From Historical Grievance to Pragmatic Engagement: Can Bangladesh and Pakistan Forge a New Path?

Abstract

Bangladesh and Pakistan share a complex political history shaped by the events before and after the 1971 Liberation War. Although diplomatic ties exist, mistrust and unresolved historical issues continue to

hinder cooperation. This article explores the challenges and opportunities for redefining the relationship through economic, geopolitical, and social collaboration, arguing that pragmatic incentives can gradually overshadow past grievances.

1. Introduction

Bangladesh and Pakistan emerged as separate nation-states through distinct historical struggles. What began as a unified Pakistan in 1947 fractured in 1971 when East Pakistan declared independence as Bangladesh following a brutal nine-month war. The legacy of this conflict—marked by allegations of genocide, mass displacement, and deep emotional trauma—remains a major barrier to trust-building. Diplomatic relations were restored in 1976, but interactions have been minimal and often symbolic.

In a globalized world facing shared challenges such as regional security threats, climate vulnerabilities, and economic pressures, renewed engagement is not just desirable but necessary. This article examines the historical foundations of tensions, current geopolitical dynamics, economic opportunities, soft power potential, institutional challenges, and actionable pathways forward. By prioritizing future-oriented pragmatism, both nations can unlock mutual benefits without erasing the past.

2. Historical Foundation of Tensions

The 1971 Liberation War left indelible wounds. Bangladeshi narratives, supported by international reports and the country’s official recognition of the conflict as genocide, estimate up to three million deaths and widespread atrocities by Pakistani forces. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (1974),

declassified in Pakistan, acknowledged military excesses but fell short of a formal apology, framing the events as an internal rebellion.

Bangladesh has consistently sought acknowledgment and reparations, viewing them as prerequisites for genuine reconciliation. Pakistan, wary of domestic political backlash from its military and conservative factions, has hesitated. Consequently, historical memory permeates political discourse: Bangladeshi textbooks emphasize victimhood and heroism, while Pakistani media often minimizes or omits the war’s darker aspects.

This asymmetry sustains public mistrust. Surveys, such as those by Pew Research in 2022, indicate that over 70% of Bangladeshis hold unfavorable views of Pakistan, contrasting with more neutral perceptions in Pakistan. High-level visits are rare—the last significant exchange occurred in 2019—and bilateral agreements remain limited to consular matters.

3. Current Geopolitical Context

Geopolitics imposes both constraints and opportunities on Bangladesh-Pakistan relations.

The India Factor: Bangladesh’s strategic partnership with India, including defense cooperation and trade exceeding $14 billion in 2023, directly conflicts with Pakistan’s adversarial stance toward New Delhi.

Joint initiatives risk being perceived as anti-Indian in Islamabad or pro-Pakistani in Dhaka.

The China Factor: Both countries are key nodes in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Pakistan

benefits from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with investments surpassing $60 billion, while Bangladesh has secured over $40 billion in BRI projects. This shared dependency on Beijing could facilitate trilateral infrastructure dialogues, such as linking Gwadar and Chittagong ports.

Islamic Multilateralism: As active members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),

Bangladesh and Pakistan have collaborated on issues like the Rohingya crisis, co-sponsoring resolutions at the 2023 OIC summit. Such platforms allow dialogue without bilateral preconditions.

Geopolitics thus limits bold unilateral moves but provides low-risk avenues through neutral multilateral forums.

4. Economic Opportunities

Bilateral trade languishes at approximately $700 million annually (2023 figures), a fraction of

Bangladesh’s $14 billion trade with India or Pakistan’s $20 billion with China. High tariffs (up to 25% on textiles), logistical barriers, and the absence of direct shipping links since 1971 exacerbate this underperformance.

