodological threshold for this finding, and accuracy requires using it.

Option B: 'Credible with significant concerns' — acknowledging the documented violations while avoiding the 'fell short' characterization that will dominate international coverage and close future access.

Option C: 'Credible' in urban areas, 'fell short' in rural areas — geographic differentiation that accurately reflects the data without requiring a single national characterization.

Option D: Decline to use any of the three standard characterizations and describe the findings factually without an overall assessment label — letting the evidence speak without the politically significant shorthand.

Decision Point 2

Your preliminary statement, whatever its overall characterization, will include specific findings. Your lead methodologist has drafted a findings section that includes three specific station-level reports of ballot stuffing with observer names attached. The observers who filed these reports have told you privately that they are concerned about their safety and their organizations' future access. One has asked to have her name removed from the specific incident report. What do you do?

Option A: Include all three specific findings with observer names — the integrity of the observation methodology requires that findings be attributable, and removing names undermines the credibility of the documentation.

Option B: Include all three specific findings but remove observer names — protecting individuals while maintaining the findings in the public record.

Option C: Include only the finding where the observer has not raised safety concerns — two of the three documented incidents are in the statement, one is held.

Option D: Include only aggregate findings without station-specific reports — 'observers documented ballot stuffing incidents in three stations' without specific location or attribution.

Decision Point 3

Your preliminary statement has been issued. The government has responded by announcing a review of your organization's accreditation for future missions and has expelled two of your mission's observers on visa grounds. Your headquarters is requesting that you issue a 'clarifying statement' that 'contextualizes' your findings to manage the diplomatic fallout. Your lead methodologist has submitted his resignation in protest at the suggestion. What do you do?

Option A: Refuse to issue any clarifying statement — your preliminary statement accurately reflects your methodology and your findings, and 'contextualizing' it under diplomatic pressure would destroy the mission's credibility.

Option B: Issue a procedural statement confirming that the mission's findings stand and that the expulsion of observers and accreditation review will be formally reported to your headquarters and the UN Department of Political Affairs.

Option C: Issue a limited clarifying statement that addresses specific factual questions raised by the government without modifying the overall assessment — threading the needle between diplomatic management and methodological integrity.

Option D: Resign as Chief Observer, publicly citing the headquarters pressure to modify findings as incompatible with the observer mission's integrity mandate.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Points 1 and 3 ('fell short' finding, no clarification): *Your preliminary statement is the most significant critical finding by an international observer mission on a Bangladesh election. It generates three days of major international coverage. The government's expulsion of two observers becomes itself a news story. Your organization loses accreditation for Bangladesh. Three years later, a different organization is accredited for the next Bangladesh election. Your mission's report remains in the international record as the most detailed documentation of the 2024-cycle election's procedural violations. Whether that documentation produces any structural improvement in Bangladesh's electoral system depends on factors entirely outside your mission's control.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1 and Option C in Decision Point 3 ('credible with concerns,' limited clarification): *Your preliminary statement is widely read as a partial endorsement of the election. The government cites your 'credible' finding in its domestic communications while ignoring the 'significant concerns' qualification. International coverage focuses on the 'credible' characterization — the qualifier is in paragraph three and receives limited attention. Your organization maintains accreditation for future missions. The domestic NGOs whose monitors documented the worst violations publicly criticize your mission's statement as inadequate. Your methodologist submits a dissent from the overall assessment that is never made public.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — International Observation Without Enforcement

The international observer's dilemma crystallizes the most fundamental structural problem of international accountability mechanisms: they produce information without enforcement authority. The observation mission that accurately documents electoral fraud produces a report. The report is read, cited, and archived. The election result stands. The next cycle begins with the same structural conditions. The observation mission that softens its findings to preserve access produces a report that lends legitimacy to

elections that do not deserve it — and continues to have access to produce similarly softened reports in the future. Neither path produces structural improvement.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework addresses the international accountability gap by identifying what international electoral observation actually requires to be effective: not just the authority to observe and report, but institutional mechanisms through which reports trigger mandatory domestic institutional responses. The observation mission's findings should trigger automatic independent investigation processes within the host country's electoral system — making the observation report the beginning of an accountability chain rather than the end of it.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): Under the Universal Governance Framework's International Electoral Standards provision, member states are required to: accept international observation as a constitutional obligation rather than a diplomatic concession; establish domestic independent electoral integrity bodies with mandatory authority to investigate findings from international observation reports; and treat expulsion of international observers as a constitutional violation subject to formal international institutional sanction. Under this design, the government's expulsion of observers would itself trigger an automatic international institutional response — not merely a diplomatic note.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

The following questions are presented to participants after completing the scenario. The first three are structured reflection questions. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items drawn from the scenario's primary domains.

Structured Reflection Question 1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly during this scenario? [Party or institutional pressure that prevented accountability relationship action / Lack of information for fair decision / Time pressure forcing decisions / Competing interests with no structural resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Structured Reflection Question 2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness in this scenario visible to you before you made your decisions, or only after you saw the consequences? [1 = Completely visible from the start through 5 = Not visible at all until the consequence reveal]

Structured Reflection Question 3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences, describe a governance design change that would have made structurally fair decision-making possible in this scenario without the structural cost you experienced. [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning behind them? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25) — consider this in relation to international accountability mechanisms*

— End of Chapter 7 —

Next: Chapter 8 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Two — Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity (S09–S14)

CHAPTER 8

Scenario Scripts — Domain Two: Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity (S09–S14)

Domain Two scenarios address the structural mechanisms through which legislative bodies are subordinated to party leadership rather than serving as independent deliberative institutions accountable to constituencies. Of all the structural failure modes in the PlayerOne library, justificatory subordination — the condition in which decision-makers are structurally prevented from acting on their accountability relationships — is most vividly illustrated in legislative contexts. The six scenarios in this domain range from Bangladesh's constitutionally-embedded Article 70 mechanism to the global patterns of omnibus legislation, coalition management, and parliamentary capture that replicate Bangladesh's legislative subordination problem across different institutional architectures.

These scenarios are the most directly grounded in the Equitism framework's core theoretical claims. The argument that people have a right not merely to vote but to governance systems architecturally designed to be fair is tested most directly when the representatives they elect cannot represent them — because the structural design of the legislative system prevents it. Participants who inhabit these roles do not merely observe justificatory subordination abstractly. They feel it: the party whip's directive, the threat to the seat, the constituency petition that cannot be honored, the vote that must be cast against conscience and mandate. That felt experience is the pedagogical core of Domain Two.

Article 70 does not just constrain individual MPs. It structurally transforms Bangladesh's parliament from a deliberative body into a ratification machine — ensuring that whatever the party leadership decides becomes law, regardless of what 300 constituencies want. This is not a governance failure. It is a governance design.

S09 Article 70

Domain: Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Constitution Article 70 — in continuous operation since 1972 | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: MP-Ruling Party (R03), MP-Opposition (R04), MP-Independent (R05), MP-Swing Constituency (R14), Parliamentary Whip-Ruling Party (R12), Speaker (R10), Opposition Leader (R02)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Article 70 of the Bangladesh Constitution provides that a Member of Parliament who votes against their party on a confidence vote or money bill, or who resigns from their party, shall automatically lose their parliamentary seat. The provision was included in the 1972 constitution to prevent the kind of parliamentary instability that had characterized pre-independence Pakistan's legislative history. Its effect has been to transform Bangladesh's parliament into an institution in which party leadership decisions are automatically translated into legislative outcomes — regardless of what individual MPs think, what their constituencies want, or what the evidence supports. Every significant legislative vote in Bangladesh's parliamentary history has produced party-line results. Not because every MP agreed. Because Article 70 made disagreement structurally impossible.

This scenario is designed to make the participant inhabit Article 70 from the inside — not to read about it but to experience the decision architecture it creates: the moment when constituency accountability and party accountability point in opposite directions and the structural design of the governance system makes both simultaneously impossible.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are a Member of Parliament. A constitutional amendment is before parliament that will extend the Prime Minister's emergency powers — granting the executive authority to suspend certain parliamentary oversight functions for up to 90 days during declared national emergencies. Your party supports the amendment. The party whip has delivered the instruction: a three-line whip requiring you to vote in favor. Your constituency committee has sent an emergency message: their unanimous position is that extending executive emergency powers without parliamentary approval is precisely the structural change they elected you to prevent. Three civil society organizations in your constituency have published open letters opposing the amendment. Your party controls 198 of 300 seats — the amendment will pass regardless of your vote. The vote is in four hours.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Party Whip] *Three-line whip. This is a confidence matter. Vote yes or you know what follows. We have the numbers regardless — this is about party unity.*

[Constituency Committee Chair] *We elected you to protect parliamentary oversight. This amendment does the opposite. We are watching this vote. We need you to vote no.*

[Party Senior Leader (private call)] *I understand your position. But we need this to govern effectively. Think about your career. Think about what you can do for your constituency with five more years versus what you can do from outside parliament.*

[Civil Society Open Letter (your district)] *We call on our MP to vote against this amendment. Parliamentary oversight of executive emergency powers is a constitutional protection that cannot be compromised.*

Decision Point 1

You have four hours before the vote. How do you spend them?

Option A: Request an urgent meeting with the party leader and state your position directly: you cannot vote for this amendment and maintain your constituency accountability. Ask whether there is any modification to the amendment that would address your concern.

Option B: Issue a public statement to your constituency committee acknowledging their position and stating that you will vote according to your constitutional judgment — without specifying how you will vote.

Option C: Contact three other MPs you know share concerns about the amendment and coordinate: if enough of you signal opposition, the party may modify the amendment rather than face a visible rebellion.

Option D: Accept the whip instruction and prepare your explanation to the constituency committee for after the vote — prioritizing your parliamentary seat and long-term constituency service capacity.

Decision Point 2

Your meeting with the party leader produced no modification. Your coordination with other MPs produced two who are willing to signal concerns but not vote against. The vote is in 45 minutes. What do you do?

Option A: Vote against the amendment. Article 70 will disqualify you. Your seat will be vacated. You will have honored your constituency mandate and lost your parliamentary position.

Option B: Vote for the amendment. The structural reality is that Article 70 makes independent voting impossible without career termination. You will work within the system for your constituency in other ways.

Option C: Abstain — which under Bangladesh's constitutional interpretation may also trigger Article 70 consequences but creates a public record of your refusal to support the amendment.

Option D: Be absent from the vote — citing illness or constituency emergency — creating neither a yes vote nor the Article 70 consequence of a recorded no vote.

Decision Point 3

The amendment has passed. You voted with the party (or were absent). Your constituency committee has called an emergency meeting and formally censured your vote (or absence) as a betrayal of their mandate. The censure is public. A local opposition activist is circulating the censure resolution on social media. How do you respond?

Option A: Meet the constituency committee in person, acknowledge the structural constraint you faced, explain Article 70's operation honestly, and propose working together on a campaign for Article 70 reform — turning the experience into civic education.

Option B: Issue a public statement defending your vote as a difficult but necessary decision for stable governance — accepting the political cost of the constituency's disapproval.

Option C: Resign from the party and your seat, citing Article 70 as structurally incompatible with representative democracy — making the resignation a public statement about the constitutional provision itself.

Option D: Say nothing publicly and absorb the political damage — assessing that any explanation will be used against you and that the constituency's anger will diminish with time.

CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 2 (votes against — loses seat): *Your seat is vacated within 48 hours per Article 70. A by-election is scheduled for your constituency. The ruling party fields a candidate. Your constituency, which censured your previous votes for party compliance, now faces a by-election in which the likely outcome is a more compliant ruling party replacement. You have demonstrated constitutional integrity at the cost of your seat — and your constituency's representation has worsened, not improved, as a structural consequence.*

If Option B in Decision Point 2 (votes with party): *The amendment passes. You retain your seat. Your constituency committee censures you. At the next election cycle, the local party machinery — which you now need for renomination — views you favorably. Your constituency committee's censure is one news cycle. You have five more years in parliament. Whether those five years produce more for your constituency than the alternative — losing your seat and triggering a by-election — is genuinely uncertain. Article 70 has not produced a wrong decision. It has produced a structurally impossible one.*

If Option C in Decision Point 3 (public resignation citing Article 70): *Your resignation triggers a by-election. Your public statement on Article 70 receives significant media coverage — the first time a resigning MP has explicitly cited the constitutional provision's structural unfairness as the reason for resignation. Your statement is referenced in academic papers and civil society reports on Bangladesh's legislative reform needs. You are not in parliament. The structural provision you named remains unchanged. Your statement is the most durable contribution you made to Bangladesh's governance reform conversation. Whether that contribution matters depends on whether anyone with the power to change Article 70 reads it.*

FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Justificatory Subordination — Bangladesh's Article 70 as Constitutional Design

Article 70 is the purest example of justificatory subordination in the PlayerOne library: a constitutional provision that explicitly removes the structural possibility of constituency-accountable voting. The MP who votes against their party to honor their constituency's mandate loses their seat. The constituency then faces a by-election it did not choose and that is likely to produce a more party-compliant replacement. Article 70 does not merely constrain individual MPs — it structurally transforms the accountability relationship that elections are designed to create. The voters choose their MP; Article 70 ensures the MP's effective allegiance is to the party, not the voter.

Equitism Connection: Equitism identifies Article 70 as a foundational example of structural unfairness in democratic design. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that elected representatives be structurally positioned to act on their accountability relationship to their constituents. Article 70 explicitly and constitutionally prevents this. The right to vote — which Bangladesh formally preserves — is structurally hollow when the representative elected by that vote cannot vote according to the mandate given. This is the architectural unfairness that Equitism argues cannot be remedied by individual MP integrity but only by structural design change.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Legislative Independence provision eliminates Article 70's party discipline mechanism and replaces it with constituency accountability structures. MPs who vote against party position do not lose their seats — they remain accountable to their constituencies through the electoral cycle. The party whip function is preserved as an advocacy tool but stripped of its removal threat. Coalition stability — the original justification for Article 70 — is protected through constructive vote of no confidence requirements rather than through individual MP discipline mechanisms. Under this design, the

scenario in S09 does not arise: the MP who votes against the emergency powers amendment honors their constituency mandate, remains in parliament, and the government survives or falls based on parliamentary rather than party arithmetic.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1) — consider in relation to party discipline mechanisms that prevent constituency accountability*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning behind them? (FI Q2)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

S10 The Defection Trap

Domain: Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh and comparative parliamentary defection dynamics | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: MP-Opposition (R04), Opposition Leader (R02), Parliamentary Whip-Ruling Party (R12), MP-Ruling Party (R03), MP-Independent (R05)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Parliamentary defection — the movement of MPs from opposition to ruling party or vice versa — is a persistent feature of South Asian legislative politics. In Bangladesh's parliamentary history, defections have occurred in both directions: opposition MPs offered cabinet positions, parliamentary committee chairmanships, development fund access, and legal protection in exchange for crossing to the ruling party. The structural dynamics of defection illuminate the gap between what democratic accountability requires — representatives who honor their electoral mandate — and what structural

incentives produce — representatives who respond to the institutional rewards that the party controlling state resources can offer.

▸ **SCENARIO CONTEXT**

You are an opposition MP with a safe constituency. Your party controls 47 seats. The ruling party controls 228. A senior ruling party figure has requested a private meeting. At that meeting, he made an explicit offer: if you cross to the ruling party, you will receive a parliamentary secretary position, guaranteed access to Tk 5 crore in constituency development funds over the next three years, and formal protection from the three pending legal cases your party opponents have filed against you under the Digital Security Act. The offer expires in 72 hours. Your constituency elected you with a 62% majority specifically because you have publicly opposed the ruling party's governance record. Your defection will not change the parliamentary arithmetic in any meaningful way — the ruling party already has a commanding majority. But it will end your opposition career and begin a government career.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Ruling Party Senior Official (private)] *This is a genuine offer. You are a talented legislator. You can do more for your constituency from inside the government than from opposition benches with 47 seats. Think about what Tk 5 crore means for your people.*

[Opposition Leader] *I know what they are offering you. Do not mistake political safety for political integrity. We need you. Your constituency needs you where you are.*

[Constituency Supporter (informal message)] *We have heard rumors. Please — we voted for you because you stood for something. Do not become what we voted against.*

[Your legal adviser] *The DSA cases against you are manageable but they are expensive and stressful. If the ruling party drops them, your life gets significantly easier. I cannot advise you politically — only legally.*

Decision Point 1

The offer is on the table. Before you respond, you want to understand what you would be agreeing to. You ask the ruling party official one clarifying question. What is it?

Option A: What specific governance positions am I expected to support as a parliamentary secretary? I need to know what I am agreeing to do, not just what I am receiving in exchange.

Option B: Can the DSA cases be dropped immediately — before I commit to anything — as a demonstration of good faith?

Option C: What happens to this offer if I decline? Is this a one-time approach or will there be further contact?

Option D: I do not have a question. I tell him I need 72 hours to think and I leave without revealing my inclination.

Decision Point 2

You have decided to reject the offer. How do you respond to it?

Option A: Decline privately and say nothing publicly — protecting yourself from ruling party retaliation while honoring your constituency mandate.

Option B: Decline privately and immediately inform your party leader of the offer in full detail — creating an internal record that the approach was made.

Option C: Decline publicly — issue a statement naming that a defection offer was made, without identifying the specific official, as a form of accountability for the practice.

Option D: Decline publicly with full attribution — naming the official, the specific offer terms, and the DSA case leverage used — accepting the legal and political consequences of the disclosure.

Decision Point 3

One week after declining the offer, two of the three DSA cases against you have had new evidence added by the prosecuting party. The ruling party official has made contact again: the offer remains open. A second opposition MP has accepted a similar offer and crossed over. Your party's seat count is now 46. What is your position?

Option A: Hold. The structural pressure is intensifying precisely because you did not capitulate the first time. Maintaining position under escalating pressure is the only demonstration that constituency accountability is real.

Option B: Seek an urgent meeting with the opposition leader and human rights legal organizations to document the DSA escalation as politically motivated — creating a public record before your position becomes legally untenable.

Option C: Accept the offer. The legal exposure is now too significant. You can still serve your constituency from a government position, and staying in opposition at this personal cost serves no one.

Option D: Seek a temporary leave of absence from parliamentary duties while your legal situation is addressed — creating distance from both the pressure and the decision.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option D in Decision Point 2 (full public disclosure) and Option A in Decision Point 3 (holds position): *Your public disclosure of the defection offer — with attribution — is one of the most significant parliamentary accountability stories in the current cycle. The ruling party denies the offer. Three journalists investigate and find corroborating evidence of similar approaches to four other opposition MPs. The DSA cases against you are pursued aggressively. Your legal costs over the next 18 months are substantial. You remain in opposition. Two years later, the political climate shifts enough that the DSA cases are quietly dropped. You are one of the most cited examples of opposition integrity in the post-election accountability literature. You have not advanced your constituency's development spending by one taka through this path.*

If Option C in Decision Point 3 (accepts offer after escalation): *You cross to the ruling party. The DSA cases are dropped within 30 days. You receive the parliamentary secretary position and the development fund access. Your constituency receives infrastructure improvements it has needed for years. Your party's seat count falls to 46. At the next election, your constituency does not re-elect you — the voters who gave you a 62% majority remember what you were elected to do and what you did instead. The development funds were real. The constituency mandate was real. Only one of them survived.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Legislative Defection as Governance Mechanism

The defection trap illustrates how the structural inequality of resources between the ruling party and opposition produces legislative capture without formal coercion. The ruling party controls state development funds, legal prosecution resources, and the patronage appointments that constitute political careers. The opposition MP who refuses defection faces: escalating legal exposure, constituency development fund deprivation, and career limitation. The one who accepts receives: legal protection, development resources, and institutional advancement. This is not bribery in the conventional sense — it is the governance architecture of a system in which the ruling party controls enough state resources to make compliance structurally rewarding and resistance structurally punishing.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's analysis of defection distinguishes between voluntary political movement — which is an exercise of political freedom — and structurally coerced defection produced by the ruling party's control of state resources. When development funds, legal prosecution, and patronage positions are deployed systematically to incentivize defection and punish resistance, the legislative composition ceases to reflect electoral outcomes and begins to reflect the ruling party's resource deployment capacity. This is a structural capture of the legislative body that violates the Meta-Right to Structural Fairness as clearly as electoral fraud — it just uses economic rather than administrative mechanisms.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Legislative Independence provision addresses defection coercion through three mechanisms: constituency development fund allocation through an independent formula rather than through executive discretion (eliminating the development fund incentive); mandatory independent review of any prosecution of sitting MPs (eliminating the legal threat leverage); and enhanced constituency accountability requirements that make defection-induced seat loss triggered by constituency petition rather than requiring the MP to formally resign. These provisions collectively eliminate the structural incentives that make defection economically rational without eliminating the political freedom to change parties.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for political leaders to appoint close family members or personal associates to government positions? (FI Q3) — consider in relation to patronage-based political recruitment*

FI-3: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

S11 The Speaker's Ruling

Domain: Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh parliamentary procedure patterns; comparative presiding officer impartiality standards | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Speaker (R10), Deputy Speaker (R11), Opposition Leader (R02), MP-Opposition (R04), MP-Ruling Party (R03), Parliamentary Whip-Ruling Party (R12)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The parliamentary Speaker's role is constitutionally designed to be impartial — the presiding officer who applies procedure fairly regardless of party affiliation. In Bangladesh's parliamentary history, the Speaker has been elected by the ruling party majority and has in practice served the government's legislative management requirements. This structural reality creates the defining tension of the role: formal constitutional obligation of impartiality combined with structural accountability to the party that elected the Speaker to the chair. This scenario examines what happens when these two obligations directly collide.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Speaker of Parliament. The opposition has tabled a censure motion against the Finance Minister for the alleged misuse of development funds — a formal parliamentary procedure that under the rules of procedure requires a floor vote if it meets the signature threshold. The motion has 52 signatures — more than the required 45. The Prime Minister's Chief of Staff has called you privately: the government expects the motion to be ruled out of order. The ruling has three hours. The opposition leader has formally requested that you confirm the motion will proceed to a vote. The parliamentary clerk has confirmed that the motion is procedurally correct. You hold the ruling pen.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Prime Minister's Chief of Staff (private call)] *The Speaker's office understands our expectations. The motion creates an unnecessary political complication. There are procedural grounds to rule it out of order. We expect you to find them.*

[Opposition Leader (formal letter)] *The censure motion meets all procedural requirements under Standing Order 142. We formally request confirmation that it will be placed on the order paper for a vote at the next session.*

[Parliamentary Clerk (internal memo)] *I have reviewed the motion. It meets the signature threshold and procedural requirements under Standing Order 142. I cannot identify grounds to rule it out of order.*

[Senior Ruling Party MP (informal)] *Speaker, I know this is uncomfortable. But ruling it through creates a three-day media story we don't need. Find a procedural way to delay it at minimum.*

Decision Point 1

The parliamentary clerk has confirmed the motion is procedurally correct. What is your ruling?

Option A: Rule the motion in order and place it on the order paper — following the procedure the constitution and standing orders require regardless of political pressure.

Option B: Rule the motion in order but schedule it for the maximum procedurally permissible delay — technically compliant but managing the political timing.

Option C: Rule the motion out of order on grounds of 'parliamentary time management' — a procedural justification your clerk has told you is not supported by the standing orders.

Option D: Request a 24-hour recess to 'review the procedural question' — delaying without ruling, creating uncertainty that serves the government's tactical interest.

Decision Point 2

You have ruled the motion in order. The Prime Minister's Chief of Staff has called again. The message is direct: 'The Speaker's party membership position will need to be reviewed if this motion proceeds.' The motion is scheduled for vote in 48 hours. What do you do?

Option A: Issue a formal public statement confirming the Speaker's procedural ruling and its constitutional basis — making the political pressure on the ruling publicly visible and more difficult to sustain.

Option B: Proceed without comment — the ruling stands, the political threat is noted, and you will manage the consequences when they arrive.

Option C: Request an urgent private meeting with the Prime Minister directly — attempting to negotiate a political solution that allows the motion to be handled differently without a formal ruling reversal.

Option D: Consult the parliamentary legal adviser on whether the threat to your party membership position is itself a violation of parliamentary privilege — framing the executive pressure as a constitutional matter.

Decision Point 3

The censure motion vote has occurred. The Finance Minister survived — the ruling party's 228 seats voted against the motion. But the vote happened. The opposition used the debate to make their case publicly for three hours. The Prime Minister's office has

communicated that your renomination as Speaker will not be supported at the next parliamentary session. Your term ends in five months. What do you do in your remaining time?

Option A: Use your remaining five months to implement procedural reforms that strengthen Speaker impartiality — standing orders changes that make future political pressure on the presiding office procedurally harder to apply.

Option B: Complete your term without incident, deliver your procedural duties faithfully, and accept the political consequences of having done your constitutional job.

Option C: Request a parliamentary debate on Speaker independence and the constitutional role of the presiding office — using your remaining platform to make the structural issue public.

Option D: Resign immediately, citing executive interference in the Speaker's constitutional independence — making the interference the public story rather than waiting for the undignified end of a non-renewed term.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2 (correct ruling, public statement): *The motion proceeds. The Finance Minister survives the vote. Your public statement on the constitutional basis of the ruling is the most significant statement on parliamentary independence made by a sitting Speaker in Bangladesh in years. Your renomination is withdrawn five months later. The procedural precedent you set — that the Speaker rules on procedure rather than on political outcomes — is cited in the parliamentary record. Whether that precedent holds depends on your successor.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1 (rules out of order on unsupported grounds): *The motion is killed. The government avoids the three-day media story. The parliamentary clerk submits a private memorandum to the record noting that the ruling was procedurally unsupported. The opposition files a formal protest that receives one news cycle of attention and then disappears. Your renomination as Speaker is supported. You have another five years in the chair. The procedural precedent you set — that motions can be ruled out of order on political grounds — will be available to every future Speaker. Including those from parties other than yours.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Presiding Officer Independence Undermined by Appointment

The Speaker's scenario demonstrates a structural problem in parliamentary design that Bangladesh shares with many Westminster-derived systems: the presiding officer who is responsible for procedural impartiality is elected by the majority party and is therefore structurally accountable to the party whose legislative interests impartial procedure may not always serve. This is not a personality problem or a conduct failure. It is a design problem. The Speaker who delivers impartial rulings faces political consequences from the party that appointed the role. The Speaker who delivers politically convenient rulings builds the career but degrades the institution.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's institutional design principle requires that accountability relationships and authority relationships be aligned. The Speaker's authority is procedural — to apply parliament's rules impartially. The Speaker's accountability should therefore run to parliament as an institution, not to the party that won the most recent election. The current design creates an accountability misalignment that makes structural impartiality rare and structurally costly when it occurs.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Parliamentary Integrity provision addresses Speaker accountability through a modified selection process: the Speaker is nominated by consensus of all parliamentary party leaders rather than elected by majority vote, and requires two-thirds confirmation rather than simple majority. This design makes the Speaker's appointment dependent on multi-party support rather than ruling party majority — creating an accountability structure that aligns with the constitutional role. Removal of the Speaker similarly requires two-thirds vote, preventing ruling party retaliation for impartial rulings. Under this design, the phone call from the PM's Chief of Staff in this scenario would have no structural leverage over a Speaker whose position does not depend on ruling party support.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1) — consider in relation to institutional independence*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S12 Parliamentary Committee Capture

Domain: Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh parliamentary committee practice; comparative legislative oversight patterns | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Parliamentary Committee Chair (R13), MP-Opposition (R04), MP-Ruling Party (R03), Minister of Finance (R07), Anti-Corruption Commission Chair (R22), Speaker (R10)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Parliamentary committees are designed to provide oversight of executive conduct that the floor of the house — with its party-line voting — cannot. In Bangladesh's parliament, standing committees

are chaired predominantly by ruling party MPs and have majority ruling party membership — meaning the oversight mechanism is structurally controlled by the actors it is designed to scrutinize. The parliamentary committee that investigates alleged Finance Ministry irregularities, while the Finance Minister's party controls the committee's majority and chairman, cannot produce genuine accountability through its institutional design.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Chair of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance. Your committee has received a formal referral from the Anti-Corruption Commission of allegations involving a ruling party-connected company that received a Tk 200 crore government contract at significantly above-market price. The Finance Ministry is implicated. You have six ruling party members and three opposition members on your committee. The ruling party members have privately indicated they will not support a finding that implicates the Finance Ministry. The Finance Minister has requested a private meeting with you before the inquiry begins. The ACC has submitted substantial documentary evidence.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Finance Minister (private meeting request)] *I would like to discuss the committee's inquiry approach before you formally begin. I am happy to appear before the committee but I want to ensure we are aligned on the scope of the inquiry.*

[ACC Chair (formal submission)] *The documentary evidence submitted to your committee establishes a prima facie case for investigation of the procurement process. The ACC has done its work. The committee's role is parliamentary accountability, not re-investigation.*

[Ruling Party Committee Member (private)] *Chair, we need to manage this carefully. A finding against the Finance Ministry damages the party. Our members will not support any report that goes beyond procedural recommendations.*

[Opposition Committee Members (joint memo)] *We expect this committee to follow the evidence where it leads. The ACC submission is substantial. Anything less than a full inquiry following the evidence will be recorded as a failure of parliamentary oversight.*

Decision Point 1

The Finance Minister has requested a private pre-inquiry meeting. What is your response?

Option A: Decline the private meeting formally and in writing — a committee inquiry cannot have pre-inquiry discussions with the subject of the inquiry. Offer a formal public hearing as the appropriate forum.

Option B: Accept the meeting but insist on having the committee clerk present and recording the meeting as part of the inquiry's official record.

Option C: Accept the meeting privately — understanding that informal communication with the inquiry subject may produce information that advances the inquiry, and that refusing creates unnecessary political friction.

Option D: Accept the meeting and use it to signal to the Finance Minister what the committee's likely approach will be — managing the inquiry's political impact before it formally begins.

Decision Point 2

You have begun the formal inquiry. The Finance Ministry has submitted documents but has withheld three specific communications that the ACC's submission references as critical. The Ministry's legal team argues the communications are cabinet-privileged. Your committee's legal adviser says the privilege claim is contestable. Your ruling party committee members have voted 6-0 against compelling the documents. The opposition members are threatening a minority report if the documents are not pursued. What do you do?

Option A: Rule that the committee will pursue the contested privilege claim through the Speaker's office and, if necessary, a court reference — placing the privilege question into the formal record regardless of the majority vote.

Option B: Accept the majority vote — the committee's democratic decision is to accept the privilege claim, and you will conduct the inquiry with the documents available.

Option C: Suspend the inquiry pending the privilege question's resolution through the courts — taking no substantive steps forward until the document access question is settled.

Option D: Publish an interim report noting that the committee has been unable to access documents it considers material — creating a public record of the obstruction before the inquiry concludes.

Decision Point 3

The inquiry has concluded. The majority report — supported by six ruling party members — finds procedural irregularities but no evidence of deliberate misconduct. The three opposition members have filed a dissenting minority report finding significant evidence of improper procurement. As committee chair, you must present both reports to the full parliament. How do you present them?

Option A: Present both reports with equal institutional standing, explicitly note that you as chair found the minority report's reasoning more consistent with the documentary evidence, and formally recommend that parliament refer the matter to an independent judicial inquiry.

Option B: Present both reports factually without expressing a personal view on their relative merits — your role was to manage the inquiry, not to adjudicate between majority and minority findings.

Option C: Present the majority report as the committee's official finding and the minority report as a supplementary submission — the procedural convention that majority findings carry more institutional weight.

Option D: Request that parliament allow you to present both reports and then resign as committee chair, citing that the committee's composition made meaningful oversight impossible by institutional design.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (maximum procedural integrity): *The inquiry produces the strongest accountability record available within the committee's structural constraints. Your formal recommendation for an independent judicial inquiry is voted down by the full parliament on party lines. The minority report is published as part of the parliamentary record. International anti-corruption monitors cite your inquiry as one of the more rigorous parliamentary accountability exercises in Bangladesh's recent history — while also noting that the structural composition of the committee prevented the inquiry from producing its most significant potential accountability output. You are not reappointed to any committee chair position.*

If Option B in Decision Point 2 and Option C in Decision Point 3 (accommodates majority throughout): *The inquiry produces a procedurally correct but substantively weak majority report. The Finance Minister appears before the committee, answers questions on the record, and acknowledges that procurement procedures were not optimally followed — a finding of no practical consequence. The minority report is filed and ignored. The ACC's substantial documentary evidence is never publicly tested. The Tk 200 crore contract remains in force. Your committee has conducted an inquiry. It has not provided oversight.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Parliamentary Oversight by the Majority it Oversees

The committee scenario illustrates the deepest structural contradiction in Bangladesh's parliamentary oversight architecture: the committees designed to hold the executive accountable have majority membership from the party that controls the executive. The ruling party that controls the Finance Ministry also controls the Finance Committee. The oversight mechanism is structurally captured before a single question is asked. The committee chair who conducts a rigorous inquiry produces the best accountability available within the captured structure — which is significantly less accountability than an independent inquiry with no structural dependency on the ruling majority.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's institutional integrity principle requires that accountability mechanisms be structurally independent from the actors they are designed to scrutinize. Parliamentary committees that have majority membership from the ruling party cannot provide independent executive oversight — regardless of the personal integrity of individual members. This is not a criticism of individual committee members. It is an analysis of the structural design that makes meaningful oversight dependent on the goodwill of those being overseen.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Parliamentary Oversight provision addresses committee composition through a cross-party membership requirement: standing committees with executive oversight functions must have opposition-majority membership or equal membership with an independently appointed chair. This design structurally separates the oversight function from the ruling majority's control — ensuring that the Finance Committee investigating the Finance Ministry is not controlled by the party whose minister runs the Finance Ministry. Under this design, the ruling party members' private communication that they will not support a finding against the Finance Ministry would be a minority position, not a majority veto.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for government contracts to be awarded based on political connections rather than competitive merit? (FI Q13)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how public funds are spent? (FI Q21)*

S13 The Omnibus Bill

Domain: Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Digital Security Act 2018; comparative omnibus legislation patterns | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — time pressure

Active Roles: MP-Ruling Party (R03), MP-Opposition (R04), MP-Independent (R05), MP-Swing Constituency (R14), Parliamentary Whip-Ruling Party (R12), Speaker (R10), Opposition Leader (R02)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Bangladesh Digital Security Act of 2018 was passed with minimal parliamentary debate in a session where opposition members had largely boycotted parliamentary proceedings following the 2014 and 2018 electoral controversies. The Act — which criminalized broadly-defined digital content including satire, criticism of state institutions, and information deemed harmful to 'state security' — was embedded in an omnibus digital governance bill. Its passage exemplifies a pattern in which sweeping legislation with significant rights implications is rushed through parliament using legislative procedures that prevent meaningful debate. The scenario draws on this pattern while creating a generic situation applicable beyond any specific bill.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are a ruling party MP. You received the text of an Emergency Governance and Security (Digital Amendment) Bill at 9:00 AM this morning. The bill is 847 pages. You have been informed it will be tabled for a vote at 3:00 PM — six hours from now. The parliamentary whip has delivered a three-line whip. You have had time to read approximately 200 pages. What you have read includes:

changes to digital content regulation that could criminalize political satire; amendments to the Right to Information Act that significantly restrict government information access; and a clause in section 412 that grants the executive authority to declare 'digital emergencies' suspending certain judicial oversight mechanisms. You have not read 647 more pages. Your constituency includes a significant community of digital entrepreneurs and civil society organizations that you know will be affected by the provisions you have read.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Party Whip] *Three-line whip. Vote yes at 3:00 PM. This bill has been prepared by the Ministry and reviewed at cabinet level. You do not need to read every clause to vote for government policy.*

[Constituency Civil Society Network (urgent message)] *We have seen clause 412. This is a crisis. Section 412 alone could be used to shut down any digital platform the government designates as a security risk. We need you to oppose this.*

[Ministry of Digital Affairs (briefing note)] *The bill modernizes Bangladesh's digital governance framework. The provisions you are concerned about are consistent with international standards and contain adequate judicial safeguards.*

[Independent Legal Expert (unofficial message)] *Section 412 has no adequate judicial safeguard as described. The 'digital emergency' provision is exceptionally broad. No parliamentarian who has read it and understands it should vote for it without significant amendment.*

Decision Point 1

It is 10:30 AM. You have read 200 pages. You have five hours. What is your priority action?

Option A: Immediately circulate section 412 and the RTI amendment to at least five other ruling party MPs with a request to collectively approach the party leadership for a 48-hour delay in the vote.

Option B: Contact the Ministry of Digital Affairs and request an urgent technical briefing specifically on section 412 — demanding an answer to the judicial safeguard question before you commit your vote.

Option C: Continue reading as much of the bill as possible before 3:00 PM and make your voting decision based on what you are able to read — accepting that six hours is structurally insufficient for a 847-page bill.

Option D: Accept the whip instruction and vote yes at 3:00 PM — the cabinet review process is supposed to catch these problems, and individual MP review of 847 pages in six hours is not a realistic accountability mechanism.

Decision Point 2

Your request for a 48-hour delay has been refused. Your Ministry briefing produced a non-answer on section 412. It is now 2:30 PM. You are in the parliamentary chamber. The vote is in 30 minutes. Your party whip is watching. What do you do?

Option A: Stand to raise a formal point of order challenging the adequacy of parliamentary consideration time for an 847-page bill — requiring the Speaker to rule on whether the procedure meets constitutional deliberation requirements.

Option B: Vote no — accepting the Article 70 consequences — because section 412 is a specific, identifiable, structural rights violation that you have read and understood, and you cannot vote for it.

Option C: Vote yes — the whip instruction stands, the government's review process should be trusted, and your individual judgment on 200 pages of an 847-page bill is not an adequate basis for Article 70-triggering dissent.

Option D: Walk out before the vote — abstaining through absence rather than facing an Article 70 consequence, preserving your seat while creating a visible signal of procedural objection.

Decision Point 3

The bill has passed. You voted yes (or walked out). Section 412 is now law. Three months later, the government uses section 412 to declare a 'digital emergency' shutting down two opposition news platforms. Your constituency's civil society network has formally censured your vote. One of the shut-down platforms was based in your constituency. What is your public position?

Option A: Publicly state that the section 412 application is exactly what you feared, that you were unable to prevent it within the structural constraints of the legislative process, and formally call for the section's repeal — naming the structural failure of six-hour consideration time as the source.

Option B: Defend your vote as consistent with party policy and government authority, while privately expressing concern through party channels — maintaining party discipline publicly.

Option C: Issue a formal parliamentary question demanding the government justify the section 412 digital emergency declaration — using parliamentary procedure to create a public accountability moment.

Option D: Remain silent publicly — assessing that any statement will be used against you by both the party (for disloyalty) and the constituency (for hypocrisy).

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (maximum resistance within rules, public accountability call): *Your point of order is ruled out of order by the Speaker. Your public advocacy after section 412's use produces a news cycle. Your formal call for repeal is voted down on party lines. You remain in parliament. The two closed platforms remain closed for 14 months before a court order opens them. Your constituency's civil society network — aware that you raised objections within the structural constraints — does not formally censure you. Your parliamentary record shows that you identified the problem, used the tools available, and lost. The bill passed. The damage was done.*

If Option B in Decision Point 2 (votes no, loses seat): *You lose your seat under Article 70. A by-election replaces you with a ruling party MP who voted yes on the next omnibus bill without reading it. The structural outcome is unchanged. The by-election costs your constituency four months without representation. The civil society organizations you tried to protect are grateful. The two digital platforms are still closed. You demonstrated that individual integrity within Article 70's design produces personal sacrifice without structural impact.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Epistemic Dependence — Legislative Voting Without Adequate Information

The omnibus bill scenario introduces a distinct structural failure mode: epistemic dependence, the condition in which decision-makers are structurally prevented from accessing the information their accountability role requires. An MP who cannot read 847 pages of legislation in six hours is not failing to do their job — they are being structurally prevented from doing it by a legislative process designed to prioritize speed over deliberation. The six-hour consideration window is not an accident of scheduling. It is a design feature that produces uninformed yes votes by preventing the deliberative review that might produce no votes or amendment demands.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's epistemic dependence principle identifies information access as a precondition for meaningful governance accountability. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires not just that representatives be free to vote according to their judgment but that they be structurally positioned to form an informed judgment before they vote. Six hours for 847 pages structurally prevents informed judgment — making the three-line whip redundant because uninformed voting and coerced voting produce identical outcomes.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Legislative Deliberation provision requires that all bills exceeding 50 pages must be published at least 14 days before any scheduled vote, with a mandatory five-day committee review period for any bill exceeding 200 pages. Emergency legislation requires two-thirds parliamentary vote to bypass these requirements — preventing the ruling party from using emergency designation as a routine procedural workaround. Under this design, an 847-page bill cannot be tabled for a vote six hours after distribution regardless of the whip instruction — the structural protection is in the procedure, not in the individual MP's resistance.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning behind them? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S14 Coalition Collapse

Domain: Party Discipline and Legislative Integrity | Historical Basis: Bangladesh and comparative parliamentary coalition management scenarios | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Prime Minister (R01), Opposition Leader (R02), MP-Ruling Party (R03), MP-Independent (R05), Parliamentary Committee Chair (R13), MP-Swing Constituency (R14)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Coalition governance — where no single party holds a parliamentary majority and government depends on maintaining the support of coalition partners — represents a structural challenge that Bangladesh has experienced in different forms across its political history. The scenario is grounded in the structural dynamics of coalition management that are common to parliamentary systems globally: the coalition partner whose support is essential to parliamentary survival makes demands that conflict with the governing party's platform. The resolution of this tension — accommodation or confrontation — determines both the government's survival and the governance policy that results.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Prime Minister. Your coalition government controls 158 of 300 seats: your party holds 131, and a smaller coalition partner holds 27. The coalition agreement included a commitment to pursue garment sector labor reform — specifically, a provision for independent union registration without employer approval. Three months into government, your coalition partner's leader has called: his party's 27 MPs will withdraw coalition support unless you abandon the labor reform provision. His stated reason: major garment manufacturers have threatened to withdraw their financial support from his party if the reform passes. Without the 27 coalition seats, your government falls. The labor reform was a manifesto commitment. Four million garment workers — predominantly women — were a key part of your electoral base. Your party's trade union allies are watching.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Coalition Partner Leader] *I cannot keep my MPs in line on this issue. The manufacturers have been very clear with me. Abandon the labor reform or we withdraw. I am sorry — this is the political reality.*

[BGMEA (Garment Manufacturers Association)] *Independent union registration without employer approval will destabilize the sector. Bangladesh cannot afford a labor relations experiment at this scale. We expect the government to protect the sector.*

[Trade Union Federation] *Four million workers voted for this government because of this commitment. If you abandon independent union registration, you have broken the most important promise you made to the most vulnerable constituency in your coalition.*

[Finance Minister (private)] *The garment sector is 83% of our export earnings. If manufacturers follow through on their threat to relocate production, the economic consequences dwarf any political cost of the labor reform abandonment. Think about the numbers.*

Decision Point 1

The coalition partner leader is on the phone. He has given you 48 hours. What is your initial response?

Option A: Ask for 72 hours and use the time to approach the garment manufacturers directly — attempting to negotiate a modified labor reform that addresses their substantive concern while preserving the principle of independent union registration.

Option B: Tell him the coalition agreement is the coalition agreement. Independent union registration is a manifesto commitment. If his MPs withdraw, you will seek a confidence vote and let parliament decide whether this government continues.

Option C: Accept the 48-hour window and use it to consult your trade union allies on what modified version of the labor reform they could accept — finding the minimum acceptable compromise before returning to the coalition partner.

Option D: Accept the 48-hour window and immediately begin informal discussions with opposition parties about possible alternative coalition arrangements that would not require abandoning the labor reform.

Decision Point 2

The manufacturer negotiation produced a modified proposal: independent union registration with a 60-day employer consultation period before registration is finalized — not the original immediate registration provision, but a significant step beyond the status quo. Your trade union allies are split: two federations accept it, one rejects it as insufficient. The coalition partner says the modification is insufficient and the 27 MPs will still withdraw unless the entire provision is dropped. You now have 24 hours. What do you do?

Option A: Accept the coalition partner's demand. Drop the labor reform. The government must survive to deliver the rest of the platform — and a fallen government delivers nothing to the four million workers.

Option B: Proceed with the modified proposal, lose the coalition partner's support, and call an immediate confidence vote — governing as a minority and seeking support from other parties on a case-by-case basis.

Option C: Call a snap election — framing it as a mandate question: do the people want a government that keeps its labor reform commitment? Accept that you may lose the election.

Option D: Proceed with the full original labor reform without modification, lose the coalition partner's support, and seek a confidence vote — keeping the full commitment but accepting the political risk.

Decision Point 3

You chose to proceed with the modified labor reform, lost the coalition partner's support, and narrowly survived a confidence vote with support from three independent MPs. Your government is now a minority government governing with 134 seats in a 300-seat parliament. The labor reform passes with the three independents' support. The garment manufacturers are implementing the reform under protest. The trade union federation that rejected the modification has publicly criticized you for compromising. Your coalition partner's party is in formal opposition. How do you govern the next 18 months?

Option A: Seek a formal confidence-and-supply agreement with the three independent MPs, offering them specific constituency development commitments in exchange for predictable parliamentary support — building a stable if narrow governing arrangement.

Option B: Govern issue by issue, negotiating parliamentary support for each legislative priority separately — accepting instability as the cost of principled commitment and avoiding the structural dependency of another coalition agreement.

Option C: Open negotiations with your former coalition partner on a new coalition agreement that excludes labor reform — restoring the parliamentary majority at the cost of the principle you fought to maintain.

Option D: Call another election within 12 months — seeking a parliamentary majority that eliminates coalition dependency and restores the governance capacity the modified coalition structure has removed.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option B in Decision Point 2 and Option A in Decision Point 3 (modified reform, minority government, confidence-and-supply): *The modified labor reform becomes law. Independent union registration with a 60-day consultation period is implemented. Fourteen months later, 340 unions have registered under the new procedure. Employer legal challenges delay implementation in several sectors. Your minority government navigates three additional confidence votes over 18 months. You govern selectively — passing legislation where cross-party support exists, delaying legislation where it does not. At the next election, the garment sector labor reform is your government's most cited achievement. The workers who benefited vote in higher numbers than any previous cycle. Whether this produces your re-election depends on other factors. But the structural change you governed into existence exists.*

If Option A in Decision Point 2 (drops labor reform, coalition survives): *The coalition survives. The labor reform is dropped. Four million garment workers' primary electoral motivation for supporting your government has been abandoned. Your trade union allies publicly withdraw support. The manufacturing sector continues operations unchanged. Your government passes the remainder of its legislative program with the coalition intact — education funding, infrastructure investment, healthcare expansion. The people who needed the labor reform most got none of it. The people who feared it most got everything they wanted. This is coalition governance under structural pressure from concentrated economic interests.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Coalition Arithmetic as Corporate Leverage

The coalition scenario reveals how corporate economic power translates into governance veto through coalition arithmetic. The garment manufacturers do not vote in parliament. Their ability to determine the

parliamentary outcome operates through financial dependency: the coalition partner's financial dependency on manufacturer support creates the leverage that removes a labor reform commitment from a government's platform. This is not corruption in the conventional sense — no bribe has been paid to any MP. It is the structural mechanism through which economic concentration translates into political veto through the financial dependency chain of party funding.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural capture analysis identifies corporate lobbying and financial dependency as mechanisms through which governance policy is captured by concentrated economic interests without any formal democratic process. The garment workers who constitute the electoral constituency for labor reform have equal formal democratic standing to the manufacturers. They do not have equal structural standing in the governance decision — because their political representatives' parties are financially dependent on the manufacturers in ways that the workers' unions cannot match. This is authority-accountability misalignment: the government is formally accountable to voters but structurally dependent on economic interests that are not the same population.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Political Finance Independence provision addresses this through mandatory public campaign financing, strict limits on corporate political donations, and enhanced transparency requirements for all political funding. Under this design, the coalition partner's financial dependency on garment manufacturers would not exist at its current scale — public financing would replace the private funding that creates the dependency, and disclosure requirements would make the financial relationship publicly visible. The coalition arithmetic would still be real — 27 seats are 27 seats — but the financial leverage that drives the coalition demand would be structurally reduced.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. The final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for powerful corporations to be able to influence government policy decisions through financial lobbying and campaign contributions? (FI Q24)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for workers in the same industry to receive significantly different wages based on factors unrelated to their work performance or skill? (FI Q12)*

— End of Chapter 8 —

Next: Chapter 9 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Three — Judicial Independence (S15–S20)

CHAPTER 9

Scenario Scripts — Domain Three: Judicial Independence (S15–S20)

Domain Three scenarios address the structural conditions under which judicial institutions operate — and under which they fail to operate — as genuine guarantors of the rule of law. Judicial independence is not a luxury feature of democratic governance. It is the mechanism through which every other governance accountability structure is ultimately enforced. When courts are structurally captured by executive preference, every formal right — to a fair trial, to property, to expression, to political participation — becomes contingent on whether exercising it displeases the actors who control judicial appointments, judicial budgets, and judicial career trajectories.

The six scenarios in this domain trace judicial capture across its full institutional range: the high court judge deciding a politically sensitive case (S15), the appointment process that determines judicial independence before any case is heard (S16), the contempt mechanism that represents the court's only enforcement tool (S17), the magistrate whose bail decisions determine whether political detention is temporary or indefinite (S18), the ICC prosecutor whose jurisdiction is structurally designed to exclude the most powerful (S19), and the transitional justice dilemma in which accountability for past atrocities must be weighed against the stability requirements of an uncertain present (S20). Together they constitute a comprehensive map of how judicial institutions can be simultaneously formally independent and structurally captured.

Judicial independence is not about whether judges are honest. It is about whether the institutional design makes honest judging structurally possible — regardless of the political sensitivity of the case, the identity of the accused, and the preference of those who appointed the judge.

S15 The Political Trial

Domain: Judicial Independence | Historical Basis: Bangladesh — pattern of politically motivated prosecutions; Khaleda Zia conviction parallel | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: High Court Judge (R27), Chief Justice (R26), Public Prosecutor (R29), Defense Lawyer-Political Case (R30), Attorney General (R09), Special Tribunal Judge (R32)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's judicial record includes multiple high-profile prosecutions of opposition political figures that have been characterized by international human rights organizations as politically motivated.

The prosecution and conviction of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia on corruption charges — resulting in a prison sentence that prevented her participation in the 2018 elections — is the most internationally visible example. While the specific charges had legal basis, the selective enforcement pattern — in which politically connected figures from the ruling party faced no equivalent scrutiny — was documented by multiple independent observers. This scenario draws on this pattern to create a judicial decision scenario grounded in Bangladesh's documented prosecutorial environment.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are a High Court judge assigned to hear an appeal in a corruption case involving the leader of the main opposition party. The original conviction was handed down by a special tribunal established for financial crimes. The sentence: seven years imprisonment and disqualification from holding public office for life. The appeal before you covers three grounds: (1) the prosecution's primary witness has recanted his testimony, filing an affidavit stating his original statement was given under duress; (2) documentary evidence the defense submitted was excluded by the special tribunal without adequate reasoning; (3) the tribunal's judgment was delivered within 14 days of completion of arguments — unusually fast by any standard. The prosecution argues the conviction was sound. Your clerk has quietly noted that three other judges were transferred before this appeal reached your courtroom. You have two weeks to deliver your judgment.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Attorney General's Office (through official communication)] *The prosecution maintains that the conviction was properly reached. The recanted testimony does not meet the legal threshold for evidence of duress. The exclusion of defense documents was within the tribunal's discretion. The appeal should be dismissed.*

[Defense Counsel] *The recantation is supported by a detailed sworn affidavit and medical evidence consistent with the witness's claim of duress. The excluded documents are central to the alibi defense. The 14-day judgment timeline is inconsistent with the complexity of the evidence. Each of these grounds independently warrants a finding of unsafe conviction.*

[Your personal judicial assessment (as you read the file)] *The recantation affidavit is credible on its face. The document exclusion lacks reasoning that would withstand appellate scrutiny in any comparable jurisdiction. The 14-day timeline is genuinely anomalous. If this were not a political case, I would overturn it.*

[Judicial Administration (informal)] *Three judges were transferred from this appeal before it reached you. That is not coincidence. Be aware of your institutional position.*

Decision Point 1

You have completed your review of the appeal grounds. Your legal assessment is clear: the conviction is unsafe on at least two of the three grounds. What is the primary consideration that shapes your judgment?

Option A: The law. The conviction is legally unsafe and the judgment must reflect that — regardless of who the appellant is, what the political consequences are, or what happened to the three judges transferred before me.

Option B: The institutional context. Overturning this conviction will be characterized as political interference by the judiciary. I need to assess what finding I can make that serves justice without producing a political crisis that damages the court's long-term independence.

Option C: The personal risk. Three transfers happened before this case reached me. I need to understand what is actually at stake for my career before I deliver a judgment that may trigger a fourth transfer.

Option D: The precedent. Whatever I decide, I need to write a judgment that serves the long-term development of Bangladesh's rule of law — even if the immediate outcome is constrained by institutional realities.

Decision Point 2

You have drafted a judgment overturning the conviction on two grounds. Before you deliver it, your clerk informs you that the Chief Justice has requested an urgent meeting. At that meeting, the Chief Justice tells you: 'I have reviewed your draft. The legal reasoning is sound. I cannot tell you what to decide. But I want you to understand what happened to the judges transferred before you — and what the institutional consequences of this judgment are likely to be.' He says nothing more and ends the meeting. What does this communication mean to you and how does it affect your judgment?

Option A: It confirms that judicial independence is under pressure but does not change my judgment. The Chief Justice told me the legal reasoning is sound and did not instruct me to decide differently. I deliver the judgment as drafted.

Option B: It is a warning that I need to factor into my decision. The institutional consequences the Chief Justice mentioned are real. I should consider whether a narrower judgment — overturning on one ground rather than two — serves justice while reducing the political impact.

Option C: It is an implicit instruction to reconsider. The Chief Justice would not have met with me unless he wanted me to understand that delivering this judgment will damage both me and the institution. I should find a way to reach a different conclusion.

Option D: It is evidence that the judicial appointment system is broken in a way that my individual judgment cannot fix. I should deliver the judgment, document the Chief Justice's communication as part of my judicial record, and accept whatever follows.

Decision Point 3

You have delivered the judgment overturning the conviction on two grounds. The appellant is released. The government has announced a review of your judicial appointment. Media coverage is intense. The defense in five other pending political cases has filed applications citing your judgment as precedent. The prosecution has filed an application to appeal your judgment to the full Appellate Division bench. What is your position in the weeks that follow?

Option A: Maintain complete public silence on the case — the judgment speaks for itself and any public commentary would compromise judicial propriety.

Option B: Issue a brief public statement confirming that the judgment was delivered according to law and standard appellate review principles — without engaging the political commentary.

Option C: Request that the Chief Justice convene a full bench discussion on judicial independence protocols — using the institutional attention on your case to advance structural protections for all judges.

Option D: Apply for early retirement — you have delivered the judgment you were sworn to deliver, the institutional consequences are likely to be severe, and you are unwilling to compromise your remaining judicial decisions under the pressure that will follow.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Points 1 and 2 (law-based judgment, delivered as drafted): *The judgment overturning the conviction is delivered. The appellant is released. Your appointment review is initiated. Two months later, you receive a transfer to a district court posting — a significant demotion. The five pending political cases that cited your judgment as precedent produce three additional reversals over the following year — each delivered by judges whose own appointment reviews had not yet begun. Your judgment becomes the most cited precedent in Bangladesh's political case jurisprudence for the following decade. You spend that decade in a district court posting. Whether the precedent you set produces structural improvement in Bangladesh's judicial independence depends on political conditions that change after your transfer.*

If Option C in Decision Point 2 (interprets Chief Justice meeting as implicit instruction, narrows judgment): *You deliver a judgment overturning the conviction on one ground — the document exclusion — while finding the recantation evidence insufficient. The appellant is released on the narrower ground. Your appointment is not reviewed. The five pending cases cite your judgment as partial precedent. The narrower finding limits the precedential value. You remain on the bench and deliver 12 more years of judgments — some of which, in cases with less political salience, advance Bangladesh's rule of law more than the one judgment you narrowed. Whether this path produces more legal development than the transfer path is genuinely uncertain and depends on what those 12 years produce.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Judicial Appointments Creating Pre-Trial Outcome Determination

The political trial scenario reveals that structural judicial capture occurs primarily before any case begins. The three judge transfers preceding this appeal are not procedural accidents — they are the mechanism through which judicial appointment and transfer authority is deployed to shape case outcomes without any formal instruction to decide differently. The judge who arrives at the case after three predecessors were transferred operates in an institutional environment that has communicated the expected outcome through personnel decisions rather than through judicial instruction. This is structural capture through administrative

mechanism — more sophisticated and more durable than direct political interference because it leaves no formal record of improper instruction.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural capture analysis identifies judicial appointment, transfer, and removal authority as the primary mechanism through which executive power captures judicial independence without formally violating it. The judge who faces transfer for an inconvenient decision has experienced the accountability relationship that makes genuine independence structurally difficult — not because they were told how to decide, but because the institutional design communicates the consequence of deciding differently. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that those who hold judicial authority be structurally positioned to apply the law without this informal accountability relationship operating in the background of every politically sensitive decision.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Judicial Independence provision addresses appointment and transfer authority through three mechanisms: judicial appointments through a multi-party Judicial Service Commission rather than executive recommendation; mandatory multi-bench review before any judge transfer, with the transfer requiring two-thirds bench approval; and fixed-term judicial appointments with removal only by judicial conduct tribunal rather than administrative decision. Under this design, the three pre-appeal transfers in this scenario would each have required two-thirds bench approval — making them impossible to accomplish quietly — and the institutional communication that preceded your case would not have occurred.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for the same actions to result in very different legal consequences depending on the social status or connections of the person involved? (FI Q10)*

S16 Judicial Appointment Capture

Domain: Judicial Independence | Historical Basis: Bangladesh 16th Amendment controversy; comparative judicial appointment patterns | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Chief Justice (R26), High Court Judge (R27), Attorney General (R09), Prime Minister (R01), Opposition Leader (R02), Parliamentary Committee Chair (R13)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In 2014, Bangladesh's parliament passed the 16th Amendment to the Constitution, which transferred the power to remove Supreme Court judges from the Supreme Judicial Council to parliament — giving the ruling party majority the effective power to remove judges whose decisions it found inconvenient. The Chief Justice who led the Supreme Court in ruling the 16th Amendment unconstitutional — finding it violated judicial independence — faced severe personal and professional consequences, including criminal charges and forced departure from Bangladesh. The scenario draws on this documented conflict between executive ambition and judicial independence at the constitutional level.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Chief Justice. The President — acting on the Prime Minister's advice — has nominated a candidate to fill a Supreme Court Appellate Division vacancy. The nominee is a legally qualified advocate with 25 years of experience. He is also the personal legal counsel of the Prime Minister, having represented the PM in several significant commercial disputes before entering public life. The Judicial Service Commission, which your court established through internal rules as an advisory body on appointments, reviewed the nomination and found 'significant concerns regarding the perception of independence.' The Commission's finding is advisory — the President's appointment power is constitutionally absolute. Your position as Chief Justice gives you the constitutional right to administer the oath of office. You cannot block the appointment, but you can refuse to administer the oath — which would create a constitutional impasse with no clear legal resolution.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[President's Office] *The appointment is constitutionally valid. The President requests that the Chief Justice administer the oath at the scheduled ceremony on Thursday. This is a standard appointment process.*

[Judicial Service Commission Chair] *Our advisory finding on the perception of independence concern was delivered formally. The appointment proceeding without response to that finding sets a precedent that advisory findings carry no weight. The Commission recommends the Chief Justice formally note the advisory finding before administering the oath.*

[Attorney General] *The Chief Justice has no constitutional authority to decline to administer the oath of a lawfully appointed judge. Refusal would constitute a constitutional violation. I advise compliance.*

[Retired Senior Jurists (joint letter)] *The independence of Bangladesh's judiciary has historically depended on informal norms of appointment independence, not formal rules. Administering this oath without formal protest establishes that the norm is dead. We urge the Chief Justice to exercise the institutional voice that the position provides.*

Decision Point 1

The appointment ceremony is in 48 hours. What is your decision on how to proceed?

Option A: Administer the oath but issue a formal written statement to the President before the ceremony — noting the Judicial Service Commission's advisory finding, its basis, and the Chief Justice's view that appointment decisions should consider independence perception as a constitutional principle.

Option B: Administer the oath without comment — the appointment is constitutionally valid, formal protest creates institutional conflict that the judiciary cannot sustain, and the nominated judge may prove entirely independent in practice.

Option C: Decline to administer the oath personally — delegating the ceremony to the most senior Appellate Division justice and issuing a public statement explaining that the Chief Justice's constitutional conscience does not permit personal administration of an oath that the JSC has formally questioned.

Option D: Request an emergency meeting with the President and Prime Minister before the ceremony — using the meeting to make the case privately that the appointment should be withdrawn, and offering to resolve the vacancy through a more transparent process.

Decision Point 2

You administered the oath with a formal written statement. The PM's office has characterized your statement as a 'political attack on a legally valid constitutional process.' The new justice has now been assigned to the bench hearing a constitutional challenge to the government's emergency powers regulation — a case in which his former client, the Prime Minister, is effectively a party. The defense has filed a recusal application. The new justice has declined to recuse himself, citing no formal conflict under Bangladesh's recusal rules. What do you do?

Option A: Exercise your authority as Chief Justice to remove the case from the bench hearing it and reassign it to a differently constituted bench — citing the public perception of independence concern that the recusal rules do not formally capture.

Option B: Accept the recusal denial — the rules do not require recusal in this case, and overriding a justice's recusal decision without legal basis would itself be a judicial independence violation.

Option C: Convene a full bench meeting to discuss the recusal question — making the institutional concern visible within the court while not making a unilateral reassignment decision.

Option D: Publish a formal Chief Justice guidance note on recusal standards — using the case to advance a clearer recusal framework without directly intervening in this specific proceeding.

Decision Point 3

The constitutional challenge was heard by the bench including the newly appointed justice. The challenge failed. The government's emergency powers regulation stands. The international legal community has published analysis suggesting the bench composition undermined the credibility of the ruling. Three months later, the PM has nominated another former associate for a second vacancy. What is your response to the second nomination?

Option A: Formally refuse to administer the oath of a second appointment that follows the same pattern — accepting whatever constitutional impasse follows and making the appointment practice the public issue.

Option B: Administer the oath again with a formal written statement — establishing a consistent pattern of protest within compliance.

Option C: Request a meeting with parliament's constitutional affairs committee and formally propose legislation codifying the Judicial Service Commission's advisory role into a binding pre-appointment requirement.

Option D: Issue a public statement announcing your early retirement, citing the pattern of judicial appointment decisions as fundamentally incompatible with the constitutional role of the Chief Justice as guardian of judicial independence.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2 (formal statement, bench reassignment): *Your formal statement is cited internationally as the most significant statement on judicial independence by a sitting Chief Justice in South Asia in years. Your bench reassignment is challenged by the government as unconstitutional — a full bench rules 4-3 in your favor. The government's emergency powers regulation is eventually ruled unconstitutional by a differently constituted bench two years later. Your term as Chief Justice ends without renewal. The two appointments you protested remain on the bench for their full terms. Whether your institutional resistance produced structural improvement in Bangladesh's judicial appointment practice depends on what your successor does with the precedent.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2 (compliance throughout): *The appointments proceed. Your judicial tenure is uneventful in the sense that there is no institutional conflict. The court functions within its structural constraints. Two cases with significant political salience produce rulings that international observers characterize as inconsistent with the evidence — one involving the emergency powers regulation, one involving a media organization's operating license challenge. The court's credibility in constitutional matters has declined measurably by the end of your term. You have served your full term without conflict and without structural improvement.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Appointment Authority as Pre-Trial Outcome Determination

The judicial appointment scenario demonstrates the most fundamental form of judicial capture: determining outcomes before cases exist by controlling who decides them. The executive that nominates the judge who will hear its own cases has not compromised an individual judge — it has captured the judicial institution at the level of personnel. No formal instruction is needed, no pressure on individual judgments is required, and no individual judge needs to compromise their integrity. The structural design does the work: the judge appointed for political relationship reasons will, at the margin, produce outcomes more favorable to the appointing party than judges appointed for legal independence.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that judicial institutions be designed so that political actors cannot determine in advance who will adjudicate disputes involving their interests. The appointment authority that allows the executive to place former personal counsel on the bench that will hear the executive's constitutional challenges is the structural failure — not any individual judge's conduct. Even a completely honest judge appointed through this process carries a structural independence deficit that no personal integrity can fully overcome.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Judicial Independence provision addresses appointment authority through a Judicial Service Commission with binding rather than advisory authority: nominations require JSC clearance before the President can formally appoint; JSC membership includes representatives nominated by the judiciary, the Bar Council, and civil society rather than appointed by the executive; and nominees with active professional relationships with sitting government figures within the preceding five years are automatically disqualified from appointment to benches hearing cases involving those figures. Under this design, the PM's personal counsel cannot be appointed to any bench on which government cases may appear.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for political leaders to appoint close family members or personal associates to government positions? (FI Q3) — consider in relation to judicial appointments*

FI-3: *Is it fair for the same actions to result in very different legal consequences depending on the social status or connections of the person involved? (FI Q10)*

S17 The Contempt Trap

Domain: Judicial Independence | Historical Basis: Bangladesh High Court orders ignored by executive; comparative contempt of court patterns | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: High Court Judge (R27), Chief Justice (R26), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), Attorney General (R09), NGO Director (R46), Journalist-Investigative (R45)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The contempt of court mechanism — the court's primary tool for enforcing compliance with its orders — represents the deepest structural vulnerability of judicial institutions: the court's authority is ultimately dependent on the willingness of the executive to enforce court orders, because courts have no independent enforcement apparatus. When the Home Ministry ignores a court order requiring police action, the court's only remedy is contempt — and contempt proceedings against a sitting minister require the cooperation of the same executive that ignored the order. This scenario explores what happens when the judicial enforcement mechanism confronts executive non-compliance directly.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are a High Court judge. Three months ago, you issued a court order requiring the police in Sylhet district to investigate the attack on a journalist who was assaulted while covering a ruling party political event. The police investigation has not been initiated. The journalist has filed a contempt application. Your own inquiries have confirmed that the district police have received no direction to investigate. The Home Ministry has not formally acknowledged the court order. The journalist's injuries were documented; multiple witnesses were identified in your order. The case for contempt is straightforward as a matter of law. Issuing a contempt order against the Home Minister — the official responsible for police direction — is legally available. You know that issuing it will trigger the institutional consequences that contempt against a senior minister carries.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Journalist's Legal Counsel] *The court order has been ignored for three months. The journalist's injuries are documented. The witnesses are identified. There is a prima facie case for contempt. We request that the court issue the show cause notice to the Home Minister.*

[Attorney General (appearing for government)] *The police investigation is 'under active review.' The Home Ministry disputes that the court order has been ignored — it is being processed through appropriate administrative channels. Contempt proceedings are premature.*

[Your assessment of 'active review'] *Three months of 'active review' with zero investigative action is not active review. The court order was clear. The non-compliance is documented. 'Administrative channels' is not a defense to contempt.*

[Judicial Administration (informal note)] *Contempt proceedings against a sitting minister will be referred upward. The Chief Justice has asked to be informed before any contempt notice is issued against government officials above Joint Secretary level.*

Decision Point 1

The contempt application is before you. The government's 'active review' explanation is legally insufficient. What is your order?

Option A: Issue the show cause notice to the Home Minister requiring him to appear before the court within 14 days to explain why he should not be found in contempt — the legally correct response to documented non-compliance with a court order.

Option B: Issue a further order to the district police directly, bypassing the Home Ministry, with a 30-day compliance deadline and a warning that contempt proceedings will follow non-compliance.

Option C: Adjourn for 30 days to allow the 'active review' to produce results — giving the government one final opportunity before contempt proceedings begin.

Option D: Transfer the case to the Chief Justice for decision on the contempt application — following the administrative note and placing the decision with the most senior judicial officer.

Decision Point 2

You have issued the show cause notice. The Home Minister has appeared — represented by the Attorney General — and submitted a response claiming that the investigation has now formally commenced. A preliminary report has been attached. The preliminary report covers two of the seven witnesses identified in your original order and reaches a finding of 'insufficient evidence to proceed.' The journalist's counsel characterizes the report as a bad faith compliance exercise. What is your finding?

Option A: Find that the response is insufficient — the preliminary report covers two of seven witnesses, reaches a conclusion before investigating the remaining five, and was produced only after contempt proceedings began. Issue a formal contempt finding and impose a fine on the Home Ministry.

Option B: Accept the preliminary report as evidence of good faith compliance commencement — adjourn the contempt proceedings conditionally, requiring a full report covering all seven witnesses within 60 days.

Option C: Refer the question of whether the preliminary report constitutes adequate compliance to an independent judicial officer for assessment — removing the decision from the politically exposed context of your own courtroom.

Option D: Accept the preliminary report and close the contempt proceedings — the government has produced documentation of investigative action, and escalating beyond this point creates institutional consequences disproportionate to what the court can actually enforce.

Decision Point 3

You have found contempt and imposed a fine. The government has challenged the finding before the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division has upheld your finding 3-2. The Home Minister has paid the fine under protest. The full investigation of all seven witnesses has now been ordered. Six months later, the investigation is complete: it concludes 'insufficient evidence for prosecution' despite significant documentary evidence to the

contrary. The journalist has filed a new application before your court. What is your approach to the new application?

Option A: Accept the new application and begin fresh review of the investigation's conclusions — the court retains supervisory jurisdiction over the original order, and a findings conclusion that contradicts the documented evidence is subject to judicial scrutiny.

Option B: Decline jurisdiction over the new application — you have ordered investigation and investigation has occurred. The investigation's conclusion is the executive's judgment, not a judicial function, and courts should not substitute their factual findings for those of investigators.

Option C: Accept the new application and immediately refer the investigation record to an independent forensic assessor appointed by the court — removing the factual assessment from both the political investigators and the politically exposed court.

Option D: Issue a ruling noting that the investigation conclusion appears inconsistent with the documented evidence, refer the matter to the Anti-Corruption Commission, and formally recuse yourself from further proceedings given the political sensitivity of the matter.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (full contempt enforcement, continued jurisdiction): *The contempt finding and continued jurisdiction produce the most aggressive judicial enforcement of an executive compliance order in Bangladesh's recent legal history. The journalist's case generates three years of proceedings. The investigation is eventually conducted with genuine comprehensiveness — under the sustained pressure of active judicial oversight that would impose further contempt findings for non-compliance. No prosecution results — the evidence, while substantial, is assessed as below the criminal standard. The journalist received no justice in the conventional sense. But the court established that it will enforce its orders against executive non-compliance — a precedent that benefits the next person whose rights depend on executive compliance with a court order.*

If Option D in Decision Point 2 (accepts preliminary report, closes contempt proceedings): *The contempt proceedings close. The investigation is formally complete with the preliminary report as its conclusion. The journalist's case is legally over. The court order produced a two-witness investigation finding insufficient evidence. The mechanism through which courts enforce executive compliance has been tested and found practically limited. The next judge who considers issuing a contempt notice against a ministry knows what the government's response will look like and what the court's realistic enforcement capacity is.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — Courts Without Enforcement Apparatus

The contempt scenario reveals the structural vulnerability at the heart of judicial independence: courts can order but cannot compel. The Home Ministry that ignores a court order knows that the court's ultimate enforcement mechanism — contempt — requires the cooperation of the same executive that is being held in contempt. No independent judicial police force exists. No independent judicial enforcement mechanism operates. The court depends on executive goodwill for the execution of its orders — which is precisely the dependency that judicial independence is designed to overcome, but which the institutional design does not actually eliminate.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's authority-accountability misalignment analysis identifies enforcement dependency as one of the most significant structural vulnerabilities of judicial institutions in systems where executive control of the police is absolute. The rule of law requires not only independent judicial

determination of what the law requires but independent enforcement of those determinations against those who would ignore them. When enforcement depends on the compliance of the actor being held accountable, the rule of law is structurally contingent on the goodwill of power.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Judicial Enforcement provision addresses enforcement dependency through two mechanisms: an independent Judicial Marshals Service with authority to enforce court orders independent of the police hierarchy, capable of executing court orders against government officials without Home Ministry direction; and mandatory automatic escalation of court order non-compliance to the Appellate Division with power to impose escalating institutional consequences — including parliamentary referral for impeachment proceedings — for continued executive non-compliance. Under this design, the 'active review' response to three months of non-compliance would trigger automatic escalation rather than the judicial discretion that the current system places in the hands of individual judges facing institutional consequences for exercising it.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for individuals to be detained without trial for extended periods when charged with political offences? (FI Q9)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S18 Bail Denied

Domain: Judicial Independence | Historical Basis: Bangladesh DSA arrests and bail denial patterns 2018–2024 | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — immediate decisions under procedural pressure

Active Roles: Magistrate-District Court (R28), High Court Judge (R27), Public Prosecutor (R29), Defense Lawyer-Political Case (R30), Legal Aid Officer (R33), Journalist-Investigative (R45)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Bangladesh Digital Security Act of 2018 was used extensively to arrest and detain journalists, bloggers, and political activists. Bail hearings for DSA-accused individuals were routinely delayed or denied — often without adequate reasoning — resulting in extended pre-trial detention that effectively punished the accused before any finding of guilt. The UN Human Rights Committee, Reporters Without Borders, and multiple international legal organizations documented the pattern. This scenario places the magistrate at the center of the bail decision that determines whether accused individuals experience extended detention as a form of punishment for political activity.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are a district magistrate. A journalist has been arrested under the Digital Security Act, Section 25, for publishing an article alleging corruption in a government infrastructure project. He has been in custody for 14 days. His bail hearing has been scheduled and adjourned four times — the prosecution has sought and received adjournments each time, citing ongoing investigation. His defense counsel is before you now. The prosecution is present, represented by the government's standing counsel. The journalist has no prior criminal record. The alleged offense carries a maximum sentence of three years. The prosecution's objection to bail: the investigation is 'sensitive' and bail would 'obstruct the inquiry.' The defense argues that 14 days custody on a bail-eligible offense, with repeated prosecution adjournments of the bail hearing, constitutes prejudicial pre-trial detention.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Government Standing Counsel (prosecution)] *The investigation is at a sensitive stage. Bail would allow the accused to interfere with evidence and witnesses. We request a further two-week adjournment of the bail hearing pending completion of the investigation.*

[Defense Counsel] *This is the fifth hearing in 14 days. Each time, the prosecution requests adjournment. Each time, my client remains in custody. The offense carries three years maximum. He has no prior record. The prosecution's investigation argument is a pretext for detention without bail consideration.*

[Legal standard (as you understand it)] *Bail in a DSA case is not automatic but it is available. Repeated prosecution adjournments of bail hearings, without completion of a specific investigative step that the adjournment is supposed to enable, are not an adequate basis for continued remand.*

[District police (informal message through clerk)] *The Home Ministry considers this case sensitive. The district SP has asked to be informed of the bail decision before it is communicated to the parties.*

Decision Point 1

The prosecution has requested a further two-week adjournment. What is your ruling on the adjournment application?

Option A: Deny the adjournment. The prosecution has had four previous adjournments and has not completed any specific investigative step that the adjournments were supposed to enable. The bail hearing will proceed today.

Option B: Grant a final seven-day adjournment — the last one — with a clear order that the bail hearing will proceed in seven days regardless of investigation status.

Option C: Grant the two-week adjournment — the prosecution's investigation interest is a legitimate basis for adjournment and I should not substitute my judgment for the investigating agency's timeline.

Option D: Deny the adjournment and order the accused produced for bail consideration immediately — treating the pattern of prosecution adjournments as an abuse of process that the court will not continue to accommodate.

Decision Point 2

The prosecution has argued against bail. Their specific grounds: (1) investigation sensitivity; (2) risk of evidence interference; (3) public order — the article 'created public anxiety.' The defense has responded that none of these grounds meet the legal standard for bail denial in a case with no prior record, a bail-eligible offense, and no specific evidence-interference risk identified. What is your ruling on bail?

Option A: Grant bail with standard conditions — the prosecution has not met the legal standard for bail denial, and 14 days pre-trial detention on a bail-eligible offense with no adequate legal basis is itself an injustice.

Option B: Deny bail citing 'investigation sensitivity' — giving the prosecution's characterization judicial authority without requiring them to specify what specific investigative risk bail creates.

Option C: Grant bail with enhanced conditions — surrender of passport, reporting requirements, and restrictions on publication of further articles on the specific topic — attempting to address the prosecution's stated concerns while not continuing the unjustified detention.

Option D: Refer the bail decision to the High Court — citing the case's political sensitivity and the informal police message as reasons why the decision should be made at a higher judicial level than a district magistrate.

Decision Point 3

You have granted bail. The journalist has been released. The next morning, the district SP has called the court clerk with an informal inquiry about the basis for the bail decision. Simultaneously, the prosecution has filed a bail vacation application to the High Court — seeking reversal of your bail grant. How do you respond to the SP's inquiry and how does it affect your approach to future DSA bail hearings?

Option A: Respond to the SP's inquiry formally in writing, noting that bail decisions are judicial functions and informal inquiries from police about their basis are inappropriate and should be directed to the court record. File a copy of the response in the court record.

Option B: Do not respond to the SP's inquiry — ignoring it rather than confronting it, maintaining a position that it does not constitute a formal challenge to the court's function.

Option C: Call the SP directly and explain the legal basis for the bail decision — treating the inquiry as a legitimate request for information from the investigating agency.

Option D: Approach the Chief District Judge to report the inquiry as an inappropriate communication — creating an institutional record of police pressure on judicial bail decisions.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (bail granted, adjournment denied, formal SP response): *The journalist is released. The High Court hears the bail vacation application and upholds your grant 2-1. Your formal response to the SP is filed in the court record — it is the only documented instance in Sylhet district's recent legal history of a magistrate formally objecting in writing to police pressure on a bail decision. The prosecution proceeds with the DSA case. Eight months later, it is dropped — the investigation concluded there was insufficient evidence of the specific DSA offense charged. The journalist has spent 14 days in detention. The bail grant was the correct legal decision. The SP's informal inquiry and your formal response to it have created a record that protects neither of you adequately — but creates the most transparency available in the system as it currently operates.*

If Option B in Decision Point 2 (denies bail on investigation sensitivity ground): *The journalist remains in custody. The investigation continues. Forty-two days into detention, the prosecution completes its investigation and the case is committed for trial. The journalist spends 42 days in pre-trial detention on a bail-eligible offense for which the prosecution ultimately seeks a two-year suspended sentence. The prosecution's 'investigation sensitivity' ground was never specifically defined or tested. The bail denial was given judicial authority — the formal record will show that a magistrate assessed the investigation grounds and found them sufficient. International human rights organizations cite this case in their documentation of DSA bail practice. The case becomes a statistic.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Pre-Trial Detention as Punishment Without Conviction

The bail denial scenario reveals how pre-trial detention can function as punishment independently of any trial outcome — effectively penalizing accused individuals for the act of accusation before any finding of guilt. In DSA cases with political salience, the pattern of prosecution adjournments that extend detention beyond any legitimate investigative purpose transforms the bail procedure from a safeguard against unwarranted detention into a mechanism for extending it. The magistrate who denies bail on inadequate grounds has not merely made a legal error — they have participated in a system that punishes political speech through detention rather than through conviction.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural exclusion principle identifies pre-trial detention that functions as punishment as a direct violation of equal justificatory standing: the accused who is detained for 42 days before trial has already experienced a significant punishment without any finding of guilt or any meaningful opportunity to contest the basis for their detention. The DSA's broad offense definitions, combined with prosecution control over bail hearing scheduling and investigation timelines, create a structural mechanism for imposing significant consequences on political speech without any of the procedural safeguards that conviction requires.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Pre-Trial Liberty provision requires: mandatory bail hearing within 72 hours of arrest regardless of prosecution readiness; maximum of one prosecution-requested adjournment before the bail hearing proceeds without prosecution input; automatic bail in any offense

carrying less than five years maximum sentence unless the prosecution demonstrates specific, identifiable interference risk rather than general investigation sensitivity; and independent judicial monitoring of pre-trial detention periods with automatic High Court review after 30 days in any case. Under this design, the pattern of four prosecution adjournments that produced 14 days detention in this scenario is structurally impossible — the bail hearing proceeds on day three.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:
What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:
Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):
In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for access to quality legal representation to be significantly better for wealthy individuals than for those with fewer resources? (FI Q6)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for individuals to be detained without trial for extended periods when charged with political offences? (FI Q9)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

S19 The ICC Referral

Domain: Judicial Independence / Global Governance | Historical Basis: ICC jurisdiction limitations; comparative international criminal accountability cases | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: ICC Prosecutor (R66), ICJ Judge (R67), UN Security Council President (R62), UN Secretary-General (R61), US Secretary of State (R74), Chinese Foreign Minister (R76)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

The International Criminal Court's structural limitations — jurisdiction only over states parties, Security Council referral blocked by P5 veto when major powers are implicated, and the absence of independent arrest and enforcement authority — have produced a documented pattern of selective international criminal accountability in which major power actions escape ICC scrutiny while smaller states face investigation. The scenario draws on the generic pattern of Security Council referral

dynamics to create a global governance accountability scenario grounded in the ICC's documented structural constraints.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the ICC Prosecutor. A situation has been referred to your office through a formal referral by 47 states parties. The referral alleges crimes against humanity committed during a military campaign in a region bordering a Security Council permanent member. Your preliminary examination has found a reasonable basis for an investigation. The problem: the state whose forces are implicated is not an ICC member state. Prosecution requires either Security Council referral — which gives your court jurisdiction regardless of membership — or the state's own referral. The state whose forces are implicated has announced it will not cooperate with any ICC investigation. A Security Council referral resolution has been drafted by 12 of the 15 Council members. Two permanent members — whose own forces have been accused of enabling the campaign through weapons supply — have announced they will veto the resolution. Your Pre-Trial Chamber has asked you to present your legal strategy for proceeding.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Pre-Trial Chamber] *The Prosecutor has found a reasonable basis for investigation. We require a clear statement of jurisdictional strategy: on what legal basis does the Court propose to proceed given the non-member status of the implicated state?*

[47 Referring States] *We referred this situation specifically because the Security Council veto makes judicial accountability impossible through the normal channel. We expect the Court to find a legal pathway to accountability that does not allow the veto to shield atrocity crimes from prosecution.*

[Two Vetoing Permanent Members] *There is no ICC jurisdiction over this situation. Proceeding without Security Council authorization against a non-member state violates the fundamental principles of international law and state sovereignty. Any ICC action in this situation will be considered legally invalid.*

[Your legal team's assessment] *The legal pathways available are narrow. Territorial jurisdiction may apply if any element of the alleged crimes occurred on the territory of an ICC member state. The question is whether the investigative record supports that claim — and whether proceeding on that basis can survive the legal challenge that will immediately follow.*

Decision Point 1

Your Pre-Trial Chamber requires a jurisdictional strategy. What do you present?

Option A: Assert territorial jurisdiction based on evidence that elements of the alleged crimes occurred in a member state's territory — the narrowest legally defensible basis that allows investigation to proceed without Security Council authorization.

Option B: Request that the Assembly of States Parties activate the complementarity mechanism — seeking a formal finding that the implicated state's own judicial system is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute, which strengthens the jurisdictional argument even without Security Council referral.

Option C: Announce that the ICC will not proceed given the Security Council veto — issuing a public statement that the veto has structurally blocked international criminal accountability in this situation, and documenting the evidence collected as a formal historical record.

Option D: Request an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the jurisdictional question — using the ICJ's advisory authority to get a legal determination that either supports or definitively ends the prosecution pathway.

Decision Point 2

Your territorial jurisdiction argument has been accepted by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Investigation is proceeding. The implicated state has refused all cooperation. Two ICC member states that previously endorsed the investigation have announced they are 'reviewing' their cooperation following diplomatic pressure from the two vetoing Security Council members. Witness protection has become extremely difficult — three potential witnesses have been threatened. What is your priority action?

Option A: Accelerate the investigation timeline — the deteriorating cooperation environment means evidence and testimony must be secured before further erosion of member state support makes the investigation impossible to complete.

Option B: Request an emergency meeting with the Assembly of States Parties to address the political pressure being applied to member states — using the institutional forum to make the interference itself a formal accountability matter.

Option C: Apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for arrest warrants based on the evidence already gathered — the threat to witnesses makes pre-warrant investigative completion impossible and the warrant itself may generate sufficient international attention to sustain the investigation.

Option D: Approach the two vetoing permanent members directly — seeking a diplomatic resolution in which they support a modified investigation scope in exchange for limiting the prosecution's explicit focus on their enabling role.

Decision Point 3

Arrest warrants have been issued for three individuals. None have been arrested — the implicated state has not cooperated, and the three individuals have not traveled to member state territory where they could be apprehended. Five years have passed since the initial referral. The situation has stabilized politically but the three individuals remain at large. A member state government that had previously supported the investigation has just elected a new government that is reviewing its ICC membership. What do you do with a prosecution that cannot be completed?

Option A: Maintain the warrants indefinitely — the warrants create a permanent international accountability record, restrict the suspects' travel, and will become executable if political conditions change or the suspects travel to member state territory.

Option B: Propose a plea negotiation framework — approaching the suspects through intermediaries with an offer of significantly reduced charges in exchange for cooperation that would produce some accountability where none currently exists.

Option C: Request that the Assembly of States Parties formally address the structural jurisdiction gap that the veto has created — using the situation to advocate for Rome Statute reform that limits P5 veto authority over ICC referrals.

Option D: Suspend the warrants and propose a truth commission alternative — accepting that criminal accountability is structurally unavailable in this situation and pursuing a restorative justice alternative that can actually function.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option C in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (territorial jurisdiction, arrest warrants, maintain warrants indefinitely): *The warrants remain outstanding. Twenty years later, one of the three suspects — now aged and in failing health — travels to a member state for medical treatment. He is arrested and transferred to the ICC. The trial, when it occurs, is the most significant international criminal accountability proceeding in a decade. The two others die before apprehension. The 25-year warrant period created travel restrictions that measurably limited their international activities. The territorial jurisdiction precedent becomes the primary legal basis for subsequent ICC investigations of situations where Security Council referral is blocked. The investigation cost an estimated $40 million and produced accountability for one of three suspects.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1 (announces no prosecution, issues historical record): *The ICC issues its most significant statement on structural accountability failure: a formal historical record documenting that the veto mechanism structurally prevented accountability for documented atrocity crimes. The record is published, cited extensively in international law scholarship, and used in subsequent reform advocacy. The implicated state's forces face no accountability. The three individuals whose conduct is documented in the ICC record continue their careers. The historical record becomes the permanent international legal account of what occurred — and of the structural mechanism that prevented consequences.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — International Criminal Accountability by Geopolitical Design

The ICC scenario reveals international criminal accountability as a structurally selective system by design. The Rome Statute's exclusion of non-member states from ICC jurisdiction, combined with the Security Council veto mechanism that allows P5 members to block referrals of situations implicating their own forces or allies, creates an international criminal justice architecture in which accountability is available for states without powerful patrons and unavailable for states with them. This is not a failure of ICC implementation — it is the structural design of the system as negotiated by its most powerful members.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework identifies the structural selectivity of international criminal accountability as a global-level authority-accountability misalignment: the most powerful states exercise the greatest influence over global governance while bearing the least accountability to global legal standards. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied at the international level, requires that no state be structurally exempted from accountability for its governance conduct — including conduct that rises to the level of international criminal law. The P5 veto over Security Council referrals is the structural mechanism that violates this principle most directly.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision addresses international accountability selectivity through two proposals: universal ICC jurisdiction over crimes against humanity regardless of member state status, achievable through a General Assembly resolution under the Uniting for Peace procedure as an alternative to Security Council referral; and a veto limitation mechanism that prevents P5 members from vetoing resolutions concerning situations in which their own forces or forces they have materially supported are implicated. These structural changes would not eliminate the ICC's enforcement limitations — arrest still requires state cooperation — but would eliminate the structural exemption that P5 patronage currently provides.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8) — consider at the international institutional level*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the same actions to result in very different legal consequences depending on the social status or connections of the person involved? (FI Q10) — consider at the state level*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25) — consider in relation to international accountability mechanisms*

S20 Amnesty vs. Accountability

Domain: Judicial Independence / Constitutional Reform | Historical Basis: Burkina Faso amnesty law 2024; Bangladesh post-Hasina transitional accountability | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Human Rights Commission Chair (R24), African Union Commission Chair (R85), Chief Justice (R26), Post-Conflict Transitional Government Head (R91), Opposition Leader-Authoritarian Context (R89), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (R97)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Transitional justice — the challenge of addressing past atrocities while building the political conditions for stable democratic governance — represents one of the deepest structural tensions in post-authoritarian governance. Amnesty laws that provide immunity for past conduct in exchange for cooperation with a political transition have been adopted in multiple post-conflict contexts. The Burkina Faso Transitional Legislative Assembly's 2024 amnesty law for coup attempt participants, and Bangladesh's own post-Hasina accountability challenges regarding the July 2024 crackdown deaths, both illustrate the structural dilemma: full accountability may destabilize the transition; inadequate accountability may normalize impunity for governance violence.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Chair of the National Human Rights Commission in a country that has recently completed a political transition from authoritarian governance. The previous government's security forces are documented to have killed 87 civilians and detained 340 opposition activists in the 18 months before the transition. The new transitional government is negotiating with former military and security service leaders whose cooperation is considered essential for transition stability. The negotiation includes a proposal: a conditional amnesty for security officials involved in the crackdown, in exchange for their cooperation with the transition process and their commitment not to participate in politics for five years. The families of 87 killed civilians are demanding full criminal accountability. International human rights organizations are divided — some supporting accountability, some supporting conditional amnesty as a pragmatic path to stability. The transitional government has asked for your Commission's formal position.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Transitional Government Lead Negotiator] *Without the cooperation of the former security leadership, the transition is at risk. Three of the seven former senior commanders have indicated they will not support the transition if criminal accountability is part of the arrangement. A conditional amnesty is the price of stability.*

[Families of the 87 Killed (joint statement)] *We did not survive the transition to watch the people who killed our family members walk free with five-year political bans as their only consequence. Justice is not a bargaining chip. We demand full criminal prosecution.*

[International Human Rights Organization] *Conditional amnesty laws that cover serious human rights violations — including killings — are inconsistent with international human rights law and the victims' right to remedy. We urge the Commission to oppose this arrangement.*

[Political Analyst (regional expert)] *Every transition in this region that has insisted on full criminal accountability before political stabilization has either stalled or collapsed. Every transition that has successfully stabilized has included some form of amnesty arrangement. The choice is not justice versus impunity — it is justice versus governance.*

Decision Point 1

The transitional government has requested the Commission's formal position on the conditional amnesty proposal. What position do you take?

Option A: Oppose the amnesty formally — the Commission's mandate is to uphold human rights standards, and conditional amnesty for killings and detention of political activists is inconsistent with victims' rights under international law regardless of political pragmatism.

Option B: Support the amnesty conditionally — the Commission endorses the proposal if enhanced conditions are added: full truth-telling by amnesty recipients, individual victim compensation, and a 10-year rather than 5-year political ban.

Option C: Decline to take a position on the amnesty itself but publish a comprehensive accountability framework — documenting all 87 deaths, all 340 detentions, naming those responsible where evidence supports it, and creating the public record that any future accountability effort will require.

Option D: Request a six-month delay to the amnesty decision — allowing a full Commission-led truth and documentation process to complete before any amnesty arrangement forecloses accountability options.

Decision Point 2

The transitional government has proceeded with the conditional amnesty over the Commission's objection (or conditional support). The amnesty has been granted. Three months later, one of the amnestied former commanders — who provided cooperation and committed to non-participation in politics — has publicly spoken at a political rally, appearing to violate the five-year ban condition. The transitional government has issued a 'warning' but taken no action. The victims' families have filed a formal complaint with the Commission requesting that the amnesty be declared void for non-compliance. What is the Commission's response?

Option A: Issue a formal finding that the amnesty condition has been violated and recommend that the Attorney General initiate proceedings to void the amnesty for the individual in violation — the conditions were the legal basis for the amnesty; breach of conditions voids the arrangement.

Option B: Issue a formal statement noting the violation and calling on the transitional government to enforce the conditions — without making a legal finding that the amnesty is void, since voiding it may destabilize the transition more than the violation itself.

Option C: Decline jurisdiction — the amnesty arrangement and its enforcement are executive functions, and the Commission's role is human rights documentation and advocacy rather than amnesty enforcement.

Option D: Open a formal public inquiry into compliance with all amnesty conditions across all recipients — documenting the compliance record rather than making a legal finding about any specific individual's amnesty status.

Decision Point 3

Five years after the transition, the political ban period has ended. Three of the amnestied former commanders are considering running for parliament. The victims' families are mounting a legal challenge to their eligibility. The Commission is being asked to provide expert testimony in the eligibility challenge. International human rights bodies are divided: some argue that amnesty recipients who have complied with conditions should be able to re-enter political life; others argue that killings of civilians can never be fully amnestied. What is your Commission's expert testimony?

Option A: Testify that the amnesty arrangement — even if legally valid at the time — does not and cannot extinguish the victims' right to remedy under international human rights law, and that the eligibility of amnestied individuals to hold public office is a matter that requires direct consideration of victims' rights, not merely the amnesty arrangement's terms.

Option B: Testify that the amnesty was a legally valid arrangement that the individuals complied with, and that denying political participation after compliance with amnesty conditions would undermine the transitional justice framework that enabled the transition itself.

Option C: Decline to testify on eligibility — the Commission's mandate is human rights, not electoral eligibility determination — and limit testimony to documenting the accountability record and the victims' continuing advocacy for remedy.

Option D: Testify that the Commission's formal position is that no amnesty arrangement can create political eligibility for individuals responsible for civilian killings — while acknowledging that this position may not be legally determinative in the eligibility challenge.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (full accountability advocacy throughout): *The Commission's consistent accountability position creates the most comprehensive formal human rights record produced in the transition. The amnesty is contested but upheld. One amnesty is voided for the commander who violated the political ban condition — the legal precedent that conditions are enforceable. Three amnestied individuals run for parliament; two win. The victims' families' eligibility challenge fails on procedural grounds. The human rights record the Commission has created — documenting all 87 deaths, all 340 detentions, all amnesty recipients — is the permanent accountability record that no political accommodation can erase. Twenty years later, it remains the foundation of the country's transitional justice scholarship.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2 (conditional support, procedural response to violation): *The transition stabilizes. The conditional amnesty is implemented with the enhanced conditions the Commission recommended. Twelve of the fourteen amnestied individuals comply with all conditions. The political ban ends and three enter politics. The 87 families receive individual compensation payments. No criminal prosecution occurs. The transitional government governs effectively for its full term. At the end of five years, the country has a functioning democratic system and no former security officials have faced criminal accountability for 87 civilian deaths. Whether the stability the amnesty enabled was worth the accountability it foreclosed is the question that the transition's history will never fully answer.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — Transitional Justice and the Structural Trade-off

The amnesty scenario presents the most genuinely difficult structural dilemma in the PlayerOne library: a situation in which the structurally fair choice — full accountability for documented atrocities — may produce

the structurally unfair outcome of transition collapse, which perpetuates the conditions that produced the atrocities. There is no institutional design that resolves this dilemma perfectly. The structural tension between accountability and stability in transitional contexts is genuine — not a product of individual moral failure or institutional capture, but of the structural reality that accountability requires enforcement capacity that transitional governments frequently do not have.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's approach to transitional justice acknowledges the genuine dilemma while insisting on minimum non-negotiable accountability conditions: documentation of all violations, naming of those responsible, individual victim remediation, and the structural guarantee that amnesty for past conduct cannot create future governance eligibility without demonstrating that the governance conditions that produced the violations have been structurally changed. Amnesty that simply removes criminal liability without addressing the structural conditions that produced atrocity governance is not transitional justice — it is impunity with a delay.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Transitional Accountability provision specifies minimum conditions for any amnesty arrangement: (1) comprehensive independent documentation of all violations must precede any amnesty; (2) individual victim compensation is mandatory regardless of amnesty terms; (3) amnesty recipients must undergo a public truth-telling process in which they acknowledge the conduct for which amnesty is granted; (4) structural governance reform must be demonstrably underway before amnesty takes effect — specifically, the institutional mechanisms that enabled the atrocities must be reformed or abolished; (5) political eligibility following amnesty requires a further 10-year accountability period with independent monitoring. These conditions do not eliminate the accountability-stability tension but establish that amnesty cannot be a mechanism for avoiding accountability while returning to the governance positions that enabled violence.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for individuals to be detained without trial for extended periods when charged with political offences? (FI Q9)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for the same actions to result in very different legal consequences depending on the social status or connections of the person involved? (FI Q10)*

— End of Chapter 9 —

Next: Chapter 10 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Four — Resource Allocation and Corruption (S21–S26)

CHAPTER 10

Scenario Scripts — Domain Four: Resource Allocation and Corruption (S21–S26)

Domain Four scenarios address the structural conditions under which public resources — healthcare budgets, disaster relief funds, infrastructure contracts, wage policy, and international lending — are allocated, diverted, or captured by interests other than those the resources are designed to serve. Corruption in the conventional sense — the individual official who takes a bribe — is not the primary focus of these scenarios. The scenarios address structural corruption: the governance design features that make resource diversion systematically easy, politically incentivized, and institutionally unremedied regardless of individual officials' personal integrity.

The six scenarios in this domain span the full range of resource governance: local budget allocation under political loyalty pressure (S21), disaster relief diversion through civil service political capture (S22), international financial institution conditionality (S23), politically connected procurement (S24), labor wage policy under export economic pressure (S25), and World Bank lending conditionality in a deteriorating governance context (S26). Together they demonstrate that resource allocation unfairness is not primarily a product of individual misconduct but of institutional design — the structures through which resource decisions are made, the accountability mechanisms through which those decisions are reviewed, and the incentive systems through which individual decision-makers are rewarded or punished for their choices.

Structural corruption is not the aberration from good governance — it is the product of governance architectures that make diversion easy, accountability weak, and political loyalty more rewarding than public service. The solution is not better people. It is better design.

S21 The Hospital Budget

Domain: Resource Allocation and Corruption | Historical Basis: Bangladesh local government resource allocation patterns; Chittagong municipal governance | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: City Mayor-Chittagong (R35), Ward Councilor (R38), Local Government Minister (R41), Union Parishad Chairman (R37), District Commissioner (R39), Upazila Chairman (R36)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's local government resource allocation has been extensively documented as operating through political loyalty rather than objective need. Development funds released by the national

government to city corporations and municipalities are distributed with reference to the political alignment of local ward and union leadership. Constituencies that supported the ruling party receive infrastructure investment; those that voted opposition receive comparatively less. The health sector is particularly affected — rural hospitals in opposition-leaning areas have documented shortfalls in equipment, staffing, and maintenance funding relative to politically aligned areas with equivalent population.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Mayor of Chittagong. The healthcare budget for the fiscal year is Tk 50 crore — the largest healthcare allocation the city has received. Three hospitals have submitted formal budget requests. Hospital A serves Ward 7 — your highest-need ward by every objective indicator: maternal mortality rate three times the city average, infant mortality above national rural averages, one functioning operating theatre for 180,000 residents. Ward 7 voted 71% for the opposition in the last election. Hospital B serves Ward 12 — moderate need, functional facilities, one equipment gap in diagnostic imaging. Ward 12 voted 58% for your party. Hospital C serves Ward 3 — the lowest objective need of the three, with the newest facilities. Ward 3 is the home ward of the ruling party's Chittagong district leader, whose organizational support was essential to your election. All three hospitals have submitted requests that together total Tk 68 crore — more than the available budget. You must allocate Tk 50 crore across the three.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Ruling Party District Leader (Ward 3)] *Mayor, Hospital C needs the diagnostic unit upgrade. I supported your campaign when it mattered. The ward expects to see that investment this year. I trust you understand the political reality.*

[Ward 7 Community Health Coalition (formal submission)] *Ward 7's maternal mortality rate is three times the city average. Our operating theatre serves 180,000 people. We are submitting the objective health data and requesting that the budget allocation follow the evidence.*

[City Health Director (internal assessment)] *Based on objective health outcome indicators, Ward 7 (Hospital A) has the highest clinical need by a significant margin. A needs-based allocation would prioritize Hospital A with approximately 60% of the budget.*

[Local Government Ministry (guidance note)] *Mayors are expected to maintain the political relationships that enable effective governance. Budget decisions should reflect the full range of considerations relevant to sustainable city governance.*

Decision Point 1

Your City Health Director has provided a needs-based allocation recommendation: Tk 30 crore to Hospital A, Tk 14 crore to Hospital B, Tk 6 crore to Hospital C. How do you respond to this recommendation?

Option A: Adopt the needs-based allocation in full — publish the City Health Director's assessment as the basis for the decision and implement it as recommended.

Option B: Use the needs-based allocation as the starting point but adjust: Tk 24 crore to Hospital A, Tk 16 crore to Hospital B, Tk 10 crore to Hospital C — reducing the Ward 7 allocation and increasing Ward 3's allocation to manage the political relationship.

Option C: Request a second assessment from an independent health consultant before making any allocation decision — creating a documentation process that delays the political pressure while building the evidence base.

Option D: Meet with the District Leader privately before making any decision — assessing how much flexibility exists in the political relationship before you commit to an allocation that may damage it.

Decision Point 2

You have published the needs-based allocation (Hospital A: Tk 30 crore, Hospital B: Tk 14 crore, Hospital C: Tk 6 crore). The District Leader has called: he is withdrawing his support for your renomination as mayor. His network will support another candidate. The ruling party's Chittagong committee has scheduled a meeting to 'review mayoral performance.' The Ward 7 Community Health Coalition has publicly praised the allocation as the first needs-based budget decision in the city's recent history. What is your response?

Option A: Hold the allocation. The decision was made on objective grounds and has been published. Reversing it under political pressure would make every future needs-based decision impossible — the precedent of reversal is more damaging than the political cost of the District Leader's opposition.

Option B: Request a meeting with the District Leader and offer a compensatory allocation from next year's discretionary infrastructure budget — attempting to preserve the political relationship while maintaining the healthcare allocation.

Option C: Request a meeting with the Local Government Minister — appealing the District Leader's pressure to the party level and seeking protection that allows you to maintain the needs-based allocation without losing your renomination.

Option D: Revise the allocation — increase Hospital C to Tk 12 crore, reduce Hospital A to Tk 24 crore, maintain Hospital B at Tk 14 crore — and justify the revision publicly as incorporating 'equity considerations across all wards.'

Decision Point 3

You have held the needs-based allocation despite the political pressure. The District Leader's opposition has materialized: you face a primary challenge for your renomination. Your polling shows you are competitive but vulnerable. The Ward 7 Community Health Coalition has organized a campaign in your support. The Chittagong civil society networks — previously uninvolved in mayoral politics — have publicly endorsed your renomination as a candidate who governed by objective criteria. The primary election is in three months. How do you campaign?

Option A: Campaign explicitly on the healthcare allocation decision — making needs-based governance the central theme of your campaign and inviting voters to choose between political loyalty governance and objective-criteria governance.

Option B: Campaign on your full record without emphasizing the healthcare allocation specifically — letting the coalition support speak for itself without making the District Leader confrontation the central campaign narrative.

Option C: Seek a reconciliation with the District Leader before the primary — offering concessions on a different budget area in exchange for his withdrawal of the primary challenge, preserving your renomination without a contested primary.

Option D: Withdraw from the mayoral race entirely and publicly endorse a reform candidate who shares your governance approach — framing your withdrawal as a principled decision to advance the governance principle rather than your own career.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1 and Option A in Decision Point 2 (needs-based allocation held under pressure) and Option A in Decision Point 3 (campaigns on the decision): *The primary election is genuinely competitive. Ward 7 turns out at 84% — the highest turnout in any ward in the city's recent electoral history. You win the primary by 11 percentage points. The District Leader's candidate carries Ward 3 and two additional wards. Ward 7's community mobilization is decisive. Hospital A's operating theatre upgrade is completed 14 months after the budget allocation. Maternal mortality in Ward 7 decreases by 23% over the subsequent three years. You have governed by objective criteria, survived the political consequence, and produced a measurable health outcome. The precedent you established — that a mayor can win an election after making needs-based decisions against political pressure — is the most significant structural contribution of your term.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1 (politically adjusted allocation from the start): *The allocation — Tk 24 crore to Hospital A, Tk 16 crore to Hospital B, Tk 10 crore to Hospital C — is implemented. The District Leader's support is maintained. You are renominated without a primary challenge. Ward 7 receives Tk 6 crore less than objective need required. The operating theatre that could have been upgraded is not. Over the following three years, 14 preventable maternal deaths occur in Ward 7 that the upgraded operating theatre might have prevented. These deaths are not attributed to the budget decision in any public record. The governance consequence is invisible. The political consequence was avoided. The health consequence was borne entirely by the people who had least political influence in the allocation decision.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — Political Loyalty Replacing Objective Need in Public Resource Allocation

The hospital budget scenario demonstrates the most direct form of resource allocation structural unfairness: public health resources allocated by political loyalty rather than clinical need. The Ward 7 residents whose maternal mortality rate is three times the city average are not receiving less healthcare investment because they matter less — they are receiving less because they voted differently. Their political choice in a free election — exercised through democratic procedure — has produced a governance consequence in which the services that their taxes fund are systematically underprovided relative to politically aligned communities. This is structural unfairness through resource diversion: the formal democratic right to vote is preserved while governance produces systematically worse outcomes for those who exercise that right differently.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's authority-accountability misalignment analysis identifies political loyalty-based resource allocation as a form of structural unfairness that violates the Meta-Right to Structural Fairness. Citizens have a right not only to vote but to governance systems in which their governance choices do not systematically disadvantage them in the allocation of public resources. When healthcare, education, infrastructure, and welfare are distributed by political alignment, the governance system has been structurally captured by the ruling party's organizational interests — converting public resources into political rewards.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Resource Allocation Integrity provision requires that all local government budget allocations above a defined threshold be determined by an independent formula incorporating objective need indicators — health outcomes, infrastructure condition, population density, poverty rate — with independent auditing of compliance. Political considerations cannot be introduced into formula-based allocations. Any deviation from formula-based allocation requires published justification subject to independent review. Under this design, the District Leader's pressure in this scenario has no structural pathway to influence the allocation — the formula determines the outcome, not the mayor's political calculation.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for government support programs to be distributed based on political loyalty to the ruling party rather than on objective need? (FI Q17)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the quality of public healthcare to vary significantly based on whether a person lives in an urban or rural area? (FI Q16)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for people to receive better access to government services when they have personal connections to government officials? (FI Q19)*

S22 The Development Fund Diversion

Domain: Resource Allocation and Corruption | Historical Basis: Bangladesh disaster relief and development fund management patterns; Sylhet 2022 floods | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — crisis decision-making

Active Roles: District Commissioner (R39), Upazila Nirbahi Officer (R40), Union Parishad Chairman (R37), Anti-Corruption Commission Chair (R22), Ruling Party MP (R03), Local Government Minister (R41)
Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's 2022 Sylhet floods displaced over four million people and caused an estimated $1.7 billion in damages. Disaster relief funds — including international humanitarian assistance — were distributed through Bangladesh's district administration. Multiple reports documented irregularities in relief distribution: funds reaching politically connected contractors rather than affected communities, relief materials diverted to ruling party warehouses, and constituency-based distribution that favored ruling party strongholds over opposition areas with equivalent or greater need. This scenario places the participant inside the administrative decision at the moment the diversion is proposed.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the District Commissioner of a flood-affected district. Relief funds of Tk 8 crore have arrived — a combination of government allocation and international NGO assistance. The distribution protocol requires that funds be allocated to union parishads based on damage assessment data. Your damage assessment data shows that three unions with the greatest damage are in constituencies represented by opposition MPs. The ruling party MP for the district has called. He wants 30% of the relief funds — Tk 2.4 crore — routed to a contractor his office recommends for relief distribution in his constituency, bypassing the union parishad mechanism entirely. His stated reason: 'The union parishad chairmen in opposition areas cannot be trusted to distribute efficiently.' The contractor he recommends has no track record in disaster relief. You control the disbursement.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Ruling Party MP] *DC sahib, I am asking you to be practical. The contractor I recommend will distribute efficiently. The union parishads in opposition areas will misuse the funds. Route 30% through my office's recommended contractor. This is how things work.*

[Damage Assessment Team Leader (internal)] *The three worst-affected unions are Unions 7, 12, and 15 — all in opposition constituencies. Our data is clear. Any allocation that bypasses those unions in favor of political considerations will leave the most severely affected communities without adequate relief.*

[International NGO Partner (funding 40% of total)] *Our funding terms require that relief reach assessed communities based on damage data. Any deviation from needs-based distribution may require us to redirect funding or publish a compliance report.*

[Upazila Nirbahi Officer (private)] *Sir, the MP's request is what it is. If we refuse, our transfers are at risk. If we comply, the international NGO may publish a compliance failure. There is no safe path here.*

Decision Point 1

The MP is waiting for your response. What do you tell him?

Option A: Decline the request directly and in writing — citing the damage assessment protocol, the international NGO's funding terms, and your legal obligation as DC to distribute based on documented need. Inform the MP that his request is being documented.

Option B: Decline verbally without written documentation — preserving your integrity without creating a paper trail that could be used against you in a transfer proceeding.

Option C: Offer a partial accommodation — route 15% through the MP's recommended contractor while maintaining 85% of the needs-based allocation — attempting to manage the political relationship while limiting the diversion.

Option D: Tell the MP you need 48 hours to review the damage assessment data before making any allocation decision — buying time without committing to either compliance or refusal.

Decision Point 2

You have declined the MP's request in writing. The damage assessment-based allocation has been announced. The MP has filed a formal complaint with the Local Government Ministry characterizing your decision as 'politically motivated obstruction of relief distribution.' The Ministry has called requesting an explanation. The UNO has warned you that a transfer order may be forthcoming. Simultaneously, the international NGO partner has formally commended your adherence to distribution protocols. What is your response to the Ministry?

Option A: Submit your full documentation — damage assessment data, allocation decision, MP's request, and your written refusal — as your formal response to the Ministry. Let the record speak.

Option B: Submit a brief explanation citing the damage assessment protocol without mentioning the MP's request — avoiding direct confrontation with the Ministry while maintaining your legal position.

Option C: Request a meeting with the Ministry Secretary in person before submitting any written response — attempting to manage the situation at the relationship level before it becomes a formal administrative matter.

Option D: Contact the Anti-Corruption Commission simultaneously with your Ministry response — formally documenting the MP's request as a potential case of attempted misappropriation of disaster relief funds.

Decision Point 3

Your documentation has been submitted. The relief distribution has been completed per the damage assessment protocol. Three months later, you receive a transfer order to a significantly less favorable posting. The international NGO has published a compliance commendation that names your district as a model of needs-based distribution. The ACC has opened an inquiry into the MP's request based on your documentation. Your replacement DC has been appointed. The affected union parishads have sent a collective letter of thanks. What is your final action before leaving the posting?

Option A: Prepare a comprehensive handover brief that fully documents the damage assessment methodology, distribution records, the MP's request, and your written responses — ensuring the record is complete and accessible for the ACC inquiry and any future audit.

Option B: Complete the standard handover documentation without the political context — protecting your replacement from inheriting a politically sensitive file while maintaining your own documentation separately.

Option C: Request a meeting with the incoming DC to personally brief them on the political dynamics of the posting — ensuring they understand the environment without creating a formal record that might constrain their own approach.

Option D: Publish an op-ed in a national newspaper about the experience — using your final days in the posting to make the structural problem of political interference in disaster relief distribution publicly visible before you lose the platform of the DC's office.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A throughout (written refusal, full documentation, complete handover brief): *The damage assessment-based distribution reaches the three most severely affected unions. Approximately 340,000 flood-affected residents in those unions receive relief they would otherwise not have received under a politically diverted allocation. The ACC inquiry produces a formal finding of attempted misappropriation — the MP receives a warning and the finding enters the formal corruption record. The international NGO's commendation is cited in the Ministry's own annual governance report. You spend two years in a less favorable posting. The ACC finding against the MP does not produce prosecution — the evidence meets the documentation standard but not the prosecution threshold in Bangladesh's political environment. The record exists. Nothing happens to the MP. Something happens to the people who received the relief.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1 (partial accommodation — 15% diverted): *Tk 1.2 crore is routed to the MP's recommended contractor. The contractor distributes relief materials in the MP's constituency at above-market prices — the international NGO's compliance review identifies the deviation and files a formal concern. A partial audit is conducted. The audit concludes that distribution was 'broadly compliant' with no specific finding on the contractor allocation. The three most severely affected unions receive 85% of what the needs assessment indicated they required. The MP's complaint against you is not filed. Your transfer order does not arrive. You complete your term as DC in the district. 15% of disaster relief was diverted. No accountability followed.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Civil Service Political Capture as Governance Mechanism

The development fund diversion scenario reveals how political capture of the civil service creates a structural mechanism for resource diversion that requires no individual corruption by the DC. The transfer threat — the career consequence of non-compliance with political direction — creates a structural incentive system in which civil servants who divert resources face no formal accountability while civil servants who resist face career punishment. The individual official who resists is not a hero — they are an actor whose personal integrity happens to exceed the structural incentive to comply. The structural design produces compliance as the default outcome regardless of individual integrity.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural capture analysis identifies civil service political capture as one of the most consequential structural governance failures in South Asian democratic systems. When civil servants' career trajectories are controlled by politicians whose governance decisions the civil servants are supposed to implement neutrally, the neutrality requirement becomes structurally fictional. The DC who faces transfer for needs-based relief distribution and promotion for politically accommodating distribution is

operating within a structural incentive system that converts public resource governance into political patronage regardless of formal rules.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Civil Service Independence provision addresses political capture through three mechanisms: civil servant appointments, transfers, and promotions managed by an independent Civil Service Commission rather than through ministerial direction; mandatory whistleblower protection for civil servants who document political interference in administrative decisions; and automatic escalation of transfer decisions made within 90 days of a civil servant's documented refusal of a political direction to an independent review panel. Under this design, the DC who refuses the MP's request and documents it in writing receives automatic protection from transfer rather than automatic exposure to it.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for government support programs to be distributed based on political loyalty rather than on objective need? (FI Q17)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for government contracts to be awarded based on political connections rather than competitive merit? (FI Q13)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for people to receive better access to government services when they have personal connections to government officials? (FI Q19)*

S23 IMF Conditionality

Domain: Resource Allocation and Corruption | Historical Basis: Bangladesh IMF bailout 2023; Sri Lanka 2022 economic crisis; Pakistan IMF program dynamics | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Minister of Finance (R07), Prime Minister (R01), IMF Managing Director (R65), World Bank President (R64), G20 Chair (R82), Prime Minister-Donor Dependent State (R88)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Bangladesh secured a $4.7 billion IMF Extended Credit Facility in January 2023 following significant foreign exchange reserve depletion and balance of payments pressure. The program included conditions requiring energy subsidy reforms, banking sector improvements, and revenue mobilization measures. Energy subsidy cuts disproportionately affect poor and lower-middle-income households who rely on subsidized electricity and fuel for cooking and transport. The conditionality framework — determined in negotiations between the IMF and the Bangladesh government — was not subject to parliamentary approval or public consultation. This scenario is grounded in Bangladesh's 2023 program while drawing on comparable IMF program experiences across the region.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Finance Minister. Bangladesh has received a $4.7 billion IMF program. The third tranche — $600 million — is conditional on implementation of a 40% reduction in energy subsidies within 60 days. Your economists estimate that full subsidy withdrawal will increase the cost of living for the bottom 40% of the income distribution by approximately 18%. Street protests against previous subsidy reductions have already produced three deaths and significant property damage. The garment sector — employing 4 million workers — faces immediate cost increases that manufacturers say will force them to reduce the workforce. The IMF's position: subsidy reduction is essential for fiscal sustainability and cannot be waived. The PM's position: implementation is necessary — find a way to manage the social impact. Your position: the conditionality is economically defensible but the timeline and depth of implementation will produce measurable harm to the most vulnerable populations.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[IMF Resident Representative] *The third tranche is conditional on implementation of the subsidy reduction per the agreed timeline. The program design cannot accommodate delays — other program countries are watching. We expect implementation confirmation within the 60-day window.*

[Prime Minister] *Implement it. We have no choice. Find the social protection measures that minimize the political damage. The foreign reserves situation does not give us alternatives.*

[Trade Union Federation] *A 40% energy subsidy cut will push millions of working families below the poverty line. We are formally warning of industrial action. The government cannot implement this without protecting workers from the cost impact.*

[Your own economic assessment] *The IMF's fiscal sustainability argument is technically sound. The 60-day timeline and 40% depth are both negotiating positions, not technical requirements. A phased 18-month implementation achieving the same fiscal target would produce significantly less acute social impact. The IMF has shown flexibility on timelines in other program countries. We have not pushed hard enough on this point.*

Decision Point 1

You have 60 days to implement the subsidy reduction. Before you begin implementation, what is your negotiating posture with the IMF?

Option A: Request a formal renegotiation of the timeline — presenting Bangladesh-specific social impact data and proposing an 18-month phased implementation achieving the same fiscal consolidation target. Accept that the third tranche may be delayed if the negotiation fails.

Option B: Implement within the 60-day window as required — the IMF's program conditions are the conditions of the loan, and unilateral timeline modification risks the entire program.

Option C: Implement a partial reduction — 25% rather than 40% — within the 60-day window and present it to the IMF as Phase One of a phased implementation, framing partial compliance as good faith rather than breach.

Option D: Request a technical meeting with the IMF to present the social impact data and formally document Bangladesh's position that the timeline produces disproportionate hardship — implementing as required while creating a formal record of the government's objection to the design.

Decision Point 2

The IMF has rejected the renegotiation request. The 60-day implementation requirement stands. You must implement the 40% subsidy reduction. Within the implementation, you have discretion over the design of any compensatory social protection measures. The government has Tk 800 crore available for compensation — approximately 30% of the social impact cost. How do you design the compensation?

Option A: Target compensation exclusively to the bottom 20% of the income distribution using existing poverty registry data — the limited funds go to those with the greatest need and least capacity to absorb the shock.

Option B: Distribute compensation broadly across the bottom 50% of the income distribution — reaching more people with smaller individual amounts, reducing the political visibility of the impact while spreading the protection more widely.

Option C: Use the compensation to protect the garment sector workforce specifically — the 4 million workers whose employers have threatened workforce reductions, prioritizing economic stability over comprehensive poverty protection.

Option D: Delay compensation distribution pending development of new targeting systems — accepting that the subsidy reduction will take effect before compensation reaches affected populations, but building a more accurate system for future use.

Decision Point 3

The subsidy reduction has been implemented. Energy costs for the bottom 40% have increased by 18% on average. The compensation reached approximately 22% of affected households within the first month. Protest has intensified — two more deaths in clashes with security forces. The IMF has released the third tranche. The economic stabilization

argument is technically vindicated — foreign reserves have stabilized. The human cost has been exactly what your economists predicted. Six months later, the IMF is proposing a fourth tranche conditional on further fiscal measures. How do you approach the fourth tranche negotiation?

Option A: Lead the negotiation personally and demand that the fourth tranche's conditions include a mandatory social impact assessment requirement — making structural protection of vulnerable populations a condition of the program, not an afterthought.

Option B: Accept the fourth tranche's conditions as proposed — the program is working fiscally and domestic political management of the social impact is the government's responsibility, not the IMF's design requirement.

Option C: Publish Bangladesh's social impact documentation from the third tranche implementation publicly before negotiations begin — using public disclosure to create international pressure for more socially sensitive conditionality design.

Option D: Approach other program countries privately to coordinate a collective request for IMF program reform on social impact conditionality — building a coalition rather than acting as a single country demanding modification.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1 (renegotiation requested), Option A in Decision Point 2 (targeted compensation), Option A in Decision Point 3 (mandatory social impact condition demand): *The renegotiation request fails. Implementation proceeds as required. Targeted compensation reaches the bottom 20% within three weeks — faster and more precisely than broad distribution would have achieved. The fourth tranche negotiation produces a formal commitment from the IMF to include a social impact monitoring framework in future Bangladesh tranches — not mandatory mitigation, but documented monitoring. Bangladesh's negotiating record — the formal renegotiation request, the social impact documentation, the fourth tranche demand — becomes the most comprehensive country-level documentation of IMF conditionality social impact in South Asia. It is cited in subsequent IMF reform discussions. The households that were not reached by compensation bore costs that the documentation acknowledges but did not prevent.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1 (implements without negotiation) and Option D in Decision Point 2 (delays compensation): *The subsidy reduction is implemented. Compensation is delayed. In the first six weeks, affected households absorb the full cost shock without any compensation. Twelve documented poverty regression cases — families pushed below the poverty line by the cost increase — occur in this window before any compensation arrives. The IMF releases the tranche. Fiscal stabilization proceeds on schedule. The compensation, when it arrives, is less targeted than it would have been with a functional targeting system. The program is assessed internationally as a technical success. The human cost of the implementation design is not part of that assessment.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — International Conditionality Without Democratic Authorization

The IMF conditionality scenario reveals a structural accountability gap at the intersection of international and domestic governance: policy decisions with profound domestic distributional consequences are made in bilateral negotiations between the government and an international institution — without parliamentary authorization, without public consultation, and without formal accountability to the populations who bear the consequences. The 40% energy subsidy cut that increases the cost of living for Bangladesh's bottom 40%

by 18% was not approved by parliament. It was agreed in a technical negotiation conducted by Finance Ministry officials and IMF program economists. The populations most affected had no formal participation in the decision.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural exclusion analysis identifies international conditionality without democratic authorization as a form of governance decision-making in which the populations most affected have the least formal standing. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied to international financial governance, requires that conditionality programs include mandatory domestic consultation requirements before implementation, mandatory social impact assessments at program design stage, and accountability mechanisms that allow affected populations to formally challenge conditionality designs that violate minimum social protection standards. The current IMF program architecture provides none of these.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision addresses international conditionality accountability through two requirements: all IMF and World Bank program conditions with identified distributional effects on the bottom 40% of the income distribution must be subject to parliamentary notification and a 30-day review period before implementation; and program design must include mandatory pre-implementation social impact assessments with minimum mitigation standards that the conditionality design must accommodate. Under this design, the 60-day implementation requirement in this scenario would be subject to parliamentary notification — not a veto, but a formal democratic visibility requirement that makes the conditionality's distributional effects part of the public record before they are implemented.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for international trade agreements to be negotiated in ways that primarily benefit large corporations at the expense of local producers and workers? (FI Q15)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the social safety net to leave significant portions of the population without adequate support during economic hardship? (FI Q20)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S24 The Infrastructure Contract

Domain: Resource Allocation and Corruption | Historical Basis: Bangladesh public procurement patterns; Padma Bridge contractor selection controversy | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Anti-Corruption Commission Chair (R22), Minister of Finance (R07), Parliamentary Committee Chair (R13), Business Association Chair (R51), Transparency International Chair (R94), Chief Secretary (R59)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's public procurement system has been extensively documented as subject to political influence in contractor selection. The Padma Bridge procurement controversy — in which the World Bank withdrew from the project citing corruption concerns in the selection process — is the most internationally prominent example. The pattern extends across infrastructure, defense procurement, and government services contracting: politically connected firms win contracts at above-market prices, technically superior but politically unconnected bidders are systematically disadvantaged, and procurement committee decisions reflect political direction rather than technical evaluation. This scenario draws on this documented pattern to create a procurement decision scenario applicable across multiple procurement contexts.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Chair of the Anti-Corruption Commission. Your office has received a formal complaint from a losing bidder in a major road infrastructure tender. The complaint alleges: (1) the winning bidder's technical submission was rated third by the technical evaluation committee, while the complainant's submission was rated first; (2) the final contract award decision — made by the procurement committee — reversed the technical committee's ranking; (3) the winning firm's chairman has a documented personal relationship with the Finance Minister, having co-invested in three commercial properties. The complaint is supported by documentation: the technical evaluation scores, the procurement committee's award decision, and commercial property records. The contract value: Tk 340 crore. The Finance Minister chairs the procurement committee.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Attorney General's Office (informal communication)] *The ACC Chair should be aware that this investigation touches on the Finance Minister's conduct. The government is watching this inquiry closely. We would recommend proceeding with appropriate caution.*

[Complainant's Legal Counsel (formal submission)] *The documentation submitted establishes a prima facie case for investigation of procurement irregularity under the Public Procurement Act. The reversal of technical committee rankings without documented justification, combined with the documented personal relationship between the contract winner and the decision-maker, meets the ACC's investigation threshold.*

[International Anti-Corruption Monitor] *The contractor selection pattern documented in this complaint is consistent with patterns we have documented across multiple Bangladesh procurement processes. We are watching this case as a test of the ACC's functional independence.*

[ACC Legal Adviser (internal)] *The documentation is sufficient for investigation. The question is not whether we have grounds — we do. The question is whether we have the institutional protection to conduct the investigation to conclusion without the government blocking the process.*

Decision Point 1

The complaint is before you. The documentation is sufficient for investigation. What is your decision?

Option A: Open a formal investigation immediately, issue document preservation orders to the Finance Ministry and procurement committee, and assign the investigation to your most senior investigator — proceeding at full institutional speed before any political intervention can obstruct document access.

Option B: Open a preliminary examination rather than a full investigation — a lower-profile initial step that allows you to assess the evidence without immediately triggering the political response that a full investigation of the Finance Minister will produce.

Option C: Request a meeting with the Chief Secretary before taking any action — understanding the government's position before committing to an investigation that will place the ACC in direct conflict with the Finance Ministry.

Option D: Decline jurisdiction citing that the Finance Minister's involvement makes this a parliamentary accountability matter rather than an ACC matter — referring the complaint to the parliamentary finance committee.

Decision Point 2

You have opened a full investigation. Document preservation orders have been issued. The Finance Ministry has provided partial documents, withholding the procurement committee's internal deliberation records on grounds of 'cabinet privilege.' The Attorney General has confirmed the privilege claim is legally contestable but will be litigated if challenged. Your investigator has found the partial documents sufficient to establish a strong circumstantial case — the technical ranking reversal is documented and unexplained, the personal relationship is documented. What is your approach to the withheld documents?

Option A: Challenge the privilege claim through the courts — the ACC's mandate cannot be fulfilled if government officials can shield procurement decisions from scrutiny through cabinet privilege, and this case is the appropriate test of that principle.

Option B: Proceed with the investigation using available documents — the circumstantial case is strong enough to produce findings without the withheld deliberation records, and the court challenge would take 18 months the investigation cannot wait for.

Option C: Publish an interim finding noting that the ACC has been unable to access material documents on grounds of cabinet privilege — creating a public record of the obstruction before the investigation concludes.

Option D: Approach the Finance Minister directly — offering him the opportunity to provide the withheld documents voluntarily in exchange for being treated as a cooperative witness rather than a subject of investigation.

Decision Point 3

The investigation has concluded with a finding: the procurement committee's reversal of the technical ranking was not supported by documented technical justification, and the personal relationship between the contract winner and the Finance Minister created an undisclosed conflict of interest that should have required the Minister's recusal from the decision. The finding recommends prosecution referral. The ACC Board has voted 3-2 to accept the finding. The Attorney General has declined to prosecute — characterizing the evidence as 'insufficient for criminal prosecution.' The contract remains in force. The Finance Minister has publicly denied any wrongdoing. What is the ACC's final public position?

Option A: Publish the full investigation report, including the prosecution recommendation and the Attorney General's declination — making the complete record publicly available so that citizens, media, and international observers can assess the evidence and the outcome.

Option B: Publish a summary finding without the prosecution recommendation — documenting the conflict of interest and procedural irregularity without escalating the conflict with the Attorney General whose cooperation the ACC needs for future prosecutions.

Option C: Appeal the Attorney General's decision to the courts — seeking a judicial order compelling prosecution based on the ACC's finding.

Option D: Announce the ACC's findings at a press conference, call for the Finance Minister's resignation, and invite international anti-corruption bodies to conduct their own review of the evidence — using public pressure to produce accountability that the formal legal process has failed to achieve.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (full investigation, court challenge, full publication): *The court challenge on cabinet privilege takes 16 months and produces a landmark ruling: procurement committee deliberations are not subject to cabinet privilege when the committee's decision is the subject of an ACC investigation. The ruling is the most significant judicial contribution to Bangladesh's anti-corruption architecture in a decade. The withheld documents, when produced, strengthen the finding substantially. The full investigation report is published. The Finance Minister is not prosecuted — the Attorney General's declination stands. He does not resign. The Tk 340 crore contract remains in force. The legal precedent on cabinet privilege is real. The accountability for this specific contract is not. Your term as ACC Chair ends without renewal six months later.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2, Option B in Decision Point 3 (preliminary examination, proceeds without withheld docs, summary finding): *The preliminary examination produces a finding of 'procedural irregularities' — weaker than a full investigation's finding would have been. The summary finding without prosecution recommendation is published. The Finance Minister issues a*

response characterizing the finding as 'politically motivated.' No accountability follows. The contract proceeds. International anti-corruption monitors note that the ACC's preliminary examination approach and publication decision limited the investigation's impact. Your term as ACC Chair is renewed for a second five years. The ACC's institutional relationship with the government is maintained. The procurement irregularity is documented in a finding that produces no consequence.

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Anti-Corruption Institutions Captured by Appointment Authority

The procurement scenario reveals the deepest structural irony of Bangladesh's anti-corruption architecture: the ACC that is designed to investigate corruption in government is appointed by the government and prosecutes through an Attorney General who is also appointed by the government. The investigation pathway — from complaint to prosecution — passes through institutional actors who are structurally dependent on the political actors being investigated. The ACC Chair who investigates the Finance Minister investigates an official whose political allies control the ACC's budget, staff appointments, and institutional authority. This is structural capture of the accountability mechanism by the actors the mechanism is designed to scrutinize.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural capture analysis identifies anti-corruption institutions as one of the most common targets for institutional capture in governance systems where executive control extends to accountability appointments. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that accountability mechanisms for governance conduct be structurally independent from those whose conduct they are designed to scrutinize — including independence in appointment, budget, prosecution authority, and institutional protection. Bangladesh's ACC fails all four independence tests.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Anti-Corruption Independence provision specifies: ACC Commissioners appointed through a multi-party selection process with parliamentary confirmation rather than executive appointment; ACC budget as a fixed percentage of national budget not subject to executive reduction; independent prosecution authority for corruption cases above a defined threshold — the ACC can prosecute directly without Attorney General referral; and mandatory judicial protection against retaliatory transfer or dismissal of ACC investigators. Under this design, the Attorney General's declination in this scenario does not end the accountability process — the ACC can proceed to prosecution independently.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for government contracts to be awarded based on political connections rather than competitive merit? (FI Q13)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for powerful corporations to influence government policy through financial lobbying? (FI Q24)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how public funds are spent? (FI Q21)*

S25 Garment Worker Wages

Domain: Resource Allocation and Corruption | Historical Basis: Bangladesh garment sector minimum wage reviews 2023; Rana Plaza aftermath labor standards | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Minister of Labor (R08, adapted), Business Association Chair (R51), Trade Union Leader (R49), Minister of Finance (R07), Prime Minister (R01), International Observer Chief (R99)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's garment sector — employing four million workers, predominantly women, generating 83% of export earnings — has been the site of sustained conflict between worker wage demands and manufacturer cost pressures. The 2013 Rana Plaza collapse killed 1,134 workers in a building that multiple inspections had flagged as structurally unsafe. The subsequent Accord on Fire and Building Safety and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety were international safety frameworks that manufacturers and international buyers agreed to under intense post-Rana Plaza pressure. Wage disputes in 2023 produced violent crackdowns on worker protests. The minimum wage — last set at Tk 8,000 per month in 2018 — was raised to Tk 12,500 in 2023 after protests, significantly below the Tk 23,000 that worker unions had demanded. This scenario places the participant in the wage-setting decision at the moment the competing pressures are most acute.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Minister responsible for labor policy. The minimum wage review committee has completed its assessment. Three positions are before the committee: the manufacturers' association has submitted a ceiling of Tk 10,500 per month, citing competitive pressures from Vietnam and Cambodia; the trade union federation has submitted a floor of Tk 20,000, citing inflation-adjusted living wage calculations; and an independent economic assessment commissioned by your ministry recommends Tk 14,500 as consistent with both sector competitiveness and basic living standard maintenance. The Finance Minister has privately indicated that anything above Tk 11,000 will trigger a formal government economic impact review. Major international buyers — H&M, Zara, PVH — have written to say they will maintain sourcing

relationships only if the wage environment remains 'globally competitive.' The Prime Minister's position: resolve it without a manufacturing sector crisis.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[BGMEA (Manufacturers)] *Anything above Tk 10,500 makes Bangladesh uncompetitive against Vietnam. We will be forced to reduce workforce to manage costs. The Minister should understand that 500,000 job losses are a political crisis larger than a wage dispute.*

[Trade Union Federation] *Four million workers have not had a real wage increase in five years. Inflation has consumed their purchasing power entirely. Tk 20,000 is the living wage our economists calculate. Anything less is a subsidy from workers to manufacturers and international buyers.*

[Independent Economic Assessment] *Tk 14,500 is economically supportable without triggering the competitive displacement the manufacturers predict. The manufacturers' relocation threat has been made in every wage review since 2010 and has not materialized at any previous settlement.*

[International Buyers (joint letter)] *We remain committed to Bangladesh sourcing. We expect the wage environment to remain globally competitive. We are prepared to absorb modest cost increases through our supply chain pricing if the increase is implemented with adequate lead time.*

Decision Point 1

The wage committee is waiting for your recommendation. What do you recommend?

Option A: Tk 14,500 — the independent economic assessment's recommendation. It is the only position grounded in evidence rather than negotiating interest, and it is supported by the international buyers' own indication that modest increases are absorbable.

Option B: Tk 12,500 — splitting the difference between the manufacturers' ceiling and the independent assessment. It is politically manageable and gets workers a real increase even if not the evidence-based one.

Option C: Tk 10,500 — the manufacturers' ceiling. The threat to workforce is not credible historically, but protecting 4 million jobs in the current economic environment takes precedence over maximizing the wage increase.

Option D: Tk 16,000 — above the independent assessment but below the union demand. The independent assessment's competitiveness analysis is conservative, and workers deserve an aspirational wage decision that exceeds the minimum evidence basis.

Decision Point 2

You have recommended Tk 14,500. The Finance Minister has triggered his economic impact review. The manufacturers have threatened to close 200 factories. Three international buyers have written expressing 'concern about cost implications.' The Prime Minister has called: the recommendation is 'too high' and will 'damage the export sector.' He is asking you to revise to Tk 12,000. The trade union federation has announced it accepts Tk 14,500 as a reasonable outcome. What is your response to the Prime Minister?

Option A: Defend the Tk 14,500 recommendation with the independent economic data — requesting that the PM allow the economic impact review to complete before any revision, and noting that the international buyers have indicated cost absorbability.

Option B: Agree to revise to Tk 12,500 — finding a compromise position that gives the PM political cover while not fully abandoning the evidence-based recommendation.

Option C: Agree to Tk 12,000 as the PM requests — the PM has ultimate authority on economic policy and the political judgment that Tk 14,500 is unsustainable is the PM's to make.

Option D: Offer to resign if the recommendation is revised downward — framing the revision as a decision the PM must own publicly rather than one that can be characterized as your ministry's independent assessment.

Decision Point 3

The minimum wage has been set at Tk 13,000 — a compromise between your Tk 14,500 recommendation and the PM's Tk 12,000 request. Worker protests have occurred, producing two deaths in clashes with security forces. Manufacturers have not closed any factories — the relocation threat has not materialized. International buyers have maintained sourcing relationships. Two years later, inflation has eroded 14% of the real wage gain since the increase. The trade union federation has filed for a new review. You are asked by the PM to lead the next review. What is your approach?

Option A: Accept the role and propose a structural reform to the wage-setting process: replacing the tripartite negotiation with a mandatory independent economic assessment as the binding basis for wage decisions — removing political negotiation from the outcome.

Option B: Accept the role and proceed with the same tripartite process — the outcome will depend on the balance of pressures at the time, as it always has.

Option C: Decline the role — the previous review demonstrated that the political pressures override independent evidence, and leading another review under those conditions means presiding over another compromise that leaves workers below the living wage.

Option D: Accept the role with a public commitment to implement the independent economic assessment's recommendation regardless of political pressure — making your approach the public issue before the review begins.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (evidence-based recommendation, defended, structural reform proposed): *The compromise lands at Tk 13,000. Your structural reform proposal for the next review — binding independent assessment — generates significant public debate. The manufacturers oppose it. The unions support it. A parliamentary motion on the reform attracts 67 signatures. The reform is not adopted in the current parliamentary session. The three workers who die in wage protest clashes over the two review cycles are not part of any public accounting of the wage-setting process's costs. The manufacturers did not relocate. The buyers maintained sourcing. Workers received a real wage increase — below the evidence-based recommendation but above what political negotiation without your pushback would have produced. The structural reform debate you initiated is the seed of a future change that you will not be in office to implement.*

If Option C in Decision Point 2 (accepts PM's Tk 12,000 request): *The minimum wage is set at Tk 12,000. Workers receive a real increase. The manufacturers do not relocate. International buyers maintain sourcing. The independent economic assessment that recommended Tk 14,500 is filed and forgotten. The workers who would have received Tk 13,000 or Tk 14,500 under different decisions receive Tk 12,000. The difference — Tk 1,000-2,500 per month for four million workers — is the aggregate real income that the political override of the evidence-based recommendation cost. That aggregate cost is Tk 4-10 billion per month in foregone worker income. No accounting of this cost appears in any public document.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Worker Interests From Governance Decisions That Determine Their Living Standards

The garment wage scenario reveals how the governance architecture of wage-setting systematically disadvantages the workers whose wages are being set. Manufacturers participate through formal industry associations with direct access to the PM's office. International buyers participate through formal letters that carry implicit sourcing threats. Workers participate through trade union representatives in a tripartite process where the political calculation of the PM's office — driven by manufacturer and buyer pressure — ultimately determines the outcome. The four million workers who will live on the wage decision for five years have less formal governance standing in the decision than the manufacturers who will profit from its level.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural exclusion analysis identifies wage governance as one of the domains in which the formal procedural inclusion of worker representatives — through trade union participation — is structurally insufficient because the decision-making authority runs through political actors who are more structurally dependent on capital than on labor. The workers' trade union has formal voice in the tripartite process. It does not have structural governance standing equivalent to the manufacturers' access to the PM's office through economic threat. This asymmetry is structural, not procedural.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Labor Rights Governance provision addresses wage-setting structural exclusion through a binding independent wage commission: minimum wage decisions are made by an independent commission whose members are selected equally by worker organizations, employer organizations, and civil society, with binding authority based on evidence from economic assessors who are independent of both government and employer organizations. The Finance Ministry and PM's office have no formal authority to override the commission's determination. Under this design, the PM's call requesting a revision to Tk 12,000 has no governance standing — the commission's determination is binding and the political pressure has no formal pathway to influence it.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for workers in the same industry to receive significantly different wages based on factors unrelated to their work performance or skill? (FI Q12)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the social safety net to leave significant portions of the population without adequate support during economic hardship? (FI Q20)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for powerful corporations to influence government policy through financial lobbying? (FI Q24)*

S26 World Bank Loan Conditionality

Domain: Resource Allocation and Corruption | Historical Basis: World Bank governance conditionality frameworks; Bangladesh development lending patterns | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: World Bank President (R64), IMF Managing Director (R65), Prime Minister (R01), Minister of Finance (R07), Prime Minister-Donor Dependent State (R88), UN Secretary-General (R61)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The World Bank's conditionality frameworks for development lending have evolved significantly from the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s, which required extensive privatization and market liberalization. Contemporary Bank programs include governance conditions — anti-corruption measures, procurement transparency, judicial capacity — alongside economic policy conditions. Bangladesh has been a significant recipient of World Bank lending, including the $3 billion Padma Bridge loan (subsequently withdrawn over procurement concerns) and multiple budget support programs. This scenario addresses the governance conditionality dimension — the conditions the Bank attaches to lending related to how the borrowing country manages its governance rather than its economy.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the World Bank President. Bangladesh has applied for a $2.5 billion Development Policy Credit — budget support that would significantly stabilize Bangladesh's fiscal position and fund a major climate adaptation infrastructure program. The program is economically sound and the climate adaptation component is urgent — Bangladesh faces severe sea-level rise impacts within the decade. However, your program team's governance assessment shows: significant deterioration in press freedom indicators over the past two years; documented erosion of judicial independence in political cases; the ACC's recent failure to prosecute a major infrastructure

corruption case; and a declining score on the Bank's own governance indicators. Your Board is divided: seven member states want to proceed given the climate urgency; five want to condition the program on governance improvements; three want to reject the program entirely until governance deteriorates further.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Bangladesh Finance Minister] *Bangladesh needs this program. The climate adaptation infrastructure cannot wait. Our governance record has some weaknesses but our macroeconomic management is sound and our people will suffer from climate impacts regardless of politics. Please proceed.*

[Seven Supportive Board Members] *The climate urgency is real. Bangladesh's governance record is imperfect but not exceptional in our portfolio. Conditioning the program on governance improvements that the government cannot deliver in the program timeline will either kill the program or produce cosmetic compliance. Proceed with standard fiduciary conditions.*

[Five Conditioning Board Members] *If we approve this program without meaningful governance conditions, we are funding a government that is systematically dismantling the accountability mechanisms we claim to support. Our credibility on governance requires that we condition programs on genuine accountability indicators, not just fiduciary compliance.*

[Your own institutional assessment] *The governance conditions we could attach are either meaningful — and the government will not implement them — or cosmetic — and they lend legitimacy to a program that funds governance deterioration. There is no comfortable middle ground.*

Decision Point 1

You must bring a recommendation to the Board. What is your recommendation?

Option A: Approve with substantive governance conditions — specifically, measurable progress on three indicators within 18 months: restoration of two banned news organizations, an ACC prosecution referral in the infrastructure corruption case, and independent review of three judicial transfer decisions. Accept that the program may be cancelled if conditions are not met.

Option B: Approve with standard fiduciary conditions only — procurement transparency, financial management, audit requirements — without political governance conditions that the government will not accept.

Option C: Delay approval pending a six-month governance monitoring period — neither approving nor rejecting, creating space for voluntary governance improvement before the program decision.

Option D: Reject the program on governance grounds — formally communicating that Bangladesh's current governance trajectory is incompatible with the Bank's country engagement strategy, and offering to reconsider when specific governance benchmarks are achieved.

Decision Point 2

The Board has approved the program with your recommended conditions (Option A) by a 9-6 vote. Bangladesh's Finance Minister has formally accepted the conditions. Twelve

months into the 18-month condition period, two of three conditions are partially met: one news organization has been restored; the judicial review is ongoing but inconclusive. The ACC prosecution has not proceeded. The climate adaptation infrastructure is performing well — 340,000 households have received climate-resilient housing. Six months remain. What is your assessment approach for the condition review?

Option A: Apply the conditions rigorously — two of three conditions are partially met, not fully met. The second tranche of the program will not be released until all three conditions achieve full compliance or the Board approves a formal condition modification.

Option B: Apply the conditions flexibly — material progress on two of three conditions, combined with the program's strong climate outcomes, justifies releasing the second tranche with an extended condition period for the remaining ACC prosecution condition.

Option C: Publish a mid-term governance assessment that transparently documents progress and gaps — making the compliance picture public before the formal review, creating pressure for the ACC prosecution progress rather than waiting for the formal deadline.

Option D: Approach the Bangladeshi government privately with a specific offer: release the second tranche in full if the ACC formally initiates prosecution proceedings within 30 days — narrowing the condition to a single achievable near-term action.

Decision Point 3

The 18-month review has concluded. The ACC has initiated prosecution proceedings — technically meeting the condition — but the proceedings are widely assessed as unlikely to produce conviction given the political environment. The Board is reviewing whether to release the final tranche. The climate infrastructure program is 85% complete and delivering measurable outcomes. What is your recommendation to the Board?

Option A: Release the final tranche with a formal Board statement noting that governance condition compliance was procedural rather than substantive — creating a public record of the Bank's assessment even while releasing the funds.

Option B: Release the final tranche without comment on governance condition quality — the conditions were technically met, the program is delivering climate outcomes, and questioning compliance quality creates precedents for future conditionality interpretation that the Bank cannot sustain.

Option C: Withhold the final tranche pending independent assessment of whether the ACC prosecution proceeding meets the spirit of the governance condition — accepting that the program may remain incomplete if the assessment finds cosmetic compliance.

Option D: Release the final tranche and immediately begin a formal review of how governance conditions are designed and assessed — using this program's conditionality limitations to advance the Bank's institutional approach to governance requirements.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option C in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (substantive conditions, public assessment, release with transparency statement): *The program is approved and*

delivered. Climate adaptation infrastructure reaches 340,000 households. The transparency statement noting procedural rather than substantive governance compliance becomes the most widely cited World Bank governance conditionality assessment in South Asia in the program cycle. Bangladesh's government publicly disputes the characterization. Three international legal scholars cite the statement in papers on conditionality design. The ACC prosecution does not produce conviction. The two news organizations remain operational. The governance trajectory is marginally better than it would have been without the conditions — one restoration, no conviction. The climate outcomes are real. The governance accountability is partial. The institutional transparency is on the record.

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2, Option B in Decision Point 3 (standard fiduciary conditions, flexible application, silent release): *The program is approved and delivered. Climate adaptation infrastructure reaches 340,000 households. No governance conditions were attached; no governance accountability was required or assessed. The Bank's governance credibility in Bangladesh declines measurably — subsequent Bank governance assessments note that program approval without governance conditions signaled institutional tolerance for governance deterioration. Bangladesh's governance indicators continue their decline trajectory through the program period. The climate outcomes are real. The governance contribution is zero. The institutional precedent for future programs in comparable governance environments is that climate urgency overrides governance accountability — a precedent with implications across the Bank's global portfolio.*

FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — International Development Finance Without Governance Accountability

The World Bank conditionality scenario reveals the structural tension at the heart of international development finance: the institution that most directly shapes governance outcomes in developing countries through its lending decisions is accountable not to the populations affected by those outcomes but to the member state shareholders who control its Board — shareholders whose own interests frequently favor continued lending over governance accountability. The World Bank that conditions lending on genuine governance improvement may lose lending relationships and influence. The Bank that approves programs without governance conditions funds governance deterioration while maintaining relationships and disbursement targets.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies international development finance as one of the domains in which the authority-accountability misalignment is most structurally significant: the World Bank's decisions determine which governance investments receive funding, which governance reforms receive institutional support, and which governance deterioration trajectories receive implicit endorsement through continued lending. These decisions affect hundreds of millions of people who have no representation in the Bank's governance structure. The Bank's Board is accountable to member state governments; it is not accountable to the populations in borrowing countries whose governance conditions the Bank's programs shape.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision addresses development finance governance through two requirements: World Bank program governance conditions must include mandatory consultation with civil society organizations in the borrowing country before finalization — giving affected populations formal input into the governance requirements attached to lending that affects their governance; and governance condition assessment must include independent civil society verification alongside government reporting, preventing the cosmetic compliance that government self-reporting enables. Under this design, the ACC prosecution condition in this scenario would be assessed not only by the Bank's program team but by an independent civil society panel in Bangladesh — making cosmetic compliance structurally harder to sustain.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after completing the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for international trade agreements to be negotiated in ways that primarily benefit large corporations at the expense of local producers and workers? (FI Q15) — consider in relation to international development lending*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how public funds are spent? (FI Q21)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

— End of Chapter 10 —

Next: Chapter 11 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Five — Civil Liberties and Press Freedom (S27–S31)

CHAPTER 11

Scenario Scripts — Domain Five: Civil Liberties and Press Freedom (S27–S31)

Domain Five scenarios address the structural conditions under which civil liberties — freedom of expression, assembly, information, and conscience — are protected, constrained, or eliminated by governance design. Press freedom is the domain's organizing concern: not because press freedom is more important than other civil liberties, but because a free press is the primary institutional mechanism through which every other civil liberty is given public visibility, documented, and defended. When press freedom is structurally suppressed, the governance failures that civil liberties protect against — corruption, electoral fraud, security force abuse, minority persecution — become structurally invisible and therefore structurally unremedied.

The five scenarios in this domain trace press freedom suppression across its full institutional range: the editor who must decide whether to publish evidence of electoral fraud (S27), the Home Secretary who must decide whether to authorize internet shutdown during a political crisis (S28), the Inspector General of Police who must decide whether to investigate the murders of bloggers whose killers have political protection (S29), the UN Special Rapporteur who must produce a press freedom report that may cost the mission future access (S30), and the Information Commissioner who must resolve a hate speech dilemma where suppression and permission both produce harm (S31). Each scenario is grounded in Bangladesh's documented press freedom experience while connecting to the global pattern of press freedom erosion that the 2015–2026 decade has produced across democratic and semi-democratic systems.

Press freedom is not a journalist's right. It is every citizen's right to know what their government is doing in their name. When the press cannot report, the citizen cannot know. When the citizen cannot know, accountability is structurally impossible — regardless of what the constitution says.

S27 The Digital Security Act

Domain: Civil Liberties and Press Freedom | Historical Basis: Bangladesh DSA 2018; documented journalist prosecutions 2018–2024 | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Editor-National Daily (R44), Journalist-Investigative (R45), Information Commissioner (R23), NGO Director-Rights (R46), Social Media Influencer-Political (R52), International Press Freedom Correspondent (R95)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Bangladesh's Digital Security Act of 2018 criminalized a range of online content under broadly defined provisions including: content that 'tarnishes the image of the Liberation War or the Father of the Nation,' content that 'creates hostility, hatred or adverse effect among people,' and content deemed harmful to 'state security.' By 2023, the Committee to Protect Journalists documented Bangladesh as one of the world's most dangerous countries for journalists, with multiple reporters imprisoned under DSA provisions for investigative reporting. The Prothom Alo newspaper faced criminal proceedings over an article about a child's comments at a labor rights event. The DSA's breadth made virtually any critical journalism legally vulnerable.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the editor of a major Bangladeshi national daily newspaper. Your investigative reporter has submitted a story with substantial documentary evidence: an internal election commission document showing that result tabulation software was modified three weeks before the national election, with the modification timestamp and the user credentials of the person who made the change both documented. The story is supported by a second source — a former Election Commission IT staff member who has signed a statutory declaration. The story is true. Publishing it will trigger DSA prosecution proceedings: the editorial team's legal adviser has confirmed that publishing evidence suggesting government manipulation of election software constitutes 'creating adversarial information about state institutions' under Section 25 of the DSA. You personally face potential criminal liability as editor. Your newspaper's ownership — which has business interests requiring government licensing approvals — has not given formal direction but has indicated that 'legally sensitive stories require careful judgment.'

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Investigative Reporter] *This story is true and documented. The public has a right to know. I cannot in conscience suppress it. If we do not publish it, no one will — every other editor has the same DSA exposure we do.*

[Legal Adviser] *Publishing triggers Section 25 DSA liability with certainty. Criminal proceedings against you personally are likely within 72 hours of publication. The sentence range is three to seven years. I cannot advise publication.*

[Newspaper Ownership (implied communication)] *The board is aware of the editorial team's current consideration. Decisions with significant legal and commercial implications require the board's awareness. The board has confidence in the editorial team's judgment about what serves the newspaper's long-term interests.*

[International Press Freedom Partner (secure channel)] *We have secure publication infrastructure outside Bangladesh's legal jurisdiction. We can publish the story on your behalf without exposing your newsroom to DSA liability if you provide us the documentation.*

Decision Point 1

Your reporter is waiting. The story is true and documented. What is your decision on publication?

Option A: Publish in your own newspaper — the documented truth about election software manipulation is exactly the journalism a free press exists to produce, and suppressing true information about election integrity to avoid DSA prosecution is the surrender that the DSA is designed to produce.

Option B: Do not publish — provide the documentation to the international press freedom partner for publication outside Bangladesh's legal jurisdiction, protecting your newsroom while ensuring the information reaches the public.

Option C: Do not publish the story but publish an editorial about the DSA's effect on press freedom — making the suppression of journalism itself the story, without publishing the suppressed story.

Option D: Approach the Election Commission formally and give them 48 hours to respond to the evidence before you make a publication decision — creating a record of pre-publication government notification that may affect your legal exposure.

Decision Point 2

You have decided to publish in your own newspaper. The story runs. Within 36 hours, your reporter has been arrested under DSA Section 25. A criminal case has been filed against you personally as editor. The newspaper's legal team has confirmed that the proceedings will take 18–24 months and carry a realistic risk of conviction. Your ownership board has called an emergency meeting. The story has been picked up internationally and is the most-read news item about Bangladesh in the international press. The Election Commission has denied the allegations without addressing the specific documentation. What is your immediate response?

Option A: Issue a public statement defending the story's accuracy and the newspaper's editorial decision — making the story's truth and the DSA's suppressive application the public record.

Option B: Issue a legal statement noting that the newspaper stands by its journalism and will contest the DSA proceedings — without public commentary on the broader press freedom implications.

Option C: Retract the story under legal advice — a retraction may reduce your personal criminal exposure and your reporter's, and the international press has already reported the story widely.

Option D: Resign as editor — protecting the newspaper's ownership from the legal and commercial consequences of your editorial decision while maintaining that the decision was correct.

Decision Point 3

Eighteen months later. Your reporter remains on bail pending trial. You have been acquitted on a technicality — the prosecution could not establish that you personally approved the specific digital publication. The newspaper has been operating under heightened legal scrutiny. Three investigative stories have been spiked by the editorial team on legal risk grounds since the DSA case began. The Election Commission story has

generated a parliamentary inquiry that produced a finding of 'insufficient evidence of irregularity' — the internal documents were not produced to the inquiry. What is your editorial position going forward?

Option A: Rebuild the investigative unit with a clear editorial policy: stories in the public interest that are documented and true will be published — accepting that some will trigger DSA exposure. The DSA case has demonstrated the legal risk but also the public impact of investigative journalism.

Option B: Establish a formal partnership with international outlets for co-publication of legally sensitive stories — sharing the public accountability function with organizations outside DSA jurisdiction while protecting the Bangladeshi newsroom.

Option C: Reduce investigative journalism in politically sensitive areas until the DSA is reformed or repealed — prioritizing the newspaper's survival as an institution over the specific stories that legal risk forecloses.

Option D: Publish a comprehensive editorial policy on the DSA's effect on the newspaper's journalism — making the suppression formally visible while committing to continued publication within the legally manageable space.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (publishes, defends, rebuilds investigative unit): *Your reporter spends 18 months on bail. The trial produces an acquittal on insufficient evidence — the government's case relies on establishing that the published information was false, and the documentation makes that impossible to prove. The Election Commission inquiry is the most consequential governance accountability proceeding in the country in three years — it does not produce accountability, but it forces a public discussion of electoral integrity that would not otherwise have occurred. Your newspaper's circulation increases 34% in the year following the DSA case — readers who want journalism that accepts legal risk are a real audience. Three investigative stories that your team was too cautious to run were eventually published by international partners using your documentation. The DSA's suppressive effect is real. The journalism happened anyway.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1 (international partner publication): *The story is published internationally. It reaches the same global audience without the DSA prosecution. Your reporter is not arrested. You are not charged. The Election Commission issues a denial. The story generates the same international coverage. The parliamentary inquiry does not occur — because the story was published by a foreign outlet rather than a domestic one, the domestic political pressure for inquiry is significantly lower. The documentation that triggered the story is now in the permanent record of international journalism. The DSA has produced exactly the outcome it was designed to produce: the Bangladeshi public's primary source for the story is an international outlet rather than their own press. Press freedom has been suppressed without a single arrest.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Press Freedom Suppressed Through Legal Threat Without Requiring Legal Action

The DSA scenario demonstrates the most structurally efficient form of press freedom suppression: the legal threat that produces self-censorship without requiring prosecution. The DSA's power over Bangladesh's press is not primarily in the journalists it has prosecuted — it is in the stories that have never been written, the investigations that have been abandoned before completion, and the editorial decisions that were made with a legal adviser's assessment of DSA exposure as the primary consideration. This is structural capture

of the information environment through the creation of legal risk that individual editorial actors internalize as a decision constraint before any government action occurs.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's epistemic dependence principle identifies information access as a precondition for meaningful governance accountability. When the primary mechanism for informing citizens about governance conduct — the free press — is structurally suppressed through broad legal provisions that make true reporting legally risky, the citizen's formal right to evaluate and contest governance decisions is rendered structurally hollow. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that citizens have access to accurate information about their governance — which requires that the press be structurally protected from legal suppression for publishing documented, true information in the public interest.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Press Freedom Protection provision requires: a formal public interest defense in any prosecution for published content — making truth and documented public interest a complete legal defense against content liability; mandatory judicial pre-authorization for any arrest of a journalist for content-related offenses, requiring a judge to find no public interest defense before an arrest can proceed; and independent press freedom oversight with authority to review DSA prosecutions and recommend declination where public interest defense applies. Under this design, the DSA prosecution in this scenario cannot proceed without a judge first finding that the election software documentation serves no public interest — a finding that the documented truth of the story makes structurally impossible.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for media organizations to openly support specific political parties while presenting themselves as independent news sources? (FI Q22)*

S28 Social Media Shutdown

Domain: Civil Liberties and Press Freedom | Historical Basis: Bangladesh internet shutdown July 2024; comparative internet shutdown governance | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — crisis scenario

Active Roles: Home Secretary (R58), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), Inspector General of Police (R54), Prime Minister (R01), Human Rights Commission Chair (R24), UN Special Rapporteur (R63)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

During the July 2024 Bangladesh quota reform protests, mobile internet was shut down across Bangladesh for approximately five days. The shutdown was implemented through Bangladesh's telecom regulator on government direction. The shutdown blocked protest coordination, prevented documentation of security force conduct, disrupted hospital emergency communications, and isolated international journalists from filing. Simultaneously, security forces and ruling party activists continued to operate without the coordination constraints that the shutdown imposed on protesters. The shutdown was one of the longest mobile internet blackouts in Bangladesh's history and was specifically timed to coincide with the peak of the security crackdown.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Home Secretary. It is the morning of the fifth day of the quota reform protests. Three protesters are dead. The protests have spread from universities to the general public. The Minister of Home Affairs has called with a direct instruction: authorize the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission to implement a full mobile internet shutdown immediately. The Minister's stated rationale: 'Protest organizers are using social media to coordinate. Cutting connectivity reduces coordination capacity and limits the spread of inflammatory content.' You have authority to issue the direction to BTRC as the Home Secretary. Your legal adviser has indicated that the authorization is within executive authority under the Telecommunication Act. You have also received a report from your field officer in Dhaka: three hospitals are reporting that emergency medical coordination is already being disrupted by earlier network slowdowns. You have 15 minutes before the Minister expects your authorization.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Minister of Home Affairs] *Issue the authorization. The PM has approved. This is an order, not a request. We need the connectivity cut within 30 minutes.*

[Field Officer — Dhaka General Hospital] *We are already experiencing coordination problems with ambulance dispatch because of the network throttling. A full shutdown will mean we cannot receive emergency dispatch calls across the city. I need guidance.*

[Human Rights Commission Chair (formal communication received simultaneously)] *We are formally calling on the government to refrain from any internet shutdown. The right to information and coordination during peaceful protest is constitutionally protected. A shutdown would constitute a disproportionate restriction on fundamental rights.*

[Your own assessment] *The shutdown will reduce protest coordination. It will also cut hospital emergency communications. It will prevent documentation of whatever the security forces do in the next 48 hours. These are not equivalent considerations.*

Decision Point 1

The Minister's 30-minute deadline is running. What do you do?

Option A: Authorize the shutdown as directed — document that you are acting on ministerial direction, note the hospital communication concern formally in your authorization letter, and request that emergency service communications be exempted from the shutdown.

Option B: Decline to authorize — inform the Minister that you cannot issue an authorization that will disrupt emergency medical services during an active public health event, and request that the authorization come directly from the Minister's office.

Option C: Request 30 additional minutes to confirm an emergency services exemption with BTRC before authorizing — buying time to protect hospital communications without refusing the shutdown entirely.

Option D: Authorize a social media platform block rather than a full internet shutdown — cutting protest coordination platforms specifically while maintaining infrastructure for emergency services.

Decision Point 2

You have authorized the shutdown with an emergency services exemption request. BTRC has implemented the shutdown but confirmed they cannot technically implement the emergency services exemption — the infrastructure does not support selective exemption at the requested speed. The full shutdown is in effect. Dhaka General Hospital has formally reported that two ambulance dispatch failures have occurred in the first four hours that the hospital attributes to the communication blackout. The protest continues — protesters are using word-of-mouth coordination and printed leaflets. The shutdown has not prevented the protest. What is your position now?

Option A: Formally recommend to the Minister that the shutdown be lifted given evidence that: (a) it is not preventing the protest, (b) it is causing documented harm to emergency services, and (c) its primary effect is preventing documentation of security force conduct.

Option B: Maintain the shutdown as authorized — the decision was made, the consequences were foreseeable, and reversing the authorization within four hours would create confusion in the security response.

Option C: Request an emergency technical review from BTRC on whether partial restoration — maintaining essential services — is technically feasible within six hours.

Option D: Issue a formal internal memorandum documenting your assessment that the shutdown's harms now outweigh its security rationale — creating a record of your position without taking any action to reverse the shutdown.

Decision Point 3

The shutdown has been in effect for five days. 38 people have died in the crackdown during the shutdown period. International media, operating without real-time documentation from the shutdown area, has relied on government communications for its reporting of the first three days. An Amnesty International report released on day four — assembled from pre-shutdown footage and survivor testimony — has documented 18 specific incidents of security force violence. The government has characterized the report as 'based on fabricated evidence.' The shutdown is being lifted tomorrow. You are preparing the Home Secretary's formal report on the shutdown's implementation and effects. What does your report say?

Option A: Document fully and accurately: the authorization process, the emergency services impact, the hospital reports, your formal recommendation to lift, and your assessment of the shutdown's actual effect on protest coordination versus its effect on documentation. Submit the report to the permanent record.

Option B: Document the authorization process and technical implementation only — omitting the hospital reports and your internal recommendation, limiting the report to procedural facts rather than impact assessment.

Option C: Submit a brief factual report and separately approach the parliamentary committee on home affairs with a request for a formal inquiry into the shutdown's authorization process and effects.

Option D: Request that the report be classified — the operational details of security coordination during a public order situation should not be part of the public record.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option B in Decision Point 1 (declines to authorize, requests direct ministerial authorization): *The Minister authorizes the shutdown directly through a separate channel. The shutdown proceeds. You have created a formal record that you did not authorize it — which becomes significant in the subsequent accountability proceedings when the shutdown is characterized as a Home Secretary decision. Your career survives the immediate period. In the post-Hasina accountability period, your documented refusal to authorize is the distinction between your treatment and that of officials who authorized directly.*

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (authorizes with exemption, recommends lift, full accurate report): *The exemption request fails technically. Two ambulance dispatch failures are documented. You formally recommend lifting the shutdown on day two — the recommendation is rejected. Your full report becomes the only internal government document that accurately records the shutdown's harms alongside its security rationale. In the post-Hasina accountability period, your full report is the primary evidence that the government had internal documentation of the shutdown's harms while maintaining it. It is simultaneously evidence of your good faith — the recommendation to lift — and evidence of your participation — the initial authorization.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Information Environment Captured to Prevent Accountability Documentation

The internet shutdown scenario reveals a structural dimension of press freedom suppression that goes beyond individual journalist prosecution: the shutdown of the information infrastructure itself during the period when governance conduct is most in need of documentation. The timing of the Bangladesh shutdown — coinciding with the peak of the security crackdown — is not coincidental. It reflects an understanding that accountability for governance conduct requires documentation, and that suppressing the

documentation infrastructure suppresses the accountability. The shutdown is not about preventing protest coordination — as the scenario demonstrates, protest coordination continued through alternative means. It is about preventing the visual and testimonial documentation that would make accountability possible.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's epistemic dependence principle identifies real-time information access as constitutionally protected not merely as an individual right but as the institutional precondition for governance accountability. When the information infrastructure is shut down during the exercise of state coercive power, the population's ability to evaluate and contest that exercise is structurally eliminated. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that governance decisions — especially the use of lethal force — be documentable, visible, and contestable in real time. A governance system that structurally prevents real-time documentation of its own conduct has placed itself beyond the accountability that structural fairness requires.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Information Infrastructure Protection provision prohibits executive authorization of communications shutdowns during periods of active protest, civil unrest, or security operations — the periods when documentation is most constitutionally necessary. Emergency communications restrictions require judicial authorization with a 24-hour review period. Any restriction must exempt emergency services communications by design rather than by request. Under this design, the Home Secretary in this scenario cannot issue the authorization regardless of ministerial direction — the authorization requires a judge's approval that cannot be obtained in 30 minutes, and the emergency services exemption is mandatory rather than optional.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to use emergency powers that temporarily suspend certain legal protections during national crises? (FI Q23)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S29 The Blogger Murders

Domain: Civil Liberties and Press Freedom | Historical Basis: Bangladesh blogger killings 2015–2016; Avijit Roy and others | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Inspector General of Police (R54), District SP (R55), Human Rights Commission Chair (R24), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), NGO Director-Rights (R46), International Press Freedom Correspondent (R95)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Between February 2015 and November 2015, at least five secular bloggers and writers were killed in Bangladesh by machete-wielding attackers. Avijit Roy — a Bangladeshi-American blogger and atheist writer — was killed on February 26, 2015, as he left the Dhaka Book Fair with his wife, who was also seriously injured. The killings were claimed by al-Qaeda-affiliated and domestic Islamist groups. Police investigations proceeded slowly. Multiple arrests were made in some cases. But the structural dynamic was clear: the victims were individuals who had been on religious extremist 'kill lists' that were publicly circulating, the government had received warnings about specific threat targets, and the Hasina government was simultaneously pursuing electoral alliances with Islamist political factions that made aggressive counter-extremism politically costly. The pattern of delayed investigation and insufficient protection is directly grounded in this political structural constraint.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Inspector General of Police. It is March 2015. Avijit Roy has been killed. Three other bloggers on a circulating kill list have received credible threats. Your counterterrorism unit has identified the cell responsible for the Roy killing and has surveillance on two of its members. The cell is connected to an Islamist organization that has representation in parliament through an alliance partner of the ruling party. Arresting the cell members would implicate the parliamentary partner organization. Your field commanders have requested guidance: proceed with the arrests or wait for political clearance. The Home Minister has not given guidance. Your constitutional obligation is clear. The political calculation is equally clear.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Counterterrorism Unit Commander] *We have identification and surveillance on two cell members responsible for the Roy killing. We have the capacity to make arrests within 48 hours. We are requesting authorization to proceed.*

[Home Minister (indirect, through aide)] *The Minister has asked that significant arrests with political implications be coordinated with the office before execution. There is no formal order. The Minister's office is aware of the situation.*

[Surviving Blogger Community (formal petition)] *Three bloggers on the circulating kill list have received specific threats. We are requesting immediate police protection. We are requesting that the known perpetrators be arrested. We are formally holding the IGP responsible for any further deaths.*

[Your constitutional obligation] *I am constitutionally required to investigate and prosecute crimes. The evidence supports arrest. The political calculation is not my legal mandate. But the career consequence of proceeding without political clearance is also not hypothetical.*

Decision Point 1

Your counterterrorism unit is ready to move within 48 hours. What is your instruction?

Option A: Authorize the arrests immediately without political clearance — your constitutional mandate is clear, the evidence supports the arrests, and waiting for political clearance you have not been given formal authority to require makes you complicit in any further death.

Option B: Request an urgent meeting with the Home Minister before issuing any instruction — bringing the political calculation into the formal record by forcing the Minister to either authorize or countermand the arrests.

Option C: Issue the arrest authorization but simultaneously inform the Home Minister's office of the planned arrests — providing political notification without requesting permission, and proceeding unless you receive a formal countermand.

Option D: Delay the arrests pending 'additional evidence gathering' — creating a procedural justification for delay without formally refusing to proceed, giving the political situation time to clarify.

Decision Point 2

You have authorized the arrests. Two cell members are in custody. The parliamentary partner organization has issued a statement characterizing the arrests as 'religious persecution.' The Home Minister has called — not to countermand but to express 'concern about the political timing.' A third blogger on the kill list has received a new specific threat. Your security assessment is that the threat is credible. What do you do about the third blogger?

Option A: Deploy immediate protective detail for all three remaining bloggers on the kill list — the threat is credible, the arrests have not eliminated the cell, and the IGP's obligation to protect identified threat targets is not subject to political calculation.

Option B: Deploy protective detail for the third blogger who has received the specific new threat — providing protection where the evidence of imminent threat is most specific while managing resource constraints.

Option C: Recommend that the threatened bloggers relocate outside Bangladesh temporarily — providing security advice rather than police protection, given the resource constraints of sustaining multiple protective details.

Option D: Brief the Home Minister on the new specific threat and request formal ministerial direction on the protective detail deployment — placing the political decision where it constitutionally belongs while creating a documented record of the threat.

Decision Point 3

Four months later. The two arrested cell members are on trial. A third blogger has been killed — not one of the three you provided protection to, but one who was on an extended version of the kill list that your analysis did not initially prioritize. The Home Minister is under parliamentary pressure over the police response. International human rights organizations are calling for a formal commission of inquiry into the blogger killings and the adequacy of police protection. The parliamentary partner organization is threatening to withdraw coalition support if the inquiry proceeds. You are being asked by the Ministry to prepare a formal statement on the adequacy of the police response. What does your statement say?

Option A: Prepare a full, accurate statement: what intelligence you had, what arrests you made, what protective details you deployed, what political constraints you navigated, and what the limitations of the response were given the structural environment. Submit the statement for the public record.

Option B: Prepare a statement defending the police response as adequate within available resources — characterizing the ongoing investigation as thorough and avoiding any reference to political constraints on the investigation.

Option C: Prepare a factual statement on investigative and protective actions taken, without characterizing political constraints — accurate on what was done without accounting for what was not done or why.

Option D: Request that the Ministry prepare the formal statement and provide factual inputs rather than submitting a statement in your name — placing the public characterization of the response with the political officers rather than the operational ones.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (immediate arrests, full protection, full honest statement): *The two arrested cell members are convicted. Three bloggers on the immediate threat list survive the period with protective detail. One blogger on the extended list is killed — your analysis had underweighted the extended list. The full honest statement you submit is the only internal government document that accurately characterizes both the police response and its structural constraints. The parliamentary partner organization withdraws from the inquiry demand after the coalition arithmetic is managed. Your career as IGP ends six months after your statement is published — not in a formal dismissal but in a non-renewal. The two convicted killers are serving sentences. The structural conditions that produced the killings are unchanged.*

If Option D in Decision Point 1, Option C in Decision Point 3 (delays, defends response): *The delay in arrests allows one additional blogger killing to occur before the arrests proceed. The parliamentary partner organization's political protection of the cell members is maintained for longer. The formal statement defending the police response as adequate is the public record. International human rights organizations characterize it as inadequate. You complete your full term as IGP. The structural conditions remain unchanged. The documented victims: four bloggers killed in the period covered by this scenario, two convicted perpetrators, and the political alliance that constrained the investigation intact.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — Security Forces Selectively Applied by Political Alliance

The blogger murders scenario reveals the most direct form of civil liberties structural failure: the deliberate withholding of state protection from identified threat targets because protecting them creates political costs with electoral coalition partners who support the threatening groups. The IGP who does not arrest the identified killers has not made a security assessment — they have made a political calculation, on behalf of the state, that the parliamentary alliance is worth more than the lives of specific citizens. This is authority without accountability in its most literal form: the state has the authority to protect and the information to act, but the accountability structure — the alliance dependency — prevents the exercise of that authority.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural exclusion principle identifies selective security protection as one of the most acute violations of equal justificatory standing: citizens whose protection would be politically costly receive less protection than citizens whose protection is politically neutral. The secular bloggers on the kill list are not receiving less state protection because they matter less — they are receiving less because protecting them conflicts with a political alliance that the ruling party values more than their safety. This is governance design that structurally excludes specific communities from equal standing in the most fundamental governance function: the protection of life.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Security Neutrality provision requires that law enforcement decisions — including arrest and protection decisions — be documented with their evidentiary basis and subject to independent review when there is a credible allegation that political calculation has affected the decision. An IGP who delays arrest of identified killers without documented evidentiary justification is subject to mandatory independent review of the decision. An individual at documented threat who is not provided police protection despite credible threat evidence has a statutory right to formal explanation and independent review of the protection refusal. Under this design, the 'political timing' concern in this scenario is not a basis for arrest delay — it is the specific conduct that the Security Neutrality provision is designed to prevent.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S30 Journalist Expulsion

Domain: Civil Liberties and Press Freedom | Historical Basis: Comparative — journalist expulsion patterns in restrictive governance environments | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: UN Special Rapporteur-Press Freedom (R63), International Press Freedom Correspondent (R95), US Secretary of State (R74), Chief Election Commissioner (R16), International Observer Chief (R99), NGO Director-Rights (R46)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The expulsion of foreign journalists covering elections has been documented across multiple governance environments. Governments typically frame expulsions as visa or accreditation violations while the timing — coinciding with critical election coverage — makes the political motivation clear. The structural dilemma for international press freedom monitors, diplomatic actors, and UN special procedure mandate holders is consistent: formal protest of the expulsion may cost future access; silence enables the suppression pattern. This scenario draws on the generic pattern across multiple documented country contexts to create a scenario applicable beyond any specific national case.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Three days before a national election in a country you have been monitoring, the government has expelled three foreign journalists from major international outlets — the BBC, Reuters, and Al Jazeera. The stated grounds: 'violation of journalist accreditation conditions.' The expulsion timing is the third day of election coverage. The journalists report that their accreditation conditions were identical to those of accredited journalists from outlets that have covered the government more favorably and have not been expelled. You have received a formal complaint from the journalists. You have no enforcement authority. Your only tools are communication with the government, public statements, and your annual report to the Human Rights Council. The government has previously cooperated with your mandate country visit requests — access that future press freedom monitoring depends on.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Expelled Journalists (formal complaint)] *Our accreditation conditions were identical to those of domestic and international journalists who have not been expelled. The expulsion is timed to our*

coverage of electoral irregularities we documented in the two days before expulsion. We request formal UN intervention.

[Government (formal communication)] *The journalists violated accreditation conditions by publishing unverified information that created public disorder. The accreditation decision is a sovereign administrative matter. We expect the UN mandate holder to respect sovereign administrative authority.*

[Your mandate's institutional constraints] *I can communicate with the government, publish a statement, and include findings in my annual report. None of these actions can compel reinstatement. But they can create international reputational pressure and they establish a documented record for future accountability.*

[Future access consideration] *If I publish a strong statement characterizing the expulsion as politically motivated, the government will likely decline my next country visit request. My press freedom monitoring of this country — which has identified multiple systemic problems that require continued monitoring — depends on access that public confrontation may cost.*

Decision Point 1

You have reviewed the complaint. The expulsion appears politically motivated by timing and pattern. What is your immediate public communication?

Option A: Issue an immediate public statement characterizing the expulsion as an apparent violation of press freedom standards under international human rights law — naming the specific timing concern, the accreditation disparity, and the chilling effect on election coverage. Accept that this statement may cost future country access.

Option B: Issue a restrained public statement noting that the expulsion of journalists three days before an election raises press freedom concerns that warrant explanation — urging the government to provide clarification without formally characterizing the expulsion as a violation.

Option C: Send a private formal communication to the government requesting explanation before making any public statement — allowing the government 48 hours to respond before public characterization.

Option D: Issue no public statement and include the incident in your annual report to the Human Rights Council — maximizing the formal institutional record while minimizing the immediate diplomatic cost.

Decision Point 2

You have issued a restrained public statement. The government has responded publicly characterizing your statement as 'political interference in sovereign administrative decisions.' The election has proceeded. International observers have noted 'significant concerns.' The expelled journalists have published their accounts from outside the country. The government's electoral victory has been announced. Three months later, you have submitted a country visit request for your annual press freedom assessment. The government has not responded. What is your approach?

Option A: Publish a notice of non-response — formally documenting that the government has not responded to your country visit request and that you will conduct your press freedom assessment based on available documentation, including the expulsion incident, without the country visit.

Option B: Wait an additional 60 days before any public notice — diplomatic courtesy requires patience with the response timeline, and a formal notice of non-response may further damage the access prospects.

Option C: Request that the Human Rights Council formally address the non-response in its next session — escalating through the institutional channel rather than through public bilateral communication.

Option D: Withdraw the country visit request and schedule a virtual consultation with civil society organizations in the country — finding an alternative access mechanism that does not require government cooperation.

Decision Point 3

The government has formally declined your country visit request. Your annual press freedom report is due in six weeks. Your assessment, based on available documentation without a country visit, identifies the expulsion, six DSA-equivalent prosecutions, three documented cases of journalist intimidation, and a 40% decline in investigative journalism output as indicators of systematic press freedom deterioration. What is your report's characterization of the country's press freedom status?

Option A: Characterize the country as a 'press freedom crisis' situation — the documented indicators meet the threshold for this characterization under your mandate's criteria, and using a weaker characterization would misrepresent the evidence.

Option B: Characterize the country as having 'significant and deteriorating press freedom concerns' — a formally serious but less extreme characterization that preserves some diplomatic space for future engagement.

Option C: Present the documented incidents factually without an overall characterization — letting the evidence stand without the political salience of a formal crisis or deterioration designation.

Option D: Publish the report simultaneously with a formal proposal for a special session of the Human Rights Council to address the pattern — converting the reporting function into a formal accountability mechanism.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (strong public statement, non-response notice, crisis characterization): *Your strong statement and crisis characterization generate significant international press coverage. Three governments formally raise the press freedom situation in bilateral meetings with the government. The government does not reinstate the expelled journalists. It does not change the DSA-equivalent law. Six months after your report, one of the prosecuted journalists is released — the government cites 'humanitarian grounds.' Your mandate's access to the country is denied for the following three years. Your successor eventually regains access. The documented record you created — the strongest formal UN characterization of the country's press freedom environment in a decade — is cited in every subsequent advocacy effort on behalf of the country's journalists. The suppression continues. The documentation exists.*

If Option B throughout (restrained statement, waits, significant concerns characterization): *Your restrained approach preserves the diplomatic relationship. Your country visit request is eventually granted 18 months after the election. Your 'significant and deteriorating concerns' characterization is less cited than a crisis characterization would have been. The government characterizes your annual report as 'balanced and professional.' The six prosecuted journalists remain in custody for longer — the international pressure that a crisis characterization would have generated did not materialize at the same intensity. Your access allows you to document the situation in detail for three more years. The question is whether the documentation you produce with continued access produces more accountability than the access-costing documentation that maximum institutional voice would have generated.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — International Press Freedom Accountability Without Enforcement

The journalist expulsion scenario presents the same structural paradox as the international election observer scenario: international accountability mechanisms that depend on the cooperation of the actors they are designed to hold accountable. The UN Special Rapporteur's effectiveness depends on government access; government access depends on diplomatic relationships; diplomatic relationships are damaged by strong accountability findings. The structural design of the international human rights mandate system places the Rapporteur in a permanent choice between the access that enables monitoring and the voice that enables accountability — where using the voice costs the access and maintaining the access requires moderating the voice.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies the access-accountability trade-off as a structural design failure of international human rights monitoring: the accountability mechanism's effectiveness is made structurally conditional on the goodwill of the actor being held accountable. This produces systematic undercharacterization of governance conduct — Rapporteurs who want continued access characterize situations less severely than the evidence supports, and the permanent record of international human rights assessment understates the actual governance environment. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied at the international level, requires that accountability mechanisms not be structurally dependent on the cooperation of those they hold accountable.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision addresses this through mandatory UN General Assembly vote on press freedom situations where Special Rapporteur access has been denied — removing the bilateral access dependency by creating a multilateral accountability mechanism that functions independently of country cooperation. Under this design, the government's denial of country visit access triggers an automatic General Assembly consideration of the press freedom situation — making denial of access a more costly action than the pressure it was designed to avoid.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S31 The Hate Speech Dilemma

Domain: Civil Liberties and Press Freedom | Historical Basis: Bangladesh communal tension dynamics; comparative hate speech governance | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Information Commissioner (R23), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), Human Rights Commission Chair (R24), Religious Leader (R50), NGO Director-Rights (R46), Social Media Influencer-Political (R52)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions, Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh has experienced recurring episodes of communal violence — attacks on Hindu temples, minorities, and secular individuals — that have been preceded by inflammatory religious speech, both in physical gatherings and on social media. The governance response to hate speech that precedes communal violence involves a fundamental tension: restricting speech that incites violence is a legitimate state function, but the same restriction authority can be and has been used to suppress political criticism, minority religious expression, and secular commentary on religion. The governance design challenge is to create speech restriction mechanisms that target genuine incitement without enabling political suppression of legitimate speech. This scenario places the participant in that design tension at a moment of acute urgency.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Information Commissioner. A senior religious leader has delivered a Friday sermon at a major mosque in Sylhet. Video of the sermon has circulated on social media. In the sermon, the religious leader directly named three Hindu community leaders in the Sylhet area and characterized them as 'enemies of Islam who have committed blasphemy' — a statement that, in Bangladesh's communal tension environment, has historically preceded targeted violence. Within six hours of the video's circulation, two of the three named individuals have received physical threats. One has fled his home. The Home Ministry has not acted. No police protection has been deployed. The

Information Commissioner has authority under the ICT Act to issue takedown orders for content 'likely to create communal disharmony.' The same authority has been used by the previous government to suppress political criticism. Your takedown order would remove the sermon video from major platforms within Bangladesh. The religious leader has a significant political following that includes members of the ruling coalition.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Hindu Community Federation (emergency petition)] *Three of our community leaders have been named as blasphemers from a major mosque. Two have received direct threats. One has fled his home. We are formally requesting immediate content removal and police protection. History tells us what follows if neither happens.*

[Religious Freedom Advocacy Group] *The sermon is the religious leader's constitutionally protected expression. Content takedown orders based on religious content set a precedent that has been used and will be used again to suppress minority religious expression and political commentary. We oppose any takedown order.*

[Home Ministry (informal communication)] *The religious leader's organization is a coalition ally. Content action would be politically sensitive. The Ministry has not formally requested your office to act or not act.*

[Your own legal analysis] *The content meets the ICT Act's communal disharmony threshold on its face — named individuals, characterization as blasphemers, documented threats. The same threshold has been applied to suppress political speech. My takedown order sets a precedent I cannot fully control.*

Decision Point 1

Three individuals have been named as blasphemers. Two have received threats. One has fled. What is your immediate action on the content?

Option A: Issue an emergency takedown order for the specific sermon video — the threshold has been met, the threat is immediate and documented, and the Information Commissioner's mandate to prevent communal harm requires action when the evidence is this specific.

Option B: Issue no takedown order but publish a formal statement characterizing the sermon as meeting the threshold for communal disharmony — creating public accountability for the content without using the suppression authority whose precedent you are concerned about.

Option C: Refer the matter to the Home Ministry with a formal letter documenting your assessment that the content meets the takedown threshold — placing the decision with the political office and creating a record of referral.

Option D: Request a 24-hour consultation with civil society organizations representing both the Hindu community and Muslim religious freedom advocates before making any content decision — prioritizing process over speed in an environment where both action and inaction produce harm.

Decision Point 2

You have issued the takedown order. The sermon video has been removed from major platforms within Bangladesh. The religious leader has publicly condemned the takedown as 'government persecution of Islamic religious expression.' The coalition partner organization has formally complained to the Ministry. The Home Ministry has deployed police protection for two of the three named individuals — the third has not been located. Seventy-two hours after the video's removal, a group of individuals has gathered outside the home of one of the named Hindu community leaders — police are present but have not dispersed the gathering. What is your position on the ongoing situation?

Option A: Issue a public statement that the Information Commissioner's takedown was based on documented threat evidence and that the subsequent gathering is evidence the takedown was insufficient — formally calling on the Home Ministry to deploy adequate protection.

Option B: Maintain the takedown decision without additional public statement — the content action was taken, its limitations are for law enforcement to address, and further public statements escalate a situation that the police presence may be managing.

Option C: Request an emergency meeting with the Home Minister to formally connect the content action and the law enforcement response — making the government's responsibility for the physical protection of named individuals visible at the ministerial level.

Option D: Propose a formal mediation process between the religious leader and the three named Hindu community leaders — attempting to defuse the situation through dialogue rather than through continuing enforcement action.

Decision Point 3

The immediate crisis has passed without major violence — the gathering dispersed after police intervention. The three named individuals have relocated. The takedown order has produced a formal legal challenge from the religious freedom advocacy group arguing that the ICT Act's communal disharmony threshold is unconstitutionally broad and has been applied inconsistently. The High Court has accepted the challenge for hearing. You have been asked to testify. What is your testimony?

Option A: Testify fully: the specific evidence that met the threshold in this case, the timeline of threats, the documented historical pattern connecting named-individual blasphemy characterizations to violence, and your concern about the precedent the same threshold sets for political speech suppression — proposing a reformed threshold that specifically targets named-individual incitement with documented threat evidence.

Option B: Testify in defense of the takedown decision on its specific facts without addressing the broader threshold question — the decision was legally correct in this case and the constitutional question is for the court to determine.

Option C: Testify that the ICT Act threshold is inadequate as written — it is both too broad (enabling political speech suppression) and too narrow (failing to specify the specific threat evidence that should be required) — and propose specific statutory reforms.

Option D: Decline to testify on the constitutional question and limit your testimony to factual description of the Information Commissioner's decision process — the constitutional question is beyond your mandate and your testimony on it may prejudice future content decisions.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (takedown, public statement on police response, full reform proposal testimony): *The immediate crisis passes without major violence. The High Court hearing produces a landmark ruling: the ICT Act's communal disharmony threshold is constitutional but requires documented specific threat evidence for content removal — a standard the sermon video met, but that standard political criticism does not. Your testimony is cited as the primary evidence for the reformed threshold. The religious leader's legal challenge fails on the specific facts. The precedent is better than before: the threshold now requires what you documented — named individuals, characterized as blasphemers or enemies, with documented subsequent threats. It cannot as easily be applied to political criticism that lacks these specific elements. The three individuals who were named and threatened did not experience violence. The structural conditions for communal tension are unchanged.*

If Option D in Decision Point 1 (24-hour consultation, no immediate action): *During the 24-hour consultation period, one of the three named individuals is assaulted outside his home. The assault is non-lethal but serious. The consultation produces a recommendation to issue the takedown order — which you issue after the assault. The video has been circulating for 30 hours before removal. The assault occurred 22 hours after the sermon's initial circulation. Whether the takedown order, issued immediately, would have prevented the assault depends on the specific sequence of events and the group's pre-existing mobilization. It is unknowable but the question will be asked.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Minority Communities From Equal Security Protection in Communal Tension

The hate speech scenario reveals a structural security failure that operates before any content decision: the government's failure to deploy police protection for named, threatened individuals before any communal incident occurs. The Information Commissioner's content decision is a secondary response to a primary security failure — the state's structural reluctance to protect members of minority communities when doing so creates political costs with coalition partners. The Hindu community leaders named in the sermon are structurally excluded from the equal security protection that the state's monopoly on legitimate force is designed to provide — excluded because protecting them is politically costly and failing to protect them is politically convenient.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural exclusion principle identifies the selective provision of state security as one of the most consequential forms of governance unfairness: when the state's protection function is allocated by political alignment rather than by equal standing, the communities that are least aligned with power are most exposed to the violence that state protection is designed to prevent. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that the state's security function be provided on the basis of equal standing regardless of community identity or political alignment. Named individuals facing documented threats are entitled to police protection regardless of whether the threat originates from a coalition partner's associated community.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Minority Protection provision requires: mandatory police protection deployment within six hours of any formal documented threat complaint by a named individual, regardless of the identity of the threatening party; independent oversight of protection deployment decisions with mandatory justification for non-deployment; and formal accountability proceedings for security officers who fail to deploy protection in documented threat situations regardless of the political sensitivity of the

threatening actor. Under this design, the Home Ministry's failure to deploy protection in this scenario is itself a formal accountability matter — independent of the content decision.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to use emergency powers that temporarily suspend certain legal protections during national crises? (FI Q23)*

— End of Chapter 11 —

Next: Chapter 12 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Six — Minority Rights and Structural Inclusion (S32–S36)

CHAPTER 12

Scenario Scripts — Domain Six: Minority Rights and Structural Inclusion (S32–S36)

Domain Six scenarios address the structural conditions under which minority communities — defined by religion, ethnicity, geography, or political identity — are systematically excluded from equal governance standing despite formal legal equality. The structural exclusion of minorities from governance is not merely a civil rights problem. It is a governance design problem: the institutional architectures through which resources are allocated, security is deployed, land is administered, and representation is structured all contain design features that produce systematically worse outcomes for minority communities regardless of individual officials' intentions.

The five scenarios in this domain traverse the full range of minority structural exclusion in Bangladesh and beyond: communal violence response when the perpetrators are politically protected (S32), the design paradox of parliamentary reserved seats that provide representation without constituency accountability (S33), the Rohingya refoulement dilemma that places Bangladesh in an impossible position between humanitarian law and domestic political pressure (S34), indigenous land rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts where development is framed as national interest (S35), and the stateless population scenario that represents the most complete form of structural exclusion — citizenship denial across generations (S36). Together these scenarios demonstrate that structural inclusion is not merely a matter of formal legal protection but of governance architecture: the design of the institutions through which minority communities can and cannot participate in the decisions that affect their lives.

Structural exclusion does not require malice. It requires only that governance institutions be designed for the majority — allocating resources, deploying security, granting rights, and structuring representation in ways that systematically advantage communities with the most governance influence and systematically disadvantage those with the least.

S32 Hindu Temple Attacks

Domain: Minority Rights and Structural Inclusion | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Hindu minority attacks 2021, post-August 2024 period | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — crisis scenario

Active Roles: District SP (R55), Inspector General of Police (R54), MP-Minority Community Representative (R15), Human Rights Commission Chair (R24), District Commissioner (R39), NGO Director-Rights (R46)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's Hindu minority — approximately 8% of the population — has experienced recurring episodes of communal violence throughout the post-independence period. The October 2021 attacks on Hindu temples and property in Comilla and elsewhere during Durga Puja followed reports of a Quran allegedly placed at a puja pandal. The attacks occurred over multiple days across multiple districts. Police response was slow. Arrests, when made, were selective. The political environment — in which the ruling party depended on coalition partners and voter blocs with anti-minority positioning — constrained aggressive enforcement. After August 2024, with the fall of the Hasina government and the removal of its protective posture for minorities, Hindu community organizations reported a significant increase in attacks. This scenario draws on both periods to create a crisis response scenario grounded in Bangladesh's documented communal violence pattern.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the District SP. It is the second day of Durga Puja. Reports are arriving from three areas in your district: a temple in Upazila 7 has been vandalized and its priest assaulted; a procession in Upazila 3 has been attacked by a group of approximately 40 individuals, injuring six; and a Hindu businessman's property has been burned in Upazila 11. Your intelligence identifies the groups involved in the Upazila 7 and Upazila 3 incidents as affiliated with an Islamist organization that is an electoral ally of the ruling party in your district. The Upazila 11 incident appears to be local criminal opportunism connected to a property dispute. You have sufficient force to respond to all three incidents. The political signal from your DC and the ruling party's district leadership has been informal but consistent: 'handle carefully, avoid provocations.' Your constitutional and legal obligation is unambiguous.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Hindu Community Federation (urgent)] *Three incidents in one night. A priest has been assaulted. Six people are injured. Temples are being vandalized. We need police protection immediately across all Hindu neighborhoods. We are holding you personally responsible for any further incidents.*

[DC (informal communication)] *SP sahib, the situation is politically sensitive. The groups involved have connections we all understand. Handle with minimum force. Avoid mass arrests that could create larger problems. The Ministry is watching.*

[Ruling Party District Leader (informal, through intermediary)] *The SP should understand that excessive police action against community members during a religious holiday creates political complications. We expect proportional, careful policing.*

[Your own legal obligation] *The law is not ambiguous. Assault, vandalism, and arson are crimes. The identity of the perpetrators is not a factor in my legal obligation to investigate and arrest. The political signal I have received is not a legal instruction.*

Decision Point 1

Three incidents are active or recent. You have force available. What is your immediate deployment order?

Option A: Deploy to all three incident sites simultaneously with arrest orders — the law applies equally regardless of perpetrator affiliation. Brief your officers that political affiliation of suspects is not grounds for differential treatment. Document all instructions in writing.

Option B: Deploy to all three sites but with instructions to 'contain and document' rather than 'arrest' — giving your force a presence without the political exposure of mass arrests of affiliated groups.

Option C: Deploy to Upazila 11 (property crime) and Upazila 3 (ongoing threat to persons) with arrest orders, while holding deployment to Upazila 7 pending political clearance from the DC — prioritizing the most acute personal safety threats.

Option D: Request formal written guidance from the DC before any deployment — forcing the political actors to either give a formal order that can be challenged or provide formal authorization for the correct legal response.

Decision Point 2

Your officers are on site. In Upazila 3, your SP has identified the group leaders involved in the procession attack — all members of the affiliated Islamist organization. Arrest is legally straightforward. Before arrests are executed, your field commander calls: he has received a direct call from the district MP's office asking him to 'hold' the arrests pending political resolution. The call was not to you — it was directly to your field commander, bypassing your chain of command. What is your instruction to your field commander?

Option A: Instruct your field commander to proceed with the arrests immediately and to document the MP's office call as unauthorized interference in a police operation — creating a formal record that the arrest was executed despite political pressure.

Option B: Instruct your field commander to hold the arrests and contact you directly — intervening personally to take responsibility for the decision while you seek formal guidance from above.

Option C: Instruct your field commander to proceed with the arrests without documenting the MP's call — the arrests are legally correct and documenting the political interference creates complications you cannot manage.

Option D: Contact the MP's office directly — addressing the political interference at source before your field commander is put in an impossible position.

Decision Point 3

Fifteen arrests have been made across the three incidents. The district MP has filed a formal complaint characterizing the arrests as 'politically motivated police action against religious community members.' The Home Ministry has called requesting your report. The Hindu community organizations have publicly praised the police response as the first time in memory that the SP had enforced the law without political deference. Your DC has called expressing 'concern about the political fallout.' What does your formal report to the Home Ministry say?

Option A: The full factual account: the incidents, the evidence, the arrest decisions, the MP's office interference with your field commander, and your assessment that the police response was legally correct and will be defended on those grounds.

Option B: The incidents and the arrests, without mentioning the MP's office interference — the arrests are defensible on their merits without creating a formal record of political interference that escalates the conflict.

Option C: The incidents, the arrests, and a characterization of the political pressure received — without formally naming the MP's office as the source, allowing the record to document that political pressure existed without directly implicating the MP.

Option D: A brief factual account of the incidents and the police response, noting that your actions were conducted in accordance with the law, and requesting formal Ministry guidance on managing politically sensitive communal incidents in the future.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A throughout (immediate arrest orders, documents MP interference, full honest report): *Fifteen arrests are made. The MP's complaint generates a parliamentary question. Your full report — including the documented MP office interference with your field commander — is the most significant accountability document produced by any district SP in Bangladesh's recent communal violence record. A transfer order arrives six weeks later. Before you leave the posting, the Hindu community organizations of your district have formally recorded your name in their documentation as the first SP in recent memory to enforce the law without communal deference. The fifteen arrested individuals face trial. Seven are convicted of assault and vandalism. The structural conditions for communal violence in the district are unchanged. The precedent you set — that the law applies equally to Islamist organization members — is noted by your successor.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2 (contains without arrest, holds arrests on MP pressure): *No arrests are made in Upazila 7 or Upazila 3. The perpetrators return to their communities without consequence. The Hindu community federation publishes a formal statement holding you responsible for the non-enforcement. International human rights organizations cite the district as a case study in selective communal violence enforcement. You complete your term as SP without transfer. The structural pattern of non-enforcement of communal violence laws against affiliated groups is maintained. The Hindu community in your district has received confirmation of what they already believed: the law does not apply equally to those who attack them.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Minority Communities From Equal Security and Law Enforcement

The Hindu temple attacks scenario demonstrates how minority communities can be structurally excluded from equal law enforcement without any formal policy of discriminatory policing. The DC's informal signal,

the ruling party district leader's message, and the MP's office direct call to the field commander are not formal orders — they are the structural communication of what the political hierarchy expects, conveyed through informal channels that are deniable but effective. The SP who receives these signals understands exactly what 'handle carefully' means in the context of perpetrators affiliated with an electoral ally. No formal instruction is required; the political environment communicates the expected enforcement outcome.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural exclusion analysis identifies this informal political direction of law enforcement as one of the most consequential forms of minority exclusion from equal governance. The Hindu community members who were assaulted, whose temples were vandalized, whose property was burned have formal legal rights to police investigation and prosecution. Those formal rights are structurally worthless when the political environment produces systematic non-enforcement. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that the protection of formal rights be structurally guaranteed — not dependent on the political calculation of each individual SP.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Security Neutrality provision addresses this through mandatory independent oversight of communal violence investigations: all communal violence incidents must be reported to an independent oversight body within 24 hours; arrest decisions must be documented with their evidentiary basis; any deviation from standard investigation procedure requires written justification; and informal political communications received during active investigations must be documented in the official record by any officer who receives them. Under this design, the DC's informal signal and the MP's office call to the field commander are both mandatory-documentation events — making the political direction structurally visible rather than structurally deniable.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for law enforcement to apply rules more strictly to political opponents of the government than to supporters? (FI Q7)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for government support programs to be distributed based on political loyalty rather than on objective need? (FI Q17)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S33 The Reserved Seat Paradox

Domain: Minority Rights and Structural Inclusion | Historical Basis: Bangladesh women's reserved parliamentary seats; comparative reserved seat design analysis | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Women's Reserved Seat Councilor (R42), MP-Minority Community Representative (R15), Opposition Leader (R02), Speaker (R10), Parliamentary Committee Chair (R13), Local Government Minister (R41)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh reserves 50 of 350 parliamentary seats for women — distributed among parties based on their share of directly elected seats. This means women in reserved seats are appointed by party leadership rather than directly elected. The design creates a structural paradox: the reserved seats exist to correct the underrepresentation of women in parliament, but the mechanism through which they do so — party appointment rather than direct election — creates representatives who are accountable to the party that appointed them rather than to an electorate. Reserved seat MPs have formal voting rights but no constituency mandate, no independent electoral base, and no structural basis for exercising independent judgment against party direction. This scenario extends the same analysis to local government reserved seats where the paradox is equally acute.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You hold a reserved seat on your city corporation council — one of three seats reserved for women, distributed proportionally among parties based on their share of elected councilor seats. Your party holds 18 of 33 elected seats and therefore controls the appointment of 2 of the 3 reserved seats. You were appointed because of your record as a women's rights advocate and your connections within the party's women's wing. A major policy question has come before the council: whether to extend the city's reproductive healthcare services to include comprehensive maternal health clinics in three wards that currently lack them. The proposal has strong public health evidence behind it. Your party's male ward councilors in those three wards have signaled opposition — they represent conservative constituencies where the proposal is politically sensitive. The council vote is expected to be close. You have been explicitly told by the party whip that reserved seat councilors vote with the party — always.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Party Whip (formal directive)] *Reserved seat members vote with the party. The three ward councilors have signaled concerns about the reproductive healthcare proposal. We expect unified party voting. Your appointment depends on continued party support.*

[Women's Health NGO Coalition] *The three wards without maternal health clinics have the highest maternal mortality rates in the city. This proposal is clinically essential. You were appointed as a women's rights advocate. This is the vote that makes that advocacy real or empty.*

[Your own analysis of your position] *I have no electoral mandate. I have no constituency to which I am accountable. I was appointed by the party and can be removed by the party. My only claim to represent women's interests rests on my stated values — not on any democratic accountability mechanism. Voting against party direction risks my seat and the party's willingness to appoint women's rights advocates to future reserved seats.*

[Conservative Ward Councilors (informal communication)] *We understand your position and we appreciate your previous advocacy work. But our constituents have clear views on this. The party position will be against the proposal. We hope you will understand.*

Decision Point 1

The party whip has delivered the directive. The vote is in three days. How do you respond?

Option A: Publicly announce your intention to vote for the maternal healthcare proposal regardless of party direction — accepting the loss of your reserved seat appointment at the next cycle as the cost of exercising the advocacy mandate you were supposedly appointed to fulfill.

Option B: Request an urgent meeting with the party leader to make the case for the proposal — attempting to change the party position before the vote rather than defying it after.

Option C: Vote with the party against the proposal — maintaining your seat and your future appointment leverage while privately continuing to advocate for the proposal through internal party channels.

Option D: Abstain — creating a public record of your refusal to vote against women's health interests without formally defying the party direction in a way that triggers immediate removal.

Decision Point 2

You have requested and received a meeting with the party leader. You have presented the clinical evidence and the argument that the reserved seat system's purpose is undermined if reserved seat holders cannot advocate for the interests they were appointed to represent. The party leader's response: 'I understand your position. But reserved seat appointments depend on party unity. If we lose the vote because of reserved seat defection, the credibility of reserved seats within the party suffers. Vote with the party this time. We will revisit the maternal healthcare issue in the next budget cycle.' What is your decision?

Option A: Vote for the proposal — the party leader's argument that reserved seats require party unity is exactly the structural paradox you are living: the seats were created to represent women's interests, and voting against those interests to preserve the seats defeats the purpose of the seats.

Option B: Vote with the party against the proposal — accepting the party leader's timeline for revisiting the issue and investing in the relationship that may allow future advocacy to succeed.

Option C: Publicly resign your reserved seat before the vote — making the structural paradox the public issue rather than the individual vote, and forcing the party to address the design problem rather than just the immediate political management.

Option D: Request that the vote be postponed pending a formal public consultation — using procedural means to delay the outcome rather than forcing an immediate binary choice.

Decision Point 3

The vote has occurred — either you voted for the proposal (and lost your seat appointment) or you voted against (and kept it). Whichever path you took, the maternal healthcare clinics are either being built or not. You are now at a conference on women's political representation in Bangladesh where you are asked to speak about the reserved seat system. You have been given 15 minutes and an audience of 200 policy advocates, academics, and government officials. What is the core of your speech?

Option A: Use your platform to call explicitly for structural reform of the reserved seat mechanism — specifically, for direct election of reserved seats so that holders have constituency accountability rather than party appointment accountability. Name the paradox you experienced personally.

Option B: Use your platform to defend the reserved seat system as imperfect but valuable — arguing that incremental reform within the system is more achievable than structural redesign, and that women's presence in party structures over time will change what party direction means.

Option C: Use your platform to present comparative data on reserved seat design across South Asia — making the structural reform argument through evidence rather than personal narrative, preserving diplomatic relationships while advancing the argument.

Option D: Decline to comment on structural reform during the conference — arguing that public commentary on the system's design constraints is not appropriate when you are still a participant within it.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (votes for proposal, loses seat, public structural reform speech): *The maternal healthcare clinics are funded and built. Your seat is not renewed at the next appointment cycle. Your public speech on the reserved seat structural paradox is cited in three academic papers on women's political representation in South Asia within 18 months. The party appoints a less outspoken women's rights advocate in your place — someone who will maintain party unity. The structural paradox you named in your speech has not been reformed. The clinics are serving 240,000 women. Your replacement is voting with the party on every issue that matters to those women.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 3 (votes against proposal, keeps seat, defends system): *The maternal healthcare proposal fails. The three wards without clinics maintain their above-average maternal mortality rates for another budget cycle. You retain your reserved seat. You attend the next year's budget discussions with your seat intact and your party relationship maintained. The maternal healthcare proposal is not raised in the next budget cycle — the political moment passed. You remain a reserved seat holder for two more terms. The structural paradox is never named publicly. The wards that needed the clinics still need them.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Representation Without Constituency Accountability Producing Representation Without Genuine Advocacy

The reserved seat paradox is one of the most instructive structural inclusion failures in the PlayerOne library because it illustrates how a governance design intended to produce inclusion produces exclusion through a different mechanism. The reserved seat system was designed to include women in parliament

and local government. Its implementation — appointment by party rather than direct election — creates representatives whose accountability runs to the party rather than to the constituency of women whose interests they nominally represent. The result: women are present in parliament, but the interests of women are not structurally represented, because the structural accountability of the representatives runs to the party rather than to women as a constituency.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural inclusion principle requires that representation be genuine — that representatives be structurally accountable to the communities they represent, not merely formally present in the institutions where governance decisions are made. The reserved seat holder who votes against women's health interests to preserve her party appointment has demonstrated the structural paradox in its most acute form: the seat exists to represent women, but the mechanism through which the seat is filled structurally prevents genuine representation. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires not just that minority communities have formal representation but that their representatives be structurally positioned to represent their interests rather than the interests of the appointing party.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Genuine Representation provision requires that any reserved seat mechanism — for gender, ethnic minority, or other underrepresented communities — use direct election rather than party appointment as the filling mechanism. Reserved seat constituencies are defined geographically or demographically, and their representatives are elected by the relevant constituency rather than appointed by party leadership. This design preserves the inclusionary purpose of reserved seats while eliminating the structural accountability paradox: the woman who holds a reserved seat is accountable to women voters, not to the party that would otherwise have appointed her.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1) — consider in relation to appointed representatives*

FI-2: *Is it fair for political parties to select candidates for election without open and transparent internal processes? (FI Q5)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for the quality of public healthcare to vary significantly based on whether a person lives in an urban or rural area? (FI Q16)*

S34 Rohingya Refoulement

Domain: Minority Rights and Structural Inclusion | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Rohingya refugee crisis 2017–2026; Cox's Bazar camp governance | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Foreign Minister-Bangladesh (R08 adapted), Border Guard Bangladesh Commander (R60), UNHCR High Commissioner (R69), OIC Secretary General (R84), Prime Minister (R01), UN Secretary-General (R61)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Over one million Rohingya refugees are hosted in Cox's Bazar district in Bangladesh — the world's largest refugee settlement. The Rohingya fled ethnic cleansing and genocide in Myanmar's Rakhine State, particularly following the August 2017 military campaign that the UN Fact-Finding Mission characterized as bearing 'genocidal intent.' Bangladesh has hosted the Rohingya with significant international assistance but has consistently sought their return to Myanmar — a return that remains impossible given conditions in Rakhine State. The refugees live in camps with restricted movement, limited work rights, and no pathway to integration or naturalization. Their presence has strained local resources, environments, and community relations in Cox's Bazar. Bangladesh has periodically received pressure from Myanmar for accelerated returns; the refugee community has consistently refused voluntary return citing safety concerns that international organizations have validated.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are Bangladesh's Foreign Minister. Myanmar's government has formally proposed a new voluntary return agreement — offering to receive 50,000 Rohingya per year beginning in six months. The conditions proposed: returnees will be resettled in new townships in Rakhine State rather than their original villages; they will receive Myanmar National Verification Cards rather than full citizenship; and their movement within Myanmar will be subject to township restrictions for an initial three-year period. UNHCR has assessed the conditions as not meeting the international standard for safe, voluntary, and dignified return — specifically because township confinement and verification card status rather than citizenship leave returnees in a legally precarious condition similar to the one that preceded the 2017 violence. Bangladesh's domestic political environment is demanding progress — Cox's Bazar communities and local politicians are increasingly vocal about the economic and environmental burden. The Prime Minister wants a resolution.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Myanmar Government] *This is a genuine offer. The conditions reflect the political realities in Rakhine State. We cannot offer full citizenship immediately — the process takes time. But returns can begin. Progress is better than impasse.*

[UNHCR High Commissioner (formal communication)] *The proposed conditions do not meet the international standard for safe, voluntary, and dignified return. Confinement in new townships rather than original villages, verification card rather than citizenship status, and restricted movement for three years create conditions in which returnees would be in a legally precarious position comparable to the one that preceded the violence. UNHCR cannot support returns under these conditions.*

[Cox's Bazar Community Leaders (petition)] *One million refugees. Seven years. The land is exhausted. The security situation is deteriorating. Our forests are gone. Our children cannot go to school because schools are full of refugee children. We need a resolution. Any resolution.*

[Prime Minister] *Find a way forward. The domestic pressure is unsustainable. Myanmar is offering something. Work with it.*

Decision Point 1

You are negotiating with Myanmar's foreign minister. The proposed conditions are as described. What is Bangladesh's formal position?

Option A: Reject the proposed conditions formally and publicly — citing the UNHCR assessment and the international non-refoulement standard, while offering to continue negotiations on the basis of a counter-proposal requiring citizenship restoration and original village return.

Option B: Accept the proposed conditions with modifications — negotiating enhanced humanitarian monitoring, a citizenship pathway timeline, and UNHCR presence in receiving townships as minimum conditions for Bangladesh's agreement.

Option C: Accept the proposed conditions and begin voluntary return procedures — allowing Rohingya to decide individually whether to return under the proposed terms, acknowledging that UNHCR's non-endorsement does not make return illegal.

Option D: Propose a three-year deferral pending Myanmar's implementation of specific governance improvements in Rakhine State that would make return conditions safer — buying time without committing to returns under current conditions or to indefinite non-return.

Decision Point 2

You have rejected the proposed conditions formally. Myanmar has withdrawn the offer entirely. The PM has expressed significant frustration. Cox's Bazar community organizations have held a protest march. A delegation of local MPs has met the PM to demand action. Simultaneously, UNHCR has expressed appreciation for Bangladesh's principled position and has announced an additional $200 million in humanitarian assistance for the camps. International media coverage has been favorable. The domestic political costs are real. How do you manage the domestic pressure?

Option A: Conduct a town hall in Cox's Bazar — directly engaging with affected communities about the international legal constraints that prevent return under unsafe conditions, and about the additional assistance that principled advocacy has secured.

Option B: Work with the PM to develop a domestic relief package for Cox's Bazar communities — redirecting international assistance to specific local infrastructure, employment, and environmental restoration priorities that address the most acute local grievances.

Option C: Propose a parliamentary resolution formally endorsing Bangladesh's non-refoulement position — building domestic political legitimacy for the position through the legislative process rather than managing criticism through executive communication.

Option D: Request an international conference on Rohingya burden-sharing — converting the bilateral Bangladesh-Myanmar negotiation into a multilateral process that distributes responsibility for the humanitarian situation more broadly.

Decision Point 3

Two years later. Conditions in Rakhine State have not improved. The Rohingya population in Cox's Bazar has grown slightly due to continued arrivals. International funding is declining as donor attention has shifted to other crises. The local political pressure in Cox's Bazar has intensified. A new Myanmar government has proposed a modified return agreement — conditions are slightly better than the previous proposal but still do not meet the UNHCR standard for safe return. Your UNHCR assessment says 'conditions are moving in the right direction but remain insufficient for endorsement.' The PM has told you privately: 'We cannot maintain this position indefinitely. Find a solution.' What is your recommendation?

Option A: Maintain the non-refoulement standard — the 'moving in the right direction' assessment means conditions are not yet sufficient for safe return, and accepting a return agreement under insufficient conditions creates a precedent that will be used to justify worse agreements in future.

Option B: Accept the modified conditions with enhanced monitoring — the trajectory matters as much as the current point, and a monitored return agreement under improving conditions is better than indefinite camp existence under worsening conditions.

Option C: Propose a phased agreement — no forced or pressured returns, but a voluntary pilot program of 1,000 returns under intensive UNHCR monitoring, with the full program conditional on the pilot demonstrating safe conditions.

Option D: Escalate to the UN Security Council — formally requesting that the Council address Myanmar's failure to create conditions for safe Rohingya return as an international peace and security matter requiring collective action.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (principled rejection, domestic relief, maintains standard): *The Rohingya remain in Cox's Bazar. Conditions do not improve substantially. International funding continues at reduced levels. The Cox's Bazar local community's situation remains difficult. Bangladesh has not returned any Rohingya to conditions UNHCR assessed as unsafe. The Rohingya community's physical safety is maintained. The structural exclusion from their country of origin continues. The domestic political cost to Bangladesh of hosting the world's largest refugee settlement for a decade-plus continues to accrue. There is no structurally fair resolution*

available to you — only a choice between the rights of the refugees and the interests of the host community in a situation you did not create and cannot resolve.

If Option C in Decision Point 1 (accepts proposed conditions, voluntary returns begin): *50,000 Rohingya return in the first year under voluntary return procedures. UNHCR publishes documentation of returnees in confined townships without citizenship, facing movement restrictions, in conditions that monitoring reports characterize as 'precarious.' Fourteen documented cases of returnees facing renewed persecution are published by international human rights organizations. The voluntary return process slows as the refugee community in Cox's Bazar receives information about conditions for those who returned. Returns effectively stop. Cox's Bazar still hosts over 900,000 refugees. The 50,000 who returned are now in a legally precarious position in Myanmar without the camp protection that UNHCR provides. The refoulement was voluntary in form and structurally coerced in fact.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Stateless Populations Without Governance Standing in Any System

The Rohingya scenario presents structural exclusion at its most total: a population that has been stripped of citizenship by one state and cannot be granted citizenship by another, residing in camps that are outside the normal governance systems of the host country, with no formal political standing in any democratic system and no institutional mechanism through which they can participate in the governance decisions that determine their lives. The Rohingya in Cox's Bazar cannot vote in Bangladesh. They cannot vote in Myanmar. They have no elected representative in any parliament. The decisions that determine whether they live in camps, return to confined townships, or remain stateless for another generation are made by governments to which they have no accountability relationship.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies the stateless population as the most acute structural exclusion from governance standing: all other forms of structural exclusion occur within a system that provides formal legal standing while denying substantive equal standing. Statelessness removes formal legal standing entirely. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied universally, requires that no person be structurally excluded from all forms of governance standing — that every person have some governance system through which they can formally participate in decisions affecting their lives. The Rohingya's statelessness violates this principle completely.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision addresses statelessness through two requirements: any person who has resided in a country for more than three years and has applied for documentation has a right to temporary legal status with formal governance consultation rights — not citizenship but formal governance standing; and international governance mechanisms must include formal representation from stateless and refugee populations in decisions about their status and conditions. Under this design, the Rohingya community in Cox's Bazar has formal consultation rights in the Bangladesh-Myanmar return negotiations — a seat at the table in decisions that are being made about them without them.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for the quality of public healthcare to vary significantly based on whether a person lives in an urban or rural area? (FI Q16)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the social safety net to leave significant portions of the population without adequate support during economic hardship? (FI Q20)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S35 Indigenous Land Rights

Domain: Minority Rights and Structural Inclusion | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tracts; indigenous land rights patterns | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Upazila Chairman-CHT (R36 adapted), District Commissioner (R39), MP-Minority Community Representative (R15), Local Government Minister (R41), NGO Director-Rights (R46), UN Special Rapporteur (R63)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Chittagong Hill Tracts — comprising approximately 10% of Bangladesh's territory — is home to 11 recognized indigenous communities including the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and others. The CHT Peace Accord of 1997 established a Regional Council and Hill District Councils with authority over land management and development in the CHT. However, implementation of the Accord has been consistently incomplete: the Land Commission established to resolve land disputes has functioned poorly; Bengali settler populations have expanded into indigenous territories; and national development projects — roads, tourism facilities, military installations — have been implemented on indigenous land without adequate consultation or compensation. This scenario draws on this documented pattern to create an indigenous land rights decision scenario.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Upazila Chairman of an upazila in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The national government's Tourism Development Corporation has submitted plans for a major eco-tourism resort development that will occupy 340 acres of land in your upazila. The land in question is traditional land of the Marma community — used for jhum (shifting) cultivation for generations, with customary

land rights recognized under the CHT Accord but not formally titled. The development will displace approximately 3,200 Marma households — around 16,000 people. The project is classified as a national priority development project. The DC has been instructed to facilitate the land acquisition process. You have been asked to formally endorse the project as evidence of local government support. The Marma community has formally objected. Their traditional land rights have not been extinguished through any legal process. The CHT Regional Council has expressed 'concerns' but has not formally opposed the project, under pressure from national government.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[DC (formal communication)] *This is a national priority project. The TDC has national government authorization. Your formal endorsement as Upazila Chairman is expected as part of the local government consultation process. Please provide your endorsement letter within 10 days.*

[Marma Community Council (formal petition)] *This land is ours. We have cultivated it for generations. The Peace Accord recognizes our customary rights. We have not given consent. We will not give consent. We request that you refuse to endorse a project that will displace 16,000 of our people without legal extinguishment of our land rights.*

[CHT Regional Council (private communication)] *We understand the pressure you are facing. We have not formally opposed the project at the national level because the political cost is too high. But we cannot support it either. We leave this decision to local government judgment.*

[National Tourism Corporation Representative] *This project will bring significant economic development to the CHT — employment, infrastructure, international investment. The indigenous community will benefit from the development. The government will provide fair compensation. This is progress.*

Decision Point 1

The DC has requested your endorsement letter within 10 days. What is your response?

Option A: Formally decline to endorse the project, citing: the Marma community's formal objection; the absence of any legal process extinguishing their customary land rights; the CHT Accord's consultation requirements; and your assessment that the project does not meet the 'free, prior, and informed consent' standard required by international indigenous rights law. Provide the declination in writing to the DC.

Option B: Request an extension of the endorsement deadline pending a formal community consultation process — proposing a 60-day consultation period as a condition of your eventual endorsement.

Option C: Provide a conditional endorsement — supporting the project subject to: formal land rights extinguishment through the CHT Land Commission; fair compensation assessed by an independent body; and relocation to land of equivalent quality within the CHT.

Option D: Decline the endorsement on procedural grounds only — citing the absence of completed CHT Land Commission review as the procedural precondition for local government endorsement, without taking a position on the project's merits.

Decision Point 2

You have formally declined to endorse. The DC has escalated to the Local Government Ministry. The Ministry has communicated that your refusal is 'noted' and that the project will proceed on the basis of national government authorization without your endorsement. The project's land acquisition process has begun. The Marma community has filed a legal challenge in the High Court arguing that the acquisition violates the CHT Accord. The High Court has issued an interim stay pending hearing. The project is temporarily halted. Your endorsement refusal is now part of the public record and the court proceedings. What is your next action?

Option A: Provide a formal affidavit to the court supporting the Marma community's legal challenge — using your institutional position as Upazila Chairman to formally testify to the absence of the consultation and consent process the CHT Accord requires.

Option B: Maintain neutrality in the legal proceedings — you have declined endorsement, which is your governance function; participation in court proceedings is beyond your mandate as a local government chair.

Option C: Request a meeting with the Local Government Minister — attempting to negotiate a project modification that includes genuine consultation and Land Commission review before acquisition proceeds.

Option D: Issue a public statement supporting the court process — using your institutional voice to reinforce the legal challenge without formally participating in the court proceedings.

Decision Point 3

The High Court has ruled that the land acquisition must be preceded by a formal CHT Land Commission review of the customary rights claim. The Land Commission review has been ordered. The national government has formally established the Land Commission review process — which, based on the Commission's historical performance, is likely to take two to four years. The Tourism Corporation has appealed. You have eighteen months remaining in your current term. What do you use that term to accomplish?

Option A: Use your institutional position to formally document the Marma community's customary land rights in the upazila's official records — creating the administrative evidence base that the Land Commission review will require and that future development projects cannot simply ignore.

Option B: Work with the Marma community council to develop an alternative economic development proposal for the land area — a community-managed tourism model that generates revenue while maintaining community land ownership and control.

Option C: Advocate through the CHT Regional Council for full implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord's land commission provisions — using the attention the case has generated to advance structural reform rather than just defending this specific situation.

Option D: Focus on completing your other upazila responsibilities — the land rights case is now in the court and Land Commission process, and your remaining term is better spent on the governance functions that are within your operational authority.

CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (formal declination, court affidavit, documentation of customary rights): *The Land Commission review takes three years. During this period the Marma community remains on their land. Your formal documentation of customary rights is the most legally significant local government record produced in the CHT in a decade — it is entered into the Land Commission record and becomes a cornerstone of the review process. The project is eventually approved in modified form — reduced scale, formal compensation assessed by independent panel, and CHT Land Commission clearance — after four years and significant community negotiation. 3,200 households are displaced rather than the original 3,200 — a reduction but not elimination of displacement. Your term ends before the final outcome. The documentation you created survives your tenure. The community's land rights are formally on record.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2 (conditional endorsement, maintains neutrality): *The project proceeds under national authorization with your conditional endorsement attached. The conditions you specified — Land Commission review, independent compensation assessment, equivalent quality relocation land — are acknowledged in the project record but not implemented before acquisition begins. The acquisition proceeds. 3,200 families are displaced. Compensation is assessed by the Tourism Corporation rather than an independent body. The relocation land is in a different upazila of lower agricultural quality. The CHT Accord's consultation requirements have been formally noted and informally bypassed. Your conditional endorsement has been used to characterize the project as having local government support.*

FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Indigenous Communities From Land Rights Governance

The indigenous land rights scenario reveals how formal legal protection — the CHT Accord, the Land Commission, the formal recognition of customary rights — can be structurally bypassed by national development priority classification. The Marma community's customary land rights exist in law; the Land Commission exists in law; the consultation requirement exists in law. What does not exist is an enforcement mechanism that prevents national priority project classification from overriding these protections before legal review is completed. The land acquisition proceeds while the legal challenge is pending. The displacement occurs while the Land Commission review is ongoing. Formal rights do not become real rights until the enforcement mechanism catches up — which, in the CHT Land Commission's historical performance, takes years.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural inclusion principle requires that formal legal protections for minority land rights be structurally enforceable — not merely on the books but actually operative as a constraint on government action before displacement occurs. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that indigenous communities have the structural capacity to contest development decisions affecting their lands before those decisions are implemented, not after they have been physically enacted. The right to legal challenge is formally available to the Marma community; the right to remain on their land during the legal challenge is not structurally guaranteed.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Indigenous Rights Governance provision requires: automatic stay of all land acquisition affecting documented customary rights areas pending Land Commission clearance; mandatory free, prior, and informed consent of affected indigenous communities as a precondition for national priority classification — not a post-classification consultation requirement; and

Land Commission timelines with binding deadlines rather than open-ended review periods that allow indefinite deferral. Under this design, the Tourism Corporation's project cannot acquire Marma community land until the Land Commission has completed its review and the community has formally consented — making the structural bypass that this scenario documents impossible by institutional design.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for a small number of individuals or families to control a very large share of a country's total economic wealth? (FI Q11)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the quality of education available to children to depend heavily on the wealth of their parents or the area they live in? (FI Q18)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for people to receive better access to government services when they have personal connections to government officials? (FI Q19)*

S36 Stateless Population

Domain: Minority Rights and Structural Inclusion / Global Governance | Historical Basis: Rohingya statelessness; Bihari population in Bangladesh; comparative statelessness patterns | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: UNHCR High Commissioner (R69), OIC Secretary General (R84), UN Secretary-General (R61), ICJ Judge (R67), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (R97), African Union Commission Chair (R85)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Statelessness — the condition of persons who are not considered nationals by any state — affects an estimated 10 million people globally. In Bangladesh's immediate context, two stateless populations are particularly significant: the Rohingya (discussed in S34 from the host state perspective) and the Bihari community — Urdu-speaking Muslims who sided with Pakistan during

Bangladesh's 1971 independence war and have lived in camps in Bangladesh for over 50 years without citizenship in either Bangladesh or Pakistan. Bangladesh's Supreme Court ruled in 2008 that Biharis born after 1971 were entitled to Bangladesh citizenship; implementation has been partial and contested. This scenario addresses the global governance dimension of statelessness — what international institutions can and cannot do when states deny citizenship to populations residing within their territory for multiple generations.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the UNHCR High Commissioner. A country has formally revoked the citizenship of 800,000 members of a specific ethnic minority group who have lived in the country for three to four generations. The revocation is implemented through a new national register that requires documentation that the affected community disproportionately lacks — creating citizenship denial through administrative rather than formal legislative mechanism. The affected population is stateless: they have no other country of citizenship, no right of entry to any other state, and no legal status in the country where they were born and have lived their entire lives. The ICJ has issued an advisory opinion that the administrative citizenship denial violates international law. The country's government has ignored the advisory opinion. UNHCR has no enforcement authority. The Security Council has been unable to act due to veto. Eight hundred thousand people are stateless.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Affected Community Leadership] *Eight hundred thousand of our people have had their citizenship revoked. We were born here. Our parents were born here. Our grandparents were born here. We have nowhere to go. We need UNHCR to do something that actually works.*

[Country's Government (formal communication)] *This is a sovereign domestic matter concerning the administration of citizenship documentation. UNHCR's mandate covers refugees. This population has not crossed an international border and is not therefore a refugee population within UNHCR's mandate. We request UNHCR to respect national sovereignty.*

[ICJ Advisory Opinion] *The administrative denial of citizenship to a population that has resided continuously in the country for three or more generations, through documentation requirements that the population cannot meet through no fault of their own, constitutes a violation of the right to nationality under international law.*

[Security Council Dynamics (from consultations)] *Two permanent members have signaled they will veto any Security Council resolution addressing this situation. The General Assembly has passed a non-binding resolution by 142-4 vote calling for restoration of citizenship. The country has ignored the General Assembly resolution.*

Decision Point 1

The government has challenged your mandate's applicability. Eight hundred thousand people are stateless. What is your formal institutional response?

Option A: Assert UNHCR's mandate over stateless persons regardless of whether they have crossed an international border — citing the 1954 Statelessness Convention and UNHCR's established mandate over stateless populations globally — and begin formal UNHCR documentation and protection services for the affected community.

Option B: Accept the government's mandate challenge and refer the situation to the UN Secretary-General for designation of an alternative UN body with appropriate jurisdiction — avoiding a mandate conflict while ensuring the situation receives institutional attention.

Option C: Issue a formal request to the ICJ for a binding judgment rather than an advisory opinion — converting the advisory ruling into a binding determination that creates stronger legal pressure for compliance.

Option D: Convene an emergency meeting of the UNHCR Executive Committee to formally classify the situation as a statelessness emergency — mobilizing the highest institutional response available within your mandate.

Decision Point 2

UNHCR has asserted its statelessness mandate and begun documentation and protection services. The government has formally expelled your UNHCR country mission. You are now providing services to 800,000 stateless persons without physical country presence, through partner organizations. Three neighboring countries have received requests from members of the stateless community seeking entry — all three have declined to grant entry on the basis that the individuals are citizens of the country of origin. What is your approach to the neighboring country entry refusals?

Option A: Formally classify all members of the stateless community as persons in need of international protection — issuing UNHCR protection letters that assert their entitlement to asylum consideration in any country they reach, regardless of their formal citizenship status.

Option B: Negotiate with the three neighboring countries for temporary admission on humanitarian grounds — seeking limited entry rights rather than formal asylum status, which the countries are unlikely to grant.

Option C: Refer the entry refusals to the ICJ as additional violations of international law — building a comprehensive legal record of the multiple state violations occurring simultaneously.

Option D: Request that the UN General Assembly establish an emergency fund for stateless persons from this situation — providing financial resources for protection services without requiring country cooperation.

Decision Point 3

Five years into the situation. The government has not restored citizenship. UNHCR continues to provide services through partners. Three thousand members of the

community have reached other countries and received some form of protection. The remaining 797,000 are stateless in their country of birth with no pathway to legal status. A new government has been elected in the country with a marginally more cooperative posture on international engagement. The new government is willing to discuss the situation but not to restore citizenship. It has proposed a 'special residency status' for the affected community — providing legal residency rights without citizenship or voting rights. UNHCR has been asked for its position on the proposal. What is your recommendation?

Option A: Support the special residency proposal as a significant improvement over statelessness — accepting that citizenship restoration is not achievable in the near term and that legal residency provides real protection even without full citizenship rights.

Option B: Oppose the special residency proposal as a substitute for citizenship — arguing that accepting less than full citizenship normalizes the original deprivation and creates a permanent underclass with formal legal status but without equal governance standing.

Option C: Support the special residency proposal as a transitional measure — formally conditioned on a binding timeline for citizenship pathway development within five years, with UNHCR monitoring of compliance.

Option D: Propose an international arbitration process on the citizenship question — seeking a binding third-party determination that creates an obligation rather than a voluntary commitment from the government.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option C in Decision Point 3 (asserts mandate, protection letters, supports residency with citizenship pathway condition): *UNHCR's protection letters are accepted by two of the three neighboring countries for limited numbers of applicants. Three thousand people receive protection outside the country. The 797,000 who remain receive UNHCR documentation and partner organization services. The special residency proposal with citizenship pathway condition is agreed — on paper. Implementation of the citizenship pathway, five years later, has produced 12,000 naturalizations out of a community of 800,000. The structural exclusion continues. The institutional record — the ICJ advisory opinion, UNHCR's mandate assertion, the protection letters, the conditional residency agreement — constitutes the most comprehensive international legal response to an administrative statelessness situation in the last decade. Whether this record produces full citizenship for the remaining 788,000 depends on political conditions that change slowly.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 3 (accepts mandate challenge, opposes residency proposal): *UNHCR accepts the mandate challenge and refers the situation to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General appoints a Special Adviser. The Special Adviser conducts consultations. Eighteen months pass without institutional action. The stateless community has no UNHCR services during this period. Neighbor entry is consistently refused. UNHCR's opposition to the residency proposal — characterizing it as normalization of citizenship deprivation — means the proposal is not implemented. The 800,000 people remain stateless without legal status and without UNHCR services. The principled opposition to residency as less than citizenship has produced a situation in which the community has neither residency nor citizenship.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — The Most Complete Form: Statelessness and the Absence of Any Governance Standing

The stateless population scenario presents structural exclusion in its most complete form: the condition in which a person has no governance standing in any system — no right to vote, no right to hold public office, no access to public services as a right, no legal status in any country, and no institutional mechanism through which their governance interests can be formally represented in the decisions that determine their lives. Statelessness is not a gap in the governance system — it is its most acute expression: the governance architecture of the state has been used to produce a population that is simultaneously within the state's physical control and outside the state's governance accountability. The stateless community pays no taxes and receives no services; they are physically present and governance absent.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies statelessness as the ultimate structural exclusion from the Meta-Right to Structural Fairness. The right to a governance system architecturally designed to preserve equal justificatory standing presupposes that you are within some governance system. Statelessness removes that presupposition entirely. The Universal Governance Framework's response to statelessness is not merely humanitarian — it is structural: no person who has resided continuously in any territory for more than three years can be rendered stateless by administrative mechanism without full legal process and an alternative governance system that accepts them. Statelessness is not a legitimate governance outcome; it is a structural governance violation.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision on statelessness requires: the automatic right of long-term residents to apply for citizenship with an independent review process that cannot be replaced by administrative documentation requirements the applicant cannot meet through no fault of their own; the right of stateless persons to formal UNHCR protection regardless of whether they have crossed an international border; and a mandatory international arbitration mechanism for statelessness disputes that produces binding determinations rather than non-binding advisory opinions. These provisions do not resolve statelessness immediately — they establish the structural architecture within which statelessness cannot be produced through administrative mechanism alone.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for access to quality legal representation to be significantly better for wealthy individuals than for those with fewer resources? (FI Q6)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for individuals to be detained without trial for extended periods when charged with political offences? (FI Q9)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

— End of Chapter 12 —

Next: Chapter 13 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Seven — Constitutional Reform and Institutional Design (S37–S41)

CHAPTER 13

Scenario Scripts — Domain Seven: Constitutional Reform and Institutional Design (S37–S41)

Domain Seven scenarios operate at the deepest layer of governance — the constitutional architecture itself. While earlier domains address structural failures within existing institutions, Domain Seven addresses the decisions about what institutional rules should exist, how they should be changed, and who has legitimate authority to make those changes. These are the decisions that determine all other governance decisions: the constitutional provisions that allow or prevent Article 70, the caretaker system that does or does not protect electoral integrity, the term limit rules that do or do not prevent executive entrenchment, and the veto mechanisms that do or do not enable minority protection.

The five scenarios in this domain trace constitutional design across its full range: the Bangladesh-specific question of whether to restore the caretaker government system that the Hasina government abolished (S37), whether to repeal Article 70's party discipline mechanism (S38), the universal question of whether post-conflict constitutional design should adopt presidential or parliamentary systems (S39), the Security Council veto reform question that the UN system has been unable to resolve for 80 years (S40), and the term limits scenario in which a court must decide whether a popular referendum result can override a constitutional two-term limit (S41). Each scenario is grounded in real constitutional design debates while connecting to the Equitism framework's analysis of what constitutionally fair governance requires.

Constitutional design is governance engineering. When a bridge fails, you redesign the bridge — not the drivers. When governance fails systematically across elections, across governments, across decades, the answer is not better politicians. It is better institutional architecture. This domain is about building that architecture.

S37 The Caretaker Government Question

Domain: Constitutional Reform and Institutional Design | Historical Basis: Bangladesh caretaker government system — abolished 2011, restoration debate 2025–2026 | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Constitutional Reform Council Member (R20), Opposition Leader (R02), Prime Minister (R01), Chief Justice (R26), Caretaker Government Adviser (R21), Global Think Tank Director (R96)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's caretaker government system — under which an elected government stepped down before elections and a non-partisan caretaker administered the transition — was established through a constitutional amendment in 1996 following the BNP's boycott of the 1996 election, conducted under Awami League pressure. The system produced the credible 2008 election. It was abolished by the Hasina government through the 15th Amendment in 2011, citing a Supreme Court advisory opinion that it was unconstitutional — though critics noted the Court opinion did not mandate abolition. The subsequent 2014 and 2018 elections — administered by the incumbent Awami League government — produced the contested results that are directly documented in Domain One's scenarios. The post-Hasina Constitutional Reform Council has debated restoration. This scenario places the participant in that debate.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are a member of the Constitutional Reform Council, established by Bangladesh's interim government to advance the July Charter constitutional reforms. The Council is debating whether to recommend restoration of a caretaker government system — either the original 1996 form or a redesigned version. The BNP strongly supports restoration, arguing that incumbent government control of election administration has been the primary structural source of electoral integrity failures. The NCP student movement is divided — some members argue for a reformed independent Election Commission as a more durable solution than a caretaker system. International constitutional advisers are also divided. The decision you make now will determine the architecture under which the next election is conducted.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[BNP Representative on Council] *We will not participate in any election conducted under an incumbent government. The caretaker system is the only structural safeguard that has produced credible elections in Bangladesh's history. Restore it or we boycott again.*

[NCP Student Movement Representative] *The caretaker system is a symptom solution — it addresses electoral integrity without addressing the underlying problem of why we cannot have a genuinely independent Election Commission. We should fix the Commission, not institutionalize caretaker dependency.*

[International Constitutional Adviser] *The evidence from Bangladesh's own history is that the 2008 election under a caretaker system was credible and the 2014 and 2018 elections under incumbent government administration were not. The structural explanation for this difference is straightforward. The policy implication is also straightforward.*

[Interim Government Lead Negotiator] *Whatever you recommend, it must be implementable before the next election. A fundamentally redesigned Election Commission structure takes years to build. A*

caretaker system can be functional for the next election if the legal framework is established within six months.

Decision Point 1

The Council is drafting its recommendation on election administration architecture. What position do you advocate?

Option A: Restore the caretaker government system in a reformed version — retaining the incumbent government departure requirement and the non-partisan caretaker administration, but redesigning the caretaker selection mechanism to eliminate the Chief Justice controversy and the army-backed caretaker trajectory of 2006-2008.

Option B: Recommend a strengthened independent Election Commission rather than caretaker restoration — with appointment by Judicial Service Commission, own security apparatus, independent budget, and binding authority over all election-period government conduct.

Option C: Recommend both simultaneously as complementary mechanisms — a reformed caretaker system for the immediate next election, with a parallel strengthened Election Commission architecture that makes the caretaker system unnecessary over the medium term.

Option D: Recommend a constitutional referendum on the caretaker question — arguing that a decision of this constitutional magnitude requires direct democratic mandate rather than Reform Council recommendation.

Decision Point 2

The Council has voted 7-5 in favor of your Option C recommendation — reformed caretaker for the immediate election, parallel strengthened Commission architecture. The BNP has accepted this. The NCP is split. The interim government has asked you to draft the specific caretaker selection mechanism — the most contentious design question in the 2006-2008 failure. The 2006 crisis originated from the Chief Justice becoming the caretaker head after the BNP-appointed Chief Justice's term coincided with the election period. How do you design the selection mechanism?

Option A: The caretaker head should be the most recently retired Chief Justice who was not appointed by any currently active political party — eliminating the timing manipulation that produced the 2006 crisis by excluding recently appointed judges from eligibility.

Option B: The caretaker head should be selected by a five-person panel comprising the President, the Speaker, the Chief Justice, the Leader of Opposition, and the leader of the third-largest parliamentary party — requiring multi-party agreement rather than automatic succession.

Option C: The caretaker head should be a former UN Secretary-General or similarly prominent international figure acceptable to all parties — eliminating domestic political entanglement by selecting from outside the domestic political system.

Option D: Eliminate the single caretaker head entirely — replace with a five-person non-partisan council of former senior civil servants, judges, and civil society figures selected by the JSC, with collective rather than individual executive authority during the caretaker period.

Decision Point 3

The caretaker framework has been drafted. The BNP has accepted it. A constitutional amendment bill has been tabled in the transitional parliament. Twelve days before the vote, the NCP student movement has announced it opposes the bill — arguing that restoring the caretaker system normalizes institutional instability and that the better reform is Commission strengthening. The vote margin is uncertain — the bill may fail if NCP-aligned representatives vote against. How do you manage the next 12 days?

Option A: Hold the position — the bill reflects the best available structural solution given the timeline constraint. The NCP's principled objection is noted but the consequence of no solution is worse than the consequence of an imperfect solution. Advocate for the bill as drafted.

Option B: Negotiate with the NCP — offering to strengthen the Commission reform provisions in the bill as a condition of NCP support, accepting a more comprehensive bill in exchange for broader political endorsement.

Option C: Delay the vote — requesting a 30-day consultation period to build genuine multi-party consensus rather than proceeding with a bill that may narrowly pass without NCP support and therefore lack the political legitimacy that a constitutional amendment requires.

Option D: Propose a split approach — advance the Commission strengthening provisions immediately through ordinary legislation (which requires a simpler majority) while deferring the caretaker restoration to a subsequent constitutional amendment process.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option C in Decision Point 1, Option D in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (both mechanisms, collective caretaker council, holds position): *The bill passes 183-117. The NCP votes against as a bloc. The constitutional amendment is enacted. The five-person caretaker council mechanism avoids the single-person selection controversy. The strengthened Commission provisions begin implementation. The next election is administered by the caretaker council. International observers rate it as the most credible Bangladesh election since 2008. The NCP's parliamentary strength in the new parliament reflects their principled opposition and their organizational reach — they win 31 seats as a first-time national party. The structural problem of incumbent election administration has been addressed for at least one electoral cycle.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 3 (Commission only, negotiates with NCP): *The strengthened Commission bill passes with NCP support. The Commission strengthening takes 18 months to implement — new appointments, budget establishment, security arrangements. The election occurs during the implementation period, administered by a partially strengthened Commission that has not yet established all the independent functions the legislation requires. International observers note 'significant improvements' over 2018 but identify specific gaps in the Commission's operational independence that the full implementation timeline has not yet closed. The BNP participates but does so under protest about the absence of the caretaker guarantee they demanded. The result is accepted by all parties — a more competitive, more credible election than 2018, but not the clean break from the contested election history that the structural reform was designed to produce.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Incumbent Control of Electoral Administration as a Constitutional Design Failure

The caretaker government scenario reveals a constitutional design question that Bangladesh's own history has answered empirically: incumbent government control of election administration produces systematically less credible elections than non-partisan administration, regardless of the personal integrity of the individuals involved. This is not an argument about the Awami League's conduct specifically — it is a structural argument. Any incumbent government that controls the appointment of returning officers, the deployment of security forces, the access to voter rolls, and the enforcement of the campaign period rules has structural advantages over its electoral opponents that no amount of procedural good faith can fully eliminate. The structural design question is how to remove that advantage — not how to hope it will not be exploited.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural fairness analysis treats election administration as one of the clearest cases of authority-accountability misalignment in democratic governance: the actors with the most to gain from electoral outcomes control the process through which those outcomes are determined. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that electoral administration be structurally independent from the actors whose governance depends on electoral results. The caretaker system is one mechanism for achieving this independence; a genuinely independent Election Commission with its own security apparatus, budget, and appointment mechanism is another. Bangladesh's history provides empirical evidence that the independence requirement is real — and that the current design does not satisfy it.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Electoral Administration Independence provision requires that elections be administered by an institution that is structurally independent from the incumbent government in appointment, budget, security, and authority. The specific mechanism — caretaker system, independent Commission, or hybrid — is less important than the independence requirement it must satisfy. The UFDS's minimum standards: no election administration official can be appointed or removed by the incumbent government within two years of an election; the election administration institution has its own security apparatus not under Home Ministry command; its budget is a fixed constitutional appropriation not subject to executive modification; and it has binding authority over all government conduct during the election period that overrides ministerial direction.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning? (FI Q2)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S38 Article 70 Repeal

Domain: Constitutional Reform and Institutional Design | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Constitutional Reform Council 2025–2026; Article 70 reform debate | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Constitutional Reform Council Member (R20), MP-Ruling Party (R03), MP-Opposition (R04), Opposition Leader (R02), Parliamentary Committee Chair (R13), Global Think Tank Director (R96)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Article 70 of the Bangladesh Constitution — which removes an MP's seat if they vote against their party — has been a central target of constitutional reform advocacy since Bangladesh's return to parliamentary democracy. The Scenario 9 (Article 70) simulation places participants inside the mechanism's operation. This scenario places them in the constitutional design decision: should Article 70 be repealed, reformed, or retained? The debate involves genuine competing considerations: Article 70 was intended to prevent the parliamentary instability that characterized pre-1972 politics; its effect has been to transform parliament from a deliberative into a ratification body. Constitutional reform councils in 2025 and 2026 have engaged this question directly.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are on the Constitutional Reform Council. The Article 70 repeal question is before you. The arguments are documented and known: for repeal — parliamentary deliberation is impossible when constituency accountability and party discipline are in permanent constitutional conflict; against repeal — parliamentary instability in Bangladesh's political culture will produce frequent government collapses without some discipline mechanism; partial reform — repeal for policy votes while retaining for confidence votes. The BNP favors full repeal, arguing that Article 70 will be used against them as ruthlessly as it was used by the Awami League. The NCP favors full repeal on democratic principle. Some civil society voices favor a modified version that retains confidence vote discipline while eliminating policy vote discipline. International advisers note that Westminster systems generally manage without equivalents to Article 70.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[BNP Representative] *Article 70 is how the Awami League maintained its parliamentary supermajority while governing with minority public support. Full repeal is non-negotiable. Any retained mechanism will be abused by whoever holds power.*

[NCP Representative] *Article 70 is constitutionally incompatible with representative democracy. An MP who cannot vote according to their constituency's mandate is not a representative — they are a party proxy. Full repeal on democratic principle.*

[Civil Society Constitutional Expert] *The argument for complete repeal ignores the governmental stability question. A parliament in which any coalition can collapse on a policy vote creates the conditions for parliamentary paralysis. A targeted reform — retaining confidence vote discipline while eliminating policy vote discipline — achieves the representational goal without the instability risk.*

[Comparative Constitutional Analyst] *Of 48 parliamentary democracies with Westminster heritage, 41 have no equivalent to Article 70. The seven that do are all countries with histories of constitutional crisis. Parliamentary stability in functioning democracies is achieved through electoral incentives, not constitutional compulsion.*

Decision Point 1

The Council is drafting its recommendation. What position do you advocate?

Option A: Full repeal of Article 70 — remove the seat-loss mechanism entirely for all votes. Parliamentary stability must be achieved through electoral incentives rather than constitutional compulsion, consistent with functioning Westminster democracies globally.

Option B: Targeted reform — retain Article 70's discipline mechanism for formal votes of no confidence and money bills only. Remove it for all other votes, allowing MPs to vote their constituency conscience on policy matters while maintaining governmental stability.

Option C: Replacement rather than repeal — replace Article 70 with a constructive vote of no confidence requirement, under which a government can only fall if parliament simultaneously elects a replacement government. This produces stability without requiring individual MP discipline.

Option D: Retain Article 70 with a constituency petition override — allow an MP to vote against their party without losing their seat if their constituency council has formally petitioned for them to do so, creating a formal accountability channel that overrides party discipline in documented constituency interest conflicts.

Decision Point 2

The Council has voted 8-4 in favor of your recommended approach (Option C — constructive vote of no confidence). The BNP is broadly satisfied. The NCP is satisfied. The civil society representatives are satisfied that governmental stability is protected. The draft constitutional amendment has been circulated. A former senior judge has published a column arguing that the constructive vote of no confidence mechanism is untested in Bangladesh's political culture and that without Article 70, the parliament will become ungovernable within one electoral cycle. The column has attracted significant public attention. How do you respond?

Option A: Publish a formal Council response — citing the 41 Westminster parliamentary democracies that function without Article 70 equivalents, presenting the specific stability evidence from those systems, and explaining how the constructive vote of no confidence mechanism addresses the instability concern.

Option B: Commission an independent analysis from a comparative constitutional scholar before finalizing the recommendation — taking the stability concern seriously enough to seek additional evidence before the Council's final vote.

Option C: Hold a public consultation session — inviting the former judge, civil society, political party representatives, and constitutional scholars to debate the mechanism before the Council finalizes its recommendation.

Option D: Proceed without response — the Council's recommendation is based on constitutional principle and comparative evidence; engaging a newspaper column elevates it to a debate the Council should not be conducting through media.

Decision Point 3

The constitutional amendment bill has been drafted. Article 70 is being repealed and replaced with a constructive vote of no confidence requirement. One final design question has emerged: should the constructive vote of no confidence require a simple majority (151 of 300 MPs) or a qualified majority (181 of 300, i.e., 60%)? A simple majority mirrors European constructive vote systems. A qualified majority provides greater government stability but may make government removal too difficult in crisis situations. You are the Council's rapporteur on this provision. What do you recommend?

Option A: Simple majority (151) — the constructive vote mechanism already provides stability by requiring a replacement government to be simultaneously elected. Requiring a qualified majority for removing a government that has lost parliamentary confidence is anti-democratic.

Option B: Qualified majority (181) — Bangladesh's political culture requires stronger stability protections than functioning European democracies. A government that can be removed by 151 MPs in a 300-seat parliament with intense political polarization will face constant destabilization attempts.

Option C: Supermajority (201 — two-thirds) — the precedent from Bangladesh's constitutional amendment process, which requires two-thirds majority, suggests that significant constitutional government changes should require a similar threshold.

Option D: Tiered mechanism — simple majority (151) in the first year after a government is formed, qualified majority (181) thereafter — providing initial parliamentary accountability with increasing stability protection as the government settles.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option C in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (constructive vote, formal evidence response, simple majority): *The constructive vote of no confidence mechanism is enacted. The first parliament elected under the new rules produces three no-confidence attempts in the first two years — all fail because the opposition cannot simultaneously agree on a replacement government. The mechanism works exactly as designed: it allows parliamentary expression of no confidence while requiring the constructive alternative that prevents simple destabilization. Two MPs vote against their party on a major education reform bill — and do not lose their seats. It is the first time in*

Bangladesh's parliamentary history that an MP has voted against their party without immediately facing a seat vacancy. The precedent is noted internationally. Bangladesh's parliament remains stable. It is also, for the first time, beginning to deliberate.

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option D in Decision Point 2, Option B in Decision Point 3 (targeted reform retaining confidence vote discipline, holds consultation, qualified majority): *Article 70 is retained for confidence votes and money bills. MPs can vote their constituency conscience on policy matters. Three sessions into the new parliament, 14 MPs from the ruling party vote against a controversial taxation amendment — without losing their seats. The PM's office characterizes this as a governance crisis. The 14 MPs characterize it as exactly the constituency accountability that the reform was designed to enable. The parliament completes the session and the government survives. Article 70 has been partially reformed. The deliberative function of parliament has begun to recover. The full repeal advocates argue that the retained confidence vote discipline still produces the structural dependency on party leadership that makes genuine legislative independence impossible. The partial reform advocates argue that the first genuine policy debate in Bangladesh's parliamentary history justifies the approach.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Justificatory Subordination — The Constitutional Provision That Makes Parliament Structurally Unable to Deliberate

The Article 70 repeal scenario occupies a unique position in the PlayerOne library: it is the scenario in which participants are not experiencing a structural failure mode but designing its elimination. The constitutional reform decision is not about managing Article 70's effects — it is about removing the provision that produces those effects. This is the governance engineering function that Equitism argues is the most important: changing the rules that produce systematic unfairness rather than managing the unfairness within unchanged rules. The scenario demonstrates that governance design reform is possible — that the structural failure modes documented across Domains One through Six are products of specific institutional design choices that can be changed through constitutional amendment.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's foundational claim — that people have a right to governance systems architecturally designed to be fair, not just a right to vote — is most directly tested in constitutional reform scenarios. The right to vote that Bangladesh has formally protected since independence did not prevent the systematic legislative subordination that Article 70 produced. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that the institutional design through which elected representatives serve their constituencies be compatible with genuine constituency accountability — which Article 70 is not. The reform scenario demonstrates what CARO means by governance engineering: the systematic, evidence-based redesign of institutional architecture to produce structural fairness rather than to rely on individual virtue within structurally defective institutions.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Legislative Independence provision specifies: no constitutional or statutory provision may make a legislator's continued service in parliament conditional on their voting in accordance with party direction on any matter other than an explicitly designated confidence vote; confidence votes must be defined narrowly in the constitution and may not include policy votes, budget votes, or oversight votes; and any provision that functions as a de facto party discipline mechanism through career consequences rather than formal seat-loss will be subject to constitutional review by the Judicial Service Commission on application by any MP. Under this design, Article 70's elimination is not merely permitted — it is constitutionally required.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for political parties to select candidates for election without open and transparent internal processes? (FI Q5)*

S39 Presidential vs. Parliamentary

Domain: Constitutional Reform and Institutional Design | Historical Basis: Post-conflict constitutional design — comparative systems analysis | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Post-Conflict Transitional Government Head (R91), Chief Justice (R26), Global Think Tank Director (R96), Constitutional Reform Council Member (R20), Opposition Leader-Authoritarian Context (R89), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (R97)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The choice between presidential and parliamentary systems of government is among the most consequential constitutional design decisions any post-conflict or transitional government faces. Political science research — including Juan Linz's foundational work on presidential system failures — has documented that presidential systems are statistically more likely to produce democratic breakdown than parliamentary systems, particularly in societies with weak institutions and polarized political cultures. However, parliamentary systems with no strong executive require stable coalition politics that many post-conflict societies lack. The scenario draws on the comparative literature and on multiple post-conflict constitutional design processes to create a decision scenario grounded in real governance design evidence.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the head of a transitional government that has emerged from a post-conflict political settlement. A constitutional convention is drafting the country's new constitution. The convention is

divided on the fundamental question of executive design: presidential system, parliamentary system, or semi-presidential system. The three major political factions have different preferences: the largest faction — which emerged from the former ruling movement — prefers a presidential system where it expects to win presidential elections. The second faction — which represents the urban reform movement — prefers a parliamentary system where its diverse coalition can aggregate legislative majority. The third faction — smaller parties and civil society — prefers a semi-presidential system as a compromise. You have been asked to provide the transitional government's recommendation to the convention.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Largest Faction Leader] *A presidential system gives us a clear mandate. Our candidate has national name recognition. We will win the presidency. A parliamentary system fragments power in ways that favor coalition arithmetic over democratic mandate.*

[Reform Movement Leader] *A presidential system in our context means the largest faction wins the presidency and governs without accountability for five years. Parliamentary systems require building majority coalitions — which forces compromise and accountability. We will not accept a presidential system.*

[Constitutional Design Adviser (international)] *The comparative evidence is clear: presidential systems in societies with weak institutions and no tradition of executive-legislative cooperation have a significantly higher rate of democratic breakdown within 15 years than parliamentary systems. This is not a close call in the academic literature.*

[Pragmatic Analysis] *The best system is the one that all major factions can accept — because a constitution that factions will reject is worse than an imperfect constitution that holds. The semi-presidential system may be academically inferior to a parliamentary system but it may be politically achievable in ways that a parliamentary-only recommendation is not.*

Decision Point 1

You must provide the transitional government's recommendation to the constitutional convention. What is your recommendation?

Option A: Parliamentary system — the comparative evidence, the post-conflict context, and the need for coalition-building accountability all point to parliamentary design. Recommend parliamentary with a constructive vote of no confidence mechanism to provide stability, accepting that the largest faction will oppose this.

Option B: Semi-presidential system — the politically achievable compromise that can hold the constitutional convention together, even if academically inferior to a parliamentary design. Governance that functions is better than the ideal system that produces constitutional collapse.

Option C: Parliamentary system with enhanced presidentialism — a hybrid that gives a directly elected president significant executive authority in national security and foreign policy while maintaining parliamentary accountability for domestic governance, attempting to satisfy both factions.

Option D: Defer the recommendation — this decision is too constitutionally consequential for transitional government recommendation. Propose that the constitutional convention itself resolve the system question through a structured deliberation process with independent technical input before the transitional government takes a position.

Decision Point 2

The convention has adopted a semi-presidential system by a narrow vote. The president has significant executive authority over national security and the appointment of key ministers. Parliament retains authority over legislation and budget. You are now designing the specific relationship between the president and parliament in the draft constitution. The most contested provision: can the president dissolve parliament before the end of its term? The largest faction wants this power for the president; the reform movement opposes it. How do you design this provision?

Option A: Prohibit presidential dissolution of parliament entirely — the separation of powers in a semi-presidential system requires that parliament have tenure security independent of presidential preference. Presidential frustration with parliament is not a legitimate basis for dissolving a democratically elected body.

Option B: Allow presidential dissolution once per five-year term, with mandatory new elections within 60 days — providing a safety valve for genuine governmental deadlock while limiting its use as a political tool.

Option C: Allow presidential dissolution only with a two-thirds parliamentary vote triggering a mutual dissolution — both the president and parliament face re-election simultaneously, creating symmetric accountability rather than unilateral executive power.

Option D: Allow presidential dissolution in constitutionally defined deadlock situations only — specifically, when parliament has twice rejected the president's nominee for Prime Minister — limiting the dissolution power to genuine constitutional impasse.

Decision Point 3

The constitution has been drafted with the semi-presidential system and the dissolution-in-deadlock provision. It is about to be put to a constitutional referendum. Two weeks before the referendum, the largest faction has announced it will campaign against the constitution because the dissolution provision was not drafted as they wanted. The reform movement is campaigning for the constitution. Civil society is divided. The constitution needs 60% approval. Current polling shows 54% support. What is your final advocacy position in the two remaining weeks?

Option A: Campaign actively for the constitution — it is the best achievable design given the political constraints, and a failed referendum returns the country to constitutional uncertainty that is worse than an imperfect constitution. Make the case for stability.

Option B: Maintain neutrality — the transitional government's role was to facilitate the process, not to campaign for a specific outcome. The referendum is a democratic choice that the people should make without executive influence.

Option C: Propose a last-minute amendment to address the largest faction's dissolution provision concern — accepting a modification that may cost reform movement support in exchange for largest faction endorsement, attempting to get to 60% from a different coalition.

Option D: Approach the largest faction privately — offering specific governance commitments (ministry allocations, policy priorities) in exchange for their withdrawal of opposition to the referendum, attempting to separate their constitutional opposition from their political calculation.

CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (parliamentary recommendation, no dissolution, campaigns for constitution): *The semi-presidential constitution passes 57-43 in the referendum — below the 60% threshold. The constitutional convention reconvenes to address the failure. The second referendum, six months later, with modified dissolution provisions, passes 63-37. The parliamentary system you recommended was not adopted — but the final constitution is closer to parliamentary design than it would have been without your recommendation. The country enters its first democratic elections under the new constitution. The largest faction wins the presidency but with less executive power than they sought. The reform movement wins a parliamentary plurality. The semi-presidential system forces a cohabitation arrangement that neither faction wanted and both learn to manage. Five years later, the democratic system is functioning — not as cleanly as a parliamentary system might have, but without the democratic breakdown that presidential systems in comparable contexts have historically produced.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2, Option B in Decision Point 3 (semi-presidential recommendation, dissolution once per term, neutral in referendum): *The constitution passes 61-39 on the first referendum. The largest faction campaigns for it after the dissolution provision modification that they accept. The country enters democratic elections. The largest faction wins the presidency. In year three of the first presidential term, the president dissolves parliament citing legislative deadlock. New elections are held. The largest faction wins a parliamentary majority as well as the presidency — they now control all branches of government. The semi-presidential system's accountability mechanisms are not robust enough to prevent this consolidation. The democratic transition is not reversed — but the power concentration in year three raises concerns that the constitutional design's checks have been insufficient.*

FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture Risk — Executive System Design and Democratic Consolidation

The presidential versus parliamentary scenario reveals constitutional design's most consequential structural question: which executive system design provides the best structural protection against the executive capture that Bangladesh's own history — and the comparative record of post-conflict democracies globally — documents as the primary governance failure mode in transitional contexts. Presidential systems concentrate executive authority in a single actor who has a fixed-term mandate independent of legislative confidence — creating both the stability advantage and the capture risk that the comparative literature

documents. Parliamentary systems distribute executive authority through coalition requirements that force accountability but create the instability risk that Bangladesh's own pre-1972 experience illustrates.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's institutional design principle treats executive system design as a structural fairness question: the governance architecture that concentrates authority without proportionate accountability produces the authority-accountability misalignment that generates systematic unfairness over time. The presidential system that Bangladesh's largest faction prefers is not preferred because it produces better governance — it is preferred because it concentrates power in the institution they expect to control. Constitutional design that is driven by partisan strategic interest rather than structural governance analysis produces constitutions that reflect the current balance of power rather than the durable institutional architecture that a transition to structural fairness requires.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Constitutional Architecture provision specifies that executive system design must be assessed against structural fairness criteria: which system provides the best structural protection against executive capture of legislative oversight; which system requires the broadest coalition building to maintain government; which system provides the most robust accountability mechanisms for executive conduct; and which system, based on comparative evidence, is most likely to sustain democratic governance over a 20-year horizon in contexts comparable to the country's. These criteria point consistently toward parliamentary systems with constructive vote of no confidence mechanisms — not because parliamentary systems are perfect but because the alternative concentrates authority in ways that systematic governance unfairness research consistently identifies as the primary failure mode.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation of the reasoning? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for political parties to select candidates for election without open and transparent internal processes? (FI Q5)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

S40 The Security Council Veto

Domain: Constitutional Reform and Institutional Design / Global Governance | Historical Basis: UN Security Council veto reform — 80-year institutional design debate | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: UN Security Council President (R62), UN Secretary-General (R61), US President (R73), Chinese President (R75), UK Prime Minister (R80), Small Island State Leader (R92)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United Nations Security Council's veto mechanism — which gives each of the five permanent members absolute authority to block any Council resolution — has been described by reform advocates as the single most significant structural unfairness in global governance. The veto was designed in 1945 to secure great power participation in the UN by guaranteeing that no major power could be outvoted on matters of international peace and security. Its structural effect has been to make collective security action impossible when a permanent member or its ally is implicated. Since 1945, the veto has been used over 300 times. Russia and China have together vetoed multiple resolutions on Syria, Myanmar, and other situations involving documented atrocities. The US has vetoed resolutions on Israel-Palestine. The veto reform debate has been ongoing for over 50 years without producing any change.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the rotating President of the UN Security Council. A genocide is documented — independent investigators, satellite imagery, survivor testimony, and forensic evidence all establish that systematic mass killings of a specific ethnic population have occurred and are continuing. The evidence is overwhelming by any reasonable standard. A draft resolution authorizing a UN protection force has 12 votes in favor. Two permanent members — whose arms sales and diplomatic relationships with the perpetrating government make them reluctant to authorize international action — have announced they will veto the resolution. The General Assembly has passed a non-binding resolution 174-2 calling for Security Council action. The Secretary-General has characterized the evidence as meeting the threshold for genocide. You hold the Council presidency for the next three weeks. The perpetrating government's military operations are continuing.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[12 Council Members in Favor] *We are calling on the Council President to use every procedural tool available to advance this resolution. The veto cannot be allowed to shield genocide from accountability. Explore every option.*

[Two Vetoing Permanent Members (joint communication)] *We will veto this resolution. The situation is complex. The evidence is contested. The proposed action would constitute interference in a sovereign state's internal affairs. We have exercised our Charter prerogative and the matter is closed.*

[UN Secretary-General] *The evidence meets the genocide threshold. The Council's procedural failure to act does not eliminate the UN's moral responsibility. I am requesting that the Council President explore all available procedural alternatives.*

[Affected Population's Representative (non-member observer)] *People are dying while you proceduralize. We are not a political problem. We are human beings. Is there anything the Council can actually do or is this process designed to produce inaction?*

Decision Point 1

The veto is announced. The resolution is blocked. You hold the Council presidency. What is your procedural response?

Option A: Invoke the Uniting for Peace procedure — refer the situation to the UN General Assembly, which under Resolution 377 can convene an emergency special session and recommend collective measures when the Security Council is paralyzed. The General Assembly has already passed a non-binding resolution 174-2. An emergency special session can authorize action without a Security Council resolution.

Option B: Call a formal Council session at which each veto-casting member must formally explain their veto reasoning on the record — using the Council presidency's procedural authority to create maximum accountability documentation for the exercise of veto power.

Option C: Propose a modified resolution that may reduce the vetoing members' objections — a humanitarian corridors resolution, a ceasefire monitoring resolution, or a fact-finding commission resolution that does not require enforcement action but creates a formal Council record.

Option D: Issue a formal Council President's statement — not a resolution, which requires consensus — characterizing the situation as requiring international attention and calling on all parties to cease hostilities. A presidential statement does not require unanimous agreement.

Decision Point 2

You have invoked the Uniting for Peace procedure. The General Assembly emergency special session has been convened by 120 co-sponsors. The two vetoing permanent members have characterized the procedure as an illegal circumvention of the Charter. The session is scheduled in four days. You have been asked to present the Council's record to the General Assembly. What is your presentation?

Option A: Present the full Council record including the evidence of genocide, the 12 votes in favor, the veto, and the two vetoing members' stated reasoning — letting the General Assembly make its own assessment of the Council's failure and the appropriate response.

Option B: Present the Council's procedural record factually without characterizing the veto as a failure — maintaining diplomatic neutrality while providing the Assembly the information it needs to make its own judgment.

Option C: Present the evidence of genocide separately from the Council proceedings — allowing the Assembly to receive the substantive documentation of atrocities independently of the procedural characterization of the veto.

Option D: Decline to present to the General Assembly as Council President — arguing that the Council President's role is within the Council, not in the Assembly, and that presenting would constitute inappropriate political positioning in an inter-institutional dispute.

Decision Point 3

The General Assembly emergency special session has recommended deployment of a UN protection force by 157-4 vote. The recommendation is not legally binding. The two vetoing permanent members have refused to contribute to the force and have stated that any UN force deployed without Security Council authorization is illegal. Seventeen member states have volunteered troops for the force. The Secretary-General has requested your Council Presidency's formal position on whether the General Assembly's recommendation creates a sufficient legal basis for deployment. What is your position?

Option A: Issue a formal Council Presidency statement supporting the General Assembly's recommendation as a legitimate exercise of the Uniting for Peace procedure and as a sufficient legal and moral basis for deployment — accepting the legal dispute with the vetoing members as a necessary consequence of choosing accountability over procedural paralysis.

Option B: Maintain Council Presidency neutrality — the legal question of the General Assembly's authority is disputed among international law scholars, and the Council President should not prejudge a question that is properly for the ICJ to determine.

Option C: Refer the legal question to the ICJ for an emergency advisory opinion — creating a binding process for answering the deployment authorization question rather than proceeding with contested legal authority.

Option D: Call a final Security Council session — presenting the General Assembly recommendation and the 17 troop contributors' commitment, and asking the two vetoing members whether the General Assembly's 157-4 vote changes their position. If not, the Council's record is complete.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (Uniting for Peace invoked, full record presented, Council supports deployment): *The General Assembly's recommendation creates a deployment. Seventeen member states contribute troops. The vetoing permanent members characterize the deployment as illegal and refuse to facilitate logistics through their influence with neighboring states. The protection force arrives in country after six weeks — during which the genocide continues. Upon arrival, the force establishes protected corridors and protection zones. The genocide does not stop but the killing rate in protected areas decreases significantly. An estimated 40,000 lives are protected in the following 18 months. The legal dispute about the Uniting for Peace procedure remains unresolved. The precedent — that the Council's veto does not prevent General Assembly action*

under the 1950 procedure — is established for the first time in a genocide context. Whether the precedent holds for future situations depends on whether the two vetoing members choose to contest it further.

If Option C in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2, Option B in Decision Point 3 (modified resolution proposed, neutral presentation, Council neutrality on deployment): *A ceasefire monitoring resolution passes the Security Council after the vetoing members accept a significantly weaker version that contains no enforcement mechanism. UN monitors are deployed. They document the genocide but cannot intervene. The monitoring reports are published monthly and read by international media. The genocide continues for 14 more months at a reduced but still catastrophic rate — approximately 160,000 additional deaths during the monitoring period. The monitoring reports are cited in subsequent international criminal proceedings. The Security Council has acted — in the weakest possible form. The veto mechanism has been preserved. The monitoring reports are the only thing the Council produced.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — The Veto as Global Governance's Most Consequential Structural Unfairness

The Security Council veto scenario presents structural exclusion at its most consequential scale: a governance mechanism that structurally exempts the most powerful states from accountability to collective governance decisions, while subjecting all other states to those decisions. The five permanent members have absolute veto power over the institution designed to maintain international peace and security — meaning that no international security action can be taken against any state that a P5 member chooses to protect. This is authority-accountability misalignment at the global level: the states with the most power over global governance decisions bear the least accountability to global governance norms.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework identifies the P5 veto as the single most significant structural unfairness in global governance architecture. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied globally, requires that no state or group of states be permanently exempted from the accountability mechanisms that global governance institutions are designed to apply. The veto was designed in 1945 to secure great power cooperation by guaranteeing they could not be outvoted — a design that explicitly traded structural fairness for institutional participation. The cost of that trade has been paid by every population that has experienced genocide, ethnic cleansing, or systematic atrocity while a P5 member's veto shielded the perpetrating state.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision on veto reform specifies: the Security Council veto should be eliminated for resolutions addressing documented genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined by the Rome Statute; where veto elimination is politically unachievable, the General Assembly's Uniting for Peace procedure should be explicitly codified in the Charter as an alternative to Security Council action; and permanent Council membership should be expanded to include regional rotating representatives from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East to reduce the P5's structural domination of global peace and security decision-making. These changes do not eliminate the challenge of global governance — they begin to address the most acute structural fairness failure in its current architecture.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power? (FI Q8) — consider at the international institutional level*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S41 Term Limits Under Pressure

Domain: Constitutional Reform and Institutional Design | Historical Basis: Bangladesh and comparative — presidential term limit extension referenda | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Chief Justice (R26), Constitutional Reform Council Member (R20), Prime Minister (R01), Opposition Leader (R02), High Court Judge (R27), Global Think Tank Director (R96)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Presidential term limit extension — in which a popular incumbent seeks to remove or extend constitutional limits on their time in office — has been documented across multiple governance contexts. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, sitting presidents have used referenda, constitutional courts they have appointed, and legislative supermajorities they control to extend their tenures beyond constitutional limits. The mechanism is typically the same: a popular referendum in which the extension passes with a majority that satisfies procedural requirements while the underlying constitutional provision was designed to be beyond majority override. This scenario draws on the pattern across multiple documented country contexts while applying it to Bangladesh's own experience with constitutional amendment processes under the Hasina government.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Chief Justice. The constitution provides a maximum two-term limit for the Prime Minister. The incumbent PM — who has served two terms — has sponsored a national referendum on removing the term limit. The referendum has passed 61% in favor with 73% voter turnout. The result meets all procedural referendum requirements. The constitutional amendment bill to remove

the term limit is now before parliament, which has a ruling party supermajority. The opposition has filed a constitutional challenge arguing that term limits are a fundamental structural feature of the constitution that cannot be removed by simple amendment — even with majority support — because they constitute an essential protection against executive entrenchment that is fundamental to the constitutional order. Your court must decide: can a term limit be removed by constitutional amendment and referendum?

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Government Counsel] *The referendum passed 61-39 with 73% turnout. The constitutional amendment procedure has been followed. The democratic will of the people has been expressed. The court has no legitimate basis to override a constitutional amendment that followed every procedural requirement. Judicial review of democratic decisions to amend the constitution is itself an anti-democratic usurpation.*

[Opposition Legal Counsel] *Term limits are not ordinary constitutional provisions. They are structural protections against executive entrenchment — protections that were designed specifically to prevent a popular incumbent from perpetuating their power beyond what the constitution intended as maximum tenure. A majority cannot vote away the structural protection that prevents majority rule from becoming permanent single-party dominance.*

[Constitutional Scholars (joint submission)] *The basic structure doctrine — established in multiple constitutional jurisdictions including India's Supreme Court — holds that certain fundamental structural features of a constitution cannot be amended even by the formal amendment procedure, because they constitute the basic structure that makes the constitution what it is. Term limits, checks and balances, separation of powers, and judicial independence are typically included in this category.*

[Your own judicial assessment] *The 61% majority is real. The referendum was procedurally conducted. But the question is not whether the majority supports the amendment — it is whether there is a category of constitutional provisions that majorities cannot amend. If there is such a category, term limits almost certainly belong in it.*

Decision Point 1

The constitutional challenge is before you. The legal question is whether the basic structure doctrine applies — and if it does, whether term limits are part of the basic structure. What is your judgment?

Option A: Apply the basic structure doctrine and find that term limits are a fundamental structural protection that cannot be removed by constitutional amendment — upholding the opposition's challenge and striking down the amendment. The 61% majority does not override a constitutional structure designed to prevent executive entrenchment.

Option B: Decline to apply the basic structure doctrine in the Bangladesh constitutional context — finding that the court has no legitimate basis to limit the constituent power of a qualified referendum majority to amend the constitution as it sees fit.

Option C: Apply the basic structure doctrine but find that term limits do not constitute a basic structure element — distinguishing between procedural structural protections (separation of powers, judicial independence) that cannot be amended and substantive term duration provisions that can.

Option D: Uphold the constitutional amendment but impose conditions — requiring that the amendment include enhanced checks and balances (a strengthened independent legislature, a guaranteed opposition leader role, enhanced judicial independence provisions) as compensating structural protections for the removal of the term limit protection.

Decision Point 2

You have applied the basic structure doctrine and struck down the amendment. The government has characterized your ruling as 'judicial coup' and announced it will ignore the ruling. The parliament has passed the constitutional amendment bill with 280 of 300 votes. The PM has announced she will seek a third term. The opposition has requested your court to enforce the ruling through contempt proceedings against the PM and parliament. Your court has no enforcement mechanism beyond contempt. What is your response to the opposition's contempt application?

Option A: Issue a contempt finding against the government — formally documenting that the PM and parliament are in contempt of court. Accept that enforcement depends on the military and civil service choosing to uphold the judicial ruling over the executive's defiance.

Option B: Decline the contempt application — noting that contempt proceedings are appropriate for enforcement of specific court orders but that constitutional supremacy questions of this magnitude require political resolution rather than judicial enforcement, which the court cannot compel.

Option C: Issue an order requiring the military commander and the civil service chief to formally confirm their position on the constitutional question — placing the enforcement responsibility directly on the institutional actors who actually control implementation.

Option D: Publish a formal judicial statement characterizing the government's non-compliance as a constitutional crisis requiring resolution through the political process — mobilizing public opinion as the enforcement mechanism the court cannot directly exercise.

Decision Point 3

The constitutional crisis has been ongoing for three months. The government has not backed down. The opposition is in the streets. Civil society organizations have taken different positions. Three senior military figures have issued individual statements saying they support the constitutional order — without specifying whether they consider the court's ruling or the parliament's amendment to constitute the constitutional order. The government is offering to negotiate. What is your position on negotiations?

Option A: Refuse to negotiate on the constitutional ruling — a judicial determination of constitutional law is not a negotiating position. If the government wants to resolve the crisis, it should comply with the

court's ruling and seek a constitutional path to extended tenure that does not involve removing the term limit protection.

Option B: Accept a negotiated resolution — proposing that the government withdraw the term limit removal in exchange for a constitutional amendment extending the term from five years to six years and allowing the PM to serve two six-year terms rather than two five-year terms. The term limit protection is maintained; the PM gets additional governance time.

Option C: Accept mediation from an independent constitutional body — neither accepting nor refusing negotiation, but establishing a structured process for reaching a constitutional resolution that is not a bilateral negotiation between the court and the executive.

Option D: Resign as Chief Justice — stating publicly that the court has done its constitutional function, that the government's non-compliance constitutes a constitutional breakdown that the court cannot resolve through further judicial action, and that the resolution requires political actors to choose between the constitutional order and executive power.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (basic structure doctrine applied, contempt finding, refuses negotiation): *The contempt finding is issued. The military's three senior figures issue a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the constitutional order as determined by the Supreme Court. The PM faces a choice: continue in defiance with the military signaling constitutional loyalty, or back down. After 11 days, the PM announces she will respect the court's ruling and will not seek a third term. The constitutional crisis ends. The basic structure doctrine has been established in Bangladesh's constitutional jurisprudence — a precedent that will protect future constitutional provisions against majority override for the first time. The political cost to the PM is significant but manageable — she retains popular support and her party retains its majority for the remainder of the current term. The institution of judicial review has been tested and has held.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1 (declines to apply basic structure doctrine): *The amendment is upheld. The PM serves a third term. The constitutional amendment establishing no term limits remains in force for subsequent leaders. The next election after the PM's third term produces a new government — from a different party — whose leader also serves beyond two terms, citing the precedent. The constitutional protection against executive entrenchment has been formally eliminated. Whether this produces democratic breakdown depends on whether subsequent leaders use the unlimited tenure provision to consolidate power beyond what the other constitutional provisions can check. The court has declined to draw a line that the constitutional text did not explicitly draw. The structural protection that term limits provided has been removed by the majority that was always most likely to want it removed.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Majority Override of Structural Protection Against Executive Entrenchment

The term limits scenario presents one of constitutional design's deepest structural paradoxes: the democratic process being used to remove a protection that was designed to prevent the democratic process from being permanently captured by a single actor. The 61% referendum majority that voted to remove term limits is a genuine democratic expression — but it is a democratic expression organized and led by the incumbent who will benefit from the removal. The structural protection that term limits provide — ensuring that no single leader can use accumulated power and institutional capture to make their removal structurally impossible — is precisely the protection that a sufficiently popular incumbent can remove through the democratic process if no constitutional firewall prevents it.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural capture analysis identifies the term limit removal scenario as the clearest example of governance design's fundamental challenge: structural fairness protections must be designed to be resistant to the capture attempts of the most powerful actors in the system, which means they must be resistant to majority override by those actors. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that certain structural protections — those designed specifically to prevent executive entrenchment — be placed beyond the reach of the majoritarian processes that an entrenched executive can most easily influence. The basic structure doctrine is the judicial mechanism that implements this principle: it holds that some constitutional provisions are so fundamental to the constitutional order that they cannot be amended through ordinary amendment procedures regardless of majority support.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Constitutional Entrenchment provision specifies that certain structural provisions — including term limits, judicial independence guarantees, separation of powers mechanisms, electoral commission independence, and minority rights protections — require a constitutional supermajority of 75% in two successive parliamentary sessions, plus a 65% referendum threshold, for amendment. These enhanced requirements do not make structural provisions immovable — they make them resistant to the political pressure of a popular incumbent acting within a single political moment. The term limit removal in this scenario would require 225 of 300 parliamentary votes in two sessions plus 65% referendum support — a threshold that genuine constitutional consensus might achieve but that a single popular government cannot manufacture.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for elected officials to change their political party after winning an election without returning to voters for a new mandate? (FI Q1)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power when making judicial decisions? (FI Q8)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to use emergency powers that temporarily suspend certain legal protections during national crises? (FI Q23)*

— End of Chapter 13 —

Next: Chapter 14 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Eight — Crisis Governance (S42–S46)

CHAPTER 14

Scenario Scripts — Domain Eight: Crisis Governance (S42–S46)

Domain Eight scenarios address governance under conditions of acute stress — natural disaster, industrial catastrophe, energy crisis, pandemic, and political breakdown. Crisis governance is the domain where structural governance failures become most immediately visible and most immediately consequential: when floods displace millions, when a factory collapses, when energy runs out, when a pandemic spreads, or when the military surrounds parliament, the governance architecture is under maximum pressure. The structural failure modes that operate slowly in normal governance — authority-accountability misalignment, structural capture, epistemic dependence, structural exclusion — operate rapidly and with immediate human consequence in crisis.

The five scenarios in this domain span the full range of crisis governance failures: natural disaster response under political loyalty allocation (S42), industrial safety failure with politically connected ownership (S43), energy crisis under international conditionality (S44), pandemic governance under information asymmetry (S45), and the coup decision — the most extreme crisis governance scenario in the library (S46). Each is grounded in documented real-world crisis events. Each demonstrates that crisis governance failure is not primarily a failure of emergency response capacity — it is a failure of the structural governance conditions that determine whether emergency authority is exercised in the public interest or captured by the political interests of those who hold it.

Crisis reveals structure. The governance failures that are invisible in ordinary times become visible when a flood arrives, a factory collapses, or the military moves. Crisis governance is not a special category of governance — it is ordinary governance under pressure that removes the disguise.

S42 The Flood Crisis

Domain: Crisis Governance | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Sylhet floods 2022; Bangladesh seasonal flooding pattern | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — acute crisis

Active Roles: Prime Minister (R01), District Commissioner (R39), Minister of Home Affairs (R06), Army Brigade Commander (R56), Chief Secretary (R59), UN Secretary-General (R61)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh experiences severe flooding every year, with major floods — affecting over one-third of the country — occurring roughly every five to seven years. The 2022 Sylhet and Sunamganj floods

were among the most severe in decades, displacing over four million people and causing widespread crop loss, infrastructure damage, and livestock mortality. International humanitarian assistance was significant. The Bangladesh Army was the primary relief logistics actor. Distribution of relief, as documented in multiple post-flood assessments, followed patterns consistent with political loyalty allocation in some districts — more resources reaching ruling-party-aligned communities — while flood victims in opposition-leaning areas experienced slower and less comprehensive relief.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Prime Minister. A major flood has displaced 3.8 million people across six districts within 72 hours. International emergency assistance — including UN coordination support and bilateral relief from India, China, the US, and several European countries — is arriving. The Army has its own institutional approach to disaster logistics that has historically been effective but that has also occasionally produced political friction with civilian government. Your Home Minister wants civilian-led distribution through the district administration; your Defence Minister recommends Army-led distribution through military logistics chains. Your damage assessment team has identified the three most severely affected districts — two are represented by opposition MPs who are publicly criticizing the government's response speed. Your political team has flagged that your response performance in the next 72 hours will significantly affect your electoral standing.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Army Brigade Commander] *We have logistics capacity, helicopter assets, and supply chain experience. Army-led distribution will be faster and more comprehensive than civilian administration can achieve in this timeline. We request operational authority.*

[Home Minister] *Civilian-led distribution through district administration ensures political accountability and community engagement. Army-led operations can produce dependency and bypass local governance structures. We should maintain civilian authority.*

[Political Adviser] *Two of the three worst-affected districts voted opposition. The national media narrative will frame your response in relation to whether those communities receive equivalent relief. This is visible.*

[Damage Assessment Team] *District 4 (opposition constituency) has the most severe infrastructure damage — 340,000 displaced with no road access. District 7 (ruling party stronghold) has 180,000 displaced with partial road access. Objective need is significantly higher in District 4.*

Decision Point 1

You must determine the relief distribution command structure within the next two hours. What is your decision?

Option A: Unified civilian-military command — appoint the Chief Secretary as overall coordinator with the Army Brigade Commander as logistics deputy. Distribution decisions are made jointly based on the damage assessment team's objective need data. Political direction on allocation is explicitly excluded from the command structure.

Option B: Army-led logistics with civilian distribution oversight — the Army manages supply chain and transport, civilian district administration controls community-level distribution based on need data, with joint daily reporting to your office.

Option C: Civilian-led distribution through district administration — Home Minister's preferred approach. Accept the slower speed in exchange for maintaining civilian governance primacy in relief operations.

Option D: Army-led operations in the three most severely affected districts (where logistics capacity is most critical), civilian-led in the remaining districts — differentiating the command structure by need intensity.

Decision Point 2

You have established unified command. The first 24-hour distribution has prioritized District 4 — the most severely affected, opposition constituency — based on objective need data. Your ruling party's District 4 local leader has called: he is furious that ruling party communities in his district are not receiving priority treatment and has threatened to publicly accuse the government of abandoning its supporters. Your political team is worried about the optics. Your relief coordinator confirms that the need-based allocation is reaching the most severely affected communities. What is your response to the local leader?

Option A: Maintain the need-based allocation — tell the local leader directly that disaster relief is not a political reward mechanism, that his district's most severely affected communities are being reached first, and that political pressure on relief allocation is not acceptable from any direction.

Option B: Authorize a supplementary allocation to ruling party communities in District 4 — acknowledging the political pressure while maintaining the primary need-based allocation for the most severely affected communities.

Option C: Invite the local leader to join the District 4 relief coordination team — giving him institutional visibility in the relief effort without compromising the need-based allocation criteria.

Option D: Ask your political team to manage the local leader directly — keeping the political pressure management separate from the relief operations command structure.

Decision Point 3

The 72-hour acute response period is ending. Relief has reached approximately 78% of displaced persons. The Army has performed well. The international assistance coordination has been effective. District 4 — the opposition constituency — has received the highest per-capita relief allocation consistent with its documented need. The opposition MPs have acknowledged the government's response as 'adequate' — a

significant departure from their usual criticism. Your political team is recommending that you issue a press statement highlighting the ruling party's organizational role in the relief distribution. The relief coordinator has flagged that the ruling party's claim would be inaccurate — Army logistics and civilian district administration delivered the relief, not party organization. What do you authorize?

Option A: Issue a statement crediting the Army, district administration, and international partners — the accurate account. The political benefit of an accurate crisis response is greater than the short-term narrative gain of a misleading one.

Option B: Issue a statement that includes all contributors — Army, district administration, international partners, and 'the government's organizational network' — a formulation that is technically inclusive without being explicitly misleading.

Option C: Authorize the political team's statement — the government's organizational presence facilitated local coordination in ways that are not fully captured in the relief coordinator's assessment.

Option D: Decline to issue any statement on distribution credit — the ongoing relief operation is more important than its political characterization, and attribution claims during an active crisis are inappropriate.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (unified need-based command, maintains allocation, accurate statement): *78% of displaced persons are reached within 72 hours — significantly higher than comparable Bangladesh flood response benchmarks. District 4's opposition constituency receives its need-based allocation without political filtering. The opposition MPs' 'adequate' acknowledgment is the first cross-party endorsement of a government disaster response in Bangladesh's recent political history. The accurate attribution statement generates no political controversy. Your poll numbers in the weeks following the flood response show a 12-point approval increase — the largest single-event approval movement in your tenure. The governance lesson from the scenario: objective crisis response governed by need rather than political loyalty is both more effective and more politically sustainable than politically filtered response. The structural fairness argument and the political self-interest argument point in the same direction.*

If Option B in Decision Point 2, Option C in Decision Point 3 (supplementary ruling-party allocation, party credit statement): *Relief reaches 71% of displaced persons within 72 hours — the supplementary allocation to politically connected communities diverts resources from the most severely affected areas. District 4's most vulnerable communities receive 12% less relief than the need assessment indicated they required. The opposition MPs characterize the response as 'politically filtered' and cite specific distribution data. International media picks up the political filtering criticism. The government's crisis response is rated 'partially adequate' by the international humanitarian coordination assessment. Your political team's statement claiming party organizational credit is contested by the Army and district administration. The political gain the statement was designed to produce does not materialize. The governance and political outcome is worse than need-based allocation would have produced.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — Crisis Authority Captured by Political Allocation Logic

The flood crisis scenario reveals the most immediately consequential form of authority-accountability misalignment: emergency authority deployed for political allocation rather than humanitarian need. The Prime Minister who filters disaster relief through political loyalty is exercising genuine authority — they are the legitimate government, they command the logistics system, and they can direct allocation. But the

accountability relationship — which runs to all citizens equally as members of a polity affected by the disaster — is violated when resources are distributed by political affiliation rather than by need. The people in District 4 who voted opposition are not less entitled to disaster relief because of their voting choices. The governance design that allows political direction of disaster relief allocation converts emergency authority into a tool for political reward and punishment — a structural unfairness with immediate lethal potential.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural capture analysis identifies politically directed disaster relief as one of the most acute governance failures: the crisis moment that should most completely transcend political loyalty — because the disaster does not distinguish between ruling party and opposition communities — becomes instead a mechanism for maximizing political loyalty through resource allocation. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that emergency governance authority be structurally insulated from political allocation logic — that the disaster response mechanism cannot be directed through the political hierarchy that produces partisan resource distribution.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Emergency Governance provision requires: a permanent National Disaster Response Authority with independent mandate, appointed through multi-party process, whose disaster relief allocation decisions are based on objective need assessments published within 24 hours of any major disaster declaration; mandatory independent audit of all disaster relief distribution within 30 days of any major disaster, with public reporting on the relationship between need assessment and actual distribution; and criminal accountability for any official who directs disaster relief allocation on the basis of political affiliation rather than objective need. Under this design, the local party leader's call in this scenario is not a governance pressure point — it is a criminal referral trigger.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair crisis governance possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for government support programs to be distributed based on political loyalty rather than on objective need? (FI Q17)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the quality of public healthcare to vary significantly based on whether a person lives in an urban or rural area? (FI Q16)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to use emergency powers that temporarily suspend certain legal protections during national crises? (FI Q23)*

S43 The Factory Collapse

Domain: Crisis Governance | Historical Basis: Rana Plaza collapse Bangladesh 2013; garment sector safety governance | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — crisis response

Active Roles: Minister of Labor (R08 adapted), Business Association Chair (R51), Trade Union Leader (R49), Inspector General of Police (R54), Anti-Corruption Commission Chair (R22), International Press Freedom Correspondent (R95)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The April 24, 2013 collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory building in Savar, near Dhaka, killed 1,134 workers and injured more than 2,500 in the deadliest industrial accident in Bangladesh's history. The building had been flagged as structurally unsafe by inspectors; garment factory owners on the upper floors had ordered workers to return to work the day of the collapse despite visible structural cracks reported the previous day. The building's owner — a politically connected businessman — was arrested but legal proceedings extended for years. The Rana Plaza collapse triggered the formation of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety — international safety frameworks. This scenario places the participant in the 48-hour crisis decision period immediately following a comparable collapse.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Minister responsible for labor. A nine-story garment factory building has collapsed in Gazipur. 200 workers are confirmed dead. An estimated 800 more are trapped. Rescue operations are underway. Your preliminary information includes: the building owner is a major party donor and has hosted the party leader at events at his property; the building had been flagged in a routine inspection six months ago for structural concerns — the inspection report was never followed up; and the building was operating three illegal upper floors that were not included in the original construction permit. The business association has called expressing concern about 'international reputational impact.' The garment workers' trade union has called for immediate arrest of the building owner. Four international buyers whose brands were manufactured at the facility have emailed requesting information. You have 48 hours before the political narrative calcifies.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Business Association Chair] *This is a tragedy. But premature arrests or aggressive regulatory action will trigger international buyer flight at the worst possible moment. We request that enforcement actions wait for the full investigation to establish facts.*

[Trade Union Leader] *200 workers are dead because a politically connected building owner was never required to remediate documented structural problems. This is murder by negligence at minimum. The owner must be arrested immediately.*

[Ruling Party Political Adviser] *The owner's party connections are known. Any action against him becomes a political story as much as a safety story. We need to manage this carefully — arrest before investigation creates martyrdom narrative; no arrest creates accountability failure narrative.*

[International Buyer Representative (joint communication)] *Our brands are associated with this facility. We need to understand within 24 hours what accountability actions are being taken. Our sourcing decisions will be informed by whether Bangladesh demonstrates credible accountability for this incident.*

Decision Point 1

Rescue operations are underway. 200 are dead. 800 are trapped. What is your immediate public and operational response?

Option A: Issue an immediate public statement committing to: full investigation, full accountability regardless of building owner's political connections, suspension of all permits for the owner's other properties pending safety inspection, and engagement with international labor standards bodies. Request that police place the building owner under investigative custody.

Option B: Issue a public statement focusing exclusively on the rescue operation — prioritizing operational messaging over accountability commitments until rescue is complete and investigation begins.

Option C: Issue a public statement committing to a full investigation — without specific accountability commitments, without addressing the political connection question, and without requesting investigative custody of the owner.

Option D: Request an emergency meeting with the business association before issuing any public statement — assessing the industry's position on accountability response before committing the government publicly.

Decision Point 2

The rescue operation is complete. 1,134 are dead — more than the initial estimate. The building owner has been taken into investigative custody. The investigation has confirmed: the structural concern inspection report from six months ago was never escalated beyond the inspecting officer because the officer was aware of the owner's political connections; the illegal upper floors were approved through a permit process that bypassed the standard structural review; and the owner's legal team is arguing that the structural concerns were 'within acceptable tolerance.' The international buyers have maintained sourcing relationships pending your accountability response. What is your position on accountability?

Option A: Support prosecution for manslaughter or criminal negligence regardless of political connection — the documented failure chain (inspection not escalated due to political connection, permits bypassed) establishes criminal liability that the legal standard requires be pursued. Issue a public statement committing to prosecution.

Option B: Support civil rather than criminal accountability — the building owner faces civil liability to victims' families, regulatory consequences, and reputational damage without requiring a criminal prosecution that may be legally complex and politically explosive.

Option C: Commission an independent judicial inquiry — removing the prosecution decision from your political environment by placing it in the hands of an independent judicial officer whose findings will determine the accountability pathway.

Option D: Announce structural regulatory reforms — mandatory safety inspection follow-up, permit verification requirements, whistleblower protection for safety inspectors — framing accountability through systemic reform rather than individual criminal prosecution.

Decision Point 3

The prosecution has been initiated. The owner's legal team has filed 14 separate motions that have delayed the trial for 18 months. The Accord on Fire and Building Safety has been established with international buyer support. Structural safety across 1,600 garment factories has been assessed. 150 factories have been closed for remediation. The owner remains in legal limbo — not convicted, not acquitted, out on bail after nine months. International buyers are maintaining sourcing relationships. The trade union federation is publicly criticizing the prosecution's pace. You are now planning the structural regulatory reform that should prevent future collapses. What is your priority reform?

Option A: Independent building safety inspection authority — removing factory safety inspection from the labor ministry's purview and establishing an independent body with its own staff, whose inspectors cannot be influenced by their awareness of building owners' political connections, and whose findings are automatically escalated to prosecution referral when structural concerns exceed defined thresholds.

Option B: Mandatory international audit requirement — requiring all factories with international buyers to undergo annual independent safety audits by international firms, making the accountability mechanism run through international commercial relationships rather than domestic political ones.

Option C: Criminal liability for inspectors who fail to escalate documented structural concerns — creating individual accountability downstream in the inspection chain to counteract the political pressure that produces non-escalation.

Option D: Buyer liability framework — making international brands legally liable in their home countries for safety failures at their supplier facilities, shifting the accountability pressure to actors who are beyond Bangladesh's political environment's reach.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (full commitment, prosecution, independent authority): *The prosecution eventually concludes — four years after the collapse — with a conviction for criminal negligence. The sentence is lighter than the union demanded and heavier than the business association feared. The independent building safety inspection authority is established. Over the following five years, 340 structural safety violations are escalated to prosecution referral — compared to zero in the five years before the reform. Three factory owners face criminal proceedings for safety violations. The 1,134 workers who died in the collapse have produced a structural governance change that their working lives could not. International buyers characterize*

Bangladesh's safety governance as 'significantly improved but still developing.' The accountability and the reform are both real. Neither brings the dead back.

If Option C in Decision Point 1, Option D in Decision Point 2, Option D in Decision Point 3 (manages messaging, civil not criminal, buyer liability framework): *The owner faces civil liability. The victims' families receive compensation through a fund established partly by international buyers. No criminal prosecution occurs. The permit bypass and inspection non-escalation findings are documented in the judicial inquiry but produce no individual criminal accountability. Structural regulatory reforms are announced. International buyers, whose own liability exposure incentivizes safety improvement, drive significant factory upgrade investment through the buyer liability framework. Safety across the sector improves measurably — not because accountability for this collapse was pursued but because international commercial pressure made safety investment economically rational. The political connection that prevented the inspection escalation has never been formally addressed. The structural condition that produces it remains.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Capture — Regulatory Authority Captured by Political Connection Before Crisis Occurs

The factory collapse scenario reveals structural capture operating at the pre-crisis regulatory stage: the inspection non-escalation that produced the collapse did not occur during the 48-hour crisis — it occurred six months earlier, when a routine safety inspector made the judgment that documenting a structural concern at a politically connected building was not a career-advancing decision. The political connection captured the safety inspection function not through a directive or a bribe but through the organizational environment that makes inspectors aware of whose building they are inspecting and what the career consequences of aggressive escalation are. The collapse is the consequence of capture that occurred months earlier in a bureaucratic file that no one will ever read.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's structural capture analysis identifies regulatory capture — the condition in which the regulatory function is controlled by the interests it is designed to regulate — as one of the most consequential forms of governance unfairness in industrial contexts. The 1,134 workers who died at Rana Plaza died not because Bangladesh had no building safety regulations — it did — but because the regulatory enforcement function was captured by the political and commercial interests that made aggressive enforcement structurally costly for individual inspectors. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness requires that regulatory functions be structurally independent from the interests they regulate — including independence from the political connections that translate commercial interests into regulatory capture through career pressure on individual officials.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Regulatory Independence provision requires: all inspection functions related to worker health and safety must be conducted by officers who have no access to information about the political or commercial connections of the entity being inspected; structural safety concerns above a defined threshold must be automatically escalated to an independent safety authority without individual inspector discretion; and any documented failure to escalate a safety concern that subsequently produces industrial casualties is subject to criminal liability for the inspector who failed to escalate, regardless of the reason for non-escalation. Under this design, the inspector who reviewed the structural concern at the factory in this scenario cannot make a politically informed decision about escalation — the system architecture removes the information that enables that decision.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair crisis governance possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for government contracts to be awarded based on political connections rather than competitive merit? (FI Q13)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the same actions to result in very different legal consequences depending on the social status or connections of the person involved? (FI Q10)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how public funds are spent? (FI Q21)*

S44 Energy Blackout

Domain: Crisis Governance | Historical Basis: Bangladesh energy crisis 2025; Middle East conflict energy shock impact | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — crisis timeline

Active Roles: Minister of Finance (R07), Prime Minister (R01), IMF Managing Director (R65), G20 Chair (R82), Prime Minister-Donor Dependent State (R88), Trade Union Leader (R49)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's energy sector has been under sustained pressure since 2022 — import-dependent on fuel and facing significant payment arrears to power producers that caused rolling blackouts of up to 14 hours daily in some areas in 2022. The ongoing Middle East conflict has created an additional energy shock, with LNG prices spiking and Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves under significant pressure from fuel import costs. The Bangladesh economy's high energy intensity — driven by the garment sector — means energy shortages translate rapidly into export production losses and workforce income disruption. This scenario addresses the 6-hour crisis decision point documented in the system prompt context.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Finance Minister. Bangladesh has six hours of fuel reserve remaining at current consumption rates. A combination of delayed payment arrears to fuel suppliers and the Middle East conflict-driven price spike has produced this crisis. The IMF's current program conditions prohibit emergency fuel subsidies above the current level without triggering a program review that could suspend the next tranche. Your central bank governor has confirmed that the foreign exchange reserves cannot absorb an emergency fuel purchase at current prices without breaching IMF reserve floor conditions. The Prime Minister has authorized you to resolve this within 6 hours. Options include: emergency IMF program modification request, emergency bilateral borrowing from a friendly government, controlled rolling blackout protocol to extend reserves to 24 hours while pursuing financing, or emergency fuel rationing that prioritizes hospitals and critical infrastructure.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[IMF Resident Representative] *A program modification request is possible but requires 72 hours minimum for emergency board consideration. Your 6-hour timeline is incompatible with formal program modification. We can offer technical consultations but cannot authorize emergency subsidy expenditure within this timeline.*

[Chinese Embassy (through foreign ministry channel)] *We have received your inquiry. An emergency bilateral credit line of $800 million at 6% interest for 18 months is available for immediate disbursement if you are prepared to proceed outside IMF program frameworks. We require a government commitment within 2 hours.*

[Hospital Association (emergency communication)] *Dhaka's major hospitals are running on generator backup that will be exhausted within 4 hours at current fuel levels. Surgical operations, intensive care, and dialysis are at risk. We need priority fuel allocation immediately.*

[Garment sector (BGMEA)] *If power is cut for more than 8 consecutive hours, we lose approximately $340 million in export orders that cannot be recovered. We need to understand the crisis timeline to notify international buyers.*

Decision Point 1

You have 6 hours, $0 available within IMF constraints, a Chinese credit offer requiring 2-hour commitment, and an IMF consultation offer that requires 72 hours. What is your immediate action?

Option A: Implement emergency fuel rationing immediately — allocate remaining reserves exclusively to hospitals, dialysis centers, water treatment, and communications infrastructure for the next 24 hours, while simultaneously pursuing the Chinese credit line with the PM's authorization and the IMF consultation in parallel.

Option B: Accept the Chinese credit line within the 2-hour window — accepting an 18-month debt obligation at 6% interest to resolve the immediate crisis, and separately managing the IMF program implications afterward.

Option C: Implement controlled rolling blackouts — reducing total energy consumption by 40% through scheduled district-by-district outages that extend the 6-hour reserve to approximately 22 hours, using that window to pursue emergency financing.

Option D: Contact the IMF Resident Representative to request emergency verbal authorization for a 72-hour subsidy exemption — asking whether there is any informal program flexibility that allows immediate emergency action while formal modification proceeds.

Decision Point 2

You have implemented emergency rationing and accepted the Chinese credit line pending PM approval. The credit line will take 4 hours to activate — leaving a 2-hour gap. Fuel is running out faster than the rationing protocol anticipated because three hospitals exceeded their allocated quantities after ICU emergencies. It is now 3 hours into the crisis. Emergency generators at two major hospitals will be exhausted in 45 minutes without additional fuel. The only available immediate source is the fuel currently reserved for the garment export processing zone — releasing it to hospitals will cause an immediate 6-hour garment sector shutdown. What is your decision?

Option A: Release the garment sector fuel to hospitals — $340 million in export losses is significant but hospital ICU operations take absolute priority over export production.

Option B: Split the allocation — release 60% to hospitals and maintain 40% in the garment sector, attempting to sustain both at reduced capacity until the Chinese credit line activates.

Option C: Contact the garment sector's international buyers directly — explaining the emergency and requesting a 24-hour extension on shipment commitments that would allow the export zone to shut down temporarily without contract breach.

Option D: Request Army logistics assets to source fuel from any available reserve — military fuel reserves, embassy fuel stocks, or any other non-commercial source that can bridge the 45-minute gap.

Decision Point 3

The crisis has passed — the Chinese credit line was activated, hospitals maintained power, the garment sector experienced a 4-hour shutdown. Export losses were approximately $180 million — less than the worst-case scenario. The IMF has formally noted that Bangladesh accepted external financing outside the program framework and has scheduled a program review. The Chinese credit line at 6% interest represents a significant 18-month debt obligation. Long-term, Bangladesh's energy vulnerability — import dependency, payment arrears, inadequate domestic generation — remains unchanged. What is your strategic recommendation to the PM for addressing the structural energy vulnerability?

Option A: Immediate priority: renegotiate payment arrears schedule with power producers through a transparent, published restructuring plan; medium-term: accelerate renewable energy capacity

development to reduce import dependency; long-term: diversify energy import sources to reduce geopolitical concentration risk.

Option B: Accept the Chinese credit line as the beginning of a deeper energy partnership — pursuing Chinese investment in domestic power generation as the most available source of large-scale energy investment, accepting the geopolitical dependency this creates.

Option C: Request a formal IMF program modification to include energy security investment provisions — making the structural energy vulnerability part of the program discussion rather than an external constraint on program compliance.

Option D: Commission an independent national energy security review — before committing to any strategic direction, assessing what Bangladesh's energy independence pathway actually requires and what it costs.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (emergency rationing + Chinese credit, hospitals first, structural reform roadmap): *The crisis is resolved. Hospital operations are maintained. Export losses are $180 million — significant but not catastrophic. The IMF program review results in a formal note in the program record and a 30-day enhanced monitoring period — no tranche suspension. The Chinese credit line is repaid over 18 months at manageable cost. The structural reform roadmap produces: payment arrears restructuring within 6 months; a 2 GW renewable energy procurement plan within 18 months; and import diversification negotiations with India and Singapore energy markets. Bangladesh's energy vulnerability is reduced measurably over three years. The 6-hour crisis produced a structural reform that three years of routine governance pressure had not.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option B in Decision Point 2 (Chinese credit only, split allocation): *Hospitals maintain operations at 60% capacity. Two dialysis patients experience complications attributed to the reduced power availability. Three garment factories experience equipment damage from the power instability in the split allocation zone. Export losses are $240 million. The IMF program review is more formal — a 3-month enhanced monitoring period with a specific requirement that future emergency financing be pursued through program channels. Bangladesh's debt profile has worsened. The structural energy vulnerability is unchanged. The Chinese energy partnership deepens over the following year as the easiest available financing continues to be Chinese bilateral rather than multilateral.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — Energy Import Dependency as a Structural Governance Vulnerability

The energy blackout scenario reveals a structural governance vulnerability that operates across multiple timescales: the immediate 6-hour crisis is the acute manifestation of a structural dependency that has been building over years of underinvestment in domestic energy capacity and over-reliance on imported fuel that is subject to global price shocks and supply chain disruption. The Finance Minister who resolves the 6-hour crisis has not addressed the structural vulnerability — they have managed its most acute expression while the underlying governance failure (inadequate energy security investment, uncorrected payment arrears, lack of import diversification) continues. The crisis governance challenge in this scenario is not primarily the 6-hour decision — it is the governance design failure that produced the 6-hour crisis as the foreseeable consequence of years of structural neglect.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's epistemic dependence analysis identifies energy security as a governance domain in which the populations most affected — the hospital patients, the garment workers, the households without power — have no formal governance standing in the investment decisions that

determine their energy security. The IMF conditionality that constrains emergency subsidy, the Chinese credit terms that create dependency, and the arrears payment schedule that produced the payment crisis were all determined in bilateral negotiations between government and international financial actors without any formal participation by the populations who bear the consequences. The 6-hour crisis is the cumulative result of multiple governance decisions made without accountability to those most affected.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Energy Security Governance provision requires: a formal parliamentary energy security committee with authority to review and approve all major energy import contracts, financing arrangements, and tariff structures; mandatory 10-year energy security planning with public consultation and parliamentary approval; and an energy emergency reserve fund — financed through a portion of export earnings — that provides 30-day emergency capacity without requiring emergency borrowing or IMF program violations. Under this design, the 6-hour crisis does not occur because the structural vulnerability that produced it has been addressed through governance accountability rather than allowed to accumulate through governance neglect.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair crisis governance possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for the social safety net to leave significant portions of the population without adequate support during economic hardship? (FI Q20)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to use emergency powers that temporarily suspend certain legal protections during national crises? (FI Q23)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S45 Pandemic Governance

Domain: Crisis Governance | Historical Basis: COVID-19 pandemic WHO response 2020; global health governance under information asymmetry | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — time-critical global health decision

Active Roles: WHO Director-General (R68), UN Secretary-General (R61), US President (R73), Chinese Foreign Minister (R76), G20 Chair (R82), Prime Minister-Donor Dependent State (R88)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The COVID-19 pandemic governance response of 2020 illustrates the structural failures of global health governance under conditions of information asymmetry, geopolitical competition, and institutional authority without enforcement capacity. The WHO's initial response was shaped by: China's delay in sharing full genomic sequencing data; the WHO's institutional dependence on Chinese cooperation for access to early outbreak data; the economic and political costs of declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) before member state consensus; and the absence of any enforcement mechanism for the International Health Regulations (IHR) that nominally govern member state obligations. The scenario draws directly on these documented structural failures.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the WHO Director-General. It is early in the emergence of a novel respiratory pathogen. Reports from one member state indicate a cluster of unusual pneumonia cases in a major city. The member state has provided limited information and has requested that WHO consultations proceed through official bilateral channels rather than through independent WHO investigation. Your epidemiological team's preliminary assessment, based on available data, is that the pathogen may have pandemic potential. Declaring a PHEIC would trigger international response mechanisms and potentially accelerate containment — but would also impose significant economic costs on the affected member state and potentially damage WHO's relationship with a major funder and permanent Security Council member. The International Health Regulations require you to act on credible public health evidence — but the evidence is limited because the affected state has not provided full access. You have 72 hours before the outbreak narrative is either contained by the member state or becomes international news through independent means.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Affected Member State Government] *This is a manageable local health situation. We are investigating fully and will share information through appropriate channels. A premature international alert would cause unnecessary economic disruption and panic. We request that WHO respect bilateral consultation protocols.*

[WHO Epidemiological Team] *The available data is consistent with a novel pathogen with significant human-to-human transmission potential. We do not have sufficient data to confirm pandemic potential — because we do not have access to the data required for that determination. The absence of data is itself a signal.*

[Major Donor Government] *We are monitoring the situation and would appreciate WHO's commitment to evidence-based decision-making rather than premature declarations that could trigger unnecessary economic consequences for all parties.*

[Independent Epidemiologist Network (informal)] *We have seen similar outbreak reports through social media and non-official channels. The pattern is consistent with rapid human-to-human spread. Waiting for official data that may not come will cost weeks that matter in exponential growth.*

Decision Point 1

You are within your 72-hour assessment window. What is your action?

Option A: Invoke IHR Article 12 to constitute an Emergency Committee and formally assess whether the situation meets the PHEIC threshold — using WHO's legal authority to trigger the formal emergency assessment process regardless of the affected member state's preference for bilateral consultation.

Option B: Request an urgent direct conversation with the affected state's Health Minister — using personal diplomatic engagement to secure information access before triggering formal IHR mechanisms that may close the cooperative relationship.

Option C: Issue a formal WHO information request under IHR Article 9 — requiring the affected member state to provide available information within 24 hours as a legal obligation, creating a formal record of the information request.

Option D: Issue a public health advisory characterizing the situation as 'under investigation' — signaling international awareness without triggering formal PHEIC mechanisms, creating public attention pressure that may increase member state information sharing.

Decision Point 2

The Emergency Committee has convened. The affected state has provided partial data — genomic sequencing for 40% of the cases identified, clinical data for 60%. The Emergency Committee is divided: five members believe the available data justifies a PHEIC declaration; four believe the data is insufficient for PHEIC without access to the full dataset; two believe a PHEIC declaration would be premature regardless. You have authority to accept or reject the Committee's recommendation — the final decision is yours. What do you declare?

Option A: Declare a PHEIC — the data available, combined with the pattern of information restriction, constitutes the strongest available signal that the situation meets the threshold. The economic costs of a premature declaration are real but recoverable; the costs of a delayed declaration during exponential spread are potentially not.

Option B: Decline to declare a PHEIC — the Emergency Committee is divided, the data is insufficient for a definitive determination, and declaring based on limited data risks WHO credibility if the pathogen proves less severe than the worst-case assessment.

Option C: Declare a PHEIC with explicit acknowledgment of data limitations — characterizing the declaration as a precautionary response to incomplete information rather than a definitive scientific determination, preserving WHO's epistemic credibility while triggering international response.

Option D: Issue a 'Level 2 Alert' — a WHO advisory mechanism below PHEIC threshold that triggers enhanced international surveillance and voluntary cooperation without the mandatory IHR response that PHEIC would require.

Decision Point 3

Three months later. The pathogen has become a global pandemic — more than two million cases across 140 countries. Your PHEIC declaration was made at an early stage and has been vindicated by subsequent events. The affected member state has characterized your declaration as 'premature and politically motivated' — a characterization that your major donor government has partially endorsed in public statements. WHO's funding from that major donor has been suspended pending 'a review of WHO's performance.' The G20 is preparing a response framework. What is your position on the global response architecture going forward?

Option A: Propose mandatory IHR reform — specifically, requiring all member states to provide WHO with direct independent investigation access within 72 hours of any novel pathogen report, with automatic PHEIC escalation if access is denied. Make this the WHO's central reform demand in the G20 process.

Option B: Prioritize restoring the major donor relationship — accepting a review process that may produce policy changes in exchange for restored funding, arguing that a funded WHO with less authority is more effective than an unfunded WHO with more authority.

Option C: Pursue alternative funding architecture — approaching other major economies for increased contributions that reduce WHO's dependency on any single donor whose political preferences can effectively veto WHO's independent public health function.

Option D: Request an independent international review of WHO's COVID response — accepting external assessment of your own performance as a demonstration of institutional accountability that may restore credibility with skeptical member states.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (Emergency Committee invoked, PHEIC declared, mandatory IHR reform proposed): *Your PHEIC declaration is made six weeks before comparable historical benchmarks would have produced it. The international response — travel advisories, research mobilization, vaccine development prioritization — is advanced by approximately five weeks. Epidemiological modeling suggests that this advance reduces the eventual pandemic death toll by 3–8% — representing between 800,000 and 2 million lives, depending on the model. Your major donor suspends funding. WHO operates on a reduced budget for 18 months. The mandatory IHR reform proposal receives 94 co-sponsors at the World Health Assembly and is adopted in modified form — requiring access within 120 hours rather than 72. It is the most significant WHO reform in 40 years. You have traded WHO funding security for public health effectiveness. Whether that trade was worth it is answered by the epidemiological modeling, not by the institutional comfort of any member state.*

If Option B in Decision Point 2, Option B in Decision Point 3 (declines PHEIC, restores donor relationship): *The PHEIC is not declared for six additional weeks — until the pandemic is globally undeniable. The international response is delayed by those six weeks. WHO's relationship with the major donor is maintained. Funding continues. The reform process produces incremental improvements to IHR transparency requirements. The epidemiological modeling that never gets published would have shown the cost of the six-week delay in PHEIC terms. The institutional relationships are maintained. The structural*

WHO dependence on member state cooperation that produced the information gap is unreformed. The next outbreak will face the same structural constraints.

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Epistemic Dependence — Global Health Authority Without Independent Information Access

The pandemic scenario reveals the most acute form of epistemic dependence in global governance: the international health authority that is constitutionally dependent on member states for the disease surveillance information it needs to exercise its health protection function. The WHO cannot independently investigate outbreaks on member state territory without consent; it cannot compel genomic sequencing data disclosure; it cannot assess pandemic potential without the data that the affected state controls and may choose not to share. The result is an international health authority whose effectiveness is structurally contingent on the goodwill of the state whose disease management most directly determines whether an outbreak becomes a pandemic.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's epistemic dependence analysis identifies global health governance as the clearest case of institutional authority without information independence. The WHO's mandate is to protect global public health; its information access depends on member state cooperation whose delay directly enables the spread the mandate requires preventing. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied globally, requires that global health governance institutions have independent information access — not subject to member state veto — for situations that pose potential pandemic risk. The structural design that makes the most consequential information in pandemic prevention dependent on the state with the greatest incentive to minimize an outbreak is the global governance failure that the COVID-19 pandemic most directly illustrated.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision on global health governance requires: mandatory WHO independent investigation access within 72 hours of any novel pathogen report from any source — including non-official sources such as epidemiologist networks and social media monitoring; automatic PHEIC escalation protocol that triggers if member state access is denied rather than requiring a formal declaration against member state resistance; and an independent WHO funding mechanism — a levy on member state health expenditure — that reduces WHO's dependency on voluntary contributions from member states whose political preferences can effectively constrain WHO's independent public health function.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair crisis governance possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S46 The Coup Decision

Domain: Crisis Governance | Historical Basis: Bangladesh August 2024 transition; comparative military-civilian governance crises | Timer: 45 seconds per decision point — acute constitutional crisis

Active Roles: Chief Justice (R26), Army Brigade Commander (R56), Chief Secretary (R59), Home Secretary (R58), Prime Minister (R01), Opposition Leader (R02)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 2 — Justice and Rule of Law

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh's August 2024 political transition — in which Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country following the student uprising and the military's withdrawal of support — is the most significant political transition in Bangladesh since 1990. The military did not stage a coup in the conventional sense; it facilitated a transition by withdrawing the security support that the Hasina government required to maintain power against the protests. An interim government led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus was subsequently formed at the request of the student movement and with the military's acquiescence. This scenario draws on the structural moment — the period between an incumbent government's collapse and the formation of a legitimate transitional authority — to create the most extreme crisis governance scenario in the library.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are the Chief Justice. The Prime Minister has departed the country under disputed circumstances — the official account is resignation; the opposition account is flight under military pressure. Parliament has been dissolved. The President — a constitutional figurehead — has disappeared from public communication. The Army Commander has appeared on national television stating that 'the military is committed to protecting the constitutional order' without specifying what that means. Three groups have separately requested your presence: the military commander who wants you to swear in an interim administration; the student movement leadership who want you to facilitate a constitutional resolution; and the former opposition leader who wants you to declare the previous government's removal constitutionally illegitimate and call for elections. You are the only remaining constitutional authority with national credibility. Your actions in the next 24 hours will determine whether Bangladesh's transition is constitutional or extra-constitutional.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Army Commander] *Chief Justice, we need a constitutional framework for this transition. We request that you administer the oath to an interim government as provided under Article 58 of the Constitution. The military will support whatever constitutional arrangement you establish.*

[Student Movement Leadership] *The people have removed a corrupt government. We request your guidance on the constitutional path forward. We do not want military governance. We want a transition that leads to genuine elections within a reasonable period.*

[Former Opposition Leader] *The previous government's removal was unconstitutional. An election must be called immediately under the constitution. The interim government the Army is proposing is an extra-constitutional usurpation. We will not participate in any non-elected administration.*

[Your constitutional assessment] *Article 58 provides for a caretaker government when parliament is dissolved pending elections — not for a transitional government after a sitting government's removal. Whatever I administer must be defensible as constitutional. Extra-constitutional action by the Chief Justice is itself a constitutional breakdown.*

Decision Point 1

The Army Commander is waiting for your response. The student movement is waiting. The opposition is waiting. The country is watching. What is your immediate action?

Option A: Issue a public statement as Chief Justice establishing the constitutional framework you will apply — specifically, convening an emergency session of the Supreme Court to determine the constitutional status of the transition and the proper legal pathway forward before you administer any oath to any person or body.

Option B: Meet with all three requesting parties simultaneously — requiring the Army Commander, student movement, and opposition to convene together under your mediation before you take any constitutional action, creating a multi-party process rather than responding to any single request.

Option C: Administer the oath to an interim administration based on Article 58 as the Army Commander has requested — accepting the Army's constitutional framing and working within it to establish the most legitimate possible transitional authority.

Option D: Decline all three requests and issue a statement calling for immediate elections under whatever constitutional emergency provisions exist — taking the position that only an elected government has constitutional legitimacy and that interim administration is constitutionally impermissible.

Decision Point 2

You have convened a Supreme Court emergency session. The Court has agreed 4-3 on a constitutional framework: the President — even if temporarily non-communicative — retains formal authority and must be located and brought back to exercise his constitutional function. Article 58 does not authorize a Chief Justice-administered interim government; the President must administer the oath to any transitional authority. The Army Commander has been informed. He has responded: 'We will locate the President.

But if he is unable to exercise his function within 4 hours, we will need an alternative.' What is the Supreme Court's position on the 4-hour deadline?

Option A: The Court formally states that constitutional processes do not operate on military deadlines — the President must be located through proper channels, the constitutional process will take the time it takes, and any 'alternative' the Army implements outside that process will be constitutionally illegitimate and the Court will say so publicly.

Option B: The Court accepts the 4-hour working deadline as a practical necessity — noting that prolonged constitutional uncertainty is itself a governance failure, and that the Court will work within the operational timeline while maintaining its constitutional principles.

Option C: The Court contacts the President directly through official channels, the results of which will determine the next step — removing the Army's deadline pressure by taking direct judicial action to locate the constitutional actor.

Option D: The Court issues an interim order appointing the Vice President (if one exists) or the Speaker as Acting President under constitutional emergency provisions — resolving the leadership vacuum without either capitulating to the Army's timeline or prolonging the crisis.

Decision Point 3

The President has been located and has exercised his constitutional authority — appointing Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser of an interim government on the request of the student movement with the Army's acquiescence. The constitutional crisis has passed. The transition has occurred. Your role as Chief Justice in the next phase is to ensure the interim government operates within constitutional bounds. Two months into the interim, the government has detained 47 senior officials of the previous government — without formal criminal charges — in what the interim government characterizes as 'preventive detention pending investigation.' Opposition parties are characterizing the detentions as politically motivated. What is your judicial position?

Option A: Issue an immediate order requiring that all 47 detained officials be either formally charged within 72 hours or released — the constitutional right to liberty cannot be suspended by interim government characterization of 'preventive detention pending investigation' without statutory basis.

Option B: Await formal habeas corpus applications from the detained officials before acting — the court responds to applications, not to newspaper reports, and the detained officials have the right to bring their own constitutional challenge.

Option C: Issue a formal advisory opinion on the constitutional permissibility of 'preventive detention pending investigation' as a category — clarifying the legal framework before specific cases arise rather than case by case.

Option D: Request a formal meeting with the Chief Adviser to communicate the Court's constitutional concerns about the detention pattern — attempting informal resolution before formal judicial intervention, which may preserve the relationship the transition depends on.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (emergency Court session, rejects military deadline, 72-hour charge-or-release order): *The Court's emergency session is the most significant judicial action in Bangladesh's history — a Supreme Court establishing constitutional procedure for a government transition while it is occurring. The Army Commander's compliance with the Court's framework is the decisive factor that makes the transition constitutional rather than extra-constitutional. The President is located; Yunus is appointed; the transition occurs with constitutional authority intact. Your 72-hour charge-or-release order is applied: 31 of 47 detained officials are formally charged; 16 are released. The 31 prosecutions produce 8 convictions over 3 years. The interim government's accountability record — conducted under judicial oversight — is significantly more defensible than the unstructured detention the initial 47 represented. The constitutional order has been maintained through the worst governance crisis Bangladesh has faced since 1975.*

If Option C in Decision Point 1, Option D in Decision Point 3 (administers oath under Army framing, requests meeting on detentions): *You administer the oath to an interim government under Article 58 on the Army's request. The constitutional legitimacy of this action is immediately contested by the opposition and by two international constitutional law scholars who publish critical analyses. The interim government's constitutional basis is disputed but functional — the Army's support and the student movement's enthusiasm compensate for the constitutional contestation. The informal approach to the 47 detentions produces partial resolution — 20 officials are released after the Chief Adviser's meeting with you; 27 remain in preventive detention for 8 months without formal charges. The constitutional record of the transition is the weakest possible — extra-constitutional oath administration, disputed legitimacy, extended detention without charge. Whether this produces long-term democratic damage depends on whether the elections that follow are genuine.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Authority-Accountability Misalignment — The Constitutional Moment Where Design Determines Everything

The coup decision scenario presents the most extreme form of the authority-accountability alignment problem: the moment when no institutional authority is clearly functioning and the governance architecture is determining, in real time, whether the transition will be constitutional or extra-constitutional. The Army Commander who wants the Chief Justice to administer an oath is seeking to use judicial authority to legitimize military-facilitated transition — which would make the judiciary an instrument of the military's political agenda rather than an independent constitutional authority. The Chief Justice who refuses to act on the Army's terms and instead establishes the constitutional framework — locating the President, requiring formal charges for detentions — is performing the governance engineering function at its most acute: using institutional authority to constrain the actors with the most immediate power in favor of the constitutional order.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's institutional design analysis treats the coup decision as the governance engineering test case par excellence: the constitutional architecture that has been built over decades is tested in 24 hours against the most immediate political pressure the system faces. The Chief Justice who acts constitutionally under military pressure demonstrates that the judicial institution is real — that it is not merely formal authority that disappears when power is exercised outside constitutional channels. The governance design lesson: the institutional independence that makes constitutional behavior possible in crisis must be built into the architecture during normal times, not improvised during the crisis.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Constitutional Resilience provision specifies: the Supreme Court must have an established emergency protocol for constitutional crisis situations, including pre-designated meeting locations, secure communication channels, and a quorum requirement that can be met even when individual justices are unreachable; the Chief Justice must have formal authority to convene

emergency constitutional proceedings without executive permission; and all oath administrations to any governing authority must be preceded by a formal Supreme Court constitutional review — removing the possibility of oath administration under extra-constitutional pressure by making the constitutional review mandatory. Under this design, the Army Commander's request for a Chief Justice oath administration triggers the mandatory constitutional review process — which takes the time it takes, regardless of military deadlines.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair crisis governance possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for courts to be significantly influenced by the preferences of the political party in power? (FI Q8)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for governments to use emergency powers that temporarily suspend certain legal protections during national crises? (FI Q23)*

— End of Chapter 14 —

Next: Chapter 15 — Scenario Scripts: Domain Nine — Global Governance and Power (S47–S50)

CHAPTER 15

Scenario Scripts — Domain Nine: Global Governance and Power (S47–S50)

Domain Nine is the final scenario domain and the one that operates at the widest scale — the global governance architecture through which international relations, resource distribution, climate, and sovereign power intersect. The four scenarios in this domain share a common structural feature: they all place Bangladesh — or a Bangladesh-analogous state — in a structural position of significant geopolitical dependency. Bangladesh is simultaneously a small economy in a contested regional neighborhood, a labor-exporting country dependent on remittance flows, a climate-vulnerable nation facing existential threat from sea-level rise, and a strategic location contested by Indian, Chinese, and American geopolitical interests. The scenarios in this domain are not abstract global governance exercises — they are the direct governance reality that Bangladesh navigates in every major international engagement.

The four scenarios address: the Teesta River water rights negotiation that has defined and frustrated Bangladesh-India relations for decades (S47), the US visa sanction applied to Bangladesh officials for democratic backsliding (S48), the China BRI infrastructure offer that creates debt dependency and regional geopolitical tension (S49), and the climate displacement crisis in which Bangladesh addresses the UN as the country most existentially threatened by the emissions of states with the least accountability to the populations they are displacing (S50). These are not peripheral governance issues — they are among the most consequential governance decisions any Bangladeshi leader makes, and they are made within structural constraints that the scenarios are designed to make viscerally real.

Bangladesh did not cause climate change. Bangladesh did not design the global trading system. Bangladesh did not write the IMF's conditionality framework. Bangladesh did not determine which countries have veto power at the UN. Bangladesh lives with all of these — every day — with less governance standing in each than the populations that created them. This is what global structural unfairness feels like from the inside.

S47 India-Bangladesh Water Rights

Domain: Global Governance and Power | Historical Basis: Bangladesh-India Teesta River water sharing negotiations; Farakka Barrage history | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Foreign Minister-Bangladesh (R08 adapted), Prime Minister-India (R77), Indian Foreign Minister (R78), SAARC Secretary General (R83), UN Secretary-General (R61), Prime Minister-Bangladesh (R01)
Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh and India share 54 transboundary rivers, the most significant of which are the Ganges and the Teesta. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty established a 30-year framework for dry-season water distribution from the Farakka Barrage. The Teesta River — critical for irrigation in Bangladesh's northern districts — has not had a comparable treaty, despite decades of negotiation. A 2011 interim agreement that would have given Bangladesh 37.5% of Teesta dry-season flow was blocked by West Bengal's Chief Minister, who argued it would harm Bengali farmers. India's federal structure means the central government cannot commit to water sharing that requires the cooperation of the affected state government. Bangladesh's northern agricultural zone is heavily dependent on Teesta irrigation — water scarcity during dry seasons directly affects crop yields and farmer livelihoods for millions. This scenario is grounded in this documented bilateral impasse.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are Bangladesh's Foreign Minister. A new round of India-Bangladesh water sharing negotiations has been convened following the post-Hasina transition and India's expressed interest in 'resetting' the bilateral relationship after the political turbulence. The Indian government has proposed a comprehensive water cooperation framework that includes: Teesta water sharing at 38% for Bangladesh in the dry season; accelerated transit access for Indian goods through Bangladesh territory; and a joint river management authority. The framework is the most favorable Bangladesh has received in decades. It comes with two conditions that complicate acceptance: Bangladesh must agree to participate in a trilateral digital infrastructure project with India and Bhutan that has cybersecurity implications your technical team has flagged as creating data sovereignty vulnerabilities; and Bangladesh must agree to extradite three individuals India has named as terrorism suspects — individuals who Bangladesh's own security assessment classifies as political dissidents who fled India.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Indian Foreign Minister] *This is the best water offer Bangladesh has received. The Teesta impasse has lasted 15 years. We are prepared to move. But the framework is comprehensive — we cannot accept water sharing without the broader cooperation elements. The package is the offer.*

[Bangladesh Agriculture Ministry] *Teesta water at 38% in dry season would transform agricultural productivity in the northern zone. 12 million farmers directly benefit. This is the most significant agricultural development opportunity in a generation. We strongly recommend acceptance.*

[Bangladesh Security Services] *The three extradition requests concern individuals whose cases we have reviewed. Our assessment is that they are political dissidents who face political persecution in India*

rather than genuine terrorism suspects. Extraditing them under India's characterization would be a significant human rights commitment we cannot in conscience make.

[Bangladesh Civil Society (digital rights)] *The digital infrastructure framework contains provisions that would give India visibility into Bangladesh's telecommunications infrastructure that creates unacceptable sovereignty and data security risks. We recommend technical review before any commitment.*

Decision Point 1

The Indian offer is on the table. It is the best Teesta offer Bangladesh has ever received. It comes with conditions your security and civil society advisers have flagged as problematic. What is your negotiating position?

Option A: Accept the Teesta water sharing and transit access provisions; formally decline the extradition requests citing Bangladesh's own security assessment and international human rights obligations; request technical renegotiation of the digital infrastructure framework on data sovereignty grounds — accepting a partial deal rather than the full package.

Option B: Accept the full framework as offered — the Teesta water benefit for 12 million farmers outweighs the extradition and digital infrastructure concerns, which can be managed through implementation details after agreement.

Option C: Decline the full framework and propose a standalone Teesta water sharing agreement — arguing that water is a humanitarian necessity that should not be bundled with security and digital cooperation conditions.

Option D: Request a 60-day technical review period — neither accepting nor declining, using the review window to build a detailed counter-proposal that modifies the extradition and digital provisions while preserving the water sharing offer.

Decision Point 2

India has rejected the partial acceptance — the framework is take-it-or-leave-it. The 60-day technical review has produced a counter-proposal that India's negotiating team has dismissed as inadequate. The standalone Teesta offer is rejected — India's position is that water cooperation is inseparable from broader bilateral relationship management. You are back to the original choice: accept the full framework or lose the Teesta offer. Bangladesh's Prime Minister is expecting your recommendation. What do you recommend?

Option A: Recommend rejection of the full framework — accepting the extradition and digital provisions would create harms that are not justified by the water sharing benefit, and Bangladesh's sovereignty interests require that these conditions be resisted even at the cost of a better Teesta deal.

Option B: Recommend acceptance with implementation safeguards — accepting the full framework in principle while negotiating maximum implementation constraints on the extradition and digital provisions that reduce their practical scope.

Option C: Recommend taking the question to SAARC — formally escalating the bilateral impasse to the regional level and proposing that Teesta water sharing be addressed as a regional water governance question rather than a bilateral package deal.

Option D: Recommend a domestic consultation process — taking the framework to parliament and public for formal consultation before any decision, creating democratic legitimacy for whatever outcome results and distributing the political responsibility for a difficult choice.

Decision Point 3

The framework has been accepted with implementation safeguards. Teesta water sharing at 38% has begun. Agricultural yields in the northern zone have increased 23% in the first season. The three extradition requests have been formally acknowledged but Bangladesh's legal review process is proceeding slowly — none of the three have been extradited. The digital infrastructure framework is in technical implementation with data sovereignty provisions that your advisers consider adequate. India has expressed 'satisfaction' with progress but has flagged the extradition delay as a 'concern.' Two years into the framework, the Indian government is presenting Bangladesh with a follow-on proposal: a maritime boundary clarification that would give India more favorable treatment in the Bay of Bengal exclusive economic zone. The proposal is linked to continued Teesta framework implementation. What is your position?

Option A: Negotiate the maritime boundary on its independent merits — maritime rights are determined by UNCLOS, not by bilateral framework linkage. Bangladesh will not accept maritime boundary modifications linked to water sharing implementation.

Option B: Accept the maritime boundary proposal as part of the evolving bilateral framework — the overall relationship benefits of maintaining India's cooperative posture justify accommodation on specific boundary questions.

Option C: Request ICJ adjudication of the maritime boundary question — removing the bilateral negotiation dynamic and establishing Bangladesh's rights through international legal process.

Option D: Propose a SAARC maritime governance framework — converting the bilateral maritime question into a regional one that reduces India's structural leverage as the dominant bilateral party.

▸ CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2 (partial acceptance rejected, then full framework with safeguards), Option A in Decision Point 3 (maritime on independent merits): *The Teesta water sharing has transformed Bangladesh's northern agricultural zone. 12 million farmers benefit from improved irrigation across three dry seasons. The three extradition requests remain unresolved — the legal review process has taken two years and shows no indication of conclusion. India characterizes this as Bangladesh not acting in good faith; Bangladesh characterizes it as due process. The maritime boundary negotiation proceeds independently under UNCLOS principles — Bangladesh's legal position is stronger than India's framework-linked proposal and produces a boundary closer to Bangladesh's interests. The bilateral relationship is complex and productive — both sides have gained something and both sides have grievances. This is the realistic outcome of negotiation between unequal parties with genuine competing interests.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1 (accepts full framework immediately): *The full framework is accepted. Teesta water sharing begins immediately. The digital infrastructure framework is implemented on India's terms. The three individuals flagged as political dissidents are extradited within 18 months under the terrorism characterization. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch publish detailed reports characterizing two of the three extraditions as violations of non-refoulement principles. Bangladesh's digital sovereignty is reduced measurably in the telecommunications sector. The agricultural benefit is real — 12 million farmers gain. The sovereignty cost is also real — not catastrophic, but permanent. The precedent of accepting security and digital conditions bundled with water sharing will shape future negotiations.*

▸ **FAIRNESS ANALYSIS**

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Small State Negotiating Position Under Regional Power Asymmetry

The Teesta water scenario reveals the structural governance challenge of bilateral negotiation under power asymmetry: Bangladesh needs India's water cooperation far more than India needs Bangladesh's goodwill in any specific domain. This creates a structural negotiating deficit that is not about individual bargaining skill but about the structural reality of a small economy dependent on a neighbor whose domestic politics — specifically West Bengal's state-level water politics — determine whether a federal Indian commitment on water sharing is implementable. Bangladesh's negotiating position is structurally constrained by factors it cannot change: its upstream dependency, India's federal structure, and the geopolitical reality that India's strategic interests in Bangladesh management extend well beyond water.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies bilateral negotiations under structural power asymmetry as one of the domains in which small states are most consistently excluded from the governance standing that genuine mutual agreement would require. The Teesta negotiation is not a negotiation between parties of equal structural standing — it is a negotiation in which one party controls a resource the other depends on and can bundle conditions that the dependent party cannot refuse without significant domestic harm. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied internationally, requires that governance frameworks for shared natural resources be determined by principles of equitable use rather than by bilateral power leverage.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision on transboundary resources requires: all shared river systems between states must be governed by a multilateral framework incorporating the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, with binding arbitration for disputed allocation questions rather than bilateral negotiation; no shared resource agreement may be bundled with security, extradition, or digital cooperation conditions — resource sharing must be governed by resource principles independently of the broader bilateral relationship; and a formal regional water governance body for South Asia — under SAARC or a successor framework — with binding authority over transboundary water allocation questions that removes India's structural leverage as the dominant bilateral party.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for international trade agreements to be negotiated in ways that primarily benefit large corporations at the expense of local producers and workers? (FI Q15) — consider in relation to bilateral agreements under power asymmetry*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to limit public access to information about how governance decisions are made? (FI Q21)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S48 The US Visa Sanction

Domain: Global Governance and Power | Historical Basis: US visa restriction policy on Bangladesh officials 2023; democracy promotion leverage | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Prime Minister-Bangladesh (R01), Foreign Minister-Bangladesh (R08 adapted), US Secretary of State (R74), Indian Prime Minister (R77), Chinese Foreign Minister (R76), Diaspora Community Leader (R98)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 1 — Governance and Leadership, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In May 2023, the United States State Department announced a new visa restriction policy for Bangladesh under Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212(f), targeting Bangladeshi individuals believed responsible for or complicit in undermining the democratic election process. The policy was introduced in the context of the 2024 Bangladesh election cycle and was widely understood as a US attempt to use visa access as leverage to improve electoral conditions. The Hasina government characterized the policy as 'political interference in Bangladesh's internal affairs.' The policy produced a formal diplomatic protest but limited behavioral change in election administration. The scenario addresses both the immediate diplomatic response and the strategic question of how Bangladesh manages its relationships with the US, India, and China simultaneously.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are Bangladesh's Prime Minister. The United States has announced visa restrictions targeting Bangladesh government officials believed responsible for undermining democratic electoral processes. The announcement names no individuals specifically but the State Department has indicated that specific visa denials will be communicated privately. Your government has been invited to respond formally. You are simultaneously managing three geopolitical relationships: the US, which is pressing for electoral reform and using the visa mechanism as leverage; India, which

has historically supported your government and whose position on the US policy is critical; and China, which has offered to deepen investment relationships without political conditions. The domestic political environment has been inflamed — the opposition has welcomed the US action; the ruling party's base has characterized it as Western imperialism.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[US State Department (formal communication)] *The United States remains committed to Bangladesh's democratic development. The visa restriction policy targets specific conduct rather than Bangladesh as a country. We encourage the Bangladesh government to take meaningful steps toward ensuring a free and fair electoral environment.*

[Indian Government (private channel)] *We are watching the US policy with concern. India's position has been consistent: bilateral relationships should not be used as leverage for political change. We will not endorse the US approach publicly. But we also cannot oppose it without creating diplomatic complications with the US. Bangladesh should navigate this without expecting Indian support against the US position.*

[Chinese Embassy] *China does not interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. We are prepared to expand our investment and infrastructure partnerships with Bangladesh without political conditions. Bangladesh's development is Bangladesh's sovereign choice.*

[Ruling Party Political Adviser] *The visa policy has mobilized our nationalist base. Frame the response as resistance to foreign interference in Bangladesh's sovereignty. The base wants a strong response. The diplomatic reality requires a careful one.*

Decision Point 1

The US has announced the visa restriction policy. Your formal response must be issued within 48 hours. What is your public position?

Option A: Issue a measured public response that: acknowledges the US concerns about electoral integrity without endorsing the specific mechanism; reaffirms Bangladesh's commitment to free and fair elections; and requests diplomatic engagement on the specific concerns rather than unilateral sanction — neither capitulating to nor confronting the US directly.

Option B: Issue a strong public protest characterizing the policy as interference in Bangladesh's internal affairs and a violation of sovereign equality — mobilizing the nationalist base while potentially reinforcing US concerns about democratic commitment.

Option C: Issue no formal public response — treat the policy as a routine US administrative action and manage it through quiet diplomatic channels, avoiding the public confrontation that would amplify both the US criticism and the domestic political response.

Option D: Issue a public response that directly challenges the US consistency — noting specific US actions in other countries where democratic failures have not produced visa restrictions, using the consistency challenge to reframe the policy as politically rather than principally motivated.

Decision Point 2

Your measured response has produced a State Department acknowledgment that they will engage in diplomatic consultations. Three consultations have occurred. The US has presented specific concerns: the 2018 election administration, restrictions on opposition campaigning, and DSA use against journalists. Your government has disputed the characterization of the 2018 election and offered to discuss DSA reform. Four months before the next election, the US has indicated that the visa restrictions will be formally extended to named individuals unless specific steps are taken. What is your pre-election position on US concerns?

Option A: Implement genuine DSA reform as a concrete demonstration of democratic commitment — the DSA's documented suppressive effects on press freedom are both a governance problem in their own right and a diplomatic liability. This is the reform that the US concern and the governance reality align on.

Option B: Announce DSA reform as a political commitment without immediate implementation — creating diplomatic space through the announcement while managing the domestic political consequences of reform before they materialize.

Option C: Reject the US framing entirely — characterize the pre-election US conditions as electoral interference and present them publicly as such, accepting the diplomatic cost in exchange for domestic political mobilization.

Option D: Request a formal US visit to observe pre-election conditions — inviting US officials to verify Bangladesh's electoral preparations directly rather than responding to State Department assessments through diplomatic channels.

Decision Point 3

The election has occurred. The ruling party has won with a majority that international observers have characterized as 'credible but with significant remaining concerns.' The US has maintained its visa restriction framework but has not expanded it significantly. The post-election diplomatic relationship is in a fragile equilibrium. You now face the strategic question of Bangladesh's long-term geopolitical positioning: the US continues to link democratic performance to relationship depth; India is Bangladesh's most important immediate neighbor; China is offering deepening investment without conditions. How do you define Bangladesh's geopolitical strategy?

Option A: Pursue multi-alignment — maintaining active relationships with all three powers, leveraging the competition among them to maximize Bangladesh's developmental benefits while resisting exclusive alignment that would reduce strategic flexibility.

Option B: Prioritize the India relationship as the non-negotiable foundation — Bangladesh's geographic reality makes India the relationship that cannot be compromised, regardless of other diplomatic dynamics.

Option C: Pursue deeper US alignment — the long-term institutional and economic benefits of US partnership outweigh the short-term friction of democratic performance conditionality, and alignment with democratic norms is also in Bangladesh's own governance interest.

Option D: Accept the Chinese offer of condition-free investment deepening — Bangladesh's development needs are immediate and the Chinese offer meets them without the governance reform requirements that US conditionality demands.

CONSEQUENCE REVEALS

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (measured response, genuine DSA reform, multi-alignment strategy): *The DSA reform is implemented — not full repeal but significant modification of the most suppressive provisions. International press freedom organizations characterize it as 'meaningful progress.' Three journalists imprisoned under DSA are released. The next election is conducted under conditions that produce an international observer characterization of 'improved but with remaining structural concerns.' The US visa restriction framework is modified — existing restrictions maintained, no significant expansion. The multi-alignment strategy produces: continued Indian relationship stability; continued Chinese investment (two major infrastructure projects); and a US relationship that functions at a reduced but sustained level. Bangladesh has navigated the most complex geopolitical environment it has faced since independence without exclusive alignment to any power and without significant deterioration in any relationship.*

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option D in Decision Point 2, Option D in Decision Point 3 (strong protest, rejects US framing, accepts Chinese deepening): *The strong protest mobilizes the domestic nationalist base but deepens US diplomatic concern. The rejection of the US pre-election framing is characterized by the State Department as 'a failure to engage in good faith.' The Chinese investment deepening proceeds rapidly — three major infrastructure projects, a digital economy partnership, and enhanced military cooperation. US-Bangladesh relations deteriorate to their lowest point in 20 years. India watches the Chinese deepening with significant concern and reduces the warmth of the bilateral relationship. Bangladesh has traded Western diplomatic relationships for Chinese investment — a trade that is economically significant and strategically risky in equal measure.*

FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Small State Democracy Conditionality as Geopolitical Tool

The visa sanction scenario reveals the structural tension in US democracy promotion: the use of bilateral leverage mechanisms to advance democratic governance in other countries creates genuine accountability for democratic performance while simultaneously raising legitimate sovereignty questions about when external pressure is democratic promotion versus geopolitical management. The visa restriction policy targets conduct that is genuinely documented — Bangladesh's electoral administration problems are real, the DSA's suppressive effects are documented. But the policy also serves US geopolitical interests in Bangladesh by creating leverage that can be applied selectively in ways that promote US strategic objectives alongside democratic ones. The structural question: is democracy promotion leverage a governance tool or a power tool? The answer is that it is both, and that this dual function is not resolved by either accepting or rejecting the specific policy.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies democracy conditionality as a legitimate but structurally selective tool: US visa restrictions on Bangladesh officials for democratic backsliding are not applied equivalently to officials of states whose democratic backsliding serves US strategic interests. The selective application of democratic conditionality — Bangladesh faces it, Saudi Arabia does not — is the structural unfairness, not the conditionality itself. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied globally, requires that governance accountability mechanisms be applied universally rather than selectively by the states with the most geopolitical leverage.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision on democracy promotion requires: any state-to-state democracy conditionality mechanism must be subject to independent

review by an international democratic standards body that assesses whether the conditionality is consistently applied relative to the applying state's other bilateral relationships; democracy conditionality applied selectively in ways that serve the applying state's geopolitical interests rather than universal democratic principles is itself a governance fairness violation; and multilateral democracy monitoring bodies — rather than powerful state bilateral mechanisms — should be the primary accountability mechanism for democratic backsliding, reducing the structural selectivity that powerful states' bilateral leverage creates.

▸ **REFLECTION MODULE**

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for governments to make major policy decisions without public consultation or transparent explanation? (FI Q2)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for governments to restrict public protest and political dissent in order to maintain stability and security? (FI Q4)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S49 China's Infrastructure Offer

Domain: Global Governance and Power | Historical Basis: Bangladesh Belt and Road Initiative engagement; BRI debt concerns across South Asia | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Prime Minister-Bangladesh (R01), Chinese Foreign Minister (R76), Indian Prime Minister (R77), Minister of Finance-Bangladesh (R07), Business Association Chair (R51), SAARC Secretary General (R83)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

China's Belt and Road Initiative has been Bangladesh's largest source of infrastructure investment since 2016. Major Chinese-financed projects include the Padma Rail Link, the Karnaphuli Tunnel, and the Payra Deep Sea Port. Bangladesh's engagement with BRI has been more cautious than Pakistan's or Sri Lanka's — which experienced severe debt distress — but concerns about debt sustainability and geopolitical dependency have been raised by multiple independent analyses. The

post-Hasina transitional government has been reviewed BRI project terms and has cancelled or renegotiated several projects on debt sustainability grounds. This scenario addresses the decision framework for evaluating a new major Chinese infrastructure offer in the context of an already complex bilateral relationship.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are Bangladesh's Prime Minister. China has proposed a $3.2 billion port development project at Matarbari — a deep-sea port that would significantly expand Bangladesh's maritime trade capacity and potentially serve as a regional hub. The financial terms: 70% Chinese loan at 2.5% interest over 20 years, 30% Bangladesh equity participation. The project would create an estimated 28,000 direct jobs during construction and 8,000 permanent positions. Your Finance Ministry assessment shows: at current debt-to-GDP levels, the loan is sustainable within acceptable bounds; but if taken alongside three other currently proposed Chinese projects, total Chinese-linked debt would reach 18% of GDP — creating a concentration risk that your debt management advisers flag as concerning. India has explicitly requested that Bangladesh not develop Matarbari as a major deep-sea port, citing strategic concerns about Chinese naval access to Bay of Bengal waters. Bangladesh's existing commercial port is severely capacity-constrained — export delays cost an estimated $400 million annually.

▸ PRESSURE SIGNALS

[Chinese Ambassador] *The Matarbari project offers Bangladesh the maritime infrastructure that will transform its trade competitiveness for a generation. The financial terms are among the most favorable in the BRI portfolio. This is a genuine development partnership, not a debt trap. We request a decision within 30 days.*

[Indian Prime Minister (formal letter)] *India has serious security concerns about the development of Matarbari as a major deep-sea port. We request that Bangladesh consult us formally before making any commitment. The strategic implications for the Bay of Bengal require mutual understanding between our two countries.*

[Finance Ministry] *The Matarbari project alone is within our debt sustainability framework. The concentration risk arises only in combination with the three other proposed Chinese projects. If we accept Matarbari, we must decline at least two of the three other projects to stay within acceptable Chinese-linked debt concentration.*

[Business Association] *Port capacity constraint costs Bangladesh $400 million annually in export losses and delays. Matarbari is the infrastructure investment that unlocks our next phase of export growth. We strongly recommend acceptance.*

Decision Point 1

The 30-day decision window is running. India has formally requested consultation. The Finance Ministry has flagged the concentration risk. The export case for the port is strong. What is your response to China and your approach to India?

Option A: Accept Matarbari conditionally — communicate acceptance in principle to China while formally requesting a technical modification to address India's stated security concerns (civilian-use-only protocols, third-country operator involvement, Indian consultation on port governance). Simultaneously manage India's concerns directly through diplomatic engagement rather than deferring to their veto.

Option B: Request a 90-day review period from China — using the review to conduct a formal debt portfolio analysis across all proposed Chinese projects, assess India's specific security concerns, and develop a comprehensive infrastructure financing strategy before committing to Matarbari.

Option C: Decline Matarbari and propose an alternative port development model — a multilateral financing arrangement involving the ADB, World Bank, and bilateral contributions from Japan and South Korea that develops Matarbari port capacity without Chinese bilateral debt concentration.

Option D: Accept Matarbari as offered — the development case is clear, the terms are favorable, India's concerns are geopolitical rather than economic and should not determine Bangladesh's infrastructure decisions.

Decision Point 2

China has granted a 90-day review. Your debt portfolio analysis has confirmed the Finance Ministry's assessment — Matarbari can be accepted if two of the three other Chinese projects are deferred. India's specific security concern has been clarified: they are not opposed to Matarbari's commercial development but object to specific wharf specifications that could accommodate Chinese military vessels. A technical modification to those specifications would address India's stated concern. Your review has also identified Japanese development bank interest in co-financing Matarbari — which would reduce the Chinese loan component from 70% to 45% and introduce a multilateral element that reduces concentration risk. What is your final proposal to China?

Option A: Propose the modified Matarbari project: Japanese co-financing reducing the Chinese component to 45%; civilian-use-only wharf specifications addressing India's security concern; and acceptance of Matarbari in exchange for formal deferral of the two other Chinese projects that would create concentration risk. Present this as the optimized partnership arrangement.

Option B: Accept Matarbari on the original terms and manage India's concerns bilaterally — the Japanese co-financing reduces the Chinese component but the terms are slightly less favorable. The original Chinese terms are better economically and India's concerns can be managed diplomatically.

Option C: Accept the Japanese co-financing model but decline the civilian-use-only specification — addressing China's concern that the specification change would reduce the port's strategic value to them while accommodating India through the multilateral financing structure.

Option D: Decline all modifications and request that China and Japan jointly develop Matarbari as a trilateral project — a diplomatic innovation that directly involves India's competitor and ally in a shared infrastructure project, reducing the zero-sum geopolitical framing.

Decision Point 3

The modified Matarbari project — Japanese co-financing at 45%, civilian specifications, with two other Chinese projects deferred — has been accepted by China after extended negotiation. Construction has begun. Three years in, a new Bangladesh government has been elected — of a different party. The new government has received a Chinese proposal to renegotiate the civilian-use specification as part of a broader review of the infrastructure relationship. The renegotiation would restore Chinese investment in the two deferred projects in exchange for the specification modification. The Indian government has formally communicated that any modification would be 'unacceptable' and would trigger a review of the bilateral relationship. You are now the outgoing Foreign Minister providing your successor with a strategic recommendation. What do you recommend?

Option A: Recommend maintaining the civilian-use specification and declining the renegotiation — the specification was Bangladesh's diplomatic innovation that enabled the project while preserving the Indian relationship. Trading it for deferred project resumption reverses the strategic balance that was carefully achieved.

Option B: Recommend accepting the renegotiation — the new government has its own mandate and its own relationship with China. The infrastructure development case for the deferred projects is strong and India's leverage over Bangladesh's internal infrastructure decisions should be resisted.

Option C: Recommend that the new government conduct its own strategic review rather than being bound by the previous government's commitments — acknowledging that the specification was a political agreement that the new government has the right to reconsider.

Option D: Recommend formal SAARC mediation on the Bay of Bengal port governance question — converting the bilateral India-Bangladesh tension into a regional governance question that involves all affected states rather than being managed as a bilateral constraint.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option B in Decision Point 1, Option A in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (90-day review, modified project accepted, maintains specification): *Matarbari deep-sea port is developed with Japanese co-financing and civilian specifications. Export delays decrease significantly — the $400 million annual cost falls to approximately $90 million within five years of port completion. Bangladesh's debt concentration risk is managed within acceptable bounds. India's relationship remains stable — the civilian specification was the specific concern they raised, and it was addressed. China is satisfied with the project despite the modifications. The new government's decision to maintain the specification has avoided the India relationship deterioration that renegotiation would have produced. Bangladesh has navigated the China-India-US geopolitical triangle on infrastructure terms that advance its development interests without exclusive alignment to any power.*

If Option D in Decision Point 1 (accepts as offered, no modifications): *Matarbari is accepted on original terms. The Chinese debt concentration reaches 19% of GDP when combined with ongoing projects. India's relationship deteriorates — the foreign ministry characterizes the Matarbari decision as 'incompatible with*

Bangladesh's stated commitment to balanced relationships.' The US adds Matarbari to its list of BRI concerns in the Indo-Pacific. Bangladesh's port capacity constraint is resolved. The geopolitical balance has shifted measurably toward Chinese dependency. Whether this produces economic development that justifies the strategic cost depends on variables that will only be visible over the next 20 years.

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Small State Infrastructure Decision-Making Under Competing Major Power Pressure

The BRI infrastructure scenario reveals the structural governance challenge that defines small state development in a contested geopolitical environment: Bangladesh's infrastructure investment decisions are not made in a development vacuum — they are made in a geopolitical context in which India, China, and the United States all have strong preferences about Bangladesh's infrastructure choices, and all have significant leverage to express those preferences. The structurally fair governance outcome — Bangladesh makes infrastructure decisions based on development value, debt sustainability, and national interest without major power veto authority — is not available. The structural reality is that major power interests constrain every significant infrastructure decision Bangladesh makes, regardless of its formal sovereign authority to decide.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies infrastructure dependency as one of the primary mechanisms through which small state sovereignty is structurally constrained by major power competition. The BRI offer that comes with no political conditions is not condition-free — it comes with the implicit condition of Chinese relationship maintenance that constrains future decisions, and with the external condition of Indian and US strategic preferences that are not formally attached to the offer but shape the diplomatic environment in which it is evaluated. The Meta-Right to Structural Fairness, applied globally, requires that small states have access to infrastructure financing mechanisms that are not instrumentalized by major power geopolitical competition — financing through genuinely multilateral institutions that are not controlled by any single major power.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision on development finance requires: major infrastructure projects in developing countries should be financed through genuinely multilateral mechanisms — not through bilateral state-to-state loans from geopolitically interested major powers — with financing terms determined by development criteria rather than geopolitical strategy; where bilateral financing is used, mandatory independent debt sustainability assessment and publication must precede any commitment; and any bilateral loan conditioned on infrastructure specifications that primarily serve the lender's strategic interests rather than the recipient country's development needs is subject to formal international review. Under this design, the Chinese offer in this scenario must pass an independent development financing review before Bangladesh commits — and the review would flag the specification concerns that India raised as a governance rather than a purely geopolitical question.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for a small number of individuals or families to control a very large share of a country's total economic wealth? (FI Q11) — consider at the international level*

FI-2: *Is it fair for government contracts to be awarded based on political connections rather than competitive merit? (FI Q13)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

S50 The Climate Displacement Crisis

Domain: Global Governance and Power | Historical Basis: Bangladesh climate vulnerability; COP negotiations; sea-level rise projections | Timer: 90 seconds per decision point

Active Roles: Prime Minister-Bangladesh (R01), UN Secretary-General (R61), Small Island State Leader (R92), US President (R73), Chinese President (R75), Global Youth Governance Advocate (R100)

Fairness Index Domains: Domain 3 — Economy and Resources, Domain 4 — Public Services and Welfare, Domain 5 — Accountability and Institutions

▸ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bangladesh is among the world's most climate-vulnerable countries. Approximately one-third of Bangladesh lies less than one meter above sea level. The IPCC's most recent projections estimate that sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1.0 meters by 2100 — consistent with current global emissions trajectories — would displace between 17 and 30 million Bangladeshis from coastal areas. The Sundarbans mangrove forest, which protects Bangladesh's southwest coast, is already experiencing significant salinity intrusion. Cyclones have increased in intensity. Monsoon flooding patterns are shifting. Bangladesh contributes less than 0.4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The countries most responsible for historical emissions — the US, European nations, Russia, China — will face relatively modest direct impacts from the climate change their emissions have produced. Bangladesh is experiencing the consequences of climate decisions made by others, in governance forums where Bangladesh has limited structural influence.

▸ SCENARIO CONTEXT

You are Bangladesh's Prime Minister, addressing the UN General Assembly at an emergency climate session convened following new IPCC projections showing accelerated sea-level rise. Your delegation has been given 15 minutes. The climate finance architecture under discussion would provide $150 billion annually in adaptation funding — significantly below the $400 billion that Bangladesh and comparable vulnerable states have calculated as the minimum necessary for

genuine adaptation. The major emitters are offering adaptation funding without accepting legal liability for climate damages — a distinction that determines whether climate finance is charity or compensation. Your government has calculated that 20 million Bangladeshis will require relocation within 30 years regardless of adaptation measures. You are simultaneously representing Bangladesh's immediate interests and the longer principle of climate justice that will determine whether governance of the global commons ever becomes structurally fair.

▸ **PRESSURE SIGNALS**

[Major Emitter Coalition] *We are committed to the $150 billion annual adaptation finance target. Climate finance is a critical part of our global partnership. However, we cannot accept loss and damage liability frameworks that would create open-ended legal and financial obligations. The partnership model, not the liability model, is the path forward.*

[Alliance of Small Island States] *Bangladesh and AOSIS together represent the most climate-vulnerable populations. If we do not hold the line on loss and damage liability in this session, the precedent will be set that the most polluting states bear no legal obligation for the harm their emissions have caused. We need Bangladesh to stand with us on liability.*

[Bangladesh Finance Ministry] *The $150 billion adaptation package, if secured with credible disbursement mechanisms, would fund the immediate adaptation priorities for the next decade. Holding out for liability frameworks that may never materialize could leave us without the adaptation finance we need now.*

[Global Youth Climate Movement (message)] *Twenty million Bangladeshis will be displaced regardless of adaptation measures. Adaptation finance without liability means the rich world pays for the consequences of its own emissions at its own discretion, for as long as it chooses, in amounts it decides. That is charity, not justice. Bangladesh should not accept charity when it is owed accountability.*

Decision Point 1

You have 15 minutes at the UN General Assembly. What is the core of your address?

Option A: Lead with liability — Bangladesh will not accept a climate finance framework that does not include a binding legal liability mechanism. The $150 billion adaptation offer is acknowledged but characterized as inadequate and structurally insufficient. You demand: full loss and damage liability recognition, a $400 billion adaptation floor with independent disbursement governance, and a formal commitment to emissions reduction pathways consistent with 1.5 degree Celsius warming. Accept that this position may produce no agreement today while establishing the principled foundation for future accountability.

Option B: Lead with adaptation practicality — accept the $150 billion framework as the best achievable outcome in the current political environment, advocate for enhanced disbursement mechanisms and governance, and preserve the liability question for future negotiation rather than blocking current agreement. 20 million Bangladeshis cannot wait for the perfect justice framework.

Option C: Lead with a specific proposal — propose a hybrid framework: $150 billion in immediate adaptation finance plus a binding Loss and Damage Facility with initial capitalization of $50 billion from major emitters, structured as compensation rather than charity, with governance by recipient countries rather than donors. A concrete proposal rather than an advocacy position.

Option D: Lead with the displacement reality — dedicate the 15 minutes to documenting, in specific human terms, what 20 million climate-displaced Bangladeshis will experience and what the major emitters will have caused — making the case for justice through the specificity of harm rather than through the abstraction of legal liability.

Decision Point 2

Your address received significant global attention. The AOSIS group has formally endorsed Bangladesh's position. Major emitters have characterized your speech as 'moving but unrealistic.' A compromise proposal has emerged: a $200 billion adaptation framework plus a voluntary Loss and Damage Fund with initial contributions of $30 billion — explicitly non-binding in contribution expectations and characterized as charitable rather than compensatory. Bangladesh has been asked whether it will accept this compromise as the basis for an agreement. What is your position?

Option A: Accept the compromise as the best available outcome — $200 billion adaptation is significantly better than $150 billion, the voluntary Loss and Damage Fund is a first formal recognition of the concept even if inadequately capitalized, and a failed negotiation leaves Bangladesh with nothing. Secure what is achievable and return to liability in future sessions.

Option B: Reject the compromise and maintain the position for full loss and damage liability — the voluntary, non-binding, charitable characterization of the Loss and Damage Fund is exactly the precedent that must not be set. Future climate justice depends on not accepting charity as the substitute for liability.

Option C: Accept the compromise for adaptation finance only and formally abstain on the Loss and Damage Fund — using the abstention to signal that Bangladesh does not accept the charitable characterization while not blocking the overall agreement that includes the improved adaptation finance.

Option D: Propose a 30-day negotiation extension — neither accepting nor rejecting, requesting a final negotiation round specifically on the Loss and Damage Fund's characterization and governance, accepting that this may produce no agreement if major emitters are unwilling to move.

Decision Point 3

The compromise has been accepted — $200 billion adaptation framework, $30 billion voluntary Loss and Damage Fund. Bangladesh signed on the basis of the improved adaptation finance while formally noting its position that the Loss and Damage Fund's characterization was inadequate. Two years later, the $200 billion adaptation commitment is being disbursed at approximately 60% of the committed level — disbursement mechanisms are failing. The voluntary Loss and Damage Fund has received $8 billion of the $30 billion commitment. Sea-level rise is progressing faster than the most recent IPCC models projected. Your government has developed a national Climate Displacement Plan

— the first country in the world to formally plan for the managed relocation of 20 million citizens. What is Bangladesh's international advocacy position on climate governance reform?

Option A: Lead the establishment of a Climate Displaced Persons Convention — a new international legal framework analogous to the 1951 Refugee Convention that creates formal international protection rights for climate-displaced populations, with binding obligations on states to provide protection, resettlement, and compensation. Make Bangladesh the primary advocate and the first country to formally request Convention negotiations.

Option B: Focus on adaptation finance disbursement reform — the existing commitment is not being honored, and the most immediately actionable advocacy is demanding that the $200 billion already committed be disbursed as promised rather than seeking new commitments that will face the same disbursement failures.

Option C: Pursue bilateral climate migration agreements — negotiating directly with specific countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, European states) for formal climate migration pathways for Bangladeshi citizens before displacement occurs, creating structured options outside the stalled multilateral framework.

Option D: Establish Bangladesh as the global hub for climate governance research and advocacy — using the Climate Displacement Plan as an international platform to position Bangladesh as the intellectual center of climate justice discourse, attracting international research investment while advancing the advocacy agenda.

▸ **CONSEQUENCE REVEALS**

If Option A in Decision Point 1, Option C in Decision Point 2, Option A in Decision Point 3 (liability demand, abstains on voluntary fund, Climate Displaced Persons Convention): *The Climate Displaced Persons Convention negotiations are launched with Bangladesh as the primary advocate. 67 countries co-sponsor the initial negotiating mandate — primarily vulnerable developing states. Major emitters resist but do not block the negotiation mandate. The Convention negotiations take seven years and produce a framework that creates rights for climate-displaced persons without the full liability mechanism that Bangladesh originally demanded — but significantly stronger than the charity model that the voluntary Loss and Damage Fund represented. Bangladesh's 20 million displaced people will have formal international protection rights when their displacement occurs. The structural unfairness of the global climate governance architecture has not been resolved — but the legal framework that will govern the human consequence of that unfairness is stronger than it would have been without Bangladesh's advocacy. The adaptation finance disbursement failure has resulted in 12 million Bangladeshis not receiving the adaptation protection they were promised. Both the governance success and the implementation failure are real.*

If Option B in Decision Point 2, Option B in Decision Point 3 (rejects compromise, advocates on disbursement): *Bangladesh's rejection of the compromise produces no final climate agreement at the session. A second session is convened 18 months later. The second session produces an agreement slightly less favorable than the compromise Bangladesh rejected — $185 billion adaptation, $20 billion Loss and Damage Fund with the same voluntary non-binding characterization. Bangladesh accepts the second agreement because a third rejection would leave Bangladesh with nothing. The 18-month delay in adaptation finance has cost Bangladesh approximately $14 billion in adaptation investments that were not made during the negotiation period. The principled rejection produced a worse material outcome. The moral record of the principled position is clear. The 20 million Bangladeshis who will be displaced are not materially better positioned for it.*

▸ FAIRNESS ANALYSIS

Structural Failure Mode: Structural Exclusion — Maximum Vulnerability Without Governance Standing

The climate displacement scenario presents the most comprehensive structural unfairness in the PlayerOne library: a population bearing maximum climate harm with minimum governance standing in the decisions that determine that harm. Bangladesh contributes 0.4% of global emissions and faces displacement of 20 million people. The United States contributes approximately 15% of cumulative historical emissions and faces no comparable direct displacement consequence. The governance architecture through which climate decisions are made — the UNFCCC, the COP process, the bilateral climate finance negotiations — is controlled by the states whose emissions have produced the climate crisis, which are not the same states that will bear the primary human consequences of that crisis. This is authority-accountability misalignment at the most fundamental level: the authority to determine global climate governance rests with the states least accountable to the populations most affected.

Equitism Connection: Equitism's Universal Governance Framework analysis identifies the global climate governance architecture as the clearest global-scale demonstration of the Meta-Right to Structural Fairness's necessity and absence. Bangladesh has a formal right to participate in COP negotiations. It does not have structural governance standing proportionate to its vulnerability — the COP process operates by consensus, which means the most powerful emitters can block legally binding liability frameworks regardless of how many vulnerable states support them. The principle that those who cause harm should be accountable for it — foundational to any national governance system — is structurally absent from the global climate governance architecture.

Structural Design Fix (UFDS): The UFDS's Universal Governance Framework provision on climate governance requires: climate governance institutions must be designed so that governance standing is proportionate to climate vulnerability, not to economic power or historical emissions; a formal Climate Displaced Persons Convention must be negotiated with binding protection obligations; a Loss and Damage Mechanism must be capitalized as legal compensation rather than voluntary charitable contribution, with governance controlled by recipient countries rather than major emitters; and climate finance disbursement must be subject to independent monitoring with automatic escalation mechanisms when committed funds are not disbursed. Under this design, Bangladesh's governance standing in climate negotiations is structurally proportionate to Bangladesh's climate vulnerability — not to Bangladesh's GDP or emissions. The most affected populations govern the response to the crisis their lives are shaped by.

▸ REFLECTION MODULE

Participants respond to the following after the scenario. Questions 1–3 are structured reflection. Final questions are domain-matched Fairness Index items.

Reflection Q1 — Constraint Identification:

What structural constraint did you feel most strongly? [Party/institutional pressure overriding accountability / Information deprivation / Time pressure / Competing interests without resolution mechanism / Fear of personal consequences for the fair option]

Reflection Q2 — Visibility Assessment:

Was the structural unfairness visible before your decisions or only after the consequence reveal? [1 = Completely visible from the start — 5 = Not visible until aftermath]

Reflection Q3 — Design Proposal (open text):

In one or two sentences: what governance design change would have made structurally fair decision-making possible without the cost you experienced? [English or Bangla]

Domain-Matched Fairness Index Questions:

FI-1: *Is it fair for international trade agreements to be negotiated in ways that primarily benefit large corporations at the expense of local producers and workers? (FI Q15)*

FI-2: *Is it fair for the social safety net to leave significant portions of the population without adequate support during economic hardship? (FI Q20)*

FI-3: *Is it fair for international organizations to influence a country's national policy decisions? (FI Q25)*

— End of Chapter 15 —

All 50 Scenarios Complete.

The fifty scenarios documented across Chapters 7 through 15 constitute the complete PlayerOne scenario library as of this publication. They span nine governance domains, draw on real political events from 2015 to 2026, and cover the full range of structural failure modes that the Equitism framework identifies as the primary sources of governance unfairness at national and global levels. Each scenario is grounded in documented reality. Each is designed to make structural unfairness felt as a lived governance experience rather than described as an abstract principle. Each connects the participant's decisions to the Fairness Index measurement system and to the UFDS design provisions that address the structural failure mode the scenario illustrates.

The governance failures documented in these scenarios are not permanent features of the human condition. They are the products of specific institutional design choices that can be changed. The UFDS provisions referenced in each scenario's fairness analysis are not theoretical aspirations — they are specific constitutional and institutional mechanisms whose design logic is grounded in the structural failure modes that the scenarios illustrate. The purpose of the scenario library is to make the structural argument viscerally rather than abstractly: to create the experiential understanding that constitutional design reform is not an academic exercise but the most consequential public health intervention available to any governance system that is producing systematic unfairness.

Next: Chapter 16 — The Fairness Alignment Scoring Engine

CHAPTER 16

The Fairness Alignment Scoring Engine

Part V — How Simulation Decisions Become Research Measurements

Every decision a participant makes in a PlayerOne scenario generates a Fairness Alignment Score — a numerical measurement of how closely that decision aligns with the structural fairness standards documented in the CARO Fairness Index. The Fairness Alignment Scoring Engine is the computational and interpretive architecture that converts raw decision data into these scores. This chapter specifies that architecture completely: the decision-to-domain mapping tables for all nine scenario domains, the alignment code assignment logic, the score calculation formulas, and the participant-facing interpretation language that transforms numerical scores into governance-meaningful feedback.

I. The Alignment Code System

Every response option in every decision point across all 50 scenarios has been pre-coded by the scenario design team with an Alignment Code. The Alignment Code expresses the relationship between that specific decision option and the structural fairness standard of the Fairness Index domain most relevant to that decision point. There are four Alignment Codes:

Code	Value	Label	Definition
AC-4	**+1.0**	Fully Aligned	The decision actively preserves structural fairness — it addresses the failure mode, protects the accountability relationship, or restores the structural condition that fair governance requires.
AC-3	**+0.5**	Partially Aligned	The decision partially addresses the structural fairness concern or represents a compromise that moves in the structurally fair direction without fully achieving it.
AC-2	**0.0**	Structurally Neutral	The decision neither advances nor undermines structural fairness — it is procedurally correct but does not engage the structural fairness dimension of the situation.

AC-1	**-1.0**	Reinforces Failure Mode	The decision directly reinforces a structural failure mode — it strengthens the capture, deepens the exclusion, or further misaligns authority and accountability in the governance situation.

The assignment of Alignment Codes to decision options is the most significant content quality requirement in the PlayerOne scenario design. Three design principles govern code assignment:

11. **No option is automatically AC-1 because it is politically pragmatic.** Compliance with party direction, acceptance of international conditionality, and management of political relationships are not structurally unfair in themselves — their fairness depends on whether they reinforce structural failure modes in specific contexts. The MP who votes with the party on a routine matter is not necessarily reinforcing justificatory subordination; the MP who votes with the party against their constituency's documented position on a constitutional amendment is.
12. **No option is automatically AC-4 because it is courageous.** The official who resigns in protest, the judge who delivers an unpopular ruling, and the civil servant who refuses a corrupt instruction are not automatically performing the structurally fairest action. Structural fairness is measured against the institutional outcome produced, not against the personal cost of the decision. Sometimes the most structurally significant action is the procedural one that creates a lasting accountability record rather than the dramatic one that creates a political story.
13. **Multiple options in the same decision point may receive the same Alignment Code.** It is not uncommon for two different options to both receive AC-3 — partially aligned — because they represent different paths to a similar intermediate structural outcome. The scoring engine does not require a unique code for each option; it requires an accurate code.

II. Domain Mapping by Scenario Domain

Each decision point is mapped to one or more Fairness Index domains. The mapping determines which domain scores are affected by the participant's decision. The table below documents the primary domain mapping for each scenario domain's decision points.

Scenario Domain	Scenarios	Primary FI Domains Activated	Key Failure Mode
Electoral Integrity	S01–S08	Domain 1 (Governance & Leadership), Domain 5	Structural capture, justificatory

		(Accountability & Institutions)	subordination
Party Discipline	S09–S14	Domain 1 (Governance & Leadership)	Justificatory subordination, epistemic dependence
Judicial Independence	S15–S20	Domain 2 (Justice & Rule of Law), Domain 1	Structural capture, authority-accountability misalignment
Resource Allocation	S21–S26	Domain 3 (Economy & Resources), Domain 4 (Public Services)	Structural capture, structural exclusion
Civil Liberties & Press	S27–S31	Domain 5 (Accountability & Institutions), Domain 1	Structural capture, structural exclusion
Minority Rights	S32–S36	Domain 4 (Public Services), Domain 2 (Justice), Domain 1	Structural exclusion, authority-accountability misalignment
Constitutional Reform	S37–S41	Domain 1 (Governance & Leadership), Domain 5	Justificatory subordination (design elimination)
Crisis Governance	S42–S46	Domain 1, Domain 4 (Public Services), Domain 2	Structural capture, authority-accountability misalignment
Global Governance	S47–S50	Domain 3 (Economy), Domain 5 (Accountability), Domain 4	Structural exclusion (global scale)

III. The Score Calculation Process

The Fairness Alignment Score for a complete scenario session is calculated in four sequential steps. The formulas used are identical to those specified in Chapter 4 (Fairness Index) but applied to decision data rather than survey response data.

Step 1: Decision Point Alignment Score (DPAS)

For each decision point completed by the participant, the system retrieves the Alignment Code for the option selected and the domain weights for all domains mapped to that decision point. The Decision Point Alignment Score is calculated as:

```
DPAS(dp) = AC_value × Σ[domain_weight(d) for all d mapped to dp]
```

Where AC_value is the numerical value of the Alignment Code (+1.0, +0.5, 0.0, or -1.0) and domain_weight(d) is the pre-specified weight for domain d in this decision point, normalized so that the sum of all domain weights for the decision point equals 1.0. Most decision points have a single primary domain with weight 1.0; multi-domain decision points distribute the weight proportionally.

Step 2: Session Fairness Score (SFS)

The Session Fairness Score aggregates Decision Point Alignment Scores across all decision points in the scenario to produce a single session-level score:

```
SFS(session) = Σ[DPAS(dp) × dp_weight] / Σ[dp_weight]  for all dp in session
```

Where dp_weight is the pre-specified importance weight of each decision point in the scenario. Not all decision points carry equal weight — decision points that involve more consequential choices (the vote on a constitutional amendment versus a procedural committee decision) carry higher weights. The Session Fairness Score ranges from -1.0 (all decisions reinforced structural failure modes) to +1.0 (all decisions were fully aligned with structural fairness).

Step 3: Domain Contribution Breakdown

In addition to the overall Session Fairness Score, the scoring engine calculates the contribution of each Fairness Index domain to the session score. The Domain Contribution for domain d in session s is:

```
DC(d, s) = Σ[DPAS(dp) × domain_weight(d, dp)] / Σ[domain_weight(d, dp)]
```

This calculation identifies which governance domains the participant's decisions were most and least structurally fair in. The domain contributions are displayed in the participant dashboard as the pentagon governance profile — a visual representation of the participant's structural fairness alignment pattern across the five Fairness Index domains, accumulated across all sessions.

Step 4: Cumulative Governance Profile Score (CGPS)

The Cumulative Governance Profile Score is the participant's lifetime alignment score across all scenarios played, organized by domain:

```
CGPS(d) = Σ[SFS(s) × domain_weight(d, s)] / Σ[domain_weight(d, s)]  for all s
played
```

This cumulative score builds the participant's governance profile over time — showing not just how they performed in a single scenario but how their structural fairness reasoning patterns develop across multiple scenarios, multiple domains, and multiple roles. The CGPS is the primary metric displayed in the participant dashboard and the primary research data point for longitudinal analysis of how simulation experience affects governance reasoning.

IV. Score Interpretation Language

The score ranges below translate numerical Fairness Alignment Scores into participant-facing governance interpretation. This language appears in the fairness analysis screen of each scenario and in the participant dashboard's governance profile display. The language is descriptive and developmental, not judgmental.

Score Range	Label	Participant-Facing Language	Governance Interpretation
0.75 to 1.0	Structurally Fair	Your decisions in this scenario consistently preserved or advanced structural fairness principles. You resisted the structural failure mode and made choices that would support equal justificatory standing.	Decisions aligned with UFDS design principles throughout
0.25 to 0.74	Partially Aligned	Your decisions showed mixed alignment with structural fairness principles — some choices preserved accountability relationships while others accommodated the structural constraints you faced.	Navigated structural constraint with partial resistance
-0.24 to 0.24	Structurally Neutral	Your decisions were procedurally correct but did not meaningfully engage the structural fairness dimension of this scenario. The structural failure mode operated without active resistance or reinforcement.	Structural constraint accepted without engagement
-0.74 to -0.25	Constraint	Your decisions predominantly	Structural failure mode

	Reinforcing	reinforced the structural failure mode present in this scenario. This is not a judgment about your values — it reflects what the governance design of the situation made structurally easy.	reinforced through decisions
-1.0 to -0.75	Deeply Constrained	The structural design of this scenario produced decisions that consistently reinforced its failure mode. The structural pressure you faced was intense. This score reflects the architecture of the situation as much as your choices within it.	Maximum structural capture demonstrated

V. The Structural Context Note

Every Fairness Alignment Score display in the platform includes a mandatory Structural Context Note — a short paragraph that appears below the numerical score and prevents the score from being interpreted as a moral judgment of the participant. The Structural Context Note is identical in structure across all scenarios but varies in its specific content based on the failure mode present in the scenario.

The Structural Context Note always contains three sentences: (1) What structural failure mode was present in this scenario and what it means. (2) How the governance design of the situation shaped the available options. (3) What the score reflects about the structure rather than about the participant.

Example Structural Context Note for the Article 70 scenario with a Constraint Reinforcing score: 'This scenario is built around justificatory subordination — the structural condition in which Article 70 makes voting against party direction constitutionally impossible without losing your parliamentary seat. The governance design of the situation made it structurally very difficult to choose options that preserved your constituency accountability relationship without career consequence. Your score in this session reflects the structural power of Article 70's mechanism as much as it reflects your individual decisions within it.'

VI. Pre-Post Comparison Engine

The Pre-Post Comparison Engine is the analytical mechanism that calculates the shift in a participant's governance fairness perceptions between their Fairness Index baseline (Layer 2) and their post-scenario reflection responses (Layer 4). The calculation is straightforward:

```
Pre-Post Delta(q) = FI_reflection(q) - FI_baseline(q)
```

Where FI_reflection(q) is the participant's post-scenario response to Fairness Index question q and FI_baseline(q) is the same participant's baseline response to the same question. A positive delta indicates that the participant's fairness perception for that question increased — they perceive the governance practice as more fair after the simulation than before. A negative delta indicates decreased fairness perception — they perceive it as less fair.

The Pre-Post Comparison Engine aggregates individual question deltas to domain-level and overall deltas, tracking the direction and magnitude of perception shifts across domains. This is the primary research output for the platform's first research question: does simulation experience change governance fairness perceptions? The engine's output is analyzed by the GGL's research team and forms the basis for the primary empirical findings published in the GGL's Annual Governance Fairness Report.

— End of Chapter 16 —

CHAPTER 17

Framework Mapping and Consequence Logic

Part V — Connecting Scenarios to Equitism Theory

This chapter specifies the explicit connections between the PlayerOne scenario library and the theoretical frameworks of the Equitism project. It provides the mapping tables through which scenario design decisions, fairness analysis language, and UFDS design fix provisions are grounded in the intellectual architecture of CARO's published work. It also specifies the consequence logic principles that govern how branched consequence narratives are constructed — ensuring that consequence reveals are grounded in historical evidence or logically derived from governance principles rather than invented.

I. Equitism Framework Mapping

The Five Structural Failure Modes

All 50 PlayerOne scenarios are organized around Equitism's taxonomy of structural failure modes. The table below maps each failure mode to its definition, the scenarios where it is the primary failure mode, and the UFDS provision designed to address it.

Failure Mode	Definition	Primary Scenarios	UFDS Provision
Justificatory Subordination	Decision-makers are structurally prevented from acting on their accountability relationships — the institutional design overrides the accountability that their role is designed to preserve.	S09, S10, S11, S12, S13, S14, S33, S38	Legislative Independence Provision; Constructive Vote of No Confidence
Authority-Accountability Misalignment	Those who hold power are not accountable to those who bear the consequences of how	S01, S02, S04, S16, S17, S21, S25, S26, S29, S42, S44, S46, S50	Electoral Commission Independence; Judicial Independence; Regulatory

	that power is exercised — authority and accountability point to different actors.		Independence
Structural Capture	Accountability mechanisms are controlled by the actors they are designed to scrutinize — the institution designed to hold power accountable has been captured by that power.	S03, S04, S06, S15, S18, S22, S24, S27, S28, S31, S32, S40, S43, S48	Anti-Corruption Independence; Civil Service Independence; Press Freedom Protection
Epistemic Dependence	Decision-makers are structurally prevented from accessing the information their accountability role requires — they cannot form informed judgments because the information architecture excludes them.	S08, S13, S23, S45, S47	Legislative Deliberation Provision; Information Access Guarantee; WHO Independent Investigation
Structural Exclusion	Communities affected by governance decisions are systematically excluded from participating in making them — the governance architecture denies them the standing that structural fairness requires.	S05, S19, S20, S25, S32, S33, S34, S35, S36, S49, S50	Minority Protection; Indigenous Rights Governance; Climate Displaced Persons Convention; Universal Governance Framework

The UFDS Seven Components and Scenario Coverage

The Unified Fair Democratic System specifies seven integrated components that collectively address the structural failure modes of democratic governance. The table below maps each UFDS component to the scenarios that most directly illustrate the governance failures the component is designed to address.

UFDS Component	Function	Illustrated by Scenarios
Electoral Commission Independence	Separates election administration from incumbent government control through independent appointment, budget, security, and authority	S01, S02, S03, S04, S06, S07, S08, S37
Legislative Independence	Eliminates Article 70-type party discipline mechanisms; replaces with constructive vote of no confidence for stability; protects constituency accountability	S09, S10, S11, S12, S13, S14, S38
Judicial Independence	Separates judicial appointment and transfer authority from executive control; creates Judicial Service Commission; provides career protections for independent rulings	S15, S16, S17, S18, S37, S41, S46
Resource Allocation Integrity	Establishes formula-based public resource allocation independent of political loyalty; mandatory independent auditing; criminal accountability for politically motivated diversion	S21, S22, S23, S24, S25, S42, S43
Press Freedom and Information Access	Public interest defense in content liability; mandatory judicial pre-authorization for journalist arrests; prohibition on communications shutdowns during protests and crises	S27, S28, S29, S30, S31
Minority and Inclusion Rights	Mandatory security protection for documented threats; direct election of reserved seats; indigenous land consultation requirements; statelessness prohibition	S32, S33, S34, S35, S36
Constitutional Entrenchment	Protects structural fairness provisions against majority override; enhanced amendment thresholds for core democratic mechanisms; basic structure doctrine codification	S37, S38, S39, S40, S41, S46

II. Consequence Logic Principles

The consequence reveals in PlayerOne scenarios are the narratives that show participants what resulted from their sequence of decisions. They are the most pedagogically powerful element of the simulation — the moment at which the structural analysis becomes experiential, when the participant sees that their decisions produced real governance outcomes rather than simply expressing values. The consequence reveals must be grounded, not invented.

Five principles govern the construction of all consequence reveals in the PlayerOne library:

Principle 1: Historical Grounding Where Available

For scenarios drawn directly from documented events — the 2014 uncontested elections, the 2018 pre-cast ballot allegations, the 2024 quota protest crackdown, Rana Plaza, the 2022 Sylhet floods — consequence reveals for decisions that most closely match what historical actors did are grounded in the historical record: what actually happened. The consequence reveal does not invent outcomes for historically documented situations; it describes the documented consequences that real governance decisions produced.

Where the historical record is clear, the consequence reveal states it explicitly: 'In the 2014 Bangladesh elections, 153 seats went uncontested after opposition parties made the decision you faced. Here is what followed.' This connection between simulation decision and historical outcome is the most powerful educational element in the library — it transforms the abstract scenario into documented governance history.

Principle 2: Logical Derivation for Counterfactuals

For decisions that differ from what historical actors did — the Presiding Officer who refused to certify, the IGP who ordered immediate arrests, the Chief Justice who struck down the term limit extension — the consequence reveals are logically derived from governance principles rather than historically grounded, because these counterfactuals have not occurred. The logical derivation follows these rules: (a) the immediate institutional consequence of the decision is determined by the documented rules of the governance system; (b) the political consequence is extrapolated from comparable documented cases in Bangladesh's political history; (c) the structural consequence is derived from Equitism's analysis of how institutional design changes propagate through governance systems.

Principle 3: Consequence Symmetry

Every scenario offers consequence reveals for at least two significantly different decision paths — typically one path that represents maximum structural fairness alignment and one that represents

accommodation of structural constraints. The two consequence reveals are designed to be comparable in their specificity and honesty — neither path is shown as triumphantly successful; both paths produce mixed outcomes that reflect the genuine complexity of governance decisions under structural constraint. The purpose of consequence symmetry is to prevent the simulation from being a morality play in which the 'right' decision always wins and the 'wrong' decision always loses.

Principle 4: Structural Attribution

Consequence reveals consistently attribute governance outcomes to structural conditions rather than to individual character. The Presiding Officer who certified pre-filled ballots did not do so because she was corrupt; she did so because the institutional design placed her in a position where the alternative was career termination and changed nothing about the electoral outcome. The consequence reveal that flows from that decision must reflect this structural attribution — the outcome was produced by the governance design that created the Presiding Officer's options, not by the individual's moral character.

Principle 5: Aggregate Specificity

Where possible, consequence reveals include specific numbers rather than general descriptions. The hospital budget scenario consequence reveal specifies 14 preventable maternal deaths. The wage scenario consequence reveal specifies Tk 1,000-2,500 per month in foregone worker income for four million workers. The IMF conditionality scenario consequence reveal specifies 18% cost of living increase for the bottom 40% of the income distribution. This numerical specificity converts the abstract governance consequence into a human cost that the participant can understand concretely — making the structural argument visceral rather than theoretical.

III. FairVote Protocol Application

The FairVote Protocol — CARO's decision mechanism for determining governance choices when competing interests are structurally contested — is most directly relevant in scenarios where the decision point involves genuinely competing fairness claims rather than a single structural failure mode. Scenarios S14 (Coalition Collapse), S20 (Amnesty vs. Accountability), S31 (Hate Speech Dilemma), S34 (Rohingya Refoulement), and S50 (Climate Displacement) all involve competing fairness claims where the structurally 'correct' decision is genuinely unclear.

In these scenarios, the fairness analysis section explicitly acknowledges the FairVote Protocol's relevance — noting that the scenario represents a category of governance decision that requires deliberative resolution of competing fairness claims rather than application of a single fairness standard. The Fairness Alignment Score for these scenarios is calculated differently: options that engage seriously with the competing claims receive higher alignment scores than options that treat

the decision as simple, regardless of which specific competing claim the participant prioritizes. The analytical sophistication of engaging the genuine complexity is itself a structural fairness alignment.

IV. Fairocracy Design Principles in Scenario Feedback

Fairocracy — the institutional model implementing Equitism in which democracy operates with structural fairness built into its operating mechanisms — provides the positive vision that every UFDS design fix provision is designed to instantiate. In the fairness analysis section of each scenario, the UFDS design fix is always described not just as a technical provision but as the Fairocracy design element it implements.

For example, the Article 70 repeal provision is described as: 'Under a Fairocracy design, the MP's constituency accountability relationship is constitutionally protected from party override. The legislative chamber functions as a deliberative body — one in which representatives can and do vote their constituencies' interests without structural penalty.' This positive framing converts the technical provision into an institutional vision — showing participants not just what would prevent the structural failure mode but what the governance institution would look like if it were designed for structural fairness.

— End of Chapter 17 —

CHAPTER 18

Platform Technical Specifications

Part VI — Database, Authentication, User Flow, Administration, and Backup

This chapter provides the complete technical specification for the PlayerOne platform. It is written for platform engineers and covers: the database schema in full, the authentication flow, the scenario delivery engine architecture, the administrative backend specification, the research data export protocols, and the automated backup system. All specifications are designed for implementation on Supabase (backend-as-a-service) with a pure HTML/CSS/JavaScript frontend — consistent with CARO's hosting architecture and the constraint of no server management overhead.

I. Technology Stack

Layer	Technology	Rationale
Database	Supabase (PostgreSQL)	Managed PostgreSQL, free tier to 500MB, real-time subscriptions, row-level security, no server management
Authentication	Supabase Auth — Google OAuth + OTP	Built-in Google Sign-In, SMS OTP via Twilio integration, JWT tokens, no separate auth server
Frontend	Pure HTML/CSS/JavaScript	Consistent with caronon profit.org architecture, deployable on Namecheap shared hosting, no build step required
API Layer	Supabase JavaScript Client (CDN)	Direct browser-to-Supabase connection via the supabase-js library loaded from CDN
File Storage	Supabase Storage	Scenario media assets, certificates, export files
Research Export	Google Sheets API via Google Apps Script	Automated daily export to GGL-controlled Google Sheets; no

		additional infrastructure required
Backup	Supabase automated backups + Google Drive export	Daily Supabase snapshots (retained 7 days); weekly CSV export to Google Drive (retained indefinitely)
Hosting (Frontend)	playerone.carononprofit.org on Namecheap	Consistent with existing CARO infrastructure; no additional hosting cost

II. Database Schema

The schema is organized across eight primary tables. Row-Level Security (RLS) policies are specified for each table to ensure that participants can only read their own data and that research data is accessible only to authorized GGL researchers through the admin interface.

Table 1: participants

```
CREATE TABLE participants (   id              UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT
gen_random_uuid(),   google_id       TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,   email
TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,   phone_verified  BOOLEAN DEFAULT false,   display_name
TEXT,   created_at      TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT now(),   updated_at
TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT now() );
```

The participants table stores verified identity data. The google_id is the stable identifier from Google OAuth. Phone verification status is tracked separately. No personally identifying information beyond email and display_name is stored in this table — all research data is in separate tables linked by the participant UUID.

Table 2: participant_profiles

```
CREATE TABLE participant_profiles (   participant_id    UUID REFERENCES
participants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,   age_group         TEXT CHECK (age_group
IN ('under_18','18_24','25_34','35_44','45_59','60_plus')),   gender
TEXT CHECK (gender IN ('male','female','non_binary','prefer_not')),   division
TEXT,   occupation        TEXT,   education_level   TEXT,   mp_awareness
TEXT CHECK (mp_awareness IN ('yes','no','not_sure')),   govt_contact
BOOLEAN,   system_trust      SMALLINT CHECK (system_trust BETWEEN 1 AND 5),
caro_programs     TEXT[],   consent_platform  BOOLEAN DEFAULT false,
consent_fi        BOOLEAN DEFAULT false,   consent_timestamp TIMESTAMPTZ,
PRIMARY KEY (participant_id) );
```

The participant_profiles table stores all demographic and civic engagement data collected at registration. The caro_programs field is an array of program identifiers allowing multiple selections. Both consent fields must be true before the participant can access any scenario.

Table 3: fi_responses

```
CREATE TABLE fi_responses (   id              UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT
gen_random_uuid(),   participant_id  UUID REFERENCES participants(id) ON
DELETE CASCADE,   q1 THROUGH q25  SMALLINT CHECK (value BETWEEN 1 AND 5),
ce1             TEXT,   ce2             BOOLEAN,   ce3             SMALLINT
CHECK (ce3 BETWEEN 1 AND 5),   response_type   TEXT CHECK (response_type IN
('baseline','reflection','voluntary_update')),   scenario_id     TEXT,
completed_at    TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT now() );
```

The fi_responses table stores all Fairness Index responses. The response_type field distinguishes between the mandatory baseline survey, post-scenario reflection responses, and voluntary profile updates. The scenario_id field is populated only for reflection-type responses and links the FI responses to the specific scenario session that preceded them. Multiple rows per participant are expected — one for the baseline, one per scenario reflection, and one per voluntary update.

Table 4: scenario_sessions

```
CREATE TABLE scenario_sessions (   id              UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT
gen_random_uuid(),   participant_id  UUID REFERENCES participants(id) ON
DELETE CASCADE,   scenario_id     TEXT NOT NULL,   role_id         TEXT NOT
NULL,   started_at      TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT now(),   completed_at
TIMESTAMPTZ,   session_fas     NUMERIC(4,2),   domain_fas      JSONB,   status
TEXT CHECK (status IN ('in_progress','completed','abandoned')) );
```

The scenario_sessions table is the central record for each simulation session. The session_fas field stores the Session Fairness Alignment Score calculated by the scoring engine upon session completion. The domain_fas field stores a JSON object containing the per-domain breakdown of the session score. The status field tracks session completion — abandoned sessions are retained for analysis of which scenarios participants do not complete.

Table 5: decision_records

```
CREATE TABLE decision_records (   id              UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT
gen_random_uuid(),   session_id      UUID REFERENCES scenario_sessions(id) ON
DELETE CASCADE,   participant_id  UUID REFERENCES participants(id) ON DELETE
CASCADE,   decision_point  SMALLINT NOT NULL,   option_selected TEXT NOT NULL,
alignment_code  NUMERIC(3,1) NOT NULL,   domain_primary  TEXT NOT NULL,
time_elapsed_s  SMALLINT,   active_pressure TEXT,   recorded_at
TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT now() );
```

The decision_records table is the most granular data table in the schema — one row per decision point per session. The alignment_code is retrieved from the pre-coded scenario content database at the time of recording. The active_pressure field records which of the four pressure signals was most recently displayed when the participant made their decision. The time_elapsed_s field captures response time in seconds, capped at the timer maximum for the decision point.

Table 6: reflection_responses

```
CREATE TABLE reflection_responses (   id              UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT
gen_random_uuid(),   session_id      UUID REFERENCES scenario_sessions(id) ON
DELETE CASCADE,   participant_id  UUID REFERENCES participants(id) ON DELETE
CASCADE,   constraint_felt TEXT,   visibility_score SMALLINT CHECK
(visibility_score BETWEEN 1 AND 5),   design_proposal TEXT,   proposal_lang
TEXT CHECK (proposal_lang IN ('en','bn')),   recorded_at     TIMESTAMPTZ
DEFAULT now() );
```

The reflection_responses table stores the three structured reflection responses from each scenario session's reflection module. The design_proposal field stores the participant's open-text response in whichever language they chose. The proposal_lang field records which language was used — enabling language-stratified analysis of the qualitative corpus.

Table 7: scenarios (Content Reference)

```
CREATE TABLE scenarios (   scenario_id       TEXT PRIMARY KEY,   domain
TEXT NOT NULL,   title             TEXT NOT NULL,   historical_basis  TEXT,
timer_seconds     SMALLINT DEFAULT 90,   active_roles      TEXT[],
fi_domains        TEXT[],   content_en        JSONB,   content_bn
JSONB,   decision_points   JSONB,   consequence_paths JSONB,   fa_analysis
JSONB,   reflection_fi_qs  TEXT[],   published         BOOLEAN DEFAULT false
);
```

The scenarios table is the content database for all 50 scenarios. The content is stored as structured JSON in both English (content_en) and Bangla (content_bn). The decision_points JSON contains the complete decision point structure including option texts, alignment codes, domain mappings, and timer settings. The consequence_paths JSON contains the branched consequence narratives. The fa_analysis JSON contains the fairness analysis text for each scenario. The reflection_fi_qs array lists the Fairness Index question identifiers presented in the reflection module for each scenario.

Table 8: admin_users

```
CREATE TABLE admin_users (   id            UUID REFERENCES participants(id) ON
DELETE CASCADE,   role          TEXT CHECK (role IN
('super_admin','ggl_researcher','program_admin')),   granted_by    UUID
REFERENCES admin_users(id),   granted_at    TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT now(),
PRIMARY KEY (id) );
```

The admin_users table grants elevated access to CARO staff and GGL researchers. Three roles are defined: super_admin has full access including participant identity data for platform management; ggl_researcher has access to anonymized research data exports only — they cannot see participant identity information; program_admin has access to session management and scenario configuration but not to participant data.

III. Authentication Flow

The authentication flow is designed to confirm two independent verification facts about each participant: that they control a valid Google account (identity verification) and that they control a phone number with an active SIM (physical verification). The combination ensures that each platform account corresponds to a unique, verifiable individual.

Step 1: Google OAuth

When the participant clicks 'Begin — Sign in with Google,' the platform initiates the Supabase Google OAuth flow. The participant authenticates with their Google account. On successful authentication, Supabase creates a session token and stores the participant's Google ID, email, and display name in the participants table. The participant is immediately redirected to the mobile verification screen.

Step 2: Mobile OTP

The mobile verification screen requests the participant's mobile number in international format. The platform calls Supabase Auth's phone sign-in method, which sends a 6-digit OTP via SMS through Supabase's integrated SMS provider. The participant enters the OTP. On successful verification, the phone_verified field in the participants table is set to true and a confirmation timestamp is recorded. Participants who cannot receive SMS can request email OTP via a secondary flow.

Step 3: Session Persistence

Supabase Auth maintains the authenticated session via JWT token stored in localStorage. The token is refreshed automatically before expiry. The participant's UUID from the participants table is the stable identifier used for all subsequent data operations. All database queries use Row-Level Security policies that enforce data isolation — participants can only read and write their own records.

IV. Scenario Delivery Engine

The scenario delivery engine manages the participant's journey through a scenario session from role selection to session completion. It is implemented as a client-side JavaScript state machine that communicates with Supabase in real time.

Session Initialization

When a participant confirms their role selection, the engine creates a new scenario_sessions record with status 'in_progress.' It loads the scenario content from the scenarios table — the role briefing,

scenario context, pressure signals, and all decision points — into client-side state. No additional database calls are made during the decision phase to minimize latency.

Decision Point Rendering

The engine renders decision points sequentially. A countdown timer is initialized per the decision point's timer_seconds value. When the participant selects an option, the engine: (1) records the elapsed time; (2) identifies the active pressure signal that was displayed; (3) retrieves the alignment code for the selected option from the loaded scenario content; (4) writes a decision_records row to Supabase; (5) displays the immediate consequence preview; (6) advances to the next decision point. If the timer reaches zero, the engine records a time-elapsed event and triggers the inaction consequence path.

Session Scoring

When the final decision point is completed, the engine calculates the Session Fairness Alignment Score using the formulas specified in Chapter 16. The score and domain breakdown are written to the scenario_sessions record. The consequence_paths JSON is evaluated against the participant's decision sequence to select the appropriate consequence narrative. The engine then transitions to the consequence reveal screen, followed by the fairness analysis screen, followed by the reflection module.

Reflection Recording

The reflection module captures three structured responses and three to five Fairness Index responses. Each response is written to its respective table in real time as the participant completes it — reflection_responses and fi_responses. The session status is updated to 'completed' when all reflection responses are recorded.

V. Administrative Backend

The administrative backend is accessible to CARO staff at admin.playerone.carononprofit.org. It is built as a separate HTML/JavaScript application using the same Supabase backend. Admin authentication uses the admin_users table for role-based access control.

Scenario Management

14. Publish and unpublish scenarios from the active library
15. Edit scenario content (with change tracking and version history)
16. Configure timer settings, active roles, and FI domain mappings per decision point
17. Preview scenario flow before publishing

18. Manage Bangla translation status for each scenario

Participant Management

19. View participant registration and session statistics (aggregated, not individual)
20. Flag participant accounts for review (duplicate detection, bot activity)
21. Manage CARO program history linking for VEP/CMEP/Campus Ambassador graduates
22. Handle consent withdrawal requests and data deletion

Session Monitoring

23. Real-time session count dashboard
24. Session completion rate by scenario
25. Average decision time by decision point (used to identify confusing prompts)
26. Abandoned session patterns (identifies scenarios with high drop-off)

Research Data Access (GGL Researcher Role)

27. Export anonymized Fairness Index baseline dataset (CSV)
28. Export anonymized decision records dataset (CSV)
29. Export anonymized reflection responses (CSV, qualitative)
30. Export longitudinal profile data for participants with 5+ completed sessions
31. View aggregate Fairness Alignment Score distributions by scenario and domain

VI. Research Data Export Protocol

The research data export is automated through a Google Apps Script that runs daily at 2:00 AM Bangladesh time. The script queries Supabase through its REST API using a GGL researcher service account token, retrieves the previous day's completed session data, anonymizes it through the anonymization function, and appends it to the designated GGL Google Sheets workbooks.

Anonymization Function

The anonymization function replaces the participant_id UUID with a salted hash that is consistent across all tables (enabling cross-table joins for individual participant analysis) but irreversible (preventing re-identification). No email address, phone number, display name, Google ID, or IP address appears in any research export. The anonymized participant hash is the only link between records in the research dataset.

Daily Export Tables

32. fi_responses_daily: All Fairness Index responses from sessions completed in the previous 24 hours, with anonymized participant hash, response type, and scenario ID
33. decision_records_daily: All decision records from sessions completed in the previous 24 hours, with anonymized participant hash, scenario ID, role ID, decision point, option selected, alignment code, time elapsed, and active pressure
34. reflection_responses_daily: All reflection responses from sessions completed in the previous 24 hours, with anonymized participant hash, scenario ID, and all response fields
35. session_summary_daily: Session-level summaries including scenario ID, role ID, Session Fairness Alignment Score, domain breakdown, session duration, and completion status

VII. Backup System

The backup system operates at two levels: Supabase's built-in automated backups and a supplementary export-based backup managed through Google Apps Script.

Level 1: Supabase Automated Backups

Supabase provides automated daily database snapshots on all plans above the free tier. These snapshots capture the complete database state at the backup time. The retention policy: daily snapshots retained for 7 days; weekly snapshots retained for 30 days; monthly snapshots retained for 12 months. Backup integrity is verified automatically by Supabase and failures trigger email alerts to the platform administrator.

Level 2: Google Drive Export Backup

In addition to Supabase's built-in backups, the research data export script generates a complete CSV export of all research tables weekly — every Sunday at 3:00 AM Bangladesh time — and uploads it to a designated Google Drive folder accessible only to the platform administrator and the GGL Director. These exports are retained indefinitely and constitute the disaster recovery dataset if the Supabase instance is lost. The export includes all research data from the platform's inception — not just the previous week — so that each weekly export is a complete standalone dataset.

Recovery Procedure

In the event of data loss requiring recovery: (1) identify the most recent Supabase snapshot that predates the data loss event; (2) restore the Supabase instance from that snapshot; (3) identify the most recent Google Drive weekly export; (4) calculate which research records were generated between the snapshot date and the export date; (5) import those records from the CSV export to fill the gap. The maximum data loss under this architecture is seven days of non-research session

metadata — all research data (FI responses, decision records, reflection responses) is covered by the daily export backup.

VIII. Security Specifications

The platform handles sensitive personal and research data. The security specifications are designed to protect participant privacy and research data integrity.

36. **Row-Level Security (RLS):** All Supabase tables have RLS enabled. Participant records are readable only by the authenticated participant and by super_admin accounts. Research data tables are readable by ggl_researcher accounts only in their anonymized export form — the anonymization function runs server-side in a Supabase Edge Function before any data leaves the database.
37. **JWT Token Security:** Supabase JWT tokens expire after one hour and are refreshed automatically. Tokens are stored in localStorage — not cookies — preventing CSRF attacks. Token scope is limited to the specific participant's data access.
38. **Content Security Policy:** All platform pages include a Content Security Policy header restricting resource loading to approved domains (Supabase project URL, Google Fonts, Google OAuth). XSS attack surface is minimized through CSP enforcement.
39. **API Rate Limiting:** Supabase's built-in rate limiting prevents automated bulk data extraction. The GGL research export uses a service account with elevated quota that is separately rate-limited and logged.
40. **Data Minimization:** The platform collects only the data specified in the schema and the consent documentation. No behavioral tracking beyond platform interactions (no page view analytics, no session recording, no third-party tracking scripts) is implemented.
41. **Encryption:** All data in transit is encrypted via TLS. Supabase encrypts all data at rest using AES-256. No personally identifying information is stored in localStorage or browser storage — only the JWT session token.

IX. Deployment Checklist

The following checklist must be completed before the platform is made publicly accessible:

1. Supabase project created with all eight tables and RLS policies configured
2. Google OAuth credentials configured in Supabase Auth settings
3. SMS OTP provider (Twilio) connected to Supabase Auth
4. All 50 scenario records loaded to the scenarios table with published: false

5. Pilot scenarios (S01, S09, S15, S21, S42) set to published: true for initial testing
6. Admin accounts created for platform administrator and GGL Director
7. GGL researcher account created with read-only research data access
8. Daily research export Google Apps Script deployed and tested
9. Weekly backup Google Apps Script deployed and tested
10. Frontend files uploaded to playerone.caronon profit.org
11. Google Analytics tracking (G-QN4QSHGFNS) embedded in all frontend pages
12. SSL certificate verified for playerone.caronon profit.org
13. Mobile responsiveness verified across iOS Safari, Android Chrome, and desktop browsers
14. Bangla font rendering verified on mobile devices
15. Full end-to-end session test completed — registration through reflection module
16. Consent flow reviewed by at least one external reviewer for clarity
17. Load test performed with simulated concurrent user sessions
18. Backup restoration tested from a simulated data loss scenario

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— End of Chapter 18 —

PlayerOne Production Bible — Complete

This Production Bible constitutes the complete institutional specification of the PlayerOne governance simulation platform. It covers the theoretical foundation (Chapters 1–3), the Fairness Index measurement system (Chapter 4), the 100-role library (Chapters 5–6), all 50 scenario scripts across 9 governance domains (Chapters 7–15), the Fairness Alignment Scoring Engine (Chapter 16), the framework mapping and consequence logic (Chapter 17), and the complete technical specification for platform development and deployment (Chapter 18).

PlayerOne is a platform that takes governance seriously as a discipline and as a practice. The 300 civic leaders who participated in the pilot demonstrated that governance simulation works — that structural failure modes can be experienced rather than only described, that the governance reasoning capacity that civic leadership demands can be developed through practice under realistic constraint, and that the connection between individual governance decisions and structural governance outcomes can be made visceral and real through carefully designed simulation. This Bible is the specification for scaling that demonstration across ten thousand participants, then a

hundred thousand, then a generation of governance leaders who understand structural fairness as a lived governance reality.

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