Mutual gains are evident in complementary sectors:

SectorBangladesh’s StrengthsPakistan’s StrengthsPotential Joint Gains
Textiles & RMGWorld’s second-largest exporter ($45B)Top cotton producer (4 globally)Integrated value chains: +$2B in trade
PharmaceuticalsLeader in generic drugsActive pharmaceutical ingredientsExports to Africa/Middle East: $500M+
ICT & OutsourcingTop freelance hub (Upwork rankings)Emerging tech startupsCollaborative BPO services
Regional ConnectivityChittagong Port hubGwadar Port under CPECTransit via BBIN/MGC frameworks

Granting full Most Favored Nation (MFN) status—Pakistan extended it in 2012, but reciprocity is incomplete—and restoring direct flights could boost combined GDP by 0.5–1%, according to World Bank

projections (2024). Economic diplomacy, focused on tangible benefits, has the potential to transform rivalry into shared prosperity.

5. Soft Power and People-to-People Diplomacy

Cultural and religious affinities—shared Muslim heritage, linguistic echoes (Bengali-Urdu influences), and passions like cricket—offer a natural foundation for reconciliation. Yet, practical barriers persist:

  • Visa restrictions result in over 80% rejection rates for Bangladeshi applicants in Pakistan.
  • Academic and cultural exchanges are virtually nonexistent since 2015.
  • Media portrayals reinforce stereotypes, with Bangladeshi outlets highlighting 1971 atrocities and Pakistani ones focusing on post-independence successes.

Encouraging youth mobility through scholarships, joint research programs, and digital initiatives could reshape perceptions. A proposed “Youth Bridge Program,” offering 1,000 annual exchanges modeled on successful Turkey-Pakistan schemes, could engage over 50 million young people via platforms like

TikTok for shared cultural challenges.

6. Key Institutional Challenges

Progress is stimulated by structural weaknesses:

Limited Policy Dialogue: No functional joint commission since the 1980s.

Domestic Political Exploitation: Leaders invoke 1971 for electoral gain, as seen in Bangladesh’s 2024 polls.

Weak Regional Frameworks: The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been dormant since 2016 due to India-Pakistan tensions.

Absence of Strategic Vision: Short-term reactions dominate over long-term planning. Without institutional commitment, initiatives risk remaining symbolic gestures.

7. Pathways to a New Beginning

Shifting from grievance to pragmatism requires sequenced, actionable steps:

  1. Immediate Actions: Resume direct flights between Dhaka and Islamabad; establish a bilateral trade facilitation office.
  2. Short-Term (1–2 Years): Form a reconciliation commission with OIC mediation, focusing on transparent historical dialogue.
  3. Medium-Term (3–5 Years): Remove trade barriers and integrate into China-led corridors for joint infrastructure projects.
  4. Long-Term: Institutionalize annual summits with economic key performance indicators (KPIs), alongside expanded youth and cultural programs.

A future-oriented agenda, emphasizing multilateral platforms, is crucial for sustainable progress.

Conclusion

The Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship is indelibly shaped by the trauma of 1971. Yet, rising geopolitical uncertainties—Bangladesh’s $460 billion economy seeking diversification, Pakistan’s $300 billion debt burden demanding partnerships—and shared vulnerabilities provide compelling incentives for pragmatic engagement. Constructive diplomacy, economic integration, and societal bridges can help both nations transcend the past. History cannot be erased, but reconciliation through mutual benefit can forge a stable, prosperous partnership in an evolving South Asia.

References

Ahmed, I. (2023). Bilateral relations in South Asia: History, identity, and strategy. Dhaka: University Press Limited.

Bose, S. (2023). Dead reckoning: Memories of the 1971 war. London: Hurst Publishers.

Haque, M., & Khan, S. (2022). Reconciliation and realpolitik in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations. South Asian Studies Journal, 40(2), 115–130.

Pew Research Center. (2022). Global attitudes survey. https://www.pewresearch.org

Rahman, T. (2024). Trade and connectivity in the Bay of Bengal region. Journal of Regional Integration, 12(1), 55–72.

Siddiqa, A. (2021). Geopolitics and the China factor in South Asia. Contemporary Asian Affairs, 9(3), 201–218.

World Bank. (2024). South Asia economic update. https://www.worldbank.org

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *